Death Penalty

The Supreme Court commutes death penalty to life imprisonment for man convicted of killing wife and four children, citing no prior criminal record, good conduct during 16-17 years of incarceration, mental health issues due to past trauma, and contributions to inmate welfare. The Court, while acknowledging the severity of the crime, removes the convict from death row but orders lifelong imprisonment without release, emphasizing penance for the crime. (Para 17) Reji Kumar @ Reji v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 457 : 2025 INSC 538

Supreme Court criticises 'undue haste' of trial court in awarding death penalty in 2 months without proper opportunity for defence. Irfan v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 167 : 2025 INSC 150

Delay

Delay and Laches– Writ Jurisdiction– Negative Discrimination– Article 14- Noted that respondents approached the Court for a higher post after a gap of three and nine years respectively after joining as Sweepers- Held, inordinate delay in seeking compassionate appointment or a higher post is fatal- Prolonged delay dilutes the sense of "immediacy" which is the core of compassionate appointment policies- Respondents claimed parity with others who were allegedly granted appointments to higher posts- Held, Article 14 does not envisage "negative equality"- If an illegality or mistake was committed in favor of one person, it cannot be a ground for the Court to mandate the State to perpetuate the same illegality for others- Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das (2023) 15 SCC 273; Paras 13-19] Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1203 : 2025 INSC 1423

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Special Leave Petition (Criminal) - Delay - Legal Aid - National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) Scheme - Misuse of Process - Supreme Court noted that SLP was filed with a delay of 2298 days by a convict and held that the petition was filed merely under a legal aid programme without the convict's consent, and that such a practice amounts to misuse of process - Held that since the petitioner never expressed any desire to file the Special Leave Petition, its filing only in view of the NALSA programme is a misuse of the process - Noted that that the delay in filing the same does not stand explained at all - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4, 5] Kamaljit Kaur v State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1035

Delay in uploading judgments - Delay in uploading judgment after 2 years 5 months of pronouncing of judgment, is a matter of grave concern and a practice to be deprecated - However, there was no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence by the lower courts and concluded that the delay, by itself, was not sufficient to set aside the judgment - Delay in judgment uploading alone cannot nullify a conviction if the judgment is otherwise sound - Practice of High Courts deprives the aggrieved party of the opportunity to seek further judicial redressal more particularly in criminal matters wherein the appeal is dismissed affirming the judgment and order of conviction passed by the Trial Court - Such delays should not recur and reiterated the guidelines from the case Anil Rai v. State of Bihar to address delays in pronouncing and uploading judgements - Judgments should be made available to the parties within 3 months from the date of reserving - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 41-47] Rajan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 879 : 2025 INSC 1081

Condonation of delay - Judicial Discipline - Jurisdiction of Trial Court - Supreme Court noted that Trial Court refrained from exercising the jurisdiction just because the timeline prescribed by the Supreme Court for it to dispose of the proceedings was not followed by the Trial Court - Appropriate remedy available to him was to ask for extension of time but he cannot say that he has lost jurisdiction over the matter as the time allowed has lapsed - Magistrate's order was 'wholly misconceived and without authority' - Noted that the Trial judge's act was uncommon, Supreme Court directed the District Judge concerned to call for an explanation of the Judge concerned and report within a month. [Paras 4-8] Shiv Kumar Shaw v. Rekha Shaw, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 967

