Supreme Court Summarises Law On Approver's Testimony, Says Corroboration Not Mandatory For Accomplice's Evidence

The Supreme Court observed that even where an accomplice's testimony is not independently corroborated on material particulars, it may still form the basis of a conviction if the court finds it credible, trustworthy, and reflective of a full and truthful account of the events surrounding the commission of the offence.

“One of the necessary tests is that his (approver) testimony must be inculpatory and not exculpatory. However, if his testimony is not entirely exculpatory and makes a full and complete disclosure of the events qua commission of the crime, which inspires confidence i.e., appears truthful in the context of proven circumstances, his testimony cannot be discarded as one lacking credibility merely because he does not implicate himself to the extent he implicates the other co-accused.”, observed a bench of Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Justice Manoj Misra.

The Court clarified that though Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 renders an uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice to be sufficient to sustain a conviction, however, the same cannot be read in isolation, as illustration (b) to Section 114 of the Evidence Act adds a note of caution that testimony of an accomplice is unworthy of credit unless it is corroborated in material particulars.

Therefore, the Court noted that “as a matter of practice and prudence, the testimony of an approver may be accepted in evidence for recording conviction of an accused person provided it receives corroboration from direct or circumstantial evidence in material particulars.”

The Court summarised the legal principles regarding the necessity of corroboration of an approver's testimony as under:

"(a)It is not an inviolable rule of law that testimony of an approver must be independently corroborated in material particulars before it could form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is not mandated by law but is a rule of prudence. Therefore, the Court may convict an accused even on an uncorroborated testimony of the approver provided it is satisfied, and record reasons for its satisfaction, that it is safe to rely on such testimony even in the absence of corroboration.

(b)Corroboratory evidence, if required, may be either direct or circumstantial, or both.

(c) However, where corroboration is considered necessary, it must come from independent sources. Ordinarily, the testimony of one approver is not to be used to corroborate the testimony of another approver.

(d)Corroboration, when required, must be such that it renders the testimony of the approver believable in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, it is not the requirement of law that every material circumstance against the accused is independently confirmed."

 What are the factors to be considered to determine whether the testimony of an Approver is credible and reliable?

The Court held that the creditworthiness / reliability of the testimony of an approver is not dependent on any one factor.

"There are several factors which must be considered cumulatively to determine whether the testimony is credible and reliable. The first and foremost is that the approver must not appear to be a planted witness. Once that hurdle is crossed, the testimony of an approver is to be tested as any other witness, though with greater care and caution. One of the necessary tests is that his testimony must be inculpatory and not exculpatory. However, if his testimony is not entirely exculpatory and makes a full and complete disclosure of the events qua commission of the crime, which inspires confidence i.e., appears truthful in the context of proven circumstances, his testimony cannot be discarded as one lacking credibility merely because he does not implicate himself to the extent he implicates the other co-accused",said the Court 

Background

The case arose from a brutal double murder committed in July 1984. According to the prosecution, a group of five individuals conspired to steal a truck by hiring it under the pretext of transporting goods and subsequently murdering the driver, and the cleaner. The prosecution's case largely rested on the testimony of one of the accused who later turned approver after being granted pardon.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellant argued that the approver's evidence was unreliable as it was exculpatory and lacked adequate corroboration. Rejecting the contention, the Court found that the witness had not attempted to absolve himself completely. Rather, his testimony disclosed his own participation in the events leading to the murders, including physically assisting in restraining one of the victims.

The Court also found substantial corroboration of the accomplice testimony from independent evidence, including the recovery and identification of the stolen truck, forensic evidence, identification of the victims, and circumstances matching the approver's narration of events.

“The above-extracts of PW-1's testimony would indicate that his testimony is not entirely exculpatory. It inculpates PW-1 by showing that he participated in the events that ultimately led to the murder… the approver's testimony was corroborated in material particulars. Besides no serious question was put to PW-1 to doubt his presence at the scene of crime. We, therefore, hold that PW-1's testimony was reliable and creditworthy and could form the basis of conviction.”, the Court observed.

Accordingly, the appeal was partly allowed, wherein the conviction was upheld, however, noting that the Appellant had already served 18 years of sentence, the Court in light of Union of India v. V. Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, granted him a benefit of remission by modifying his life sentence to the sentence already undergone. Accordingly, the appellant was released.

Headnote

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 read with Section 114, Illustration (b) — Accomplice/Approver Testimony — Worthiness of Credit and Prudence of Corroboration - The combined result of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 is that an accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony is not illegal per se - as a rule of prudence, courts require corroboration in material particulars to safely connect the accused with the crime - The corroboration need not be direct and can be circumstantial, nor must it confirm every single material fact independently Creditworthiness is evaluated cumulatively, the approver must not be a planted witness, their testimony must be intrinsically natural, and it must be inculpatory rather than exculpatory - If the disclosure is complete and inspires confidence, it cannot be discarded merely because the approver did not inflict the fatal blow or implicate himself to the exact same extent as the other co-accused. [Paras 24 - 36]

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120-B — Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Murder — Liability for Foreseeable Crimes - To establish criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, a meeting of minds to execute an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is vital - Direct evidence is rarely available, and conspiracy can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct - One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is jointly liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by other members in furtherance of the common design, irrespective of whether they directly participated in or had specific knowledge of the collateral act - Where a group forcefully separates victims to steal a vehicle using deadly weapons (Gandasa), causing grievous hurt or murder is a foregone, foreseeable conclusion - The conspirator maintaining a vigil while co-participants execute the killings is justifiably liable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. [Paras 50 – 55]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 464 — Defect, Omission, or Irregularity in Charge — Absence of Prejudice - No finding or sentence is invalid due to an error, omission, or defect in the framing of charges unless a failure of justice has been occasioned - Where the accused's name was initially included in the charge framing order for offenses under Sections 302/120-B IPC, and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, they were fully cognizant of the case against them - If the witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel regarding the murder charge, no prejudice is caused to the accused, and the trial is not vitiated. [Paras 41 - 43]

Sentence Modification — Substitution of Life Imprisonment with Period Already Undergone - While maintaining the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, the Supreme Court took into account that the incident dated back to 1984, the co-convicts had been granted state remission, and the appellant had served over 18 years of actual imprisonment - Modifying a life sentence to a fixed-term sentence or the period already undergone is permissible provided the sentence served exceeds 14 years - Sentence modified to the period already undergone, and immediate release directed. [Paras 45 - 62]

Cause Title: GOPI CHAND @ PAPPU VERSUS STATE (NCT OF DELHI)

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Appellant(s) : Mr. A Sirajudeen, Sr. Adv. Ms. Manjeet Chawla, AOR Ms. Jyoti, Adv. Ms. Shaik Soni Ahamed, Adv.

For Respondent(s) :Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, A.S.G. Mr. Mukesh Kumar Maroria, AOR Mr. Praneet Pranav, Adv. Mrs.Rajeshwari Shankar, Adv. Mr. Prashant Singh II, Adv. Mr. Annirudh Sharma II, Adv. Ms. Sunanda Shukla, Adv.