THE BHARTATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 (BNS) AND THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (IPC) | SUPREME COURT ANNUAL DIGEST 2024CORRESPONDING SECTIONS and COMPARISON SUMMARYSection 3 (5) - General explanations - Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention[Section is included as sub-section in BNS sans heading. No other change.]Section 34 – Applicability of - Murder - Sentencing...
THE BHARTATIYA NYAYA SANHITA, 2023 (BNS) AND THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 (IPC) | SUPREME COURT ANNUAL DIGEST 2024
CORRESPONDING SECTIONS and COMPARISON SUMMARY
Section 3 (5) - General explanations - Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention
[Section is included as sub-section in BNS sans heading. No other change.]
Section 34 – Applicability of - Murder - Sentencing – Doctrine of Parity – Individual Culpability of Co-Accused – The appellant argued for sentence reduction on grounds of parity with co-accused, citing the acquittal of one co-accused and the reduced sentence of another. Held, the doctrine of parity applies only when co-accused share similar levels of culpability and involvement in the crime. The evidence established that the appellant's actions were distinct and more culpable. While the co-accused wielded sticks and caused non-fatal injuries, the appellant alone used a knife to inflict fatal injuries on the deceased, signifying a deliberate escalation of violence. There was no evidence to show a common intention among the accused to commit murder, precluding the application of vicarious liability under Section 34 IPC. The reduced sentence of one co-accused was based on the lesser nature of his involvement, while another was acquitted due to lack of evidence. The Court emphasized that parity in sentencing is not automatic and must consider the qualitative differences in actions and intent among co-accused. The appellant's role, marked by clear intent and use of a deadly weapon, warranted a distinct and more severe sentence. The principle of parity was inapplicable given the appellant's materially different and more culpable conduct. Appeal for sentence reduction dismissed. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964
Section 34 IPC – Common intention – The existence of common intention in a given case must necessarily be established by the Prosecution with relevant evidence. The Court also has the responsibility to analyze and assess the evidence before convicting a person with the aid of Section 34 of the IPC. Importantly, a mere common intention per se may not attract Section 34 IPC without action in furtherance of such common intention. (Para 19, 22 & 25) Madhusudan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 418
Section 34 & 149 IPC – Difference between common intention and common object – There is a significant distinction between Section 34 and Section 149 of IPC. Section 34 requires active participation and prior meeting of minds whereas Section 149 assigns liability merely by membership of an unlawful assembly and has a wider scope than Section 34 IPC. (Para 15) Madhusudan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 418
Section 34 & 149 IPC – Power of courts to alter charge – It is permissible for Courts to alter charges but it can only be done by careful analysis of evidence and the reasons for the same must be recorded in the judgment. The “proof” of “common intention” is necessary to alter conviction from Section 149 to 34 of IPC. In the present case no charge under Section 34 of the IPC was laid against the accused by the Prosecution but when the charge under Section 149 IPC was dropped, the trial Court decided to conveniently alter the charge and with the aid of Section 34 IPC, ordered for conviction of the accused. Held, common intention of the appellants is not established by the prosecution. Further held, the Court while altering the charge from Section 149 to Section 34 IPC omitted to furnish any reasons. Hence, the appellants are entitled to benefit of doubt and their conviction is unsustainable. (Para 17, 19, 20, 21) Madhusudan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 418
Section 34 & 494 IPC – Charged with common intention to commit offence of Bigamy – Held, in order to bring home the said charge, the complainant would be required to prima facie prove not only the presence of the accused persons, but the overt act or omission of the accused persons in the second marriage ceremony and also establish that such accused were aware about the subsisting first marriage. Held, mere presence in the marriage is not enough to establish common intention to commit offence of Bigamy. Further, there is no allegation that the accused, acted as witnesses to the second marriage having knowledge of the first marriage. Hence, the charge is not established. (Para 17 & 18) S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 385
Section 34 & 120B IPC – Since the foundational facts essential for constituting the substantive offences under Sections 153A and 504 IPC are not available from the admitted allegations of prosecution, the allegations qua the subsidiary offences under Sections 34 and 120B IPC would also be non est. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : (2024) 7 SCC 555
Section 34 IPC – Subjective test of Intention - A person intends a consequence when he (1) foresees that it will happen if the given series of acts or omissions continue, and (2) desires it to happen. The most serious level of culpability, justifying the most serious levels of punishment, is achieved when both these components are actually present in the accused's mind. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561
Section 34 - Things done in private defence
[No Change]
Section 96 to 106 IPC - Right of Private Defence – The law provides that the person claiming such a right bears the onus to prove the legitimacy of the actions done in furtherance thereof and it is not for the Court to presume the presence of such circumstances or the truth in such a plea being taken. (Para 19) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667
Section 61 (1) - Criminal conspiracy definition
[IPC section is included as sub-section in BNS.]
Section 120A IPC - Criminal Conspiracy – To constitute even an accusation of criminal conspiracy, first and foremost, there must at least be an accusation of meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act, which is not illegal in itself, by illegal means. (Para 27) Ram Prakash Chadha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 475 : AIR 2024 SC 3540
Section 61 (2) - Criminal conspiracy punishment
[IPC section is included as sub-section in BNS, sans heading.]
Sections 120B, 419, 420 - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 13(1)(d), 13(2) – Whether the suspension of the substantive sentence by the High Court extended to the sentence of fine imposed on the respondent. Whether the respondent could avoid imprisonment for default of fine payment despite partial compliance. Held, a fine is a distinct form of punishment under Section 53 of the IPC, and its suspension is within the ambit of Section 389 CrPC. The High Court's order suspending the respondent's sentence implicitly covered the fine, given the substantial embezzlement allegations. However, to balance justice and ensure compliance, the Court modified the suspension to be conditional upon the deposit of ₹15,00,000. The Court clarified that a sentence of fine is as significant as imprisonment, and its suspension should be assessed case-wise, considering the accused's rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Imposing an impossible financial condition for suspension could undermine the right to appeal. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Sirpal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 840
Section 120B, 409, 420, 468, 471 IPC - Bail - Criminal Conspiracy - Misuse of Educational Funds - The appellants were involved in managing various educational institutions in Madhya Pradesh. FIRs were lodged against them for allegedly engaging in fraudulent activities related to the management of school funds, particularly in connection with the sale of textbooks and fee hikes. Whether the appellants' involvement in the sale of textbooks and fee hikes constitutes offenses under the IPC. Whether the rejection of bail by the Trial Court and High Court was justified. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and granted bail to the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants were almost identical and pertained to their educational activities, which included managing the sale of textbooks and raising fees. These activities, per se, could not constitute criminal offenses under the IPC. Further, the investigation was still incomplete, and the prolonged incarceration of the appellants was unwarranted. The Court directed the release of the appellants on bail, subject to conditions. Fr. Abraham Thazhathedathu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 591
Section 120B IPC and Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002; Section 2(1) (y) – Schedule offence – Offence punishable under Section 120B of the IPC could become a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy alleged is of committing an offence which is included in the Schedule to the PMLA. Held, the offences alleged in the complaint except Section 120-B of IPC are not scheduled offences within the meaning of Section 2(1) (y) of the PMLA. (Para 2, 3) Yash Tuteja v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : (2024) 8 SCC 465
Section 63 - Rape definition
[Age of Consent: 15 years is replaced by 18 years in BNS. Exception 2 of Section 63 states that “sexual intercourse or acts by a man with his wife, the wife not being under 18 years of age, is not rape”.]
Section 375 IPC - In view of “sixthly” in Section 375 of the IPC, penetrative intercourse with a woman under eighteen years of age, with or without her consent, constitutes an offence of rape. Therefore, whether such offence arises from a romantic relationship is irrelevant. (Para 19) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : AIR 2024 SC 4004
Section 375 IPC – “Consent” of a woman – To establish whether the “consent” was vitiated by a “misconception of fact” arising out of a promise to marry, two propositions must be established. The promise of marriage must have been a false promise, given in bad faith and with no intention of being adhered to at the time it was given. The false promise itself must be of immediate relevance, or bear a direct nexus to the woman's decision to engage in the sexual act. Held, the allegations in the FIR so also in the restatement made before the Dy. S.P., do not, on their face, indicate that the promise by accused was false or that the complainant engaged in the sexual relationship on the basis of such false promise. No error has been committed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court by holding that permitting further proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of law and result in miscarriage of justice. (Para 11, 15 & 18) Ms. X v. Mr. A, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2024 CriLJ 1894
Section 375 IPC - If it is established that from the inception, the consent by the victim is a result of a false promise to marry, there will be no consent, and in such a case, the offence of rape will be made out. (Para 7) Sheikh Arif v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 68 : AIR 2024 SC 710 : (2024) 4 SCC 463
Section 64 - Punishment for rape
[Word “military” is replaced with “army”.]
Sections 376, 420, 504, and 506 IPC - False Promise to Marry - Delay in Allegations - Consensual relationship - Abuse of process - Long-term relationships - A promise to marry that is not made from the outset with the intention to deceive cannot attract the penal provisions of Section 375 IPC, punishable under Section 376 IPC. The absence of early protest or objection by the complainant, and the continuation of a prolonged consensual physical relationship, indicates the lack of a false promise from the beginning. A decade-long consensual physical relationship without insistence on marriage reflects mutual understanding rather than coercion or deceit. The complainant's awareness of the appellant's marital status undermines claims of naivety or susceptibility to deceit. Allegations raised after the discontinuation of financial support rather than immediate protest weaken the claim of a false promise of marriage. Prolonged consensual relationships, if criminalized belatedly, may result in misuse of criminal law to address civil disputes. Observations are case-specific, emphasizing that human relationships are dynamic and influenced by individual circumstances, requiring decisions tailored to the specific facts of each case. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the appellant under Sections 376, 420, 504, and 506 IPC. It held that continuing the criminal proceedings would constitute an abuse of the process of law. The court clarified that the complainant retains the right to pursue other remedies under the law. Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 921
Sections 376(2)(n), 503, and 506 Quashing of FIR - breakup in a consensual relationship - Allegations of Rape and Criminal Intimidation - Legal Provisions - The relationship between the appellant and the complainant was consensual and lacked the ingredients of coercion or false promises to marry. The complainant, an educated adult, willingly engaged in the relationship despite its eventual breakdown, which cannot retrospectively criminalize consensual acts. The continuation of proceedings would constitute an abuse of the process of law. A consensual relationship does not amount to rape unless consent was vitiated by false promises or coercion. Allegations of criminal intimidation require clear evidence of threats causing alarm or coercion, which was absent in this case. The Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings, observing that a breakup in a consensual relationship does not constitute grounds for criminal prosecution. The FIR and associated proceedings were declared an abuse of judicial process. Prashant v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 904 : AIR 2025 SC 33
Sections 376(2)(N) and 506 IPC - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Section 3(1)(R), 3(1)(w) and 3(2)(5) - Whether the High Court was correct in quashing criminal proceedings based on affidavits indicating a settlement without verifying their genuineness and securing the personal presence of the victim. Whether affidavits executed by an illiterate victim without proper endorsement explaining their contents can be relied upon in quashing criminal proceedings for serious offences. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing criminal proceedings and remanded the matter for further inquiry into the authenticity of the alleged settlement and affidavits. In cases involving serious offences under IPC and the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, the High Court must verify the genuineness of any alleged settlement before exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution or Section 482 of Cr.P.C. The personal presence of the victim, particularly an illiterate one, is critical for the Court to verify whether affidavits or settlements are genuine and made with informed consent. In absence of an endorsement indicating that the contents of an affidavit were explained to the affirming party, especially when illiterate, such affidavits cannot be relied upon without further inquiry. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, requiring the personal presence of the appellant and an inquiry into the affidavits. The High Court was directed to consider whether the settlement was genuine and, if so, whether the power to quash proceedings could be exercised in light of the seriousness of the allegations. Appeal partly allowed. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. XYZ v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 887
Section 376 and 313 IPC - Allegation of rape on false promise to marry – Long-term consensual relationship – Held, mere refusal to marry after a long consensual relationship cannot constitute rape. FIR, filed after a five-year delay, lacked a prima facie case of consent under misconception. The investigation under Section 313 IPC found no evidence of forced abortion, and thus no sufficient grounds existed for further proceedings under Section 376 IPC. FIR quashed. Lalu Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 805 : AIR 2024 SC 5194