Condonation of delay - Advocate's Fault - The appellant filed a civil suit seeking, inter alia, a declaration that she was the legally wedded wife of the late Raj Kishore Sahoo. The suit was dismissed, and her first appeal met the same fate. She filed a second appeal before the High Court after a delay of 225 days, attributable to her advocate's failure to timely inform her of the first appellate order's dismissal. The High Court rejected the condonation application, deeming the explanation unsatisfactory. Whether a 225-day delay in filing a second appeal, caused by counsel's negligence, warrants condonation, particularly in light of the litigant's socio-economic vulnerability. Held, delay condoned; appeal allowed; matter remitted to the High Court for expeditious disposal. While courts must exercise caution in condoning protracted delays under the Limitation Act, 1963, the scales of justice demand a balanced approach, especially for India's socio-economically disadvantaged litigants who are often wholly reliant on their advocates. An innocent litigant ought not suffer for her counsel's default, a principle enduring since Rafiq v. Munshilal, (1981) 2 SCC 788, notwithstanding evolving socio-economic realities in under-resourced regions. Here, the appellant acted with diligence upon learning of the dismissal, rendering the delay sufficiently explained and non-deliberate. Condonation of delay is not merely procedural but a facet of substantive justice, tilting in favor of equity where advocate fault prejudices a vulnerable party, without condoning laxity. Kumari Sahu v. Bhubanananda Sahu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 165

Whether the High Court erred in condoning a delay of approximately 2200 days in filing an application for recall, thereby reviving a suit pending for 48 years? Whether the High Court overlooked the principles of limitation, judicial restraint, and the doctrine of res judicata while condoning the delay? The dispute pertains to a property initially purchased in 1916. Multiple suits were filed over the years where the deceased respondent was found not to be a bona fide purchaser. The respondent filed O.S. No. 1833/1980, which was dismissed for default in 1983, restored in 1984, and later abated in 2000 due to the respondent's failure to bring the legal heirs of a deceased defendant on record. In 2006, the respondent filed an application for recall, which was dismissed by the Trial Court in 2014, citing inordinate delay, lack of bona fides, and the suit being barred by res judicata. The High Court, in 2020, condoned the delay of 2200 days, allowing the revival of the suit. Held, the High Court ignored the inordinate delay of 6 years in filing the recall application and the respondent's repeated negligence in prosecuting the suit. The High Court failed to consider the principles of limitation, which are based on sound public policy and equity, and should not be overridden by a "liberal approach" to condone delay. The suit, pending for 48 years, was barred by res judicata and lacked bona fides, as the respondent's rights had already been adjudicated in prior suits. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's order and restoring the Trial Court's dismissal of the recall application. The Court emphasized that rules of limitation are not merely technical but serve to prevent dilatory tactics and ensure prompt resolution of disputes. H. Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 53

If a court is inclined to condone the delay, it should not delve into the merits of the case before the appeal is properly heard. The High Court's scope in a challenge to the rejection of a delay condonation application is limited to assessing whether sufficient cause was shown. Observations on the merits of the case at the delay condonation stage are unwarranted and prejudicial. Surendra G. Shankar v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Whether the High Court erred in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeals before the Maharashtra Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. Whether the High Court was justified in commenting on the merits of the orders passed by the Maharashtra Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) and the Appellate Tribunal while considering the delay condonation issue. Held, the High Court should have limited its examination to the issue of condonation of delay and should not have commented on the merits of the case, especially when the Appellate Tribunal had not adjudicated on them. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and the Appellate Tribunal's order rejecting the delay condonation application. The delay in filing the appeals was condoned, and the appeals were restored for consideration on merits before the Appellate Tribunal. Surendra G. Shankar v. Esque Finamark Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 111

Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Lease - Conveyance - Whether the writ petition filed by Century Textiles in 2016, 61 years after the lease expired in 1955, was barred by delay and laches. Held, Century Textiles' writ petition, filed 61 years after the lease expired, was barred by delay and laches. Century Textiles had not taken any legal steps to enforce its claim for conveyance until 2016, despite the lease expiring in 1955 and a legal notice being issued in 2006. The High Court erred in entertaining the writ petition, especially when Century Textiles had an alternative remedy of filing a suit for specific performance or mandatory injunction, which it failed to pursue within the limitation period. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and dismissed Century Textiles' writ petition. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) was not obligated to convey Block-A to Century Textiles, and the writ petition was barred by delay and laches. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34

