O XII R 6 CPC | No Decree On Admissions Unless Defendant's Pleadings Contain Unequivocal Admissions; J&K&L High Court
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has held that unless the admissions made by a defendant in its pleadings or otherwise are clear, categorical and unequivocal, a court cannot proceed to pass a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Court further clarified that even where certain facts stand admitted, the court retains discretion to require the...
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has held that unless the admissions made by a defendant in its pleadings or otherwise are clear, categorical and unequivocal, a court cannot proceed to pass a decree under Order XII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The Court further clarified that even where certain facts stand admitted, the court retains discretion to require the plaintiff to prove those facts through evidence rather than mechanically pronouncing judgment on the basis of admissions alone.
The Court was hearing an appeal filed by Vishwa Bharati Women's Welfare Institution challenging a judgment and decree passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, whereby a civil suit instituted by certain lecturers of the institution had been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 read with Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 CPC on the ground that the defendant's written statement contained deemed admissions regarding the age of superannuation of faculty members.
A Bench of Justice Sanjay Dhar observed,
“.. Unless the admissions made by the defendant in its pleadings or otherwise are clear and unequivocal, the Court would not proceed to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of such admissions. Even where admissions have been made by the defendant in its pleadings with regard to certain facts, the Court may, in an appropriate case, refuse to pass a decree on the basis of such admissions and may call upon the plaintiff to prove those facts by leading other evidence.”
Background
The contesting respondents-plaintiffs had filed a suit seeking a declaration that Communication whereby their services were terminated upon attaining the age of 60 years and their salaries were withheld, were illegal and unsustainable. According to the plaintiffs, they were engaged as Lecturers on a contractual basis in 1993, and their services were subsequently regularized in 2001.
They claimed that under the Bye-laws of the defendant-college, the J&K Private Colleges (Regulation and Control) Act, 2002, and the Rules framed thereunder, the age of superannuation for faculty members was 65 years.
They placed reliance on information obtained under the Right to Information Act showing that employees had retired at 65 years, and on Clause 8 of the Bye-laws which stated that the age of superannuation “shall not be less than 60 years and not more than 65 years,” as well as Rule 11 of the J&K Private Colleges (Regulation and Control) Rules, 2005, which provided that no teacher shall continue beyond 65 years.
The appellant-defendant contested the suit by filing a written statement, pleading that the college is a fully aided institution and that the age of retirement of faculty members is 60 years in terms of the Bye-laws of the Society as well as relevant Government SROs. It contended that the Bye-laws relied upon by the plaintiffs had subsequently been amended, and the amended Bye-laws fixed the age of superannuation of teaching staff at 60 years.
The defendant further pleaded that the management had migrated from the Valley in 1990 due to militancy and, upon learning that certain employees had been allowed to continue beyond 60 years by a local manager without informing the management, it took corrective measures by issuing the impugned communications.
Thereafter, the plaintiffs moved an application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC read with Order VIII Rules 3, 4 and 5 CPC seeking a decree on the basis of alleged admissions in the written statement. The trial court came to the conclusion that the reply furnished by the defendant to paragraphs 23 and 24 of the plaint was evasive and therefore amounted to admission, and proceeded to pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved, the defendant filed the present appeal.
Court's Observations
The High Court first examined the provisions of Order XII Rule 6 CPC, which empowers the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of admissions made either in the pleadings or otherwise. It noted,
“.... The primary object of Rule 6 is to enable a party to obtain an expeditious judgment to the extent of the admissions made by the opposite party. However, the provisions contained in Rule 6 are discretionary in nature and not obligatory or mandatory, as is evident from the use of the word 'may' in the provision.”
The Court also considered Order VIII Rule 5 CPC, which provides that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, shall be taken to be admitted, but with a proviso that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission.
The Court observed,
“... Therefore, discretion is vested in the Court either to rely upon the deemed admission and pass a decree against the defendant on the basis of such admission or to require the plaintiff to prove the admitted facts by leading evidence. Thus, the provision is not obligatory or mandatory in nature.”
Relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in Balraj Taneja v. Sunil Madan, (1999) 8 SCC 396, the Court noted that the proviso to Section 58 of the Evidence Act and the proviso to Order VIII Rule 5(1) CPC give a discretion to the Court to require facts admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. The Court quoted,
“... The Court has not to act blindly upon the admission of a fact made by the defendant in his written statement nor should the Court proceed to pass judgment blindly merely because a written statement has not been filed by the defendant.” The Court also cited S. M. Asif v. Virender Kumar Bajaj, (2015) 9 SCC 287, where it was held that the power under Order XII Rule 6 CPC is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right, and where the defendants have raised objections which go to the root of the case, it would not be appropriate to exercise such discretion.
Applying the legal position to the facts, the High Court found that the trial court had erred. It noted that the plaintiffs had placed reliance on Clause 8 of the Bye-laws, which provided that the age of superannuation “shall not be less than 60 years and not more than 65 years,” and on Rule 11 of the Rules of 2005, which provided that no teacher shall continue beyond 65 years.
The Court observed,
“.. Both these provisions go on to show that an employee of the defendant-college may be continued in service up to a maximum age of 65 years. However, this does not mean that in every case an employee would be entitled to claim that the age of superannuation is 65 years. As per the aforesaid provision, age of superannuation of an employee of the defendant-institute could be anything between 60 to 65 years.”
The Court further noted that the defendant had categorically pleaded in its written statement that the Bye-laws relied upon by the plaintiffs had subsequently been amended, and under the amended Bye-laws, the age of superannuation of the teaching staff was fixed at 60 years. The defendant had also referred to SRO 339 dated 20.12.2005, which fixed the age at 60 years. The defendant had specifically denied the existence of any policy of retiring employees at 65 years and had contended that the plaintiffs had concealed applicable Rules.
The Court held,
“.. Whether or not the said stand of the defendant-college can be accepted and whether or not they would be able to prove this fact is a matter of trial. The same cannot be determined at the stage of considering an application under Order 12 Rule 6 CPC.”
It also observed that even with regard to the information furnished under the RTI Act, the defendant had taken a specific stand that because the management had migrated in 1990, they could not gather knowledge about employees continuing beyond 60 years, and once they came to know, they issued the impugned communications. This, again, was a matter of trial, the Court underscored.
In view of these findings the court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the 1st Additional District Judge, Srinagar, and remanded the matter to the trial court with a direction to proceed further with the case and decide it in accordance with law.
Case Title: Vishwa Bharati Women's Welfare Institution v. Amina Naseem and others
Citation: 2026 LiveLaw (JKL)