Rahul Gandhi's Remarks On Sikhs Protected U/Article 19; Elected Leader Can Raise Minority Rights Concerns, Says Allahabad High Court

The Court further observed that the speech did not tend to incite violence or disturb public order and that no material had been placed before it to show that it attracted the ingredients of an offence under Section 152 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.

"...questioning the rights of minorities by elected representative by itself cannot be an offence and the said speech of respondent no. 2 will have protection of freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 of Constitution," a bench of Justice Vikram D Chauhan observed while dismissing a plea challenging a Varanasi court order rejecting an application seeking registration of an FIR against Gandhi.

The Court was dealing with a petition filed by Nageshwar Mishra and another under Section 528 BNSS challenging the orders of the Courts in Varanasi.

On October 17, 2025, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Varanasi, passed an order on Mishra's plea, and on July 9, 2026, the revisional court upheld that order, both declining to direct registration of an FIR against Gandhi.

It was the applicants case that during his US visit in September 2024, Gandhi questioned whether Sikhs in India felt safe wearing turbans or visiting Gurdwaras.

They pointed out that Khalistani terrorist Gurpatwant Singh Pannun had endorsed Gandhi's statement as correct. It was submitted that Gandhi's remarks made the work of terrorists easier and now, the terrorists will take advantage of this statement to try to spread violence and anarchy in India and run a propaganda campaign against India around the world.

They further claimed that the remarks could provoke violence in India and aid anti-India propaganda worldwide.

The High Court, however, observed that elected representatives are chosen to carry the voice of people into the institutions of governance. It remarked thus:

"Raising public concerns is therefore not an optional courtesy but a core function. Representatives also act as channel of public concerns, ensuring that less powerful sections are heard in public debate," the Court remarked.

It added that concerns raised in the legislature or public forums enter the public record, inform citizens and invite scrutiny of government action, thereby keeping democratic discourse alive and vibrant.

The Court further observed that individuals may disagree with Gandhi's statement, but that, by itself, would not be a ground to treat the speech as an offence.

"Disagreeing with one's view is part of vibrant democracy," it said.

The High Court also examined whether the alleged speech attracted Section 152 BNS, which criminalizes acts endangering the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India, including purposely or knowingly exciting or attempting to excite secession, armed rebellion or subversive activities, or encouraging feelings of separatism.

The applicants had argued that the endorsement of Gandhi's remarks by a separatist figure demonstrated that the speech could be used to advance separatist activities. 

Rejecting this contention, the Court observed:

"Upon examination, the impugned speech of respondent no. 2 does not tend to incite violence or disturb public order. It merely articulates the concerns of a certain segment of society."

It added that If a third party misinterprets or appropriates the said speech to advance its own ends, the responsibility for any ensuing consequences lies exclusively with that party, which is amenable to the law for its own acts.

The Court noted that no material particulars had been placed before it to indicate that the alleged speech resulted in inciting, secession or armed rebellion or subversive activities or encourages feelings of separatist activities or endangers sovereignty or unity and integrity of India.

It also pointed out that the applicants had not disclosed the date, time and place of the alleged speech or placed its complete extract before the Court and they merely rleied on newspaper reports.

Even after two years, no material had been produced to show that the speech had resulted in any of the mischief covered by Section 152 BNS, it noted.

In a significant observation, the Court held that raising concerns about the security of a section of society does not, by itself, amount to an offence under Section 152 BNS, particularly when such concerns are raised by elected representatives.

It further observed that even if statements made by an elected representative concerning an individual are found to be inaccurate or unsubstantiated, the appropriate recourse lies in subjecting them to parliamentary debate or open public discourse.

"Even if statements made by an elected representative concerning an individual were to be found inaccurate or unsubstantiated, the appropriate recourse lies in subjecting such statements to scrutiny through parliamentary debate or open public discourse, so that the truth may be ascertained through the free contest of ideas or thoughts," the Court observed.

It added that raising concerns on foreign soil, even if some individuals consider it an impropriety or a deviation from parliamentary tradition, would not, by itself, make the speech an offence.

The Court emphasized that suspicion cannot form the foundation of criminal prosecution and that "the grave suspicion however strong cannot take the place of proof".

The High Court observed that registration of an FIR has serious consequences for an individual's liberty. Courts must therefore exercise particular caution while considering applications seeking criminal action on the basis of alleged offending speech or expression.

Relying on the Supreme Court's judgment in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the Court reiterated:

"Mere discussion or even advocacy of a particular cause howsoever unpopular is at the heart of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. It is only when such discussion or advocacy reaches the level of incitement that Article 19(2) comes into play."

The Court also referred to the Supreme Court's judgment in Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat and its own decision in Simran Gupta v. State of U.P., observing that courts must examine whether a prima facie offence is made out and whether the speech falls within the reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2).

It stressed that the burden lies on the person seeking criminal action to demonstrate that the speech attracts the ingredients of the offence and is not constitutionally protected.

The applicants' initial application seeking an FIR was rejected on November 28, 2024, on the ground that prior sanction from the Central Government under Section 208 BNSS had not been obtained.

On July 21, 2025, the revisional court set aside that order and remanded the matter for fresh consideration. Rahul Gandhi challenged the remand before the Allahabad High Court, which dismissed his revision on September 26, 2025, holding that the Magistrate was empowered to decide whether a cognizable offence was made out.

Following reconsideration, the Magistrate rejected the FIR application on October 17, 2025. The applicants' subsequent revision was dismissed on July 9, 2026. Challenging both the order, the applicants moved the HC with the present petition.