Demurrer

Supreme Court summarised the position of law prevailing in India on demurrer as follows - i. The plea of demurrer is an act of objecting or taking exception or a protest. It is a pleading made by one party which “assumes” the truth of the matter as alleged by the opposite party, but sets up that it is insufficient in law to sustain the claim, or that there is some other defect in the pleadings which constitutes a legal reason as to why the suit must not be allowed to proceed further - In other words, that even assuming those facts as pleaded are true, the court does not have jurisdiction as a matter of law; ii. a decision on demurrer has to be determined ex-facie the plaint; iii. Certain objections are capable of being decided by way of demurrer. Only those objections which do not involve questions of facts nor the adducing of any further evidence, could be decided by way of demurrer; iv. The rule that when a mixed question of law and fact is decided on the basis of a demurrer, the issue would not be permanently foreclosed; v. Disputed questions cannot, as a matter of rule, be decided while considering an application filed under Order VII Rule 11(d). What has to be decided is whether on the face of it, the averments made in the plaint, without any doubt or dispute, show that the suit is or is not barred by limitation or any other law in force; vi. Therefore, it is inherent in the nature of a decision as regards the rejection of a plaint that, if the court deems it fit to not reject the plaint at the threshold upon an examination of the averments in the plaint, the ground that the suit is still barred by any law can be taken by the defendant in the course of the suit proceedings, after leading evidence; vii. It cannot be said that at the stage of rejection of plaint, the defendant/respondent chooses to waive his right to plead and instead, adopts the course of only testing the sufficiency of the plaint in law- At this stage, there is no choice between either pleading or demurring and the defendant/respondent cannot be taken to have elected to demur instead of pleading- This is simply because, there exists no burden of proof on him, at that stage, to plead. [Relied on Man Roland Druckimachinen AG v. Multicolour Offset Ltd. and Another; 2004 7 SCC 447; Indian Mineral & Chemical Co. and Others v. Deutsche Bank reported in (2004) 12 SCC 376; Ramesh B. Desai and Others v. Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Others reported in (2006) 5 SCC 638; Paras 63-75] Urban Infrastructure Real Estate Fund v. Neelkanth Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1028 : 2025 INSC 1255

Disability

Education Law - Rights of Persons with Disabilities - Appointment of Special Teachers - Non-compliance with prior judicial orders - Directions issued. Rajneesh Kumar Pandey v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 302

Doctrines

Doctrine of Merger and Review Jurisdiction - Dismissal of an SLP via a non-speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger; thus, a review petition remains maintainable before the High Court - If the High Court refuses to exercise its review jurisdiction or finds no error apparent on the face of the record, the original judgment attains finality inter-partes - No appeal lies against an order rejecting a review petition under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the CPC - Held that mere reference of an issue to a Larger Bench does not unsettle declared law - High Courts must continue to decide matters based on the law as it stands and cannot await the outcome of a reference or review unless specifically directed by the Supreme Court. [Relied on T K David v. Kuruppampady Service Cooperative Bank Limited (2020) 9 SCC 92; Paras 20-25] Kangra Central Cooperative Bank v. Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1205 : 2025 INSC 1416

Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate – Estoppel – Held, the private respondents, having agreed to the compensation by negotiation, are totally estopped from seeking any relief beyond the terms of the contract. Seeking interest after agreeing to the determined amount is a clear case of approbation and reprobation - The doctrine means that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing; one cannot "blow hot and cold" - A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25; Paras 18, 21, 23] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Limits on Legislative Power- Held that Parliament cannot nullify binding judicial declarations under Article 141 by legislative restatement of previously-struck provisions. A legislature may neutralise a judgment only by curing the identified defect, not by repeating what was invalidated- explained that a Legislature may remove the substratum of a judgment, but cannot directly override it. [Relied on NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 INSC 810, where the Court; Paras 118–119, 136–141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Doctrine of estoppel by conduct and election - Supreme Court applied principle that a party cannot “approbate and reprobate” or “blow hot and cold” by taking inconsistent positions in court proceedings - It was noted that respondents had initially pleaded that their suit was not barred by section 92 CPC, then willingly referred the dispute to arbitration and accepted the award, leading to a consent decree in their favor - Subsequent attempt by respondents to challenge the validity of the award was deemed an impermissible change of position - Held that there can be no estoppel against the law, the issue in this case was an “equitable hurdle of estoppel” based on respondents conduct, which had caused the appellants to alter their position to their detriment - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-19] Sanjit Singh Salwan v. Sardar Inderjit Singh Salwan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 810 : 2025 INSC 988 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2337

