UP Tenancy Act | Sixty-Day Timeline To Decide Rent Case Is Directory, Not Mandatory: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that the sixty-day timeline for disposal of cases by the Rent Authority and the Rent Tribunal under Section 33(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Regulation of Urban Premises Tenancy Act, 2021 is directory and not mandatory in nature.

Section 33(2) of the Act requires the Rent Authority or the Rent Tribunal to endeavour to dispose of a case as expeditiously as possible and within not more than sixty days of receipt of the application or appeal, and its proviso requires written reasons to be recorded where that does not happen.

Justice Saurabh Lavania held,

“Upon due consideration of above, this Court is of the view that timeline provided in section 33(2) of the Act of 2021 is 'Directory' and not 'Mandatory'.”

Petitioner approached the High Court under Article 227 seeking a direction to the Rent Authority/Additional District Magistrate, Trans Gomti, Lucknow to decide and dispose of her case expeditiously, within the time stipulated under Section 33(7) of the Act. It was argued that Section 33(2) is mandatory and that the relief sought was therefore liable to be granted.

The Court found no force in the submission, holding that the proviso itself allows the Rent Authority or the Rent Tribunal to carry on with a case or appeal once the prescribed period has run out.

“The 'Proviso' to section 33(2) of the Act of 2021 indicates that the Rent Authority or Rent Tribunal, as the case may be, can proceed with case or appeal after expiry of timeline provided in Section 33(2) of the Act of 2021, after recording its reasons in writing for not disposing the case or appeal within the period prescribed.”

The Court took note of eighteen decisions on when the expression 'shall' in a statutory provision is to be read as 'may' so as to treat the provision as directory. It referred to Nasiruddin v. Sita Ram Agarwal, where the Supreme Court held that a time-frame fixed for a private person is ordinarily mandatory, but one within which a public functionary must act is directory unless the consequences of non-compliance are specified.

Further, it referred to P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, where it was held that the question turns on the purpose and object the statute seeks to achieve and not on the use of the words 'shall' and 'may'.

It also noted Topline Shoes Limited v. Corporation Bank, where a time limit under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 was held directory as no penal consequences were prescribed, and a coordinate bench decision holding a two-month timeline for deciding a landlord's release application not mandatory, in Priyambda Devi v. Prescribed Authority, Aligarh.

Accordingly, the petition was dismissed for the main relief sought.

The Court further observed,

“Before parting, keeping in view the facts of the case and also the age of the petitioner, this Court finds it appropriate to observe that it is expected that the Authority concerned would decide the application/case, as indicated in prayer clause, quoted above, in accordance with law expeditiously.”