'Mere Position As School Principal Does Not Attract Liability U/S 19 POCSO Act Without Knowledge Of Offence': Patna High Court
The Patna HC has held that merely holding the position of Principal of a school does not automatically attract criminal liability under Sections 19 and 21 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), unless there is material establishing knowledge or apprehension of the commission of a sexual offence and a consequent failure to discharge the statutory duty to report it.
A Single Judge Bench of Justice Sunil Dutta Mishra quashed criminal proceedings against a school principal in a case involving allegations of sexual harassment of a minor student by two sports teachers, holding that no material established his involvement, abetment or culpable omission in relation to the alleged offences.
The case arose from an FIR registered on September 17, 2023, on the complaint of the father of a minor girl, alleging that two sports teachers of her school had sexually harassed her on August 27, September 1 and September 12, 2023. The FIR was registered against the two teachers under Sections 342, 354A, 354B, 506 and 34 IPC, read with Sections 4 and 8 of the POCSO Act.
During the investigation, the Special POCSO Court, Bhagalpur, questioned why Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, had not been invoked against the person in charge of the school. The investigating officer initially reported that the complainant had made no allegations against the school management or Principal. However, following a supervision report by a senior official, the Principal was added as an accused and subsequently chargesheeted.
By an order dated February 4, 2025, the Special POCSO Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 17 and 21 read with Section 19 of the POCSO Act and Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act against the Principal. Aggrieved, the Principal approached the High Court under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, seeking quashing of the cognizance order and criminal proceedings.
He contended that neither the FIR nor the victim's statements recorded under Sections 161 and 164 CrPC attributed any role to him. He further submitted that the school management had suspended the accused teachers on September 17, 2023, terminated their services the following day and cooperated with the investigation by providing CCTV footage. Examining the materials collected during investigation, the High Court found no evidence indicating that the Principal had prior knowledge of the alleged acts or had intentionally facilitated or abetted their commission. The Court observed:
“In the absence of any material demonstrating a culpable act or omission on the part of the petitioner, his mere position as the Principal of the institution cannot, by itself, furnish a sufficient ground for subjecting him to criminal prosecution.”
On the statutory reporting obligation under Section 19 of the POCSO Act, the Court clarified that liability for non-reporting requires material establishing knowledge or apprehension of an offence and failure to discharge the corresponding duty. The Bench held:
“Similarly, Section 19 of the POCSO Act casts an obligation upon a person having apprehension or knowledge of the commission of an offence under the POCSO Act to report the same to the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police, whereas Section 21 provides for punishment for failure to report or record such an offence in accordance with law. However, the mere fact that the petitioner was the Principal of the school does not, in the absence of material establishing his knowledge or apprehension of the commission of the alleged offence and his consequent failure to discharge the statutory obligation, automatically attract penal liability under the aforesaid provisions. The prosecution materials, as placed before this Court, do not disclose the requisite factual foundation to constitute the aforesaid offences against the petitioner.”
The Court further held that Section 17 of the POCSO Act, dealing with punishment for abetment, could not be invoked without material indicating instigation, intentional assistance or participation in the principal offence. Similarly, the Bench found no material indicating that the Principal had assaulted, abused, abandoned or wilfully neglected the victim, or knowingly facilitated such treatment, so as to attract Section 75 of the Juvenile Justice Act.
The Court emphasised that the mere occurrence of an alleged sexual offence within school premises was insufficient to establish criminal liability against the Principal in the absence of the essential statutory ingredients. Finding that the allegations and investigative materials, even if accepted at face value, failed to disclose a prima facie case against the Principal, the Court held that continuing the prosecution would amount to an abuse of the process of law.
Accordingly, the High Court set aside the cognizance order dated February 4, 2025, and quashed the entire criminal proceedings in POCSO Case No. 30 of 2024, insofar as they concerned the Principal.
Appearance:
For the Petitioner: Mr. Amit Kumar, Advocate; Mr. Vivek Anand Amritesh, Advocate; Mr. Sudhansu Trivedi, Advocate
For the Opposite Parties: Mr. Nawal Kishore Prasad, Additional Public Prosecutor