Doctrine of Sub-Silentio - A judgement is an authority only for what it decides - When a judgment fails to address issues raised, it is said to be 'sub-silentio' and cannot be held as a binding precedent on those undecided issues - Precedents sub silentio, not accompanied by reasons, cannot be deemed to be a law declared to have a binding effect under Article 141 of Constitution. [Para 13] Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772 : 2025 INSC 928

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation - Held that it is subject to constitutional limitations - it is a well-recognized principle, rooted in ideals of fairness, non-arbitrariness and transparency in executive action - It arises when a public authority, either through a consistent past practice, an express promise or a statutory policy, creates an expectation in the mind of an individual or class of persons that a certain course of action will be followed - It is not a rigid rule and must be conceded where a superseding public interest or a statutory or constitutional bar exists - Legitimate expectation may guide how discretionary powers are exercised, it cannot be invoked to compel an authority to act contrary to a binding legal or constitutional command - Section 26 of the 2014 Act, which provided for an increase in number of seats in the Legislative Assemblies of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana, is expressly “subject to” Article 170 of the Constitution - Article 170(3) of the constitution imposes a constitutional embargo on any readjustment of seats in State Legislative Assemblies until the publication of census data following the first census conducted after the year 2026 - The delimitation exercise in the UT of J & K is governed by Article 239A of Constitution, which applies to UT, and not by Article 170, which deals exclusively with State Legislatures - There is a clear of constitutional distinction between States and UT regarding delimitation, and the claim of parity is unsustainable - Petition dismissed. [Paras 32-37] K. Purushottam Reddy v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 741 : 2025 INSC 894 : (2025) 9 SCC 722

Doctrine of Merger - Exceptions - Fraud - Protection of third party rights - Held, when a judgment is obtained by excluding necessary parties or suppressing facts, doctrine of merger cannot shield it - The doctrine of merger dictates that when an order of an inferior forum is subjected to a remedy before a superior forum, the superior court's order becomes the final, binding, and operative decree or order - This doctrine, though rooted in common law, is not of universal or unlimited application - Exceptions to the doctrine include cases where an order was obtained by fraud, rendering such an order vitiated, non-existent - The doctrine also does not apply when the higher court has not adjudicated the issues on merits, and the controversy between the parties has not been fully examined - Furthermore, the doctrine may not apply where the judgment prejudicially affects a third party who was deliberately excluded from the proceedings - In situations where applying the doctrine would defeat the interests and rights of other parties, especially in matters of public significance, prioritizing justice and fairness should prevail over an absolute insistence on finality - If a specific portion of the judgment is decided by Court then only operative part of an original judgement merges in the judgment of appellate forum and not the whole judgment - Restored case for fresh adjudication before High Court with all affected parties impleaded. [Paras 93-96,105,106, 110, 112, 113, 124] Vishnu Vardhan @ Vishnu Pradhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 736 : 2025 INSC 884

Doctrine of Restitution – Held, when a person is deprived of the use of his money to which he is legitimately entitled, he has a right to be compensated for the deprivation which may be called interest or compensation. (Para 17) Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2025 INSC 262 : (2025) 7 SCC 269

Doctrine of Restitution - Interest as Compensation for Deprivation of Money – Held, a person deprived of money to which they are legitimately entitled has a right to interest as compensation under the doctrine of restitution, which aims to restore the party to their original position by addressing unjust enrichment and the loss of use of funds. (Para 25) Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2025 INSC 262 : (2025) 7 SCC 269