Sections 376 (2) and 506 IPC - Continued use of the "two-finger test" on rape survivors, despite previous rulings condemning the practice - Referred to its earlier decisions in Lillu alias Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 643 and State of Jharkhand v. Shailendra Kumar Rai, (2022) 14 SCC 299, which decried the test as regressive and invasive. A circular issued by the Government of Meghalaya on June 27, 2024, prohibiting the test and mandating disciplinary action for non-compliance, was noted and placed on record. The circular directs all government doctors and medical practitioners in Meghalaya to cease conducting the test immediately, with strict disciplinary actions, including suspension and penalties, to be imposed for non-compliance. It also mandates adherence to medico-legal guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare and emphasizes the importance of compassionate care for sexual assault survivors. After reviewing the case, found no merit to interfere with the concurrent findings of the lower courts. The Court dismissed the petition on merits, upholding the conviction, and urged full compliance with the circular. (Para 4 - 8) Sunshine Kharpan v. State of Meghalaya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 654
Section 376(2)(g) - Whether the High Court was justified in converting the acquittal of the accused into conviction under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC. Whether the sentence of three years' rigorous imprisonment imposed by the High Court, which is less than the mandatory minimum of ten years prescribed under Section 376(2), was legally sustainable. Whether further leniency should be shown to the accused, considering the passage of time and their personal circumstances. The respondents were initially acquitted by the Trial Court for the offence of gangrape under Section 376 read with Section 34 of the IPC. Upon appeal, the High Court remanded the matter for retrial under Section 376(2)(g). The Trial Court again acquitted the accused. The High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the accused under Section 376(2)(g), imposing three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of ₹50,000 each, invoking the proviso to Section 376(2) for imposing a sentence below the statutory minimum of ten years. The prosecutrix was found to be over 16 years of age at the time of the incident, making consensual intercourse outside the purview of "rape" under the then-prevailing provisions of Section 375 IPC. Held, the Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment, finding no merit in the appeals filed by both the State and the accused. It was noted that the High Court exercised its discretion under the proviso to Section 376(2) as it existed before the 2013 amendment, considering the long passage of time (28 years) and the changed circumstances of the accused. The Court declined to enhance the sentence to the statutory minimum, citing the peculiar facts of the case and the elapsed time since the incident. Both the appeals were dismissed. Accused who had not served the full sentence, was directed to surrender within one month to serve the remaining term. The proviso to Section 376(2) of the IPC (as it existed pre-2013) permits courts to impose a sentence lower than the statutory minimum of ten years for adequate and special reasons, provided such reasons are explicitly stated in the judgment. State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raghubir Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 403 : AIR 2024 SC 2395 : 2024 Cri LJ 2431
Sections 376(2)(g) and 506(1) IPC - Tamil Nadu Prevention of Women Harassment Act, 1998; Section 4 - Principles of evaluating evidence in sexual offence cases - Reliability of evidence and corroboration with medical and other supporting evidence - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by Accused No. 2 challenging the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court. The case arose from an incident where the prosecutrix alleged gang rape by the accused persons. The Trial Court convicted the accused based on corroborative evidence, including the victim's testimony, medical reports, and statements recorded under Section 164 CrPC. The High Court upheld the conviction, finding no merit in the accused's appeal. Held, despite discrepancies in the witnesses' testimonies due to delay in cross-examination, the victim's statement, corroborated by medical evidence and other material, was sufficient to sustain the conviction. The appeal was dismissed, and the concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld. Selvamani v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : AIR 2024 SC 2273 : 2024 Cri LJ 2602
Section 376 (2) (f) IPC – Fiduciary relationship – Held, appellant was not in a position of trust towards the prosecutrix. Hence, there was no fiduciary relationship between the appellant-accused and the Prosecutrix. (Para 7 & 11) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : AIR 2024 SC 3091 : (2023) 14 SCC 147
Section 376 (2) - Applicability of presumption as to absence of consent for offences under Section 376(2) – The condition precedent for applicability of Section 114A is that the prosecution must be for the offence of rape under various clauses set out under Section 376(2) of the IPC. No charge was framed against the appellant accused for the offence punishable under Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC. In the absence of the charge framed under Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC, neither the prosecution nor the victim can contend that Section 376(2)(f) of the IPC was applicable. Therefore, the presumption under Section 114A of the Evidence Act will not apply, and the burden will be on the prosecution to prove that the sexual intercourse was without the consent of the Prosecutrix. (Para 11) Pankaj Singh v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : AIR 2024 SC 3091 : (2023) 14 SCC 147
Sections 376, 417 and 420 IPC - Accused is a police officer. The allegation of undue influence and/or unintended favour towards him by the Investigating Officer cannot be brushed aside lightly. The appellant in her application has stated that: (i) respondent no.2 was already married to M and was, thus, disqualified to perform the second marriage; (ii) he being a Government officer, his second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage would have been a misconduct under the Conduct Rules; and (iii) that the first chargesheet itself suggested that the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together and were in physical relationship. If that is so, the Investigating Agency ought to have further probed as to whether they have been cohabitating pursuant to the so-called marriage performed on 13.09.2012 and/or it was merely a consensual live-in relationship. Similarly, the Investigating Officer does not appear to have taken any pains to visit the hospital/medical clinics to verify whether the appellant underwent abortion twice. We are not sure whether the statements of the persons living in the neighbourhood were recorded or not to find out whether the appellant and respondent no.2 had been living together as husband and wife. All these facts will have a material bearing on the determination by the Trial Court as to whether a prima facie case under Sections 376, 417 and 420 of IPC is made out or not. XXX v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 110
Sections 376 / 506 IPC - Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Rape - Lodging a case after 34 years and that too on the basis of a bald statement that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of commission of offence, could itself be a ground to quash the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever is given in the FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping silent for a long period of 34 years. The material on record shows that the relationship was consensual, in as much as the son who is born out of the said relationship has been treated by the accused as his son and all the facilities, including cash money, have been provided to him. Rajaram Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 40
Sections 376 and 506 IPC – Rape - False promise of marriage - The relationship between the accused and the victim was a consensual relationship which culminated in the marriage. In the legal notice issued on behalf of the victim, the factum of marriage was admitted and the victim has been described as the wife of the accused. Therefore, on the face of it, the allegation that the physical relationship was maintained due to false promise of marriage is without basis, as their relationship led to the solemnization of marriage. Therefore, this is a case where the allegations made in the FIR were such that on the basis of the statements, no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. Hence, a case was made out for quashing the FIR. (Para 9) Ajeet Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 18 : AIR 2024 SC 257 : (2024) 2 SCC 422
Section 65 (2) - Punishment for rape in certain casesrape on a woman under twelve years
[Section is included as sub-section in BNS sans heading.]
Section 376 AB IPC - Punishment for rape on woman under twelve years of age - In the instant case, the petitioner-convict was aged 40 years on the date of occurrence and the victim was then only a girl, aged 7 years. Thus, the position is that he used a lass aged 7 years to satisfy his lust. For that the petitioner-convict took the victim to a temple, unmindful of the holiness of the place, disrobed her and himself and then committed the crime. We have no hesitation to hold that the fact he had not done it brutally will not make its commission non-barbaric. (Para 10) Bhaggi @ Bhagirath @ Naran v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 87 : AIR 2024 SC 938
Section 70(1) - Gang rape
[No Change except IPC section is included as subsection in BNS.]
Sections 376D and 354 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 389, 357A and 357B - The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for gang rape (Section 376-D IPC), outrage of modesty (Section 354 IPC), and sexual offences against a minor under the POCSO Act, receiving a cumulative sentence of 20 years imprisonment with fines. The High Court dismissed his application for suspension of sentence and bail under Section 389 CrPC. Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. Whether the appellant should be granted suspension of sentence and bail. Whether the Sessions Court erred in not awarding victim compensation under Section 357A CrPC and POCSO Rules. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, granting suspension of sentence and bail, citing: The appellant had already served over half of his sentence. Co-accused had been granted similar relief by the High Court. Low probability of sentence enhancement by the High Court. The Court also directed : Sessions Courts to mandatorily consider awarding victim compensation under Section 357A CrPC and POCSO Rules in cases involving sexual offences, particularly against minors and women. High Courts to ensure implementation of victim compensation schemes, such as Maharashtra's "Manodhairya Scheme." Expedited consideration of interim compensation for the victim in the present case under the POCSO Rules. The Court emphasized the need for uniform and prompt implementation of victim compensation schemes across the judiciary. Appeal allowed, and the appellant was granted bail. Directions were issued for enhancing victim compensation mechanisms. Sahiba Noor Mohammad v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 860
Section 72 - Disclosure of identity of victim of certain offences etc.
[Word "minor' is replaced by 'child'.]
Section 72(1) BNS - Unauthorized dissemination of the identity and graphic content related to a murder and alleged rape case - The Court reiterated its directives established in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, (2019) 2 SCC 703 emphasizing the necessity to protect the identity of victims of sexual violence and the prohibition against media exposure of such identities. In light of these violations, the Court issued an injunction ordering the immediate removal of all references, photographs, and video clips of the deceased from social media and electronic platforms. Kinnori Ghosh v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 590
Section 228A IPC - Failure to mask victim's identity in POCSO case - Sensitization of Judicial and Police Officers ordered - In this order, the court considers an application for anticipatory bail in a case under the POCSO Act. While denying bail, the court notes a violation of Section 33(7) of the POCSO Act and Section 228A of the IPC regarding the disclosure of the victim's identity. Citing the importance of safeguarding the victim's identity, the court directs the need for sensitization of judicial and police officers in West Bengal to ensure compliance with these provisions. The order emphasizes that disclosing the victim's identity is permissible only in specific circumstances for the child's best interest. The court orders a copy of the order to be forwarded to the Registrar General of the High Court of Calcutta for further action. Utpal Mandal @ Utpal Mondal v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 282
Section 75 - Sexual harassment
[No Change]
Sections 354A, 342, 509 and 504 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Sections 7 and 8 - Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) - Whether a compromise between the accused and the complainant in a case involving serious offenses under the POCSO Act can justify quashing criminal proceedings under Section 482, Cr. P.C. Whether such offenses can be treated as private disputes capable of settlement. Held, offenses under the POCSO Act, particularly those involving allegations of pressure to prevent reporting of crimes, cannot be treated as private disputes or minor compoundable offenses. A compromise between the accused and the complainant's family cannot justify quashing proceedings when the alleged offense has serious societal implications. The power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., cannot be invoked to quash proceedings for heinous offenses, as deterrence and societal interest must be prioritized. The POCSO Act was enacted to safeguard children from sexual offenses, and offenses under its purview are not merely private matters but have significant social ramifications. The statement of the complainant indicating pressure from the accused to refrain from lodging a report further justifies the continuation of criminal proceedings. Reliance was placed on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan to emphasize that heinous offenses cannot be quashed solely on the basis of compromise. The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's order quashing the FIR and criminal proceedings was set aside. The investigation and proceedings were directed to continue in accordance with the law. The Court reiterated that a victim's parent cannot settle disputes involving serious offenses on behalf of the victim. Courts must safeguard children's interests and ensure justice is not compromised by private settlements. Ramji Lal Bairwa v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 865
Section 78 - Stalking
[No Change]
Section 354D & 506 IPC – Power of court exercised to quash conviction of accused – Held, the offences under Section 354D IPC and Section 506 IPC are personal to the complainant and the accused, and the fact that the appellant and the complainant have married each other during the pendency of the appeal gives rise to a reasonable belief that both were involved in some kind of relationship even when the offences alleged were said to have been committed. Hence, on grounds that the accused and the complainant married each other and the affirmation of the conviction of accused would have the disastrous consequence on the matrimonial relationship of the accused with the complainant, the appellant is acquitted of the charges. (Para 7, 9 & 11) Dasari Srikanth v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 391 : AIR 2024 SC 2879
Section 80 - Dowry death
[No change]
Section 304B IPC - For a conviction under Section 304-B IPC, mere allegations of dowry demand are insufficient. There must be credible evidence of harassment or cruelty directly linked to dowry demands and occurring “soon before” the death, fulfilling the essential ingredients required to invoke Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. Shoor Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 726 : AIR 2024 SC 4551
Section 304B IPC - When dowry demand isn't established, conviction for dowry death under S.304B IPC is unsustainable. Chabi Karmakar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : AIR 2024 SC 5295
Section 304B and 498A IPC - Dowry death - The High Court reversed the acquittal passed by the trial court, holding that the death occurred within seven years of marriage due to 100% burn injuries at the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's conviction, emphasizing the presumption of dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, and held that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proof. The appeal was dismissed. Damodar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 607
Section 82 (1) - Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife
[IPC section is included as a sub-section.]
