Supreme Court Quashes FIR Against YouTuber Elvish Yadav in Snake Venom Case; Allows Filing Of Fresh Wildlife Complaint

Update: 2026-03-19 06:48 GMT
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The Supreme Court on Thursday quashed the criminal proceedings against YouTuber Elvish Yadav in a case alleging use of snake venom in video shoots and involvement in rave parties where drugs were consumed, holding that the FIR could not be sustained in law on the limited legal issues examined.A Bench comprising Justice MM Sundresh and Justice N Kotiswar Singh clarified that it was confining...

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The Supreme Court on Thursday quashed the criminal proceedings against YouTuber Elvish Yadav in a case alleging use of snake venom in video shoots and involvement in rave parties where drugs were consumed, holding that the FIR could not be sustained in law on the limited legal issues examined.

A Bench comprising Justice MM Sundresh and Justice N Kotiswar Singh clarified that it was confining its consideration to two specific questions: the applicability of Section 2(23) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, and the validity of proceedings under Section 55 of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972.

On the NDPS aspect, the Court recorded the submission of Senior Advocate Mukta Gupta that the alleged psychotropic substance (snake venom antidote) recovered from a co-accused did not fall within the Schedule of the NDPS Act. The Bench noted that, admittedly, the substance in question was not covered under the statutory schedule. It also took note of the argument that no recovery had been made from Yadav himself, with the charge sheet only alleging that he placed orders through an associate.

In light of this, the Court found that the invocation of the NDPS Act was not legally sustainable on the facts presented.

Turning to the second issue concerning the Wildlife Protection Act, the Bench observed that Section 55 mandates that prosecution can be initiated only through a complaint filed by a duly authorised officer. The complaint that led to registration of the present FIR was filed by one Gaurav Gupta, associated with an animal welfare organisation called People For Animals (PFA).

Referring to settled precedent on the point, the Court held that the FIR, in its present form, was not maintainable as it was not filed by a competent authority.  The Court also expressed doubts on the complainant's bona fides.

The Court also recorded the submission that offences under the Indian Penal Code were not independently made out, as they were part of an earlier complaint that had already been closed.

Concluding that the FIR could not stand scrutiny on these legal grounds, the bench ordered that the proceedings be quashed. However, it clarified that it had not examined the underlying allegations on merits.

Notably, the Court granted liberty to the competent authority to initiate appropriate proceedings in accordance with law, including by filing a proper complaint under Section 55 of the Wildlife Protection Act. "We are not going to give a clean chit to this person. If he has committed something it has to be done", Justice Sundresh remarked.

The Court was hearing Yadav's plea challenging the Allahabad High Court's order dated May 12, 2025, which had dismissed his petition against the chargesheet and summoning order issued in a case under various provisions of the Wildlife Protection Act, IPC, and NDPS Act.

On August 6, 2025 the Court granted stay on trial court proceedings against Yadav in a case alleging that he misused snakes and snake venom for a YouTube video and was involved in organising rave parties where foreigners allegedly supplied snake venom and other intoxicating drugs.

Last month, the Court said it would examine whether there was adequate material to implicate him under the Wildlife Protection Act, remarking that it gives a very bad message that a popular person used a voiceless snake for publicity.

AAG Apoorva Agarwal appeared for the State of UP.

Advocates Uday Bedi and Varisha Sharma represented complainant Gaurav Gupta.

Headnote

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 — Section 55 — Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Section 2(xxiii) — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 120 B, 284 and 289 — Quashing of Criminal Proceedings — Non-compliance with Mandatory Special Procedure — Power Exercised Without Jurisdiction is Void Ab Initio - Key Legal Propositions held – i. Cognizance Under Special Statutes: Section 55 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 explicitly mandates that no court shall take cognizance of any offence under the Act except on a statutory complaint filed by an authorized officer - A police report or chargesheet under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C.

(or corresponding provisions of the BNSS) cannot be treated as a statutory complaint - Cognizance taken on the basis of a police chargesheet for offences under the 1972 Act is legally impermissible and unsustainable in law; ii. Definition of Psychotropic Substance - Under Section 2(xxiii) of the NDPS Act, 1985, a substance must be specifically listed in the Schedule of the Act to qualify as a "psychotropic substance" - The conscious omission of the legislature in not including "snake venom" or "antibodies to snake venom" in the NDPS Schedule means these substances cannot be construed as psychotropic substances - the recovery of snake venom antibodies does not warrant the invocation of the NDPS Act – iii. Jurisdictional Nullity and the Ripple Effect - When an initial action or investigation by an agency is undertaken in the complete absence of authority or statutory jurisdiction, the entire subsequent proceeding suffers from a fundamental illegality and is rendered void ab initio - Procedural irregularities can be cured, but an absolute lack of jurisdiction cannot be regularized or saved – iv. Double Jeopardy / Re-litigation on IPC Offences - Ingestion of allegations pertaining to Sections 284 and 289 of the IPC that were already the subject matter of an earlier complaint where a closure report was filed noting no cognizable offence or cruelty was established cannot form the basis of a subsequent criminal proceeding by a different agency lacking jurisdiction. [Relied On: State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan, (1988) 4 SCC 655; Jeewan Kumar Raut & Anr. v. Central Bureau of Investigation, (2009) 7 SCC 526; Balbir Singh v. State of Haryana, (1987) 1 SCC 533 (as emphasized in Raj Kumar Karwal v. Union of India, (1990) 2 SCC 409); B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Sanjay, (2014) 9 SCC 772; Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Sharma, (2021) 12 SCC 674; Paras: 14-40]

Case no. – SLP(Crl) No. 11480/2025

Case Title – Elvish Yadav @ Siddharth v. State of UP and Anr.

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 447

Click Here To Read/Download Order

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