1. A Hindu male dies intestate, leaving behind his son and other Class I heirs. His property devolves upon the Class I heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, and is subsequently partitioned among them. The share allotted to his son is later sought to be claimed by the son's own child on the ground that the property originally belonged to the grandfather and, therefore, constitutes ancestral property in which the grandchild acquired an interest by birth. Which of the following best states the legal position?
(A) The property retains its ancestral character even after succession under Section 8, and the grandson acquires an interest by birth.
(B) The son holds the inherited property as karta of his branch of the Hindu Undivided Family, and the grandson can seek partition during the father's lifetime.
(C) The share inherited by the son under Section 8 becomes his absolute property in his individual capacity, and his child does not acquire a right by birth in it.
(D) The grandson acquires a coparcenary interest upon birth, provided the property originally belonged to the grandfather, irrespective of the mode of its devolution.
Answer: C
J Rajesh (Minor) Thr His Mother and Natural Guardian J Gomathi Versus M Kumaran (Dead) Thr LRs & Ors, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1148
Explanation: Under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, where a Hindu male dies intestate, his property devolves upon his Class I heirs in accordance with the statutory scheme of succession. A son inheriting such property takes it in his individual capacity and not as karta of his own Hindu Undivided Family, therefore, a son's son cannot claim a share in the property devolved upon the son.
2. A hospital administrator fails to ensure that a maintenance contractor follows prescribed safety checks. The contractor knowingly uses defective equipment, which later causes a patient's death. Assuming the administrator's omission amounts to civil negligence, what must the prosecution additionally establish to attract Section 304-A IPC against the administrator?
A. That the administrator occupied a position carrying responsibility for patient safety.
B. That the contractor's conduct occurred during the administrator's tenure.
C. That the administrator's rash or negligent act was the direct and proximate cause of death.
D. That the administrator could have prevented the accident by exercising greater care.
Answer: C
MATIN SHANKARRAO BHOSALE & ANR VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANR, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1140
Explanation: To attract the criminal liability under Section 304- A IPC, i.e., death caused by negligence, there should be an act of negligence or rashness proved by evidence necessarily carried with a criminal liability. According to the Court, the determinative factor is to ascertain whether the alleged act of the accused is the direct result of a rash and negligent act, and that act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death without the intervention of others' negligence.
For Conviction Under S.304A IPC, Death Must Be Direct Result Of Rash & Negligent Act : Supreme Court
3. A person is apprehended by the police at 8 AM, but his arrest is formally recorded at 4 PM. He is produced before a Magistrate the next day, within 24 hours of the formal arrest but 26 hours after his liberty was actually curtailed. The police seek remand, arguing that Article 22(2) has been complied with.
Which statement correctly reflects the law?
(A) The 24-hour period begins only from the formal recording of arrest.
(B) Production within 24 hours automatically validates detention, and the Magistrate cannot examine its reasonableness.
(C) The Magistrate can refuse remand only if detention exceeds 24 hours.
(D) The 24-hour period begins when liberty is effectively curtailed, and the Magistrate must also examine whether detention within that period was reasonable.
Answer: D
Sujit Das Versus Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1137
Explanation: Article 22(2) reckons the 24-hour period from the effective curtailment of liberty. Further, Section 58 BNSS imposes an independent requirement that detention must not exceed a reasonable period, even within the 24-hour limit. The Magistrate may decline remand if detention is found unreasonable.
4. A State law disqualifies a person from contesting local body elections if they have more than two children. The State defends the restriction on the ground that it promotes population control. However, evidence indicates that the country's fertility rate has fallen below the replacement level, raising concerns about an ageing population and declining workforce.
Which of the following best captures the Supreme Court's core reasoning for reconsidering the constitutional validity of such disqualifications?
(A) Population control is no longer a legitimate legislative objective, and therefore all laws imposing restrictions on family size are unconstitutional.
(B) A law constitutionally valid when enacted must continue to remain valid irrespective of subsequent demographic changes.