Section 494 IPC - Proportionality of sentence with respect to the offence committed – To claim enhancement of punishment for conviction for the offence – Held, it is the solemn duty of the Court to strike a proper balance awarding sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed by the accused concerned upon his conviction for serious offence(s). The offence under Section 494 I.P.C., has to be treated as a serious offence, hence, the imposition of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' is not a proper sentence falling in tune with the rule of proportionality. Further held, imposition of sentence of 'imprisonment till the rising of the court' upon conviction for an offence under Section 494 I.P.C., on them was unconscionably lenient or a flea-bite sentence. Hence, it is appropriate to use our judicial discretion to modify the sentence imposed under the impugned judgment to six months each, making the nature of the sentence as simple imprisonment for the said period. (Para 14, 15, 17 & 19) Baba Natarajan Prasad v. M. Revathi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : AIR 2024 SC 3348 : (2024) 7 SCC 531 : 2024 Cri LJ 3281
Section 494 IPC - Criminal procedure Code, 1973; Section 216 – Bigamy – Charges framed against accused for offence of Bigamy – Held, order framing charge is erroneous on the face of the record because no person other than the spouse to the second marriage could have been charged for the offence punishable under Section 494 IPC simplicitor. Defect in framing of charge is curable and can be altered at any stage as per the provisions of Section 216 CrPC. Further held, allowing the proceedings of the criminal case to be continued against the appellants with defect in charges framed, would tantamount to gross illegality and abuse of the process of Court. Hence, all subsequent proceedings sought to be taken against the appellants are quashed and set aside. (Para 16, 21) S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 385
Section 85 - Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty
[No change]
Section 498A IPC – Quashing of Proceedings – Abuse of Process of Law – Prima Facie Case – Misuse of Section 498A - The complaint was filed two years after the alleged incidents, coinciding with a divorce notice, and appeared to be an attempt to pressurize the appellants. No specific acts of cruelty or evidence supporting the allegations of miscarriage were established. The Court reiterated concerns over misuse of Section 498-A IPC, especially in matrimonial disputes, and underscored the importance of ensuring legal processes are not weaponized for personal vendetta. The appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings initiated against the appellants were quashed to prevent abuse of the judicial process. High Court erred in dismissing the petition for quashing. Criminal proceedings quashed as they constituted an abuse of process of law. Digambar v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1025
Sections 498A, 504, 109 IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of criminal proceedings - Held, a girlfriend or a woman with whom a man has had romantic or sexual relations outside marriage does not qualify as a "relative of the husband" under Section 498A of IPC. To attract Section 498A IPC, the ill-treatment must be connected to the non-fulfilment of a demand for dowry. In this case, no such connection was established in the FIR or charge sheet against the appellant. The allegations against the appellant, including claims of past relations with the complainant's husband and use of abusive language, did not constitute harassment related to dowry demands. The Court concluded that the continuation of criminal proceedings against the appellant would amount to an abuse of the process of law. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. Dechamma IM @ Dechamma Kaushik v . State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 988
Sections 498A IPC - Merely because the wife didn't file a complaint under S. 498A IPC for many years doesn't mean there was no cruelty by the husband. Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 979
Sections 498A and 306 IPC – Husband and In-laws Charged with Cruelty and Abetment of Suicide – A prima facie case of cruelty is made out against the appellants. Evidence includes repeated physical and mental harassment of the deceased, corroborated by witness statements, including allegations of selling her streedhan and subsequent harassment. The Court held that cruelty under Section 498A must involve intentional acts likely to cause grave injury or drive the victim to suicide or meet unlawful demands. These allegations sufficiently constitute a case under Section 498A, and the appellants must face trial for this offence. Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 979
Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Sections 3 and 4 — Quashing of FIR - Held, specific and concrete allegations required for criminal prosecution under matrimonial disputes. Courts must prevent misuse of legal processes and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent individuals. Allegations in FIR were vague, lacking specific details or evidence of harassment or dowry demands. No prima facie case established against the appellants. FIR found to be a retaliatory measure filed after the husband initiated divorce proceedings. Family members of the husband, living in separate locations, cannot be implicated in a matrimonial dispute in the absence of specific allegations indicating active involvement. Misuse of Section 498A IPC to settle personal grievances undermines its purpose to protect women subjected to cruelty. Courts must exercise caution to prevent abuse of legal provisions. High Court erred in not quashing the FIR under Section 482 CrPC despite observing lack of custodial interrogation necessity. Appeal allowed; FIR, charge sheet, and trial proceedings quashed. Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 968
Section 498A IPC - The Supreme Court cautioned lower courts to avoid over-implicating distant relatives of husbands in exaggerated domestic cruelty cases under Section 498A of the IPC. In a case where the husband's cousin and his wife were wrongly implicated, the Court emphasized the need for careful scrutiny of such allegations, especially when the accused are not closely related to the complainant. The Court highlighted the duty of courts to prevent undue suffering and avoid abuse of the legal process in matrimonial disputes. Payal Sharma v State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 924
Section 498A IPC - Acquittal - Lack of Evidence - Over-implication in dowry-related cases - Burden of proof for cruelty - The appellant was convicted by the Sessions Court for cruelty under Section 498-A IPC based on allegations of dowry harassment against the deceased. The High Court confirmed the conviction but reduced the sentence to time already served. The Supreme Court found no specific evidence connecting the appellant to the alleged cruelty. The general allegations were insufficient to prove guilt. The Court highlighted the risk of over-implication in dowry-related cases, emphasizing the need for careful scrutiny of evidence. The conviction under Section 498-A IPC was deemed perverse and unsustainable due to the absence of concrete evidence. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the judgments of the High Court and the trial court. Yashodeep Bisanrao Vadode v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : AIR 2024 SC 5424
Section 498A, 323, 504, 506 r/w. 34 IPC - Need for clear and specific allegations to proceed in criminal cases, especially in matrimonial disputes. The Court reiterated its concern over the abuse of criminal processes through general and omnibus allegations, noting that such claims, without specific details or evidence, can lead to the misuse of legal provisions intended to protect against genuine harm. When criminal proceedings are used as instruments of harassment or revenge, the judiciary has the power to intervene and prevent the miscarriage of justice by quashing such proceedings. Kailashben Mahendrabhai Patel v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 753
Section 498A IPC - Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Section 4 - Bail conditions - The maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel a person to do the impossible) emphasized in relation to onerous bail conditions. A court should not impose conditions that are impracticable or impossible for the accused to comply with, particularly in cases of anticipatory bail. The appellant sought relief from an order of the High Court, which had granted provisional pre-arrest bail under conditions requiring the appellant to file a joint affidavit with his wife, stating that he would fulfill all her physical and financial requirements without interference from his family. The appellant had also filed for divorce, but the parties expressed a desire to reconcile. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the onerous condition imposed by the High Court, observing that such an impracticable requirement infringes on personal liberty and the right to dignity. The Court emphasized that bail conditions should be reasonable and proportionate, particularly in matrimonial disputes, to allow the accused to comply and foster reconciliation between the parties. The order for provisional bail was made absolute, and the appellant was granted bail on the original surety terms. Appeal allowed in part. Conditions set aside to the extent of requiring an affidavit concerning financial and physical support; bail made absolute. Sudeep Chatterjee v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 540
Section 498A IPC – Cruelty – In all cases, where wife complains of harassment or ill-treatment, Section 498A of the IPC cannot be applied mechanically. Every matrimonial conduct, which may cause annoyance to the other or mere trivial irritations, quarrels between spouses, which happen in day-to-day married life, may not amount to cruelty. The Court must appreciate that all quarrels must be weighed from that point of view in determining what constitutes cruelty in each particular case, always keeping in view the physical and mental conditions of the parties, their character and social status. A very technical and hyper sensitive approach would prove to be disastrous for the very institution of the marriage. (Para 32) Achin Gupta v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 343 : 2024 CriLJ 2307 : AIR 2024 SC 2548
Section 87 - Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder or for ransom
[No change]
Sections 366, 323 and 506(II) - Arms Act, 1950; Section 25(1)(B)(a) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 319 - Whether an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. must be decided solely on the basis of the examination-in-chief without awaiting cross-examination. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court Order that directed the trial court to decide an application under Section 319 CrPC based on the examination-in-chief alone. The Court held that there is no mandatory requirement to decide the application before cross-examination. The Trial Court retains discretion in this regard, and a refusal to appear for cross-examination by prosecution witnesses cannot justify delaying the trial. The Court clarified that the Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 permits reliance on examination-in-chief for a prima facie finding under Section 319 CrPC but does not mandate that cross-examination be bypassed. The Trial Court was correct in rejecting the application for lack of admissible evidence and acquitting the accused under Section 232 CrPC. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's order was set aside, and the Trial Court's order acquitting the accused was restored. Asim Akhtar v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 814 : AIR 2024 SC 5744
Section 100 - Culpable homicide
[No change]
Section 299, 302 & 304 Part II IPC – The act of celebratory firing during marriage ceremonies is an unfortunate practice – In the absence of any evidence on record to suggest that the Appellant aimed at and / or pointed at the large crowd whilst engaging in such celebratory firing; or there existed any prior enmity between the Deceased and the Appellant, the act cannot be punishable under Section 302 IPC. On grounds that (i) there was no previous enmity between the Deceased; (ii) no intention may be attributed to the Appellant as may be culled out from the record to cause death of the Deceased; and (iii) person carrying a gun with live cartridges has knowledge that firing the gun in presence of several people is an act likely to cause death, the Appellant is guilty of commission of 'culpable homicide' under Section 299 IPC i.e., punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC. The conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC is liable to set aside. (Para 13, 14 & 15) Shahid Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 222 : AIR 2024 SC 1319 : 2024 Cri LJ 1579
Section 101 - Murder
[Formal changes, but essence is the same, Secondly, thirdly, and fourthly, are replaced by clauses (a), (b), (c), and (d). The word “it” is replaced by the words "the act by which death is caused".]
Section 300 - Murder - Findings on Grounds for Reduction of Sentence – Lack of Intent and Fatal Injuries - Nature of Fatal Injuries - Expert Testimony - The appellant argued that the fatal incident arose from a spontaneous scuffle between rival factions and lacked premeditation or intent to commit murder. Despite this defense, the Trial Court and High Court rejected the claim, relying on substantial evidence, including a post-mortem report and witness testimonies. The deceased sustained multiple incised penetrating wounds to vital organs such as the lungs and heart, inflicted with a sharp-edged knife. The medical expert (PW-6) opined that the injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, corroborated by the recovery of the weapon and consistent witness accounts. Held, lacking intention to commit murder irrelevant if bodily injury is caused with lethal weapon, likely to cause death. The Court emphasised that the intention to cause fatal injuries can be inferred from the severity of injuries, the use of a lethal weapon, and the circumstances of the act. The evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant intended to cause injuries sufficient to result in death, disqualifying the claim of absence of intent and supporting the conviction under Section 300 IPC. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964
Section 300 - Murder – Intention and Knowledge under Section 300 IPC – Spontaneity and Premeditation – Culpability Established - The Court examined the appellant's defense of the absence of intent to commit murder, contending that the fatal act arose spontaneously during a scuffle. However, intent and knowledge under Section 300 IPC were inferred from: (i) The nature and location of the injuries inflicted, targeting vital organs such as the heart and lungs. (ii) The use of a sharp-edged knife, indicating a deliberate escalation of violence. (iii) Testimonies corroborating that the injuries were inflicted with considerable force. The Court reiterated that under clause 3 of Section 300 IPC: (i) An act causing bodily injury, sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, qualifies as murder, even absent specific intent to kill or knowledge of fatal consequences. (ii) Spontaneity or lack of premeditation does not absolve liability when the injuries inflicted reflect clear knowledge of their likely outcome. The deliberate targeting of vital organs and the fatal nature of the injuries supported the conclusion of intent or knowledge requisite for murder. The appellant's plea for leniency based on spontaneity was dismissed, affirming the liability for murder. The appellant's act constituted murder under Section 300 IPC. Appeal dismissed. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964
Section 300 Exception 2 – Right of Private Defence – Plea of Exceeding the Right of Defence – Aggressor's Conduct and Proportionality of Force - The appellant invoked the right of private defence under Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC, claiming the act of stabbing was carried out under a perceived threat to his life. The Court analyzed the plea under the following criteria: (i) The accused must not be at fault in initiating the altercation. (ii) There must be an imminent peril to life or grave bodily harm. (iii) Injuries sustained and inflicted must be proportional to the threat faced. (iv) The accused must not have had reasonable recourse to public authorities. Upon review: (i) The appellant's injuries were minor and did not pose any real or imminent threat, as evidenced by medical reports. (ii) The testimony of eyewitnesses and the sequence of events established that the appellant and co-accused were the aggressors. (iii) The excessive and deliberate use of force, including stabbing vital organs, far exceeded the bounds of lawful defence. (iv) The Court reiterated that aggressors cannot claim the right of private defence, as the appellant's conduct was neither proportional to the perceived threat nor justified. The plea of private defence and exceeding its bounds was dismissed. The appellant's actions were deliberate and culpable, and Exception 2 to Section 300 IPC was not applicable. Appeal dismissed. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964
Section 300 IPC – Conviction for the offence of murder is challenged – Whether the nature of offensive act comes within the purview of section 300? – Held, the appellant caused such bodily injury, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. The appellant participated in a premeditated attack on the victim, armed with a deadly weapon and stabbed the unarmed victim on a vital organ causing his death. The conduct of the appellant is covered by both clauses (1) and (3) of section 300, IPC. The intention to cause death can easily be discerned from the conduct of the appellant and the nature of fatal injury inflicted, which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. Fulfilment of any one condition of section 300, IPC is enough to convict the appellant under section 302 thereof, and in the present case not one but two conditions have clearly been shown to exist to nail the appellant for murder. Further held, prosecution has been able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was the person who stabbed the victim during the course of the attack by the accused persons leading to his death. Hence, conviction of appellant is affirmed. (Para 20, 24, 26 & 27) Joy Devaraj v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 448 : (2024) 8 SCC 102
Section 103 (1) - Punishment for murder
[No Change, except IPC section is included as subsection in BNS.]