Doctrine of Restitution - The appellant purchased an e-stamp paper worth ₹28,10,000 for a property transaction, which was misplaced by the broker, necessitating a repurchase and delaying the deal. After filing a police complaint and public notice, the appellant sought a refund from the Collector of Stamps, which was denied. The High Court granted the refund but rejected interest. On appeal, the appellant claimed interest under the doctrine of restitution for the deprivation of funds. Held, doctrine of restitution applies, entitling the appellant to interest on the refunded amount as normal accretion on capital and compensation for wrongful retention. The Court explained restitution as restoring what was lost due to a decree/order or its execution, including compensation for benefits derived from wrongdoing or losses caused to another. Interest follows where the doctrine is attracted, preventing unjust enrichment. Appeal allowed, the respondents were directed to pay ₹4,35,968 as interest within two months. [Relied on: Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2014) 6 SCC 335; Authorised Officer, Karnataka Bank v. M/s R.M.S. Granites Pvt. Ltd. and Secretary, Irrigation Department, Govt. of Orissa v. G.C. Roy, (1992) 1 SCC 508, Para 17, 25, 29] Dr. Poornima Advani v. Government of NCT, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2025 INSC 262 : (2025) 7 SCC 269

Doctrine of Separation of Powers - Principle of Checks and Balances – ultra vires - Contempt of Court - Law made by Parliament or Legislature Held, that passing of an enactment after the order of this Court by the legislature of State of Chhattisgarh cannot be said to be an act of contempt of the order passed by this Court. Every state legislature has plenary powers to pass an enactment and so long as the said enactment has not been declared to be ultra vires the Constitution or, in any way, null and void by a Constitutional Court, the said enactment would have the force of law. Interpretative power of a Constitutional Court does not analyze a situation of declaring exercise of legislative functions and passing of an enactment as an act of contempt of court. Legislative function includes power to enact as well as amend laws. Legislature has power to pass a law, to remove the basis of a judgement or to validate a law which has been struck down by a Constitutional Court by amending or varying it to give effect to judgement of Court. This is the core of doctrine of separation of powers. Any law made by the Parliament or a State legislature cannot be held to be an act of contempt of a court. Promulgation of an enactment is only an expression of the legislative function and cannot be said to be an act in contempt unless it is established that the statute so enacted is bad in law constitutionally. Any piece of legislation enacted by a legislature can be assailed within the manner known to law and that is by mounting a challenge against its validity on the twin prongs of legislative competence or constitutional validity. Relied on Indian Aluminium Co. vs. State of Kerala (1996) 7 SCC 637. Held, that prayers in contempt petition are in the nature of writs of mandamus which cannot be granted as such in Contempt petition. Petitions contending that State of Chhattisgarh's enactment of the Chhattisgarh Auxiliary Armed Police Force Act, 2011 amounted to contempt of court were dismissed. Nandini Sundar v. State of Chattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 662

Domestic Workers

Need for better legal safeguards for domestic workers, particularly concerning exploitation - Vulnerability of domestic workers and the need for stronger legal protections against exploitation - Whether the existing legal framework sufficiently protects domestic workers' rights -. The Supreme Court, recognizing the vulnerability of domestic workers and the lack of comprehensive legal protection, directed the Ministry of Labour and Employment, in conjunction with other relevant ministries, to form an expert committee. This committee is tasked with exploring the feasibility of recommending a legal framework to protect and regulate the rights of domestic workers, with a report due within six months. The government is then expected to consider enacting such a framework. Directions issued to the government regarding the formation of an expert committee to examine legal protections for domestic workers. Ajay Mallik v State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 120

