Recently, the Jharkhand High Court (JHC), in a judgment, has held, inter alia, that the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) may continue 'civil action[s] to collect the material for the purpose of sending the information to the jurisdictional police under Section 66(2)' of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 1988 (PMLA) even after a person has been acquitted in the predicate offence.
In the case, the petitioner before the JHC was aggrieved by the ED's retention of the petitioner's properties seized during the search and seizure operation under Section 17 of the PMLA despite acquittal in the predicate offence, which was illegal. The petitioner averred that the acquittal had attained finality; therefore, no further proceedings, including the continued retention, cannot be sustained. The ED maintained that the seized properties were additional undisclosed monies raising suspicion of offences unrelated to the predicate offence; therefore, acquittal should not affect the ED's investigation.
The High Court affirmed the ED's stance and dismissed the petition. It noted that the trial court's acquittal did not pertain to the additional material seized during the search under Section 17 of the PMLA. In such situations, the Court reasoned, Section 66(2) acts as a 'bridge' enabling the ED tos 'collect material' even in the absence of an FIR or complaint regarding the alleged or possible predicate offence. Therefore, ED's proceedings may continue.
Importantly, the JHC dismissed the petition on other grounds as well; the merits of which are not discussed here. However, the JHC's observations regarding Section 66(2) are particularly disconcerting and warrant deliberation.
In this regard, the JHC's reasoning is faulty on at least two counts. First, it contradicts Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (Vijay Madanlal) regarding the centrality of the predicate offence. Second, it reassigns powers conferred narrowly under Section 5 Proviso II to Section 66(2) of the PMLA, thereby expanding the scope of ED's investigative powers in instances where no predicate offence has been registered to a vicious extent. Moreover, the case also raises critical questions about the true import of Section 66(2), highlighting substantial lacunas in the provision's jurisprudence.
Undisclosed Property and Vijay Madanlal
In Vijay Madanlal, the SC was unequivocal about the importance of a predicate offence in PMLA proceedings. The offence of money laundering rests upon a predicate offence which generates proceeds of crime. Therefore, when no predicate offence is alleged, or when the one alleged culminates in acquittal, no proceeds of crime can be said to exist, and the basis for the offence of money laundering vanishes. Per sequitur, once a person is finally absolved of the scheduled offence, “there can be no action for money-laundering against such a person or person claiming through him in relation to the property linked to the stated scheduled offence” (Para 33,).
The judgment clarifies that if the ED recovers unaccounted property or money, no matter the monetary value, (as it happened in the case at hand), the same cannot be presumed to be proceeds of crime to sustain action under PMLA. Vijay Madanlal states, “[t]he authorities under the 2002 Act cannot resort to action against any person for money-laundering on an assumption that the property recovered by them must be proceeds of crime and that a scheduled offence has been committed, unless the same is registered with the jurisdictional police or pending inquiry by way of complaint before the competent forum. . .”
Vijay Madanlan directs that in such instances, the ED should share information under Section 66(2), and only once the predicate offence has been registered, take further action (Para 53 ). Significantly, this is not a sanction for the ED to investigate the money or property as the JHC seems to have interpreted. The ED can only intimate the concerned authority. If such authority registers a predicate offence, only then can the ED take further measures.
The Distinct Authority of Section 5 Proviso II
Importantly, the ED does have some power to take coercive steps in such instances. This power is vested under Section 5 Proviso II. The provision allows the ED, if it believes that a property may be proceeds of crime and, if left unattended, might be displaced, to attach that said property under Section 5, even in the absence of a registered predicate offence. Although Proviso I limits attachment to cases where the predicate offence has been registered, Proviso II allows the ED to bypass it in the situation given above.
Vijay Madanlal acknowledged this, and noted that while making such attachments, if the scheduled offence is not already registered, the authorised officer may proceed under Section 5 and 'contemporaneously' share information under Section 66(2) of PMLA for registration of the offence (Para 60). The precedent further says that, absent an FIR or complaint before the magistrate of the predicate offence, the ED can only initiate “'civil proceedings' of 'provisional attachment'” (para 187). However, this power is very narrow. It does not entitle the ED to conduct a thorough probe into the matter based on its suspicion. It only permits attachment of property. After that and sharing of the information, the ED must await the registration of the predicate offence before making further inquiries.
