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The Jharkhand HC has held that prolonged and unexplained delay in concluding preliminary inquiries into corruption allegations can infringe the right to speedy justice under Article 21, and issued time-bound directions to the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) and competent authorities for dealing with such inquiries.

A Division Bench of Chief Justice M.S. Sonak and Justice Manoj Prasad was hearing a suo motu Public Interest Litigation which originated from an order dated 10.05.2019 passed in an anticipatory bail matter. The Single Judge, while considering the matter, had raised the question whether an investigation into allegations of corruption against a public servant could be permitted to continue indefinitely for years in disregard of the directions of the Supreme Court. The Registry was thereafter directed to register a suo motu PIL.

Mrs. Ritu Kumar was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court, following which the State was repeatedly directed to place on record updated reports regarding cases pending before investigating agencies under the Prevention of Corruption Act.

The matter subsequently revealed that several preliminary inquiries before the ACB had remained pending for years. The Amicus brought to the Court's attention Notification No. 1623 dated 07.08.2015 issued by the Cabinet Vigilance Department, Government of Jharkhand, which prescribes the powers, duties and functioning of the ACB.

Under Clause 21(4)(viii) of the Notification, a preliminary inquiry is ordinarily required to be completed within three months. An extension can be granted with the approval of the Bureau Chief and is required to be reviewed at short intervals. The Court noted that several inquiries had remained pending for more than a decade, despite the three-month timeline under the Notification. It further noted that the records disclosed no extension orders or extraordinary reasons justifying such prolonged pendency. The Court observed:

“The record before us reveals a stark reality: several preliminary inquiries have remained pending for over a decade, far exceeding the three-month period contemplated under the Notification…”

The Court held that although the timeline contained in the Notification was not mandatory in the sense that every instance of non-compliance would automatically invalidate subsequent proceedings, it could not be ignored without justification. It observed:

“…the fact that a provision may not be mandatory is not a license to breach it with impunity or ignore it altogether without any rhyme or reason. It means that, in a given case, if there is no compliance for valid and justifiable reasons, later compliance would not be ultra vires or otherwise vitiated solely for nonadherence to the timeline fixed by such a provision.”

The Bench further noted that a preliminary inquiry which remains pending without either culminating in an FIR or being formally closed can cause serious prejudice to the person concerned, who remains subjected to an unresolved inquiry without the procedural safeguards applicable to a formal criminal proceeding. The Court held:

“The constitutional right to a speedy trial inevitably encompasses the right to a speedy inquiry. Where a Preliminary Enquiry has remained pending for an inordinate period without adequate explanation, the constitutional requirement of fairness and reasonableness under Art. 21 of our Constitution empowers this Court to examine whether the delay is justified and whether appropriate supervisory directions are necessary to secure a timely decision.”

The Court accordingly directed that a preliminary inquiry should ordinarily be completed within three months. Where an extension is granted by the Bureau Chief, the inquiry should preferably be completed within six months from the date it was opened. Any inquiry going beyond six months would require the Bureau Chief to record reasons in writing, specify the further period and review the extension at short intervals.

The Court further directed that where a completed inquiry is placed before the competent authority, including the Cabinet or Cabinet Vigilance Department, for permission to register an FIR or for any other order, the authority should decide the matter within three months of receiving the inquiry. A further period of one month could be taken only for reasons recorded in writing.

The pending inquiries were directed to be dealt with on the same terms, with the timelines running from the date of the judgment. The Director General, ACB was also directed to file a status report after six months setting out the status of each pending inquiry.

The judgment was directed to be communicated to the Chief Secretary, Home Secretary and Director General, Anti-Corruption Bureau, Government of Jharkhand, for information and compliance.

Appearance:

Amicus Curiae: Mrs. Ritu Kumar, Advocate

For the State: Mr. Rohitashya Roy, A.G.; Mr. Vibhor Mayank, A.C. to A.G.

For the Intervenors: Mr. Rajeev Kumar, Advocate; Mr. Navin Kumar, Advocate; Mr. Raj, Advocate; Mr. Samavesh Bhanj Deo, Advocate


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Case Title :  Court on its Own Motion v. Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand and OrsCase Number :  W.P.(PIL) No. 2439 of 2019