Time Spent Prosecuting Premature Cheque Bounce Complaint Must Be Excluded While Computing Limitation: J&K&L High Court
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has held that a complainant who bona fide prosecutes a cheque dishonour complaint which is ultimately found to be premature does not forfeit the statutory cause of action merely because years elapsed in litigation.The Court ruled that time spent prosecuting such a defective complaint must be excluded while considering limitation for a...
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has held that a complainant who bona fide prosecutes a cheque dishonour complaint which is ultimately found to be premature does not forfeit the statutory cause of action merely because years elapsed in litigation.
The Court ruled that time spent prosecuting such a defective complaint must be excluded while considering limitation for a fresh complaint, and delay deserves to be condoned where the litigant has acted with due diligence rather than indifference.
Justice Sanjay Dhar made these observations while allowing a criminal revision petition filed by one Sheikh Abdul Rehman, setting aside an order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, which had refused to condone the delay in filing a fresh complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act after an earlier complaint had been held to be premature.
The dispute arose from the dishonour of three cheques of ₹11 lakh each. After issuing the statutory demand notice, the petitioner instituted a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Handwara, on 4 November 2019.
Following a full-fledged trial, the complaint came to be dismissed. Although the trial court examined the matter on merits, it also held that the complaint itself had been filed prematurely, as the statutory period of fifteen days from the date of receipt of the demand notice had not expired before institution of the complaint.
In appeal, the High Court set aside the findings on merits but affirmed that the original complaint was indeed premature, while expressly leaving it open to the complainant to pursue such remedies as were available in law. Thereafter, the petitioner instituted a fresh complaint before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The Magistrate, however, rejected the application, observing that the complaint had been filed after more than six years and that the complainant could not improve upon evidence already led in the previous proceedings. Aggrieved, the petitioner approached the High Court in revision.
Court's Observations:
Justice Dhar first rejected the trial court's reasoning that the complainant could not maintain a fresh complaint because evidence had already been recorded in the earlier proceedings. The Court noted that the High Court, while deciding the earlier appeal, had already set aside the findings recorded on merits, thereby rendering those findings legally non-existent.
The Court observed that the principal issue was whether the period spent in prosecuting the earlier complaint and the appeal could be excluded while computing limitation for filing the fresh complaint.
Answering the question in the affirmative, Justice Dhar relied upon the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Yogendra Pratap Singh v. Savitri Pandey, wherein it was held that although a complaint filed before expiry of the statutory fifteen-day waiting period is not maintainable, the complainant is not left remediless. Quoting the Supreme Court, the High Court recorded,
"The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque may file a fresh complaint within one month from the date of decision in the criminal case and, in that event, delay in filing the complaint will be treated as having been condoned under the proviso to clause (b) of Section 142 of the NI Act."
The Court held that the object of the proviso to Section 142(b) is not to punish a litigant who has been diligently pursuing a legally defective proceeding but to ensure that genuine causes are not defeated by technical computation of limitation.
Justice Dhar observed that the Supreme Court has consistently recognised that the period spent prosecuting a premature complaint deserves to be excluded while considering limitation for a fresh complaint.
Applying these principles, the Court found that after the High Court decided the earlier appeal on 8 August 2025, the petitioner first obtained the certified copy of the judgment, thereafter secured return of the original dishonoured cheques from the trial court, and filed the fresh complaint on 11 September 2025. These facts, the Court held, sufficiently explained the delay.
The Court held that the Magistrate had completely ignored these material circumstances and had consequently committed a material irregularity. Justice Dhar observed that the impugned order reflected "wrong appreciation of facts and the law" and was therefore unsustainable.
Allowing the revision petition, the High Court set aside the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Srinagar, condoned the delay in filing the fresh complaint under Section 142(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act and remanded the matter to the trial court for consideration of the complaint on its merits in accordance with law.
Case Title: Sheikh Abdul Rehman v. Ghulam Nabi Kaboo
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL) 305