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961

Section 4 - Penal Code, 1860; Sections 306, 498-A and 304B - Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 113A and 113B - The deceased allegedly faced harassment from her husband, in-laws, and the appellant (her brother-in-law) due to dowry demands, leading her to commit suicide by self-immolation. The trial court acquitted all accused of dowry death under Section 304B IPC but convicted them for abetment of suicide. The High Court upheld the conviction. Held, Dowry death cannot be presumed without clear evidence of incessant harassment. There was no cogent evidence to establish that the appellant, as the brother-in-law of the deceased, abetted her suicide. Presumptions under Section 113A of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked without evidence of cruelty or harassment. Mere familial relation to the deceased does not justify the presumption of abetment in the absence of direct or circumstantial evidence. The appeal was allowed, and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant were set aside. Ram Pyarey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 66 : 2025 INSC 71 : (2025) 6 SCC 820

Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisements) Act, 1954

Misleading medical advertisements - Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for effective implementation of the Act, 1954, criticizing its poor enforcement over 70 years. States directed to appoint gazetted officers under Section 8 within one month, establish grievance redressal mechanisms within two months, and sensitize police on the Act's provisions. Publishers and designers of misleading advertisements held liable under Sections 3, 4, and 5. States and Union of India to report compliance by June 2025. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 410

Directions - (1) Appointment of gazetted officers under Section 8 and Rule 3 of DMR Rules, 1955 within one month; (2) Sensitization of police through training academies; (3) Establishment of grievance redressal mechanisms with toll-free numbers or email within two months; (4) Immediate action on complaints by authorized officers, including FIR registration; (5) National Legal Services Authority to conduct public sensitization programs; (6) Union to develop a dashboard for tracking state actions within three months. Indian Medical Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 410

Dual Pricing Policy

Validity of the interim coal Policy dt. 15.12.2006, which increased the notified price of coal by 20% for the linked consumers of the non-core sector, was examined - The Court reaffirmed that price fixation process violates constitutional mandates or results in hostile discrimination - Judicial review extends to verifying relevant consideration and rational basis in classification but not to re-evaluating economic policy - The classification between core and non-core sector consumers for dual pricing was held to have a rational nexus to the objective of protecting vital national economic interests and common good, as core sector industries consume over 90% of coal and are critical for the economy - Differential pricing was upheld as consistent due to vital public utility functions - Higher prices for non-core industries, producing non-essential goods, can be justified given their minimal impact on the public – Held, only test to ensure that there was no arbitrariness or unfair discriminatory practices at play, was to see whether such dual price fixation was based on reasonable classification in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution - Appellant was held empowered to notify interim prices under the deregulated regime of the Colliery Control Order, 2000 and the there is no restriction on price notification pending policy formulation by the expert committee - The respondents are not entitled to a refund of the excess of the excess amount paid amount paid under Interim Coal Policy absent evidence that they had borne the cost themselves and not passed it on to consumers - Burden was on respondents to prove no unjust enrichment - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 16-19, 52-65, 70-75, 79-88, 96-113, 114-115] Coal India Ltd. v. Rahul Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 907 : 2025 INSC 1103

Education

Admission Eligibility - Curing Defect During Course - Interim Orders - Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit - Where a student, initially admitted to a B.A.M.S. course without fulfilling the mandatory English subject requirement, subsequently passed the English exam during the pendency of a writ petition and completed the entire course under interim orders, and where the college itself had provisionally admitted the student subject to passing the English exam, the High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based solely on the initial ineligibility. The principle of "Actus curiae neminem gravabit" dictates that an act of the court should not prejudice anyone, and this principle was disregarded by the High Court. The student's subsequent fulfillment of the eligibility criteria, coupled with the college's provisional admission and the completion of the course under interim orders, warranted the issuance of the B.A.M.S. degree. (Para 8) Zaid Sheikh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 319 : 2025 INSC 353

