Writ Petition Alleging Violations Of Natural Justice Can't Be Dismissed At Threshold For Alternative Remedy: Allahabad High Court

The Allahabad High Court has held that a writ petition in which particularised breaches of natural justice are pleaded cannot be dismissed at the threshold as not maintainable on the ground that an alternative statutory remedy is available, without a counter-affidavit being called for and the plea being tested on the rival versions.

The bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Abdhesh Kumar Chaudhary held,

"a finding that a case does not fall within the natural-justice exception is itself a finding of fact, as it presupposes an answer to whether a violation in fact occurred. Such a finding cannot be returned on the strength of the pleading made in the writ petition alone, and cannot then be used as the ground for holding the petition not maintainable...the said ground has to be necessarily decided after hearing the other-side of the story."

“Maintainability was never truly in issue; the only question was whether, on the facts pleaded, the Court ought to decline to exercise a jurisdiction it indisputably possessed. Framing the dismissal as one of maintainability suggests the writ petition was incompetent and a characterisation unsupported by either authority relied upon.”

The appellant, appointed a Lecturer on 28.08.1991, was appointed Principal of Sri Jai Narayan Mishra P.G. College, Lucknow, an affiliated college of the University of Lucknow, on 01.07.2023, being the senior-most teacher in the seniority list dated 30.06.2023. Private respondent no. 4, a Lecturer appointed on 21.06.1990 and regularised on 14.06.1992, had filed no appeal within the prescribed period against the earlier seniority list of 10.06.2020, in which the appellant was placed above him.

In 2023 he claimed that the leave the appellant had availed between 1995 and 2014 was unauthorised and had broken his service, and appealed to the Vice Chancellor against the appointment.

A committee constituted by the Vice Chancellor to decide the appeal was dissolved and reconstituted. Its report dated 03.11.2025 found the appellant's length of service shorter by 40 days, and by order dated 14.11.2025 the Vice Chancellor declared respondent no. 4 senior. The seniority list was modified and, by a resolution dated 30.11.2025, the Managing Committee of the college gave respondent no. 4 charge of the post of Principal.

The appellant's writ petition against these orders was dismissed by a Single Judge on 17.12.2025 without any counter-affidavit being called for, on the ground that an alternative remedy was available under Section 68 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973.

Before the Division Bench, counsel for respondent no. 4 relied on Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority and Others v. SCOPE Sales Limited and Another to submit that an intra-court appeal cannot be entertained merely because another view is possible. The Court distinguished the decision, holding that the principle assumes a writ court that has weighed the rival contentions on a complete record, and that a challenge to a threshold finding reached without evidence from the other side is not a request for a second opinion.

The Court observed that the alternative-remedy rule is one of discretion and a self-imposed restraint rather than a statutory or constitutional bar, and does not take away the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Single Judge, it held, had correctly set out the four recognised exceptions but inverted the sequence prescribed by Whirlpool Corporation and Radha Krishan Industries, the very decisions the impugned order rested on.

The Court held that the appellant had not pleaded natural justice as a bare formula to escape the alternative remedy. He had pleaded that the committee was reconstituted without notice to him, that it recomputed his length of service without addressing the State Government's approval dated 13.03.2012 of the very leave treated as a break in service, that the Vice Chancellor acted on the report without his having had an opportunity to meet its altered premise, and that the integrity of the committee members was itself in question. None of this was tested, because no counter-affidavit was called for.

“a finding that a case does not fall within the natural-justice exception is itself a finding of fact, as it presupposes an answer to whether a violation in fact occurred. Such a finding cannot be returned on the strength of the pleading made in the writ petition alone”

Referring to the order in which the question ought to have been approached, the Court held,

“..the correct sequence would be as: call for counter affidavits, then test the plea on the rival versions and then determine whether the exception is attracted and lastly decide whether discretion should be exercised in favour of relegating the petitioner to the alternative remedy.”

The contentions that the committee's report was only recommendatory, and that the appellant having appeared before the original committee could not question the process of the reconstituted one, were held to be matters requiring factual determination, precisely the issues, the Court said, that a counter-affidavit exists to resolve.

Holding that the facts attracted at least two of the exceptions carved out in Whirlpool Corporation: violation of the principles of natural justice and enforcement of fundamental rights, the Court quashed the order dated 17.12.2025 and restored the writ petition to its original number for fresh consideration on merits. It directed parties to exchange affidavits. It recorded that the appellant has only one year of service left. All contentions on merits were left open.

Accordingly, the intra-court appeal was allowed.