The JHC appears to have misconstrued this as a sanction for the ED to initiate 'civil action to collect the material for the purpose of sending the information to the jurisdictional police under Section 66(2).' It does so by mislocating the authority vouchsafed through Section 5 Proviso II in Section 66(2), even though the latter is not built for that purpose. Section 66(2) merely prescribes that if a relevant authority under the Act believes, 'on the basis of information or material in his possession, that the provisions of any other law for the time being in force are contravened,' then it 'shall share the information with the concerned agency for necessary action.'
The JHC equated 'share the information' with 'collect the information to share' in the absence of a predicate offence. It read Section 66(2) as a 'bridge' allowing investigation even without a registered predicate offence, thereby merging Section 5 Proviso II's coercive power and Section 66(2) intimation power, but without the restriction of the coercive action being limited to attachment.
This converted the ED into a proxy for agencies to investigate a possible predicate offence, which is beyond the remit of Section 66(2) as well as the Act.
The Case at Hand
In the present case, the individual had already been acquitted. The ED had seized the property under Section 17(4) in connection with the predicate offence, and the proceedings did not relate to provisional attachment under Section 5 Proviso II. In such a situation, a predicate offence was essential for investigatory action by the ED.
Significantly, the ED averred before the JHC that the alleged predicate offence was not connected to the property recovered during the search and seizure. The petitioner made a similar submission before the Adjudicating Authority for the retention of the seized properties. This raises questions about whether the properties could have been seized in the first place, as the putatively tainted property must be related to the alleged predicate offence to be considered as proceeds of crime, and no information under Section 66(2) had been shared.
Regardless, in the present case, after acquittal, there was no predicate offence, proceedings had not been initiated under Section 5 Proviso II, and no information had been shared under Section 66(2); let alone registration of the predicate offence by the competent authority. If the seized material disclosed a distinct offence, the correct modus operandi would have been to release the seized properties and initiate proceedings under Section 5 Proviso II. .
The Unfilled Crevices
In this backdrop, two important lacunas in the paradigm of Section 66(2) merit consideration. First, Section 66(2) does not stipulate any timeline for the dissemination of the information by the ED. Therefore, it remains unclear whether the ED can make provisional attachments without simultaneously disseminating the relevant information under Section 66(2) for the registration of the predicate offence.
The SC has held that sharing information under Section 66(2) regarding a new offence is mandatory.[1] Nevertheless, the consequence of violating this provision remains unclear. In this regard, the Delhi High Court verdict holding that failing to disclose information under the Act does not adversely affect proceedings initiated under other provisions, such as Section 5 Proviso II, is the most explicit authority. That verdict seems to suggest that even if the ED fails to transmit information under Section 66 while provisionally attaching property under Section 5 Proviso II, the attachment would not be impacted even though no allegations of any predicate offence have been made.
Even though the ED is required to write the reasons for attachment of property in writing, and the Adjudicating Authority, during the retention proceedings, will check if the property is truly linked to a crime, it nevertheless gives the ED a potentially coercive weapon. Hence, bundling the power under Section 5 Proviso II with the mandate of Section 66(2) (and making its failure vitiate the attachment order itself) is worth considering. It can also be considered that in the absence of the intimation under Section 66(2); or if, after the intimation, the appropriate authority does not find a predicate offence that can be prosecuted by the ED, the Adjudicating Authority will prima facie assume the property as untainted and release the same.
Second, how is the ED to proceed if its intimation under Section 66(2) does not stir the relevant investigative agency into action?
Pertinently, the Karnataka High Court has held that in such situations the ED cannot act as a 'super-cop' and move a private complaint under Section 223 BNSS. Vijay Madanlal's advice that, if the relevant authority fails to register an FIR, 'the authorised [ED] officer under the 2002 Act can take recourse to appropriate remedy' (Para 60, hyperlinked copy) offers little help. Perhaps, approaching the magistrate under Section 175(4) of BNSS can be a remedy. Here, the ED would not take the onus of investigating the predicate offence as it would under a private complaint and, thus, would remain within the parameters of the Karnataka High Court's judgment. A Kerala High Court judgment, which directed registration of an FIR after the appropriate authority failed to do so despite being intimated through Section 66(2) of PMLA, buttresses this view.
These suggestions are by no means irrefutable panaceas, but they do attempt to instigate jurisprudential discussion around the ambit of Section 66(2) and iron out the creases in the overall paradigm of the PMLA.
Significantly, the petitioner has appealed against the JHC's verdict, in the SC in SLP(Crl) No. 18585/2026. The SC has issued notice as well. It will be worthwhile to see how it pans out.
Anil Tuteja v. Union of India, in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 11790/2024, Order dated 15.09.2025 ↑
Author is a 4th year Law student at Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law. Views are personal.