Constitutional Law—Education—Fee Regulation—NRI Quota in Self-Financing Medical Institutions—Power of Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee - The Admission and Fee Regulatory Committee, constituted under the Kerala Medical Education (Regulation and Control of Admission to Private Medical Educational Institutions) Act, 2017, lacks the authority to direct the transfer of fees collected from NRI quota seats in self-financing medical colleges to a State-maintained corpus fund for subsidizing education of Below Poverty Line (BPL) students, absent enabling legislation. Such direction exceeds the Committee's limited regulatory powers, which are confined to prescribing non-exploitative fees and admission procedures for NRI seats, as delineated in P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 6 SCC 537 (para 131) and Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka, (2003) 6 SCC 697 (para 7). The State must enact suitable legislation to create mechanisms for subsidizing economically weaker sections through NRI fees, rather than delegating such fiscal redistribution to the Committee. Held, Self-financing institutions are entitled to retain NRI quota fees previously transferred to the State corpus fund, subject to utilizing a substantial portion thereof to subsidize BPL students' education within their institutions, without charging additional fees beyond the approved subsidized rates. The institutions are designated as trustees of such retained funds until State legislation is enacted, with accountability for compliance via audited accounts. BPL students admitted under scholarship schemes are entitled to refunds of any excess fees paid beyond subsidized rates, payable within three months, or set off against future dues. NRI students remain liable for full approved fees, with no refund entitlement for transferred amounts. The 2018 Kerala Government Order establishing BPL scholarship terms via the corpus fund was struck down, upholding the High Court's view, as it improperly expanded the Committee's mandate without legislative backing. Appeal allowed in part; directions issued accordingly. State of Kerala v. Principal KMCT Medical College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 586 : 2025 INSC 518

National Education Policy (NEP) 2020 - Court cannot issue any direction under Article 32 of the Constitution to compel any State to adopt the NEP. G.S. Mani v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 572

Issue of eligibility criteria for the JEE (Advanced) examination. The petitioners challenged the abrupt change in eligibility criteria from three academic years (2023, 2024, and 2025) to two years (2024 and 2025) through subsequent press releases dated 05.11.2024 and 18.11.2024, respectively. The petitioners, acting on the initial promise, had dropped out of their colleges to prepare for JEE (Advanced), claiming detriment due to the change. The Court, applying the principle of estoppel, held that the respondents could not withdraw the promise made in the 05.11.2024 press release to the detriment of the petitioners. Consequently, the Court permitted students who withdrew from their courses between 05.11.2024 and 18.11.2024 to register for JEE (Advanced), without commenting on the merits of the decision to restrict eligibility. Mithin Mondal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 55

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009; Section 23 - National Council for Teacher Education (Recognition Norms and Procedure) Regulations, 2014 - Any teacher who was in-service as on 10.08.2017 and who acquired the Diploma In Elementary Education (D. El. Ed.) qualification through National Institute of Open Schooling's (NIOS) 18-months programme prior to 01.04.2019 is a valid diploma holder and at par with a teacher who completed the 2 years D. El. Ed. programme. Such of the teachers who were in employment as on 10th August 2017 and who completed the 18 months D. El. Ed. (ODL) programme through NIOS before 1st April 2019 shall be considered as valid diploma holders for the purpose of applying in other institutions and/or for promotional avenues. (Para 33) Kousik Das v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 393 : 2025 INSC 448 : (2025) 5 SCC 413

Election

Election Commission of India (ECI) - Voters List - Supreme Court has directed the ECI to take series of additional steps as an interim measure - i. ECI will display a list of approximately 65 lakhs voters whose names appeared on 2025 Voter List but were not included in Draft Roll dt. August 1, 2025; ii. The list will be displayed district-wise on the websites of the District Election Officers; iii. Information will be booth-wise and accessible by using the Electors Photo Identity (EPIC) number; iv. The displayed list must also include the reason for the non-inclusion of names in Draft roll; v. Chief Electoral Officer (CEO) of Bihar must also display soft copies of these district-wise lists on its website; vi extensive publicity will be given in vernacular and English daily newspapers with wide circulation in Bihar; vii. Aggrieved persons can submit their claims with a copy of their Aadhaar card; viii. ECI is to obtain a compliance report from all Booth Level Officers and District Election Officers and place it on record as a collated Status Report. [Para 3] Association for Democratic Reforms v. Election Commission of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 804

