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The Supreme Court on Thursday reserved its judgment on the plea filed by the Sambhal Jama Masjid Committee challenging the Allahabad High Court's order which upheld the trial court's order to appoint an advocate commissioner to survey the mosque in a suit filed by Hindu plaintiffs.

A bench comprising Justice PS Narasimha and Justice Alok Aradhe heard arguments from Senior Advocate Huzefa Ahmadi and Advocate Nizam Pasha for the mosque committee, Advocate Hari Shankar Jain for the Hindu plaintiffs and Additional Solicitor General KM Nataraj for the State of Uttar Pradesh.

The dispute arises from a civil suit filed by Hindu plaintiffs in 2024 seeking the right to access the Sambhal Jama Masjid for performing religious ceremonies on the claim that it was originally a Hindu temple which was demolished in the 16th century to build a mosque. The trial court had appointed an Advocate Commissioner to conduct a local investigation of the mosque premises on November 19, 2024. The Allahabad High Court, in its May 19, 2025 order, upheld the survey order and held that the suit cannot be held to be barred by the Places of Worship Act at this stage.

The mosque committee had raised its main arguments on the previous dates, and today, the plaintiffs and the State responded, with the mosque committee making rejoinder arguments at the end.

State Does Not Want To Enter Merits : UP 

ASG KM Nataraj, appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh, told the Court that the State did not wish to enter into the merits of the dispute since the main suit was pending trial.

"I don't want to get into the merits because the main matter is not pending before the court," Nataraj submitted, adding that the State was bound to protect the interests of both sides since the dispute concerned religious rights.

His submissions, however, focused on the interpretation of the Places of Worship Act.

Referring to Sections 2 and 3 of the Act, Nataraj submitted that Section 2 defines "conversion" to include alteration or changes, while Section 3 imposes a prohibition on conversion of a place of worship.

He pointed out that the expression "place of worship" is defined broadly and argued that the question whether a particular proceeding is barred would depend upon whether it concerns conversion of the religious character of the place.

Nataraj also referred to the provisions concerning religious denominations and Article 26 of the Constitution, submitting that the expression "religious denomination" may have to be considered in the context of the entire religion or a section thereof. He further submitted that Section 4(2) of the Act provides for abatement of pending suits concerning the matters covered by the statute.

"If the present proceedings are not concerning conversion, there is no bar on the proceedings," the ASG submitted. Incidentally, the plaintiffs' case is that they are not seeking conversion, and are only seeking access to the structure to perform prayers.

Nataraj also referred to the exception under Section 4(3) relating to ancient monuments and archaeological sites protected under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958.

He submitted that if a particular monument falls within the parameters of the statutory exception, the suit would not be barred on that account, but otherwise the issue would have to be examined in the context of the Places of Worship Act.

The State, he reiterated, did not wish to take a position on the merits of the underlying religious dispute.

Hindu Plaintiffs Rely On Ancient Monument Protection

Advocate Vishnu Shankar Jain, appearing for the Hindu plaintiffs, referred to the protection of the Sambhal structure under the ancient monuments legislation.

He submitted that the monument had been declared a protected monument under the ancient monuments regime as early as November 1920 and that the relevant documents had been compiled in his written submissions. He referred to Section 4(3)(a) of the Places of Worship Act to state that the Act does not apply to monuments covered under the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act.

Jain also relied on the proceedings relating to Bhojshala in Madhya Pradesh, arguing that the Supreme Court had not treated the Places of Worship Act as an absolute bar to proceedings concerning a protected monument.

He referred to an order passed in January concerning the Bhojshala matter and submitted that the issue had been remanded to the High Court.

"If there was a complete bar of the Places of Worship Act, the three-judge bench wouldn't have remanded the matter back to the High Court," Jain submitted.

Jain referred to material concerning alleged alterations to the monument and submitted that officials of the Archaeological Survey of India had noted such alterations. Justice Narasimha, however, observed that such submissions concerned the merits of the underlying dispute and were not presently before the Court.

Regarding the reliance placed by the mosque committee on the observations made by the Supreme Court in the Ayodhya judgmnet lauding the Places of Worship Act, Jain said that those were obiter comments and were not central to the dispute, as the Ayodhya case was exempted from the Act.

He also said that the High Court has not conclusively held that the suit was not barred by the 1991 Act, and has left the issue open to be agitated at the stage of framing of issues or application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.

Ahmadi: Section 3 Places Independent Bar Even For Ancient Monuments

Senior Advocate Huzefa Ahmadi, appearing for the Sambhal Jama Masjid Committee, responded to the submissions on behalf of the State and the plaintiffs. He submitted that the ASG's interpretation of Sections 2 and 3 of the Places of Worship Act itself demonstrated that the interpretation of these provisions is central to the dispute.

Ahmadi pointed out that the constitutional validity and interpretation of provisions of the Places of Worship Act are already before a larger bench of the Supreme Court. He argued that the long title of the 1991 Act makes clear that the prohibition operates irrespective of the religious denomination involved.

According to Ahmadi, the exception in Section 4(3) concerning ancient monuments cannot be read as taking such monuments entirely outside the operation of Section 3.

He submitted that while Section 4 may contain specific exceptions concerning protected monuments, Section 3 independently prohibits conversion of the religious character of a place of worship.

"If the interpretation is accepted, what is the consequence?" Ahmadi asked, arguing that accepting the contrary interpretation would mean that ancient temples and mosques protected under the ancient monuments legislation would effectively lose the protection against conversion contained in Section 3.

He submitted that the protection under Section 3 would therefore apply to an ancient monument which continues to have the character of a place of worship.

Ahmadi also distinguished the Bhojshala proceedings relied upon by Jain. He submitted that the issue in Bhojshala concerned the maintainability of a writ petition challenging an order of the ASI, whereas the Sambhal case directly concerns the applicability of the Places of Worship Act to a civil suit seeking relief concerning the religious use of the structure.

He also pointed out that the Bhojshala matter did not involve a reference on the interpretation of the Places of Worship Act.

Ahmadi also asked if an ex-parte order for survey could be passed in a suit filed by plaintiffs after fifty years. Advocate Nizam Pasha argued that as per Section 16 of the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, an ancient monument, if it is a place of worship, cannot be used in a manner inconsistent with that character. He also referred to the Supreme Court's December 2024 order halting suits against places of worship, and said that the order covered "any proceeding", and hence, the High Court was wrong in deciding the matter.

In earlier hearings, Ahmadi had argued that the commissioner was appointed ex parte, without notice to the mosque committee and without the trial court specifying the points on which the local investigation was required. The committee had also questi ned the urgency of appointing a commissioner nearly 70 years after the plaintiffs' claimed grievance arose.

The committee had further argued that a commission under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC is intended to assist the court and cannot be used by a litigant to collect the "best evidence" for its case. The commissioner's visit to the mosque premises in November 2024 was followed by violence in Sambhal in which six persons were killed.

Case Details – Committee of Management Jami Masjid, Sambhal v. Hari Shankar Jain | SLP (C) Diary No. 46111 of 2025 (AoR Anil Kumar) and Committee of Management, Jami Masjid Sambhal, Ahmed Marg Kot Sambhal v. Hari Shankar Jain | SLP (C) 21599/2025 (AoR Fuzail Ahmad)

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