'Bolting Door After Setting Pregnant Wife Ablaze Shows Intent To Kill': Allahabad HC Affirms Murder Conviction; Fixes Jail Term To 20 Yrs

The Court added that the accused's act would squarely fall under Section 300 IPC, provided that the other requirements, such as knowledge and intent on the part of the accused, are satisfied.

"If it is proved that the injuries by themselves are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and if it is established that those injuries were the intended injuries, though the death occurred after septicaemia had supervened, the act of the accused would squarely fall under the third limb of Section 300 I.P.C. and the accused is therefore liable to be punished under Section 302 of IPC", a bench of Justice Rajesh Singh Chauhan and Justice Indrajeet Shukla held.

With this observation, the bench confirmed the conviction of a man who set his 8-month pregnant wife on fire, which resulted in the death of the unborn child and the subsequent death of the wife due to the burn injuries.

However, invoking the reformative theory of justice, the bench commuted the life sentence awarded by the trial court to a fixed term of 20 years' rigorous imprisonment.

Case in brief

Briefly put, on November 28, 2010, the victim (20-year-old Ruchi), carrying an 8-month pregnancy, was admitted to the District Hospital in Sitapur with extensive burn injuries.

In her dying declaration, recorded by an Executive Magistrate after medical certification, she revealed a harrowing sequence of events that the Court later described as a "barbaric act".

The victim stated that when she asked her husband-appellant (Manish) for money to treat her 1.5-year-old son's mouth sores, she was assaulted by the appellant. He threw a bowl of lentils at her and threatened that if she disclosed the incident to anyone, her face would be disfigured by pouring acid.

Thereafter, he took the deceased to the inner portion of the house, poured kerosene oil over her head and body, lit a matchstick and threw it upon her from a distance, as a result of which she caught fire.

The appellant did not stop even here; rather, to ensure her death, he bolted the door from outside. She succumbed to her injuries 23 days later on December 21, 2010, due to septicemia, and her unborn child also died.

Arguments before the HC

In his appeal against the trial court judgment to convict him and award him life imprisonment, the convict's counsel extensively argued that the death had occurred due to septicemia and the burn injuries were merely a remote cause.

It was contended that since the victim survived the initial trauma and died 23 days later from a secondary infection (septicemia), the offence should be downgraded from murder (Section 302 IPC) to culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC).

The State, on the other hand, opposed these arguments as it was contended that the appellant's conduct of burning his wife, a young lady carrying an advanced pregnancy, needs to be dealt with iron hands through stern punishment, and no interference/indulgence may be granted.

High Court's observations

Considering and analysing the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the bench noted that the case had been brought within the purview of culpable homicide in terms of Section 299 of the IPC and the only question which remained was whether such culpable homicide is to be put under the category of murder (Section 300 IPC) or if it remains as culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 299).

Having considered the facts, the Court held that the accused had a "definite intention to kill" and therefore, the act of the accused would fall under the first limb of Section 299 IPC and so under the first limb of Section 300 IPC

It also found that the act of the appellant does not fall under any of the special exceptions appended to Section 300 IPC.

Thereafter, the Court dealt with the arguments of the appellant that burn injuries were a remote cause of death. The division bench observed that the primary cause of death was the intentional burn injury, and the resulting septicemia was merely a secondary, inevitable complication.

"If it is proved that the injury is fatal and the intention was to cause the death, though the death occurred after several days after septicaemia had supervened, it is undoubtedly a murder as it falls within the first limb of Section 300 IPC… If it is proved that the injuries are imminently dangerous to life, though the death had occurred after septicemia had supervened, then the act of the accused would squarely fall under the fourth limb of Section 300 I.P.C., provided the other requirements like knowledge on the part of the accused etc., are satisfied and so the accused will be liable to be punished under Section 302 of I.P.C. Here also, the primary cause of the death is the injuries and septicemia, tetanus etc., are only the secondary cause", the bench categorically clarified.

The Court further found the tenor of the dying declaration to reflect a barbaric act of burning the pregnant wife and thereafter bolting the door from outside in order to ensure her death.

The bench also concluded that there was not even an iota of evidence with respect to a sudden fight as such, even if the incident had happened in the spur of the moment, "the act of bolting the house from outside brings no other inference except that appellant's intention to cause the death of his pregnant wife".

"It is inconceivable that appellant would not have known that setting a human being ablaze after soaking her clothes with inflammable liquid would cause her death, as the type of burn resulting therefrom would at least be "likely" to cause her death (if not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause her death)”, the bench noted.

"Thus, setting the deceased ablaze and thereafter boulting the door brings the test of intention to cause death against appellant but even if alternatively it is assumed then it is a case where the act of the accused falls under clause “Fourthly” of section 300 IPC, i.e. the act of causing injury so imminently dangerous where it will in all probability cause death,” the Bench further observed.

However, considering the several mitigating factors in favor of the convict, namely:  that he was only 21 years old at the time of the offense and is now approximately 37 years of age, that he had no prior criminal record, that his socio-economic background was exceedingly poor, and that his conduct during his 15 years of incarceration was certified as "good" by jail authorities, the bench commuted his life sentence to a 20-year rigorous imprisonment fixed term.

"…prison always does not reform people. Someone has rightly said that “in jail nights are darker and days are longer”, which means nights becomes endless days becomes unbearable and lastly hope disappears. Thus, a pragmatic view is taken to give a chance of reformation to the appellant-convict with a view of re-intigration with society", the Court concluded by partly allowing the appeal.