Life Imprisonment In Dowry Death Cases Not A Matter Of Course; Reserved For Rarest Of Rare Cases: Allahabad HC

A Bench of Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Justice Indrajeet Shukla observed thus while upholding the conviction of a husband and his parents in a 2012 dowry death case.

The bench, however, applied the principle of proportional sentencing and commuted their sentences awarded by the trial court, a life term for the mother-in-law and 20-year imprisonment for the husband and father-in-law, to the period of incarceration they had already undergone.

The core question before the bench was “whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the circumstances of the instant case”.

The High Court observed that the culpability/guilt under Section 304-B IPC is primarily dependent upon the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

It noted that, unlike Section 302 IPC, the conviction under Section 304-B IPC does not require direct or circumstantial evidence of the act of killing.

The Bench, however, clarified that "the phrase rarest of rare case used for section 302 IPC, cannot be compared to be or given same meaning when offence under Section 304-B IPC is tried with".

Relying on the Supreme Court's Judgment in Hem Chand v. State of Haryana 1994, the Bench reiterated that while courts have the discretion to award sentences ranging from 7 years to life, the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.

The court stressed that although the crime committed is "one of the most heinous and grave crimes" and does not call for any leniency, sentencing must nonetheless be guided by the judicial principles of proportionality and individual culpability.

Against this backdrop, the Court noted that in the present case, no 'plausible reasons' had been recorded by the Trial Court as to why the maximum punishment of life imprisonment had been awarded to the appellants.

Hence, it found it appropriate to commute their sentences to the period already undergone, while noting that the mother-in-law had already served over 15 years, and the husband and father-in-law had served over 10 and 9 years, respectively.

Facts in brief

As per the prosecution's case, the informant's daughter/victim (Sujata) was married to the Accused, Sunil Kumar, about 1.5 years prior to the incident.

Right from the beginning, her in-laws harassed her for additional dowry, specifically demanding a motorcycle and a fan. However, owing to her father's poor financial condition, the demands could not be fulfilled.

On May 13, 2012, the informant received word that his daughter had caught fire and she was being taken to the Civil Hospital in Lucknow, by her in-laws. When he reached the Hospital, the victim's in-laws fled from the place.

The Victim's statement was subsequently recorded by the Deputy District Magistrate/SDM, Malihabad. In her statement/dying declaration, she stated that her husband had beaten her the previous day and the following morning, her mother-in-law, father-in-law and husband poured kerosene oil upon her and set her ablaze. The victim ultimately passed away on June 04.

All 3 accused were convicted by the Additional District & Sessions Judge/Special Sessions Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act) in Lucknow in August 2019 under Sections 498-A, 304-B of IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

The Judgment of conviction rested heavily on the dying declaration of the victim recorded by an Executive Magistrate on the day of the incident.

Dealing with the present appeal filed by the appellants, the High Court noted that it was proved that the deceased died in a hospital due to burn injuries within one and a half years of her marriage.

It further noted that in her dying declaration, she unequivocally mentioned the cruelty and torture she had suffered in connection with a demand for dowry and that the abuse and torture took place shortly before her death.

The High Court also dismissed the argument of the defence that the victim was unfit to make a statement due to 90% burns and painkillers.

The Court held that a dying declaration, if recorded properly by a competent authority and found truthful, is a "substantive piece of evidence" sufficient to sustain a conviction without needing independent corroboration.

Crucially, the Court rejected the defence's argument that the victim died of septicemia after 22 days, which means the burn injuries were a 'remote' cause of death. The Court, however, affirmed that 90% burn injuries are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, and a direct proximate nexus exists between such burns and fatal septicemia.

Elaborating on the reverse burden of proof, the Court observed that dowry deaths typically occur within the "four corners of the house," creating a "systemic evidentiary vacuum." Thus, the law morally and logically shifts the onus onto the household's occupants to provide a cogent explanation.

Furthermore, the bench found the defence's attempt to claim the victim set herself on fire due to a dispute with a neighbour to be highly contradictory to the dying declaration. It also concluded that the accused had failed to rebut the statutory presumption of guilt u/s 113B of the Indian Evidence Act.

Hence, confirming their conviction, the bench modified their sentences to the period they have already undergone.