Section 302 IPC – Sentencing – Plea of Old Age and Deteriorating Health – Consideration of Personal Circumstances Versus Severity of Crime – The appellant sought a reduction in sentence on the grounds of advanced age and severe health issues, including a history of stroke and partial paralysis. Held, compassion for personal circumstances, including old age and medical conditions, must be balanced against the nature and severity of the offence. In cases of murder under Section 302 IPC, involving premeditation and deliberate targeting of vital organs in a group attack, the gravity of the crime supersedes mitigating factors related to the appellant's personal hardships. The Court emphasized that such heinous crimes, particularly those arising from political rivalry, have far-reaching societal implications, including undermining the rule of law and public order. The minimum sentence for murder under Section 302 IPC is life imprisonment, which cannot be reduced based on grounds such as parity, leniency, old age, or health concerns. The appellant's plea for sentence reduction was dismissed. The conviction and life imprisonment sentence were upheld, reinforcing the principle of accountability and the seriousness of the offence. Kunhimuhammed @ Kunheethu v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 964
Section 302 to Section 304 Part I IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - Inadmissibility of Disclosure Statements - Circumstantial Evidence Fails to Prove Guilt - Forensic and Medical Evidence - Chain of Evidence and Recovery Doubts - High Court's Erroneous Conviction Alteration - The disclosure statement recorded at the police station was not admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act as the recovery of alleged evidence occurred prior to the recording of the disclosure. The alleged recovery of stones, earth, and other items was not made pursuant to the disclosure statement, rendering it inconsequential. Circumstances such as the last seen evidence, recovery of a meat bag near the spot, accused walking near the pathway at night, and inquiries made by the accused about the deceased were not conclusively proved or did not point unerringly toward guilt. Forensic reports failed to establish a connection between the recovered items and the crime scene. The medical evidence did not confirm that the seized stones were the weapons used in the crime. Significant inconsistencies were noted regarding the recovery process, including doubts about the presence of witnesses and delayed preparation of site plans. The High Court erred in altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part I of the IPC based on the assumption of a solitary blow, ignoring multiple injuries and fractures indicating a clear intent to kill. The prosecution failed to establish the chain of incriminating evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was overturned, and the appellants were acquitted, with their bail bonds discharged. Suresh Chandra Tiwari v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 932
Sections 302, 316 and 364 IPC - Murder – Motive and Evidence – Sole Eyewitness Testimony – Death Penalty Mitigation – Inter-caste Marriage and Societal Pressure - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of the appellant for the murder of his pregnant daughter under Sections 302, 316, and 364 IPC. The motive, rooted in societal ostracism due to her inter-caste marriage, was corroborated by the testimonies of PW-1 (wife), PW-2 (complainant), and PW-3 (mother-in-law of the deceased). Despite minor discrepancies, the Court held that these did not undermine the prosecution's case. The Court rejected the appellant's plea of a financial dispute with PW-2 and noted that the appellant failed to provide corroborative evidence. The testimony of PW-6 (medical expert) confirmed that death was due to ligature strangulation, supporting the prosecution's case. On the issue of sentencing, the Court considered mitigating factors, including the appellant's impoverished background, absence of criminal antecedents, mental and physical health issues, and satisfactory prison conduct. Citing the doctrine of "rarest of rare" cases, the Court commuted the death penalty to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment without remission, emphasizing the possibility of reformation. Appeal partly allowed. Eknath Kisan Kumbharkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : AIR 2024 SC 5299 : 2024 Cri LJ 4641
Section 302; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 154 and 374 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - When the conviction was based on the deceased's oral dying declaration to a close relative, the courts must exercise due caution in believing the testimony of the close relative to convict the accused. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 844
Section 302; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 154 and 374 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Whether the oral testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were reliable to establish the guilt of the accused conclusively beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the contradictions and omissions in the oral testimonies impacted the credibility of the prosecution's case. Held, the oral evidence of the mother of the deceased, was deemed hearsay as she was informed about the alleged attack by her sons and did not witness the incident herself. Serious omissions and contradictions in her testimony, highlighted by the defense, further discredited her reliability. Although the trial court held testimonies of PWs 5 and 9 reliable, the High Court found significant omissions and contradictions. Both witnesses failed to disclose material facts, such as the infliction of injuries by the accused, in their initial statements to the police, raising doubts about the veracity of their statements. PW-2 and PW-17 were declared hostile, and their evidence was considered unreliable. PW-17's statement about the deceased being thrown on a stone boulder was inconsistent with the prosecution's case and medical evidence. The necroscopical evidence confirmed the cause of death as head injuries amounting to culpable homicide. However, it did not corroborate the prosecution's narrative implicating the accused. The High Court held that the omissions and contradictions in the oral testimonies, coupled with the lack of direct evidence, entitled the accused to the benefit of the doubt. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's judgment acquitting the accused, holding that the prosecution failed to conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramjan Khan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 844
Section 302, 120B IPC - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 106 - Murder committed within privacy of house – Motive – Illicit Relationship – Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence – The High Court reversed the acquittal by the Trial Court, finding sufficient motive—an illicit relationship between the accused—and substantial medical evidence pointing to homicide. The deceased was found with multiple ante-mortem injuries, including a fractured hyoid bone, negating the defense's claim of suicide by consuming paint. The accused failed to provide a credible explanation under Section 313 CrPC and were deemed present at the crime scene. The Court reiterated the principle that in cases where direct evidence is absent, a cogent chain of circumstances excluding all hypotheses of innocence is sufficient for conviction. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, shifting the burden onto the accused to explain the circumstances of the death, as they were in exclusive proximity to the deceased. The conviction was affirmed under Sections 120B and 302 IPC with life imprisonment and fines, emphasizing the probative value of circumstantial evidence in criminal jurisprudence. Circumstantial evidence suffices if it forms a complete chain pointing solely to the guilt of the accused. A clear motive and presence at the crime scene, combined with medical evidence, can substantiate a conviction. Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act places the burden on the accused to explain facts within their exclusive knowledge. Appeals dismissed, convictions and sentences upheld. Uma v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 843
Section 302 and 391 IPC - Dacoity and Murder - Conviction and sentencing in a case involving circumstantial evidence and alleged contradictions in witness testimonies - Imposition of the death penalty under the "rarest of rare" doctrine - Held, the Supreme Court set aside the death sentence of a watchman convicted for the dacoity and murder of his employers to life imprisonment and upheld the conviction of the appellants, finding no infirmity in the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court regarding guilt. The Trial Court's decision not to impose capital punishment was justified as the case did not fall under the "rarest of rare" category. The High Court's interference in this regard was unwarranted. Shivkumar Ramsundar Saket v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 784
Section 302, 307 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder of a political leader - Conviction, Life Sentence of Ex-MLA and another - The court upheld the life imprisonment sentence imposed by the trial court, along with additional rigorous imprisonment for five years under Section 307, both accompanied by fines. Default imprisonment of six months was added in case of non-payment of fines. The appellants were directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which the authorities were instructed to ensure their detention. Regarding A1, A2, A3, A6 and A9, the charge of conspiracy was not substantiated due to the absence of direct ocular evidence. Their acquittal was upheld, granting them the benefit of the doubt. The appeals were partially allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside in part as per the directions issued. Rama Devi v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 776 : AIR 2024 SC 5148 : (2024) 10 SCC 462
Section 302 – Disclosure Statements and Chain of Custody – Acquittal for Lack of Convincing Evidence - In appeals challenging convictions under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court quashed concurrent findings of the lower courts due to the prosecution's failure to prove the disclosure statements made by the accused under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The Court found the deposition of the Investigating Officer on the aspect of disclosure and recoveries to be perfunctory. Further, the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody or link evidence ensuring the integrity of the seized articles from seizure to submission at the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL). The Court emphasized that disclosure statements leading to discoveries must result in incriminating evidence and be legally proven. Additionally, the Court highlighted its jurisdiction to interfere with concurrent findings when evidence is improperly appreciated, material aspects ignored, or findings are perverse. Upon an overall examination of the evidence, the Court held that the prosecution failed to establish the accused appellants' guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the accused appellants were acquitted, and the judgments of the trial court and High Court were set aside. Appeals allowed; convictions and sentences set aside; appellants acquitted. Allarakha Habib Memon v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 562
Section 302 and 34 IPC – Non-compliance with Mandatory Examination under Section 313 Cr.PC – Material Prejudice and Miscarriage of Justice – Acquittal - The appellant, accused No. 4, challenged the confirmation of his conviction under Section 302 IPC, with the aid of Section 34 IPC, by the High Court. The conviction arose from an incident where the appellant's exhortation and physical involvement allegedly facilitated the murder of the deceased by co-accused. Held, the twin incriminating circumstances foundational to the conviction—(i) exhortation to commit the murder, and (ii) holding the deceased to enable the stabbing—were not put to the appellant during his examination under Section 313 Cr.PC. This omission constituted a patent illegality, resulting in material prejudice and a miscarriage of justice. The Court further observed that this defect was incurable and vitiated the trial against the appellant. Considering the lapse of 29 years since the incident and the appellant's 12-year incarceration, the Court deemed it improper to remand the matter for fresh examination under Section 313 Cr.PC. Consequently, the appellant's conviction was set aside, and he was acquitted of the charges. The judgment did not disturb the conviction of the co-accused. The appellant's conviction and sentence set aside due to non-compliance with Section 313 Cr.PC, resulting in acquittal. Naresh Kumar v. State of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 443 : AIR 2024 SC 3233 : 2024 CriLJ 3224
Section 302 Exception 4 IPC – Sudden provocation/ heat of the moment – Four conditions must be satisfied to bring the matter within Exception 4: (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in the heat of passion; and; that (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner – Where the offender takes undue advantage or has acted in a cruel or an unusual manner, the benefit of Exception 4 cannot be given to him. If the weapon used or the manner of attack by the assailant is disproportionate, that circumstance must be taken into consideration to decide whether undue advantage has been taken. Held, cannot overlook the fact that the appellant inflicted as many as twelve blows with a knife on the deceased who was unarmed and helpless. Hence, case is not one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder but the same is a case of murder. The High Court committed no error in affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court. (Para 79, 82, 83, 84) Anees v. State Govt of NCT, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : AIR 2024 SC 2297 : 2024 Cri LJ 2377
Section 302 IPC – Delay in filing the FIR and delay in examination of prosecution witness – The delay therefore renders the circumstances questionable. Hence, it cannot be said that the prosecution had succeeded in establishing its case against the two accused persons beyond reasonable doubt warranting a conviction under Section 302 IPC. (Para 42) Periyasamy v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : AIR 2024 SC 1667
Section 302 IPC – Acquittal order reversed in conviction – Reason assigned by High Court to discard evidence of complainant (PW2) and his daughter (PW3) is untenable. Complainant narrated the entire occurrence on a call made to the Police Control Room within ten minutes of the occurrence, hence, the court fails to find any meeting of the minds in such few minutes so as to create a false narrative only to implicate Gurpreet Singh. The presence of Gursewak Singh at the time of occurrence, his prompt reporting of the crime, and the swift action taken by the police immediately upon receipt of the said report, have cumulatively and unequivocally established the prosecution case beyond any doubt. On the contrary, the prosecution has successfully established that accused had been nursing a grudge against the deceased, hence, the attribution of motive by the prosecution stands proved. The reasons assigned by the High Court while granting acquittal are totally perverse and as a result of misreading of the evidence on record. Hence, it warrants interference by Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136. (Para 28, 30, 31, 33) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : AIR 2024 SC 3135 : (2024) 4 SCC 469
Section 302 & 34 IPC – Co-accused –There is also not an iota of evidence to suggest that other respondents had any meeting with Accused and/or they had conspired with him for the execution of the crime. As there is no specific motive attributed, benefit of doubt can be extended to them. There is no convincing explanation to implicate them as coaccused. (Para 35) State of Punjab v. Gurpreet Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 218 : AIR 2024 SC 3135 : (2024) 4 SCC 469
Sections 302 and 316 IPC - From every available evidence, which was placed by the prosecution, it is a case where a sudden fight took place between the husband and wife. The deceased at that time was carrying a pregnancy of nine months and it was the act of pouring kerosene on the deceased that resulted in the fire and the subsequent burn injuries and the ultimate death of the deceased. This act at the hands of the appellant will be covered under the fourth exception given under Section 300 of the IPC, i.e., “Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner”. The act of the appellant is not premeditated, but is a result of sudden fight and quarrel in the heat of passion. Therefore, we convert the findings of Section 302 to that of 304 Part-II, as we are of the opinion that though the appellant had knowledge that such an act can result in the death of the deceased, but there was no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, this is an offence which would come under Part-II not under Part-I of Section 304 of the IPC. (Para 20 & 21) Dattatraya v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 215
Section 302, 304 (Part II) and 34 IPC - The prosecution has failed to establish common intention of Accused 3 to commit murder of deceased. Held, merely based on the presence of Accused 3 near the scene of offence and his family relations with the other accused, common intention cannot be established. That the trial court and the High Court have mechanically drawn inference against Accused 3 under Section 34. Further, participation of Accused 3 in assault is confirmed. Appeal of Accused 3 is allowed by altering the conviction under Section 302 to Section 304 Part II of IPC due to lack of evidence of common intention to murder. (Para 31) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050
Section 302 to 304 IPC - Commutation of Sentence - The lack of cogent evidence to prove that Accused 3 shared a common intention to commit murder is an important factor to commute a sentence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II IPC. (Para 29) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050
Sections 302 and 201 r/w. 34 – Murder - Issue of juvenility was raised in Appeal - On the date on which the incident constituting the offence took place, the age of the appellant was less than 18 years. The 2000 JJ Act was admittedly not in force when the incident occurred. Therefore, the case will be governed by the 1986 JJ Act. Under clause (h) of Section 2 of the 1986 JJ Act, a 'juvenile' has been defined to mean a boy who has not attained the age of sixteen years or a girl who has not attained the age of eighteen years. Thus, on the date of occurrence of the offence, the appellant was a juvenile. As per Section 22(1) of the 1986 JJ Act, there was a prohibition on sentencing a juvenile to undergo imprisonment. As the appellant has undergone incarceration for a period of more than eight years, no purpose will be served by sending the appellant before the Juvenile Justice Board. Pramila v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 57
Section 302 IPC - Setting a person on fire is an act of extreme cruelty and would fall under Section 302 IPC. Naresh v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 37
Section 302 IPC - The fact remains that both the star witnesses of the prosecution are disbelieved in the trial by clearly stating that their statements are contradictory, the facts are twisted and improvements are made. For trial under Section 302 IPC, if a witness is branded as untrustworthy having allegedly twisted the facts and made contrary statements, it is not safe to impose conviction on the basis of a statement made by such witness. When there is an effort to falsely implicate one accused person, statements made by such an eyewitness cannot be relied upon without strong corroboration. Moreover, there is material on record proving previous enmity between the parties. State of Haryana v. Mohd. Yunus, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 36 : AIR 2024 SC 597 : (2024) 3 SCC 180
Section 302 r/w. 34 IPC – Murder - Circumstantial Evidence - When the prosecution case is solely based on the circumstantial evidence, then the courts must be vigilant while examining the facts proving the circumstantial evidence i.e., it must be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and should be free from doubts, improbabilities and inconsistencies. (Para 29 & 30) Pradeep Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 21 : AIR 2024 SC 518 : (2024) 3 SCC 324
Section 302 r/w 34 IPC – Murder - Benefit of Doubt - An appellate court should give the benefit of doubt to the accused persons if the evidence on record indicates the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and that a plausible view, different from the one expressed by the courts below can be taken. (Para 17) Jitendra Kumar Mishra @ Jittu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 20 : (2024) 2 SCC 666
Section 105 - Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
[Minimum imprisonment for five years is added and fine is made mandatory.]