(C) A restriction justified by population-control concerns may require reconsideration when demographic realities change, particularly where it arbitrarily excludes citizens from democratic participation and infringes reproductive autonomy.
(D) The right to contest local body elections under Article 19(1)(a) necessarily includes an unrestricted right to have any number of children.
Answer: (C)
MANGALA BHIMRAO INGLE PRATIK v THE ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER, AMRAVATI DIVISION AND ORS., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1129
Explanation: The Court reasoned that declining fertility rates have undermined the demographic rationale underlying the two-child norm. Its continued enforcement may arbitrarily exclude citizens from political representation and compel a choice between reproductive autonomy under Article 21 and democratic participation. Therefore, the earlier ruling in Javed v. State of Haryana requires reconsideration by a larger bench.
5. The accused in a rape case and the complainant enter into a compromise, following which the High Court quashes the criminal proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 528 BNSS. The accused argues that continuation of proceedings would serve no purpose since both parties have settled their dispute. Which principle best explains why the High Court's decision is legally unsustainable?
A. Serious offences having a substantial impact on society cannot ordinarily be quashed solely because the parties have entered into a compromise.
B. The inherent power to quash proceedings can never be exercised in offences punishable with imprisonment exceeding seven years.
C. A compromise becomes legally binding only when it is recorded by the trial court after framing of charges.
D. The inherent power to quash proceedings is unavailable once the investigating agency has filed a chargesheet.
Answer: A
Gopal Lodhi v State of MP & Anr, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1098
Explanation: The Court cautioned that the inherent power to quash a case is not to be exercised in cases involving “heinous and serious offences indicating mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity etc. which cannot be termed provate in nature.”
Rape Case Can't Be Quashed Solely On 'Settlement' Between Victim & Accused : Supreme Court
6. An arbitral tribunal continues proceedings after expiry of its statutory mandate under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and renders an award. Subsequently, a party approaches the competent court seeking an extension of the tribunal's mandate. Which of the following best reflects the legal position?
(A) The application is not maintainable because expiry of the mandate automatically extinguishes the court's power to extend it.
(B) The application is maintainable, and if the mandate is extended, the tribunal may resume proceedings from the stage at which its mandate expired.
(C) The application is maintainable only if the parties consent to recommencing the arbitration from the beginning.
(D) The application is maintainable, and the court must extend the mandate whenever an award has been rendered after its expiry.
Answer: (B)
SOUTH BIHAR POWER DISTRIBUTION COMPANY LTD. VERSUS INDIA POWER CORPORATION RESPONDENT(S) LTD. & ANR. (with connected matter), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1101
Explanation: Section 29A(4) permits extension even after expiry of the prescribed period. Therefore, an application under Section 29A(5) is not barred merely because the mandate has expired or an award has been rendered in the meantime. If sufficient cause is established and extension is granted, the tribunal can resume proceedings from the stage where they stopped, without starting afresh. Extension, however, is not automatic.
7. A agrees to purchase a property under an agreement to sell but never obtains a registered sale deed. Subsequently, the property is transferred to B through a registered sale deed. A files a suit seeking only recovery of possession, claiming that B's sale deed is fraudulent. B produces cogent evidence supporting his registered title.
What is the most appropriate legal position?
(A) A suit for possession is maintainable because the plaintiff's prior agreement to sell establishes a superior title over the subsequent purchaser.
(B) A suit for possession is sufficient as long as the plaintiff alleges that the defendant's sale deed is fraudulent.
(C) The plaintiff must seek appropriate substantive relief, such as cancellation of the defendant's sale deed or specific performance of the agreement to sell, since a mere suit for possession cannot resolve the seriously disputed title.
(D) An agreement to sell confers an equitable ownership interest sufficient to maintain a suit for possession against a subsequent registered purchaser.
