For Conviction Under S.304A IPC, Death Must Be Direct Result Of Rash & Negligent Act : Supreme Court

  • For Conviction Under S.304A IPC, Death Must Be Direct Result Of Rash & Negligent Act : Supreme Court

    The Court quashed proceedings against school management over the death of a child due to the collapse of a school pillar.

    Observing that a mere failure to attain the standard of care prescribed by law does not amount to a criminal act, the Supreme Court has quashed the criminal proceedings against the President and Superintendent of a school, who were sought to be prosecuted for the death of a 12-year-old student who was crushed when a pillar under construction collapsed on her within the school premises.

    “the mere failure to attain the standard of care prescribed by the law, thereby committing breach of such duty as observed by the High Court would not be a criminal act. The contractor to whom the work was assigned could at the most be prima facie guilty of negligence, being in the knowledge of the fact that poor construction or inferior construction may lead to an accident or a casualty. However, that by itself would not suggest that the appellants had the knowledge that inferior construction in all probability was likely to cause death of any student studying in the school.”, observed a bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice Manmohan.

    While acknowledging the pain and agony of the parents of the deceased girl who met with an unfortunate incident, the Court, however, refused to allow continuation of the proceedings against the accused-School President for the untoward incident, after finding that the incident that occurred cannot be treated as a direct and proximate cause of the appellant's negligence.

    “Dictating this order was a very painful experience. The very thought of a twelve-year-old girl getting crushed beneath the pillar of her own school makes our heart bleed with pain and agony. We can also imagine the pain and agony the parents of the deceased must be undergoing even as on today. However, such thoughts should not allow the mind of a judge to get boggled, otherwise justice cannot be done. However, harsh one may find the law, but at the same time, the law remains the law, and it has got to be respected.", the Court said.

    According to the Court, it was the contractor who had to ensure the safety of the students, and an untoward incident could have been avoided if little care had been taken by the contractor.

    According to the Court, the Appellant would also not be liable to face the criminal proceedings for death caused by criminal negligence under Section 304-A IPC, stating that “to impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, Indian Penal Code, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another's negligence.” [See Kurban Hussein Mohamedalli Rangawalla v. State of Maharashtra (1965)]

    “…we are of the view that so far as the appellants are concerned, they stand on a different footing as compared to the other accused if any. In our view, the appellants should not be asked to face the trial either for the offence of a rash or a negligent act punishable under Section 304A of the IPC or Section 304 IPC. At the most, the person who could be said to be prima facie responsible for the unfortunate death of the student is the contractor. This observation, of course, is prima-facie and subject to the evidence that may be led at the time of the trial if at all contractor is also one of the accused.”, the Court observed.

    The judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala explained that to call an act to be a criminal negligence, “there should be failure to exercise that care and failure to take that precaution which, having regard to the circumstances, it was the imperative duty of the individual to take.”

    Further, to attract the criminal liability under Section 304- A IPC, i.e., death caused by negligence, there should be an act of negligence or rashness proved by evidence necessarily carried with a criminal liability. According to the Court, the determinative factor is to ascertain whether the alleged act of the accused is the direct result of a rash and negligent act, and that act was the proximate and efficient cause of the death without the intervention of others' negligence.

    “To put it in other words, whether the mere fact that the appellants herein as the Administrators of the school failed to take appropriate care to ensure the safety of the students by not ensuring proper construction of pillar by itself is sufficient to establish an offence under Section 304A IPC. The answer to this question will determine whether the appellants act as alleged by the prosecution is the causa causans or has there been a causa interveniens, which has broken the chain of causation so as to make their act, though a negligent one, not the immediate cause or whether it amounts to an act of gross negligence or recklessly negligent conduct.”, the Court said.

    Applying the law, the Court observed:

    “…the incident in this case cannot be treated as a direct and proximate cause of the negligence, even if we assume one on the part of the appellants in not taking due care. Many other factors might have resulted in the unfortunate incident. It was the contractor and his team who were actually undertaking the construction. If little care would have been taken by the contractor to ensure due safety of the students then probably this incident would not have occurred. Therefore, the alleged negligence from the part of the appellants herein cannot be regarded as the causa causans. Although it may be a causa sine qua non.”

    In essence, the Court held that the act attributed to the appellants cannot be said to be the causa causans (direct or proximate cause of the negligence), but there was a cause interveniens, which broke the chain of causation so as to make the act of the applicant though a negligent one, not the immediate cause.

    As a result, the appeal was allowed, thereby quashing the pending criminal proceedings against the Appellant-accused.

    Appearance:

    For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kuldeep Jauhari- 4088, AOR Mr. Tanav Kansal, Adv. Ms. Antara Mishra, Adv. Mr. Sahil Ahuja, Adv. Mr. Kedar Bhoi, Adv.

    For Respondent(s) : Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande- 3259, AOR Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv. Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Adv.

    Case Title :  MATIN SHANKARRAO BHOSALE & ANR VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ANRCITATION :  2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1140
    Yash Mittal

    Yash Mittal is a Correspondent with LiveLaw, covering the Supreme Court of India

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