Section 304 II IPC - Conviction under Section 304 Part II IPC modified to the period already undergone, considering the emotional tension and spur-of-the-moment nature of the incident. Hussainbhai Asgarali Lokhandwala v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : AIR 2024 SC 3832
Section 304 Part II IPC is in two parts. The section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: Firstly, if the act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is the “intention”. Secondly, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Here the important ingredient is “knowledge”. (Para 28) Velthepu Srinivas v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 94 : AIR 2024 SC 1050
Section 106 (1) - Causing death by negligence
[IPC section is included as subsection in BNS. Imprisonment is increased and offence by registered medical practitioner and its explanation are added.]
Section 304A and 338 IPC - For conviction under Section 304(A) and Section 338 of the IPC, there is no minimum sentence prescribed but the term of sentence may extend to 2 years. The sentence can also be limited to fine without any term of imprisonment. George v. State of Kerala, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 661
Sections 304A and 338 IPC - Fire Accident - Trekking Expedition - Persons who were part of the trekking expedition died owing to a forest fire which is an instance of vis major. No negligence could have been attributed to the trek organiser who only facilitated the organization of the trekking expedition. The organizers and even the members of the trekking expedition were totally unaware of the forest fire as such. Accidentally they were engulfed in the forest fire and they died by sheer accident and not owing to any negligence or any criminal intent attributable to the trek organiser. The trek organiser had no role whatsoever in causing the death of the trekkers who died due to a forest fire which is a natural cause. Peter Van Geit v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 83
Section 108 - Abetment of suicide
[No change]
Section 306 and 498A IPC - Abetment of suicide - Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetment of suicide under Section 306IPC. The Court found no proximate link between the appellants' actions and the deceased's suicide. It emphasized the necessity of proving an active or direct role in instigating or aiding the suicide with clear mens rea. The alleged acts of harassment, including the selling of gold ornaments, occurred nearly a year before the suicide and did not demonstrate intent to provoke or incite the act. As such, the charge under Section 306, IPC could not be sustained, and the appellants were discharged from this offence. Appeal partly allowed. Appellants discharged under Section 306, IPC. Trial under Section 498A, IPC to proceed. Jaydeepsinh Pravinsinh Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 979
Section 306 IPC - Simple refusal to marry not abetment to suicide. Kamaruddin Dastagir Sanadi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 933
Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – To constitute an offence under Section 306 IPC, the act of the accused must amount to direct and alarming incitement or encouragement, leaving the deceased with no option but to commit suicide. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – Two broad categories of incitement were identified: 1. Sentimental or Physical Relationships – Where close personal ties, such as familial or intimate relations, may lead to psychological imbalance due to disputes or unmet expectations, triggering suicidal tendencies. 2. Official Relationships – Where the accused holds an official capacity, and the harassment or dereliction of duties may push the deceased to take extreme steps. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – Judicial Approach to Trial and Evidence - The Court emphasized the need to evaluate the accused's intention behind their acts and whether the allegations prima facie reveal a deliberate incitement to suicide. Courts must avoid unwarranted prosecutions based solely on the fact of suicide, without adequate linkage to the accused's actions. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – In the present case, the High Court's approach was deemed flawed as it failed to assess whether the accused created an unbearable situation leading the deceased to see suicide as the only recourse. There was exploitation of the deceased's emotional vulnerability or reputational harm causing psychological distress. The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings against the appellants, holding that no prima facie case for abetment of suicide was made out, and continuing the prosecution would amount to abuse of the legal process. Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – When can official superiors be liable for abetment of suicide of employee - Explained. (Para 21) Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Section 306 IPC - Abetment of Suicide – The Courts should know how to apply the correct principles of law governing abetment of suicide to the facts on record. It is the inability on the part of the courts to understand and apply the correct principles of law to the cases of abetment of suicide, which leads to unnecessary prosecutions. (Para 22) Nipun Aneja v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Section 306 IPC – Abetment to suicide – Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. Apprehensions expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not made out from the chargesheet and hence allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal. (Para 21 & 23) Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : AIR 2024 SC 1405 : (2024) 3 SCC 665 : 2024 Cri LJ 1461
Section 306 IPC - Before holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section 306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts and circumstances of the case and also assess the evidence adduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty and harassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with no other alternative to put an end to her life. It must be borne in mind that in a case of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proof of direct or indirect act(s) of incitement to the commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused which led or compelled the deceased to commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC would not be sustainable. (Para 36) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393
Section 306 IPC - In order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It would also require an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no other option and that this act of the accused must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. (Para 39) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393
Section 306 IPC - Human mind is an enigma. There can be myriad reasons for a man or a woman to commit or attempt to commit suicide: it may be a case of failure to achieve academic excellence, oppressive environment in college or hostel, particularly for students belonging to the marginalized sections, joblessness, financial difficulties, disappointment in love or marriage, acute or chronic ailments, depression, so on and so forth. Therefore, it may not always be the case that someone has to abet commission of suicide. Circumstances surrounding the deceased in which he finds himself are relevant. (Para 47) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393
Section 306 IPC - The court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case as well as the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that the victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual to commit suicide, the conscience of the court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. (Para 40) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393
Section 306 IPC - Where the accused by his act or omission or by his continued course of conduct creates a situation that the deceased is left with no other option except to commit suicide, then instigation may be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. (Para 34) Kumar @ Shiva Kumar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : AIR 2024 SC 1283 : 2024 Cri LJ 1393
Section 306 IPC – Abetment of Suicide – The basic ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 306 of the IPC are suicidal death and abetment thereof. Oral evidence of witnesses does not disclose any form of incessant cruelty or harassment on the part of the husband which would in ordinary circumstances drag the wife to commit suicide as if she was left with no other alternative. Mere demand of money from the wife or her parents for running a business would not constitute cruelty or harassment. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime cannot be assumed to be ostensibly present but has to be visible and conspicuous. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide. Mere harassment is not sufficient to hold an accused guilty of abetting the commission of suicide. The court should look for cogent and convincing proof of the act of incitement to the commission of suicide and such an offending action should be proximate to the time of occurrence. In the absence of any cogent evidence of harassment or cruelty, an accused cannot be held guilty for the offence under Section 306 of IPC by raising presumption under Section 113A. Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : (2024) 3 SCC 573 : 2024 Cri LJ 1561
Sections 306 and 417 IPC - Prohibition of Harassment of Woman Act, 2002 (Tamil Nadu); Section 4 - Broken relationships and heartbreaks are part of everyday life. Merely advising a partner to marry as per the advice of parents would not attract the penal provisions of abetment to suicide. There must be direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The accused must be shown to have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain acts to facilitate the commission of suicide. Where the words uttered are casual in nature and which are often employed in the heat of the moment between quarreling people, and nothing serious is expected to follow from the same, the same would not amount to abetment of suicide. In order to constitute 'instigation', it must be shown that the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. The words uttered by the accused must be suggestive of the consequence. (Para 10 - 12 & 16) Prabhu v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 112
Section 109 - Attempt to murder
[Under IPC, Section 307 Clause 2 prescribes the death penalty only for an attempt to murder by a life-convict, but alternate punishment is given in Section 109(2) of the BNS, which states that "be punished with death or with imprisonment for life, which shall mean the remainder of that person's natural life".]
Section 307 IPC – Acquittal restored due to lack of convincing evidence - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction under Section 307 of the IPC, restoring the acquittal of the appellant by the Trial Court. The Court held that the High Court's decision to convict was based on weak and inconsistent evidence, including contradictory witness testimonies and absence of key eyewitnesses from the investigation. The prosecution's case was undermined by discrepancies in the roles attributed to the accused, the nature of injuries inflicted, and the medical evidence presented. The Court reiterated that an appellate court should not overturn a well-reasoned acquittal unless there is a manifest error in the trial court's findings. Accordingly, the conviction was deemed unsafe, and the appellant was acquitted. Appeal allowed, acquittal restored. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622
Section 307 IPC – The appellants were charged under Section 307 IPC for an alleged knife attack on the victims. The trial court acquitted the appellants in 1995, but the High Court reversed the acquittal in 2009, sentencing them to seven years of rigorous imprisonment. Whether the conviction of the appellants under Section 307 IPC is justified in light of the inconsistencies in the prosecution's case. Held, the Supreme Court, upon reviewing the evidence, found significant contradictions between the FIR, witness testimonies, and medical reports. The absence of key eyewitnesses and discrepancies in the prosecution's narrative weakened the case. The court reiterated the principle that a conviction under Section 307 IPC requires clear intent and overt acts by the accused, which was not established beyond reasonable doubt in this case. The Court emphasized that an appellate court should not overturn an acquittal without compelling reasons. The High Court's judgment was set aside, and the trial court's acquittal was restored. The appeal was allowed, and the appellants were acquitted. Raju v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 622
Section 307 IPC - When the sentencing court doesn't deem fit to impose a life sentence for committing an offence of attempt to murder, then the maximum sentence that can be imposed on the convict for committing an offence of attempt to murder could not extend beyond the period of 10 years. (Para 7) Amit Rana @ Koka v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 500 : AIR 2024 SC 3477
Section 110 - Attempt to commit culpable homicide
[No change.]
Section 308 and 354B IPC - Bail - The petitioner, a former Private Secretary to the Chief Minister of Delhi, faced allegations of assault against a Member of Parliament. While noting the investigation's completion and the petitioner's 100-day custody, the Court addressed concerns over witness influence due to the petitioner's political standing. Balancing the right to liberty with a fair trial, the Court granted bail with specific conditions to ensure witness protection and trial integrity. Key conditions included restrictions on the petitioner's official assignments, entry into the Chief Minister's residence, and public commentary on the case. The petition was disposed of, with instructions for the trial court to expedite the examination of vulnerable witnesses. Bibhav Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 646
Section 126 (2) - Punishment for Wrongful restraint
[IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS, sans heading. Fine is increased from five hundred rupees to five thousand rupees.]
Sections 341, 323, 325, 326, 307, 354, 354A, 504, 506, 34 - CBI Investigation - Whether the investigation into FIR lodged against the petitioner, should be transferred to an independent agency like the CBI. Whether the local police could fairly investigate allegations involving politically sensitive issues and personnel from the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF). The petitioner, an advocate and political spokesperson for the BJP, alleged harassment by his former father-in-law, a sitting MP from the ruling TMC party in West Bengal. FIRs were lodged against the petitioner alleging cognizable offenses. He contended that the FIRs were politically motivated. A politically charged environment and alleged misuse of state machinery raised concerns about the impartiality of the local police. CISF security was provided to the petitioner, and its personnel were also implicated in the events leading to the FIRs. Held, the politically charged atmosphere in West Bengal and the allegations of bias against the local police warranted the transfer of the investigation to an independent agency. The Court noted the necessity of a credible and impartial investigation, particularly in cases involving political and administrative conflicts. The investigation was transferred to the CBI to ensure fairness and public confidence in the administration of justice. The Court emphasized that investigations must not only be fair but also appear to be so. Exceptional circumstances, including political rivalry and the involvement of CISF personnel, justified the exercise of the Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 32. The writ petition was allowed, and the investigation was transferred to the CBI. Kabir Shankar Bose v. State of West Bengal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 950
Sections 341, 323 and 302 IPC - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Sections 200, 203 and 227 – Discharge - The version of PW-1 is that the accused repeatedly kicked on chest with a stick. In the post-mortem, no injury was found on the chest or any other part of the body of the deceased. The expert testimony of the doctor who performed the autopsy of the deceased cannot be completely ignored while deciding the guilt of an accused. Therefore, taking the evidence of the witnesses as it is, there was no material to proceed against the accused in the private complaint. (Para 11 & 12) Ramalingam v. N. Viswanathan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 45 : AIR 2024 SC 757 : (2024) 4 SCC 808
Section 132 - Assault or criminal force to deter public servant from discharge of his duty
[No change]
Section 353 IPC - Shouting and threatening someone does not amount to committing an offence of assault. K. Dhananjay v. Cabinet Secretary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 847
Section 353 IPC - Mere jostling and pushing while resisting arrest did not amount to criminal use of force. Mahendra Kumar Sonker v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 570 : (2024) 8 SCC 244
Section 137 (1) (b) - Kidnapping from lawful guardianship
[The IPC section is included as a clause in the BNS. Words “minor under the age of sixteen years of male or under eighteen years of age if a female” are replaced by “child” thus making it gender neutral.]