Answer: (C)
SMT. RANO SINGH AND OTHERS VERSUS SH. GURBAX SINGH (D) TH LRS AND OTHERS, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1081
Explanation: An agreement to sell does not, by itself, create title to immovable property. Where the defendant rebuts the plaintiff's title through cogent evidence, particularly a registered sale deed, a mere suit for possession is insufficient. The plaintiff must seek appropriate relief challenging the defendant's title or enforcing the agreement to sell.
8. A Hindu husband obtains a divorce decree from a foreign court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, which is not recognised under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. His first wife never submitted to the foreign court's jurisdiction. Relying on the decree, he subsequently marries another woman abroad after acquiring foreign citizenship. Can he claim that his first marriage stood dissolved and avoid prosecution for bigamy under Section 494 IPC?
(A) Yes, because a foreign divorce decree becomes binding in India once it is recognised by the country where it was passed.
(B) Yes, because acquiring foreign citizenship before the second marriage excludes the application of Indian bigamy laws.
(C) No, because a foreign divorce decree that fails the requirements of Section 13 CPC cannot dissolve the first marriage under Indian law, and subsequent change of nationality cannot defeat the legal consequences of a subsisting marriage.
(D) No, but only if the second marriage is solemnised within Indian territory.
Answer: (C)
N. SRIDHAR REDDY v. THE STATE OF A.P.
Explanation: A foreign divorce decree based on a ground not recognised under Indian matrimonial law, and passed without the first wife's submission to the foreign court's jurisdiction, is not enforceable in India under Section 13 CPC. Consequently, the first marriage continues to subsist. Acquiring foreign citizenship or solemnising the second marriage abroad does not, by itself, extinguish liability under Section 494 IPC.
9. An accused is granted bail on the ground that the police failed to furnish written grounds of arrest. However, the record establishes that the accused was informed of the reasons for his arrest, understood the allegations, and was represented by counsel during remand proceedings. No prejudice arising from the alleged procedural defect is demonstrated. Examine the legality of the bail order.
(A) Any failure to furnish written grounds of arrest automatically invalidates the arrest and entitles the accused to bail.
(B) A procedural defect in communicating grounds of arrest must be examined in light of its actual impact on the accused's ability to defend himself; a technical defect without demonstrable prejudice does not automatically justify bail.
(C) Representation by a lawyer during remand proceedings automatically cures every violation of Article 22(1).
(D) In cases involving national security, the constitutional requirement of communicating grounds of arrest under Article 22(1) does not apply.
Answer: (B)
STATE OF RAJASTHAN VERSUS JHABRA RAM, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1097
Explanation: The Supreme Court emphasised that procedural defects in communicating grounds of arrest must be assessed in light of demonstrable prejudice. A hyper-technical objection regarding the mode of communication cannot, by itself, become an automatic ground for granting regular bail. At the same time, the constitutional safeguard under Article 22(1) remains applicable.
10. A consent decree is passed between two parties concerning ownership of a property. A third person, who was not a party to the suit or compromise, claims an independent interest in the property and alleges that the decree prejudicially affects his rights. He seeks leave to appeal against the decree.
Which of the following correctly states the legal position under the CPC?
(A) An appeal is barred under Section 96(3) CPC because every consent decree operates as an estoppel against all persons claiming an interest in the property.
(B) A stranger cannot challenge a consent decree unless he first establishes fraud in a separate civil suit.
(C) A stranger may seek leave to appeal by prima facie demonstrating that the decree prejudicially affects his legally cognisable rights or interests; the estoppel arising from the compromise binds its parties, not the stranger.
(D) Every person claiming an interest in the subject matter of a consent decree has an automatic right to appeal without obtaining leave of the appellate court.
Answer: (C)
GIRISHBHAI NATWARLAL PATEL Versus GAUTAM PUNJABHAI PALKHIWALA (DEAD) BY LRS & ORS., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1108
Explanation: Section 96(3) and Order XXIII Rules 3 and 3A CPC do not bar a stranger from appealing against a consent decree. The estoppel arising from a compromise operates against the parties to it, not an outsider. However, the stranger must obtain leave to appeal by prima facie showing that the decree prejudicially affects his legally cognisable rights or interests.