Section 361 and 363 IPC – Kidnapping from lawful guardianship – 'Kidnapping' within the meaning of Section 361 of IPC was established by the prosecution. Held, there was no reason for the father of the victim to falsely implicate the appellants and tutor the child to depose against them. Hence, the accused is convicted for the lesser offence of kidnapping defined by Section 361 of IPC, which is punishable under Section 363 of IPC. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258
Section 140 (1) - Kidnapping or abducting in order to murder, etc
[No Change except that IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS.]
Section 364, 302 r/w. 34 IPC - Murder – Appeal Against Conviction – Reversal of Acquittal – Standard of Proof – Testimony of Eyewitnesses – Interested and Chance Witnesses – Circumstantial Evidence – High Court's Approach in Reversing Acquittal – Requirements for Sustaining Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - The charge of abduction was based on direct evidence, while the charge of murder was based on circumstantial evidence. The Court scrutinized the credibility of the testimonies of eye witnesses (PW-2, PW-4, PW-5, and PW-18), who were challenged by the appellants as being interested and chance witnesses. It was observed that there was no satisfactory explanation for their presence at the crime scene, and inconsistencies were found in their accounts, particularly regarding crucial details such as the existence of a pistol allegedly used by the accused. The investigation conducted by PW-21 was found to be questionable, especially when considered against the statements of defence witnesses (DW-3 and DW-4), who were senior police officers supervising the investigation. The Court noted the non-examination of natural witnesses and the improbable conduct of the eye witnesses, which cast doubt on their testimonies. Additionally, the Court held that the High Court's approach in reversing the acquittal of A-6 and A-7 was flawed, as it did not identify any illegality, perversity, or complete unsustainability in the Trial Court's findings. The reversal of acquittal should meet a higher threshold, recognizing the presumption of innocence reinforced by the initial acquittal. The prosecution failed to provide convincing evidence of the residence of the deceased, and the post-mortem report raised doubts about the time of death, which was inconsistent with the prosecution's case. Held, the conviction by the High Court was unsustainable due to unreliable evidence and an improper approach in reversing the acquittal. The presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not displaced. Appeal allowed; acquittal restored. Vijay Singh @ Vijay Kr. Sharma v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 746
Sections 364, 302, 201, 212 and 120B - Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 25, 26, and 27 - Legality of confessional statements - Admissibility of eyewitness testimony - Reliability of circumstantial evidence, including CCTV footage and recovery of the deceased's body parts. The sole eyewitness failed to identify the accused or provide consistent testimony. Significant omissions and contradictions between her court testimony and her statement under Section 161 CrPC rendered her evidence unreliable. Non-examination of her husband, an alleged eyewitness, resulted in adverse inferences against the prosecution. CCTV footage lacked admissibility due to the absence of a certificate under Section 65B of the Evidence Act. Neither the footage nor the CD containing it was authenticated or properly marked, and the trial and High Courts failed to view the footage. Recovery evidence, including parts of the deceased's body, was deemed insufficient to establish guilt without corroborating evidence. The trial court improperly admitted confessions made by the accused to police officers in custody, violating Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. Under Section 27, only information distinctly leading to the discovery of facts is admissible. The prosecution failed to adhere to this principle, rendering the confessions inadmissible. The prosecution failed to establish a complete and consistent chain of evidence. The prosecution's reliance on inadmissible and inconsistent evidence, coupled with procedural lapses, led to the failure to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. The conviction was unsustainable and consequently set aside. Randeep Singh @ Rana v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 914
Section 140 (2) - Kidnapping for ransom, etc
[Section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading.]
Section 364A IPC – Kidnapping for ransom - Ingredients – There should be a kidnapping or abduction of any person or a person should be kept in detention after such kidnapping or abduction. If the said act is coupled with a threat to cause death or hurt to such person, an offence under Section 364A is attracted. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258
Section 364A IPC – Kidnapping for ransom not established – Mere Demand For Ransom without a threat to death or hurt would not Amount to offence under Section 364A. The ingredients of Section 364A of IPC were not proved by the prosecution in as much as the prosecution failed to lead cogent evidence to establish the second part of Section 364A about the threats given by the accused to cause death or hurt to such person. Only if the threats given to the parents or the close relatives of the kidnapped person by the accused was established, then a case could be made out that there was a reasonable apprehension that the person kidnapped may be put to death or hurt may be caused to him. Conviction of the appellants for the offence punishable under Section 364A of IPC is set aside. William Stephen v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 168 : (2024) 5 SCC 258
Section 364A IPC - Kidnapping for Ransom - The necessary ingredients which the prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, before the Court are not only an act of kidnapping or abduction but thereafter the demand of ransom, coupled with the threat to life of a person who has been kidnapped or abducted, must be there. (Para 14) Neeraj Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 7 : AIR 2024 SC 271 : (2024) 3 SCC 125
Section 147 - Waging, or attempting to wage war. or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India
[No change]
Sections 121, 121A and 122 - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Sections 13, 18, 18A, 20 and 43D (5) - Applicability of "Bail is the Rule, Jail is the Exception" – The principle of "bail is the rule, jail is the exception" is applicable even under stringent statutes like the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA), subject to the satisfaction of statutory conditions. The Court emphasized that the duty of courts is to objectively assess the material in the charge sheet while considering bail applications, without being influenced by the severity of allegations or external factors such as the activities of associated organizations. The Court found that the charge sheet and witness statements did not prima facie establish reasonable grounds to believe that the accusations against the appellant were true. The High Court and Special Court failed to properly appreciate the appellant's case, focusing instead on the broader activities of the Popular Front of India (PFI). Denying bail in such circumstances would amount to a violation of the appellant's fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court set aside the impugned orders and directed the appellant's release on bail, with terms and conditions to be fixed by the Special Court. The findings were expressly limited to the bail application and would not affect the trial or the cases of co-accused. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted bail. (Para 15 & 21) Jalaluddin Khan v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 571 : AIR 2024 SC 4380 : (2024) 10 SCC 574
Section 179 - Using as genuine, forged or counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currency-notes or bank-notes.
[Eleven sections of IPC [237 to 241, 250, 251, 254, 258, 260, 489B] have been covered in this single section of BNS. Thus, in a single stroke, the number of section and offences has been reduced by ten. Section 180 BNS - Possession of forged or counterfeit coin, Government stamp, currencynotes or bank-notes. Six sections of IPC [242, 243, 252, 253, 259, 489C] have been covered in this single section of BNS. Thus, in a single stroke, the number of sections and offences has been reduced by five. and 'not constitute an offence' is added.]
Sections 489B, 489C IPC – Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967; Section 16 - Bail Application – The High Court's order rejecting bail was set aside due to the protracted nature of the trial, with only two witnesses examined since 2015. The Court noted the invalidity of the prosecution's sanction for charges under Section 16 of the UAPA, as it did not comply with Section 45(2) of the Act. The trial for the remaining charges under Sections 489B and 489C IPC was to continue. Compliance with the procedural requirements under Section 45(2) of UAPA is mandatory for valid prosecution under the Act. Appeal allowed; bail granted. Sheikh Javed Iqbal @ Ashfaq Ansari @ Javed Ansari v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 486 : AIR 2024 SC 3579 : (2024) 8 SCC 293
Section 189 (1) - Unlawful assembly
[First, second, third, fourth, fifth, have been replaced by (a), (b), (c), (d) and ( e)]
Sections 143, 147, 148, 120B and 302 r/w. 149 IPC - Reversal of acquittal - The appellants, who were initially acquitted by the Trial Court were convicted by the High Court following an appeal by the State. The appellants challenged this conviction, claiming that the High Court failed to adequately address the contradictions and discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, especially the testimonies of key eyewitnesses. The Court examined the principles for appellate review in cases of acquittal, emphasizing that an appellate court has the power to re-appreciate evidence but must provide clear and convincing reasons for reversing an acquittal. The Court noted the lack of independent witnesses, contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses, and the delay in recording their statements. The Trial Court's findings that the prosecution had not proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt were significant. After applying the standard of review for appeals against acquittal, including the presumption of innocence and the double presumption in favor of the accused, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had failed to substantiate its reversal of the acquittal. The Court set aside the High Court's conviction and restored the acquittal of the appellants, thereby allowing the appeal. The appeal was allowed, and the judgment of the High Court convicting the appellants was set aside. Ramesh v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 718 : AIR 2024 SC 4481 : (2024) 9 SCC 169
Section 190 - Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of common object
[No change]
Section 149 IPC - Accused presence and active role within the assembly, despite a lack of direct assault or recovery of the weapon, was sufficient for his conviction. Constructive liability under Section 149 does not require personal commission of an offence; mere membership in an assembly with a shared unlawful intent suffices. Nitya Nand v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 659 : AIR 2024 SC 4259 : 2024 Cri LJ 3910 : (2024) 9 SCC 314
Section 149 IPC - If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence-A plain reading of the provision abundantly makes clear that an overt act of some of the accused persons of an unlawful assembly with the common object to kill the deceased Shivanna and to cause grievous hurt to the other family members is enough to rope in all of them for an offence under Section 302 IPC in aid with Section 149 IPC. (Para 20) Haalesh @ Haleshi @ Kurubara Haleshi v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 88 : AIR 2024 SC 1056 : (2024) 3 SCC 475
Section 191 (3) - Rioting - Being armed with deadly weapon
[IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS, sans heading. Upper limit of imprisonment is increased from three years to five years.]
Sections 148, 302, and 307 r/w. 34 - The appeal centered on the validity of the prosecution's case, with the appellants arguing that the alleged motive and genesis of the incident were unreliable due to inconsistencies in the evidence and the absence of independent witnesses. The Court examined the testimonies of the injured witnesses, the forensic evidence, and the accused's defenses. It noted the credibility and coherence of the witnesses' accounts, which withstood cross-examination, thus supporting the prosecution's version of events. The Court emphasized that minor discrepancies in witness statements or the non-examination of independent witnesses do not automatically discredit credible testimonies. Addressing the element of common intention under Section 34, IPC, the Court observed that common intention can form even moments before the act and may be inferred from the appellants' conduct. Here, the appellants' rapid regrouping and attack on the victims with weapons following a prior altercation suggested a shared intent to commit the crime. The Court found no merit in the appellants' claims of self-defense or false implication due to family disputes, ruling that these arguments were inadequately substantiated. It concluded that the Trial Court and High Court judgments were sound and did not result in any miscarriage of justice. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentences of A-1, A-2, and A-3. Baljinder Singh @ Ladoo v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : AIR 2024 SC 4810 : 2024 Cri LJ 4411
Section 148, 302, and 324 IPC - The case was based on the testimony of the deceased's widow who claimed to have identified the assailants in dim moonlight during a power cut. However, the Court found significant inconsistencies and contradictions in her deposition, particularly when compared to her earlier complaint. These contradictions raised reasonable doubts regarding the reliability of her testimony. The Court further noted that the assault occurred in a chaotic environment, complicating the identification of the attackers. Given the dubious nature of the evidence and the appellants' prolonged incarceration, the Court granted the benefit of doubt to the appellants and acquitted them of all charges. Saheb v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : AIR 2024 SC 4466
Section 196 - Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, etc., and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony
[The word “or through electronic communication” is added as one of the modes of spreading disharmony, etc.]
Section 153A IPC – For applying Section 153A IPC, the presence of two or more groups or communities is essential. Held, in the present case, no such groups or communities were referred to in the news article. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 29) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : (2024) 7 SCC 555
Section 153-A (1) (a) & Section 153-A (1) (b) IPC and Constitution of India; Article 19(1) (a) – Freedom to criticise decisions of the government – Article 19(1)(a) guarantees freedom of speech and expression, under which, every citizen has the right to offer criticism of the action of abrogation of Article 370 or every other decision of the State. If every criticism or protest of the actions of the State is to be held as an offence under Section 153-A, democracy, which is an essential feature of the Constitution of India, will not survive. The appellant intended to criticise the action of the abrogation of Article 370 of the Constitution of India and did not refer to any religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community. Describing the day the abrogation happened as a “Black Day” is an expression of protest and anguish. The effect of the words used by the appellant will have to be judged from the standards of reasonable women and men. Merely because a few individuals may develop hatred or ill will, it will not be sufficient to attract Section 153-A (1) (a) of the IPC. Further, every citizen has the right to extend good wishes to the citizens of the other countries on their respective independence days. It cannot be said that such acts will tend to create disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious groups. Motives cannot be attributed only because the person belongs to a particular religion. WhatsApp status of the appellant cannot be said to be prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony among various groups. Thus, continuation of the prosecution under Section 153-A of the IPC will be a gross abuse of the process of law. (Para 9, 10, 11, 12 & 14) Javed Ahmad Hajam v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : (2024) 4 SCC 156
Section 208 - Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant
[The upper limit of the fine is increased from five hundred to five thousand rupees and one thousand to ten thousand rupees; 'Court of justice' is replaced by 'Court' etc.]
Section 174 IPC - Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988; Section 50 - Overriding Effect over Cr.P.C. – Summons to Witnesses and Accused Persons – Validity and Compliance - The provisions of the PMLA override those of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.), as explicitly provided under Sections 65 and 71 of the PMLA. The PMLA constitutes a self-contained code governing all matters related to the prevention of money laundering, including attachment, confiscation of proceeds of crime, and inquiry/investigation leading to prosecution. Section 50 of the PMLA empowers the designated authorities to summon any person for evidence or production of documents during the inquiry process, which is deemed a judicial proceeding under Section 50(4) of the Act. The inquiry conducted under Section 50 is distinct from a criminal investigation under Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C., and the safeguards applicable under Section 160/161 Cr.P.C. do not extend to such proceedings. Consequently, Article 20(3) of the Constitution, which protects against self-incrimination, is not attracted at the stage of issuing summons unless the person is formally arrested. The statements recorded under Section 50 are admissible evidence, unlike statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., which are limited in evidentiary value. The procedural safeguards under the PMLA, including the issuance of summons in the prescribed format as per Rule 11 of the 2005 Rules, are sufficient and enforceable. In the instant case, summons issued by the Directorate of Enforcement were held valid, and the appellants' failure to comply with the summons led to proceedings under Section 63 PMLA read with Section 174 IPC. The Court rejected the appellants' challenges, emphasizing the overriding nature of PMLA and the validity of Section 50 proceedings. Appeals dismissed; summons under Section 50 PMLA upheld. Abhishek Banerjee v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 674 : AIR 2024 SC 439 : 2024 Cri LJ 4193 : (2024) 9 SCC 22
Section 229 - Punishment for false evidence
[Fine is defined in sub-section (1) as up to ten thousand rupees and in sub-section (2) as up to five thousand rupees.]
Section 193 IPC - Mere denial of the complainant's allegations does not constitute perjury. Prosecution for perjury requires clear evidence of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and should only be initiated when expedient in the interest of justice. James Kunjwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 574 : AIR 2024 SC 3965
Section 274 - Adulteration of food or drink intended for sale
[Upper limit of fine is increased from one thousand to five thousand rupees.]
Sections 272 and 273 IPC - If a case is registered against an accused for food adulteration under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”), then by virtue of the overriding effect of Section 89 of Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 (“FSSA”), the proceedings under IPC cannot be continued against the accused. There cannot be simultaneous prosecution under the IPC and FSSA because by virtue of Section 89 of FSSA, Section 59 of FSSA would override the provisions of Sections 272 and 273 of the IPC. Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Sections 272 and 273 IPC - When the offences under Section 272 and 273 of the IPC are made out, even the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA will be attracted. In fact, the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is more stringent. (Para 20) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Section 275 - Sale of noxious food or drink
[Upper limit of fine is increased from one thousand to five thousand rupees.]
Section 273 of the IPC applies when a person sells or, offers or exposes for sale any article of food or drink which has been rendered noxious or has become unfit for food or drink. Section 273 incorporates requirements of knowledge or reasonable belief that the food or drink sold or offered for sale is noxious. Section 59 of the FSSA does not require the presence of intention as contemplated by Section 272 of the IPC. Under Section 59 of the FSSA, a person commits an offence who, whether by himself or by any person on his behalf, manufactures for sale or stores or sells or distributes any article of food for human consumption which is unsafe. So, the offence under Section 59 of the FSSA is made out even if there is an absence of intention as provided in Section 272 of the IPC. (Para 18) Ram Nath v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 160
Section 294 - Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc.
[The fine is increased from two thousand to five thousand rupees and from five thousand to ten thousand rupees on subsequent conviction. “including display of any content in electronic form'” is added. “in whatever manner” is also added.]
Section 292 IPC - Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Obscenity – Profanity is not per se obscene – Vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity. While a person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful, unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to be 'obscene'. The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene, was “foul, indecent and profane” language and nothing more. The High Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting. (Para 35) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781
Section 292 IPC - Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Standard to determine obscenity – 'Community standard test' – The Supreme Court in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal markedly moved away from the Hicklin test to the “community standard test”. The standard of determination is that of an ordinary common person and not a hypersensitive person such as an adolescent's or child's mind, who is susceptible to influences. The High Court has incorrectly used the standard of “impressionable minds” to gauge the effect of the material and has therefore erred in applying the test for obscenity correctly. (Para 7. 1 & 39) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781
Section 292 IPC - Information Technology Act, 2000; Section 67 – Objective consideration while assessing whether the material is obscene – The court must consider the work as a whole and then the specific portions that have been alleged to be obscene in the context of the whole work to arrive at its conclusion. The High Court has taken the meaning of the language in its literal sense, outside the context in which such expletives have been spoken. While the literal meaning of the terms used may be sexual in nature and they may refer to sexual acts, their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather, the common usage of these words is reflective of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement. By taking the literal meaning of these words, the High Court failed to consider the specific material (profane language) in the context of the larger web-series and by the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and prudence”. Neither did the creator of the web-series intend for the language to be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on a reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore, there is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court in analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity. (Para 36 & 37) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781
Section 292 IPC – Obscene material – Section 292 defines 'obscene' as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import, export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material when the publication is justified as being for public good on the ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. (Para 12) Apoorva Arora v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : AIR 2024 SC 1775 : 2024 Cri LJ 1781
Section 308 (2) - Extortion punishment
[IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading. The upper limit of the imprisonment is increased from three years to seven years.]
Section 384 IPC - The appellants had been in custody for 2 years and 1 year 9 months, respectively. Initially, an FIR under various sections of the IPC was registered, but no scheduled offence under PMLA was present at the time of filing the charge-sheet. Subsequently, Section 384 IPC was added, but its validity as a scheduled offence was in question. Whether the appellants were entitled to bail under Section 4 of the PMLA Act, considering the absence of a valid scheduled offence at the time of filing the PMLA complaint and the prolonged incarceration. Held, the Supreme Court granted bail to the appellants, observing that at the time of filing the PMLA complaint, there was no scheduled offence under the Act. The addition of Section 384 IPC later did not retrospectively validate the absence of a scheduled offence at the relevant time. Continued incarceration of the appellants violated their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. Laxmikant Tiwari v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 787
Section 309 (6) - Robbery Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery.
[IPC Section is included as sub-section in BNS sans heading. No other change.]
Sections 394, 376D, 411 and 34 IPC - Preventive Detention—Justification for Invocation of Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986 — Isolated Instances of Criminal Conduct Insufficient to Sustain Detention Order - Held, preventive detention under Section 3 of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1986, requires a clear nexus between the alleged acts of the detenu and the necessity to prevent activities prejudicial to public order. Mere involvement in heinous offences, such as rape or extortion, does not suffice unless the acts integrally connect to maintaining public order. In this case, the detention order was based on two incidents: extortionand gang rape coupled with robbery. The Court ruled: (i) These were isolated instances without evidence of habitual or repeated criminal behavior. (ii) The order failed to establish how the alleged conduct prejudiced public order beyond normal law and order concerns. (iii) Subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was unsupported by material evidence linking the detenu's actions to public order disruption. The Court quashed the detention order, directing the release of the detenu, unless required in other cases. Appeal Allowed. Vaddi Lakshmi v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 254
Section 316 (1) - Criminal breach of trust
[Definition presented in BNS as a sub-section.]
Section 405 IPC - Criminal Breach of Trust - Commercial disputes over variation of rate cannot per se give rise to an offence under Section 405 of the 1860 Code without presence of any aggravating factor leading to the substantiation of its ingredients. (Para 14) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75
Section 316 (2) - Punishment for criminal breach of trust
[IPC Section is included as sub-section in BNS sans heading. The upper limit of the imprisonment is increased from three years to five years.]
Section 406, 409, and 462 IPC - Quashing of FIR – Absence of Mens Rea and Essential Ingredients – Sections 34, 37, 120B, 201, 206, 217, 406, 409, 420, and 462 IPC – Juristic Person – Inducement and Entrustment of Property – Inapplicability of Offences - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the FIR registered against officials of the appellant-bank. It held that for an offence under Section 420 IPC, the FIR must show fraudulent or dishonest inducement with mens rea, which was absent in this case. Furthermore, since the appellant-bank, being a juristic person, cannot possess mens rea, Sections 406, 409, and 462 IPC were also inapplicable due to the absence of entrustment or misappropriation of property. Similarly, Sections 206, 217, and 201 IPC require mens rea, which was not established. The Court relied on Bhajan Lal principles and found the FIR fell under categories (2) and (3) warranting quashing. Continuation of proceedings would cause undue hardship to the bank. Appeal allowed; FIR and High Court order quashed. Hdfc Bank v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 823 : AIR 2024 SC 5455
Section 406 and 420 IPC - Failure to pay rent coupled with false assurances may indicate dishonest intent and warrant investigation for criminal breach of trust. Somjeet Mallick v. State of Jharkhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 797
Section 406 IPC - Allegations that the appellants, former in-laws of the complainant's daughter, had not returned the "stridhan" (gifts, including gold ornaments) given at the time of marriage. Key facts include the unsuccessful marriage of the complainant's daughter, her divorce in the U.S. in 2016, and subsequent remarriage in 2018. The complaint, filed in 2021, alleged the failure of the appellants to return the "stridhan." The Supreme Court found no evidence supporting the claim of "stridhan" possession by the appellants, emphasizing that the complainant had no locus standi to initiate proceedings on behalf of his daughter without her express authorization. The Court reiterated established jurisprudence on the absolute ownership of "stridhan" by a married woman and highlighted that delay in filing the FIR raised questions about the complainant's motives. The appeal was allowed, and the proceedings were quashed on the grounds of insufficient evidence, unexplained delay, and abuse of the legal process. Mulakala Malleshwara Rao v. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 621 : AIR 2024 SC 4067
Section 406 and 420 IPC - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - In a criminal breach of trust, there is an entrustment of property, where the accused dishonestly misappropriates or uses the property in violation of the trust placed in him. In contrast, cheating involves a fraudulent or dishonest inducement from the beginning of the transaction, where the accused deceives the victim into delivering property or taking action they would not have otherwise taken. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 IPC - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Criminal breach of trust requires that the property entrusted must belong to someone other than the accused, who holds it in trust. Cheating, on the other hand, is based on false representations made at the inception of the transaction. Both offences, while involving dishonest intent, are mutually exclusive. The accused cannot be charged with both for the same transaction unless distinct elements of each offence are present. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 IPC - Difference Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - Mere breach of contract does not give rise to a criminal offence unless fraudulent or dishonest intent at the inception is demonstrated. A civil remedy is appropriate where the dispute arises from non-payment after a sale of goods, as the sale transfers ownership to the buyer, eliminating the possibility of criminal breach of trust. Prosecution under criminal breach of trust cannot be sustained without the essential element of entrustment. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 IPC - Judicial Oversight in Distinguishing Between Criminal Breach of Trust and Cheating - the Supreme Court expressed concern over the casual approach of the lower courts in distinguishing between the offences of criminal breach of trust and cheating. The Court emphasized the magistrates' duty to thoroughly examine complaints and ascertain whether the ingredients of the specific offences are met. It also criticized the police's routine practice of registering both offences without proper application of mind. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 IPC - The Court called for proper legal training for police officers across the country to prevent wrongful prosecution under these distinct offences. It further directed that the judgment be sent to the Union Ministries of Law & Justice and Home Affairs for appropriate action, highlighting the need for systemic reforms. Delhi Race Club (1940) Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : AIR 2024 SC 4531
Section 406 and 420 IPC - Mere non-performance of a contractual obligation, such as failure to register the sale, does not constitute cheating or criminal breach of trust. Radheyshyam v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 595
Section 406 IPC – Criminal breach of trust – Section 406 requires entrustment, which carries the implication that a person handing over any property or on whose behalf the property is handed over, continues to be the owner of the said property. Further, the person handing over the property must have confidence in the person taking the property to create a fiduciary relationship between them. A normal transaction of sale or exchange of money/consideration does not amount to entrustment. (Para 36) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322
Section 406 IPC – Dishonest misappropriation of 'Stridhan' – Entrustment of stridhan property with dominion over such property to the husband or to any member of his family as well as dishonest misappropriation of or conversion to his own use the said property by the husband or such other member of his family is an offence under Section 406 – Held, admittedly there is no criminal offence claimed and, therefore, proof on balance of probabilities would be sufficient. (Para 21) Maya Gopinathan v. Anoop S.B., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 327 : AIR 2024 SC 2454
Sections 406 and 506 IPC - The ingredients to allege the offence are neither stated nor can be inferred from the averments. A prayer is made to the police for recovery of money from the appellants. The police is to investigate the allegations which discloses a criminal act. Police does not have the power and authority to recover money or act as a civil court for recovery of money. Lalit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 150
Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC - On a reading of the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offences aforestated is made out at all. We do not find any criminal breach of trust nor any cheating by impersonation. There is also no cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property, nor has any documents referred to any forgery or security or any forgery for the purpose of cheating. There is no reference to any document which has been forged so as to be used as a genuine document and much less is as there any criminal conspiracy which can be imputed to the appellants herein in the absence of any offence being made out vis-a-vis the aforesaid Sections. (Para 17) Vishal Noble Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 96
Section 406, 409, 420, 457, 380 IPC - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; S. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; S. 319 - Demand of money for extending benefits during custody - Application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against the police officials - All the witnesses have equivocally narrated the incidents that took place at different places regarding threats, demand of huge sum of money, torture etc. - According to them, the amount was being demanded for the following benefits to be extended: (i) firstly, not to physically torture; (ii) not to ask for further police remand; (iii) to help get bail; and (iv) to give good treatment during custody. Held, there appears to be prima facie evidence on record to make it a triable case as against the police officials. (Para 8 - 14) Gurdev Singh Bhalla v. State of Punjab, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 28 : (2024) 3 SCC 142
Section 316 (5) - Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent
[Section is included as sub-section in BNS sans heading]
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120-B IPC - Maharashtra Protection of Interest of Depositors (in Financial Establishments) Act, 1999; Section 3 - Bail Cancellation – Exercise of Judicial Discretion – Economic Offences – Relevant Principles - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting bail to respondent no.1, holding that the discretion exercised was inconsistent with established legal principles. The Court reiterated that while granting bail, factors such as the seriousness of the offence, prima facie evidence, role of the accused, risks of tampering with evidence, and societal impact must be carefully considered. It observed that the High Court failed to appreciate the gravity of the allegations, including the siphoning of ₹9 crores in a financial scam affecting economically vulnerable individuals. The Court emphasized that bail orders should not be arbitrary or perverse and must be reasoned, reflecting due application of judicial mind. The High Court's failure to impose stringent conditions in a case involving economic offences compounded the error. The Court clarified that the cancellation of bail is justified where the grant is found illegal, perverse, or unsupported by relevant material. It underscored that such decisions must balance the liberty of the accused with the interests of justice and the victims. Acknowledging the respondent's medical condition and prior incarceration, the Court left open the possibility of a fresh bail application in changed circumstances. Appeal allowed; bail order set aside. Respondent directed to surrender within three weeks, with liberty to reapply for bail later. Observations limited to the present matter and shall not prejudice the trial proceedings. Manik Madhukar Sarve v. Vitthal Damuji Meher, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 619 : AIR 2024 SC 4078 : (2024) 10 SCC 753
Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420 IPC - Civil Nature – Power of Attorney – Interpretation of Clauses – Jurisdiction – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - The Supreme Court examined the interplay of Clauses 3, 11, and 15 of a Power of Attorney (PoA) executed on 12.04.1994, authorizing the PoA-holder to execute deeds, including sale deeds, receive consideration, and register the same on behalf of the landowners/principals. The Court harmoniously construed the clauses, concluding that they operate independently and are not contradictory. Clause 15, which permits the PoA-holder to present sale deeds signed by the landowners for registration, was interpreted as supplementary rather than derogatory to Clauses 3 and 11. The dispute involved the sale of land located in Dehradun, executed and registered by the PoA-holder on behalf of the appellant. The Court noted that jurisdiction over the matter lies with courts in Dehradun, as the property and related transactions occurred there. It further observed that earlier litigation by the landowners to cancel the sale deed was dismissed in favor of the appellant. The appellant, having paid the full consideration, could not be implicated in alleged misdeeds of the PoA-holder. Quashing FIR and related proceedings, the Court emphasized the need to protect individuals from unnecessary criminal prosecution when no prima facie case is made against them. The appeal was allowed, with the caveat that the Trial Court retains the authority to act under Section 319, CrPC if warranted. Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 80 : AIR 2024 SC 1071 : (2024) 4 SCC 318
Section 318 (1) - Cheating
[IPC section defining cheating is presented in BNS as a sub-section.]
Section 415 IPC – Cheating – The offence of cheating requires dishonest inducement, delivering of a property as a result of the inducement, and damage or harm to the person so induced. The offence of cheating is established when the dishonest intention exists at the time when the contract or agreement is entered, for the essential ingredient of the offence of cheating consists of fraudulent or dishonest inducement of a person by deceiving him to deliver any property, to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he had not been deceived. (Para 37) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322
Sections 415 and 420 IPC – Ingredients for Cheating and Dishonest Inducement – Essential Elements - Explained - Held, dishonest inducement is a sine qua non for both Sections 415 and 420 IPC. If the FIR or charge-sheet fails to disclose specific inducement or dishonest intention, continuation of criminal proceedings constitutes abuse of process and leads to a miscarriage of justice. The appellant (Accused No. 3) had no direct transaction with the complainant. The allegations of inducement pertain solely to Accused Nos. 1 and 2. The appellant's actions were limited to receiving payment and executing a sale deed in favor of Accused No. 1. The FIR and charge-sheet failed to disclose the essential ingredients of Section 420 IPC as against the appellant. The proceedings were quashed under Section 482 CrPC to prevent abuse of process. Appeal allowed; FIR and the consequential charge-sheet quashed. A.M. Mohan v. State, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 197
Sections 415 and 420 IPC - Cheating - Ingredients to constitute the offence - Discussed. (Para 11 - 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196
Sections 415 and 420 IPC - Cheating - For attracting the provisions of Section 420 of IPC, it must be shown that the FIR / complaint discloses: (i) the deception of any person; (ii) fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person to deliver any property to any person; and (iii) dishonest intention of the accused at the time of making the inducement. (Para 13) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196
Sections 415 and 420 IPC - Cheating - The dishonest inducement is the sine qua non to attract the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 of IPC. (Para 20) N. Manogar v. Inspector of Police, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 196
Section 318 (2) - Cheating punishment
[The IPC section is included as a sub-section in the BNS sans heading. The upper limit of imprisonment is increased from one year to three years.]
Section 417 IPC - Mere non-performance of marriage by accused at booked marriage hall does not constitute commission of offense of cheating. (Para 8) Raju Krishna Shedbalkar v. State of Karnataka, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 158
Section 318 (3) - Cheating with knowledge that wrongful loss may ensue to person whose interest offender is bound to protect
[IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading. The upper limit of imprisonment is increased from three years to five years.]
Sections 418 and 420 IPC - The complainant purchased a BMW 7 Series vehicle and reported a defect. A complaint was lodged for alleged offences under Sections 418 and 420 of the IPC, naming the manufacturer, Managing Director, and other directors as accused. The High Court concluded that the ingredients of the offence of cheating were not established based on the contents of the FIR. Having come to this conclusion, there was no justification for the High Court thereafter to direct the manufacturer to replace the vehicle with a new BMW 7 Series. Held, the High Court correctly quashed the criminal proceedings, as the ingredients of cheating were not established based on the FIR. The Court deemed it unnecessary to continue prosecution, given the nature of the dispute and the elapsed time. Exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court directed BMW India Private Limited to pay Rs 50 lakhs to the complainant in full settlement. (Para 10 - 15) State of Andhra Pradesh v. BMW India P.Ltd., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 466
Section 318 (4) - Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property
[IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading.]
Sections 420, 468, 471, 120B IPC - Criminal Appeal – Discharge of Accused – The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) filed a charge sheet against multiple accused, including former Chairman and Managing Director of the Central Bank of India, alleging criminal conspiracy and misconduct in sanctioning a credit facility. The High Court discharged the respondent, leading to this appeal. Whether the High Court erred in discharging the respondent at the stage of framing of charges. Whether mere suspicion due to expedited loan sanctioning justifies framing charges under conspiracy and corruption laws. Held, the Court found no evidence linking the respondent to criminal conspiracy or personal gain from the transactions. The loan sanction followed internal bank procedures, including Loan Advisory and Management Committee approvals. Mere suspicion due to the speed of sanctioning is insufficient for framing charges. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's discharge of the respondent while clarifying that observations in this judgment shall not affect the trial of other accused. Appeal dismissed. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Srinivas D. Sridhar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 804 : AIR 2024 SC 5428
Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 323, 504 and 506 IPC - Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 2(b)(i) and 3(1) - “Gang” - Meaning of - the person alleged to be the member of the gang should be found indulging in anti-social activities which would be covered under the offences punishable under Chapters XVI, or XVII or XXII IPC. For framing a charge for the offence under the Gangsters Act and for continuing the prosecution of the accused under the above provisions, the prosecution would be required to clearly state that the accused are being prosecuted for any one or more offences covered by anti-social activities as defined under Section 2(b). (Para 12 & 13) Farhana v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 131 : AIR 2024 SC 1158
Section 420 IPC - It must also be understood that a statement of fact is deemed 'deceitful' when it is false and is knowingly or recklessly made with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another person, resulting in damage or loss. 'Cheating' therefore, generally involves a preceding deceitful act that dishonestly induces a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, prompting the induced person to undertake the said act, which they would not have done but for the inducement. (Para 12) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033
Section 420 IPC - The act of the wife to forge the sign of husband to seek the passport for minor child to travel abroad doesn't amount to cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, due to the absence of a deceitful act that resulted in a loss or damage of property to a husband. Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033
Section 420 IPC - The term 'property' employed in Section 420 IPC has a well defined connotation. Every species of valuable right or interest that is subject to ownership and has an exchangeable value – is ordinarily understood as 'property'. It also describes one's exclusive right to possess, use and dispose of a thing. The IPC itself defines the term 'moveable property' as, “intended to include corporeal property of every description, except land and things attached to the earth or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth.” Whereas immoveable property is generally understood to mean land, benefits arising out of land and things attached or permanently fastened to the earth. (Para 13) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033
Section 420 IPC - While prosecuting a person for the offence of cheating punishable under Section 420 IPC, it is to be seen whether the deceitful act of cheating was coupled with an inducement leading to the parting of any property by the complainant. To constitute an offence of cheating, merely committing a deceitful act is not sufficient unless the deceitful act dishonestly induced a person to deliver any property or any part of a valuable security, thereby resulting in loss or damage to the person. (Para 10 - 20) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033
Section 329 (1) - Criminal trespass and house- trespass
[IPC section is included as a sub-section.]
Sections 441, 442, and 452 IPC - "house trespass" - Restaurant did not qualify as a "human dwelling" or a place for "custody of property". Hence, the essential ingredient of "house trespass" was not established. Sonu Choudary v. State of NCT Delhi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 882
Section 336 (3) - Forgery for purpose of cheating
[Section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading. No other Change.]
Sections 468 and 471 IPC - Forgery - There are two primary components that need to be fulfilled in order to establish the offence of 'forgery', namely: (i) that the accused has fabricated an instrument; and (ii) it was done with the intention that the forged document would be used for the purpose of cheating. Simply put, the offence of forgery requires the preparation of a false document with the dishonest intention of causing damage or injury. (Para 22) Mariam Fasihuddin v. State by Adugodi Police Station, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 53 : AIR 2024 SC 801 : 2024 Cri LJ 1033
Section 351 (2) / (3) - Criminal intimidation punishment
[IPC Section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading.]
Section 506 IPC – Criminal intimidation – An offence of criminal intimidation arises when the accused intendeds to cause alarm to the victim, though it does not matter whether the victim is alarmed or not. The word 'intimidate' means to make timid or fearful, especially: to compel or deter by or as if by threats. The threat communicated or uttered by the person named in the chargesheet as an accused, should be uttered and communicated by the said person to threaten the victim for the purpose of influencing her mind. The word 'threat' refers to the intent to inflict punishment, loss or pain on the other. Mere expression of any words without any intent to cause alarm would not be sufficient to bring home an offence under Section 506 of the IPC. (Para 38) Sharif Ahmed v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : AIR 2024 SC 2420 : 2024 CriLJ 2322
Section 506 IPC - Criminal Intimidation - The allegation of criminal intimidation against the accused is made in the complaint statements, no particulars thereof have been given. Both in the complaint petition and the initial deposition of one of the witnesses, there is only reproduction of part of the statutory provision giving rise to the offence of criminal intimidation. This would constitute a mere bald allegation, short of any particulars as regards to the manner in which threat was conveyed. (Para 17) Sachin Garg v. State of U.P, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 75
Section 352 - Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace
[Words “in any manner” are added.]
Section 504 IPC – This offence can be invoked when the insult of a person provokes him to break public peace or to commit any other offence. Held, there is no such allegation in the FIR that owing to the alleged offensive post attributable to the appellant, the complainant was provoked to such an extent that he could indulge in disturbing the public peace or commit any other offence. Hence, the FIR lacks the necessary ingredients of the said offence. (Para 30) Shiv Prasad Semwal v. State of Uttarakhand, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : (2024) 7 SCC 555
Section 356 (1) - Defamation
[IPC Section is included as a sub section.]
Sections 499 and 500 IPC - Petitioner described all Gujarati people as “thugs”. It is true that every prosecution for defamation cannot be quashed on the ground that the offending allegations have been withdrawn. After the petitioner has explained the context in which he made the statements and after withdrawal of those statements, in the facts of the case, it is unjust to continue the prosecution. No purpose will be served by continuing the prosecution. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of the case, this is a fit case to quash the complaint. (Para 8 - 10) Tejashwi Prasad Yadav v. Hareshbhai Pranshankar Mehta, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 113 : AIR 2024 SC 1026 : (2024) 4 SCC 731
Section 356 (2) - Defamation punishment
[IPC section is included as a sub-section in BNS sans heading. “or with community service” is added as an alternate punishment.]
Section 500 IPC - A criminal defamation case was filed against the owner of a newspaper for an article published against an advocate. The Magistrate rejected the complaint, stating that the news article in question was published in good faith and in the exercise of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Magistrate's view cannot be termed as "illegal or unjustified," and therefore, there is no justification for interference by the Sessions Court or the High Court. (Para 8 & 9) Sanjay Upadhya v. Anand Dubey, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 67 AIR 2024 SC 811 : (2024) 3 SCC 718