Election Law - Recounting of Votes - Supreme Court directed recounting of all votes by a nominated Registrar - Following the orders, OSD (Registrar) submitted a report on August 6, 2025, which compiled the revised results - According to which appellant received 1051 votes and respondent received 1000 votes - Recounting was conducted by a Judicial Officer and saw no reason to doubt the report, it was video graphed and signed by the parties representatives - Held appellant as the elected Sarpanch - Supreme Court noted that other issues raised before the election Tribunal were still pending and allowed the parties to agitate these issues before the tribunal - Directed Election Tribunal to accept the report of OSD Registrar as final and conclusive result of the recount and declaration of appellant as the elected sarpanch is subject to the final judgment of the Election Tribunal. [Paras 7-10] Mohit Kumar v. Kuldeep Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 809

Election Law - Recount of Votes - Sanctity of Electoral Process - Principle of secrecy of ballots - Conditions under which a recount can be ordered - Whether the SubDivisional Magistrate was justified in ordering a recount of votes in an election for the post of Gram Pradhan under the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The appellant challenged the election results for the post of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat alleging discrepancies in the vote count. The appellant claimed that the Presiding Officer orally informed him of 1194 votes cast in three polling booths, while the official Form 46 recorded 1213 votes. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate ordered a recount, but the High Court set aside this order, citing lack of documentary evidence and the principle of secrecy of ballots. Held, a recount of votes should not be ordered lightly and must be based on specific allegations supported by material facts. A recount is permissible only when: (i) The election petition contains adequate material facts supporting the allegations of irregularities. (ii) The court is prima facie satisfied that a recount is necessary to ensure justice. (iii) The secrecy of the ballot is not compromised without sufficient cause. The Court underscored the importance of maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. Each vote holds intrinsic value, and any irregularities in the counting process must be addressed to uphold democratic principles. The Court found that the appellant had raised legitimate concerns about the discrepancy in vote counts and the missing Presiding Officer's diary, which was a crucial document. Additionally, three out of four candidates supported a recount, further justifying the need to verify the election results. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Sub-Divisional Magistrate's order for a recount of votes. The judgment reaffirms the principles of free and fair elections, the sanctity of the ballot, and the conditions under which a recount can be ordered. It highlights the judiciary's role in ensuring that electoral processes adhere to constitutional values and democratic norms. The appeal was allowed. (Para 1, 15, 16, 19) Vijay Bahadur v. Sunil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 296 : 2025 INSC 332 : (2025) 4 SCC 180

Representation of the People Act, 1951; Section 5 - The appellant, A. Raja (CPI(M) candidate), was elected as MLA from the Devikulam (SC-reserved) Assembly Constituency in Kerala's 2021 elections by a margin of 7,848 votes. Respondent D. Kumar filed an election petition under Section 5 of the Act, 1951, challenging Raja's eligibility on the ground that he was not a member of the 'Hindu Parayan' Scheduled Caste as notified for Kerala under the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, but was instead a Christian. The petitioner alleged Raja's paternal grandparents migrated from Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu, post-1950; his parents were baptized in 1992 by the CSI Church; and Raja himself was baptized and married per Christian rites. Raja countered that he belonged to the Hindu Parayan community in Kerala, his parents were Hindus (mother's name Easwari, not Esther), and any Christian associations (e.g., his father's name) stemmed from unfruitful prayers at a church, not conversion. The Returning Officer rejected nomination objections. The Kerala High Court (March 23, 2023) annulled the election, finding insufficient proof of pre-1950 migration, suspicious alterations in church records (Family, Baptism, and Burial Registers), and evidence of Christian profession via wedding photographs. The Supreme Court stayed the High Court order on April 29, 2023, permitting Raja's Assembly participation sans voting rights or emoluments. Whether the elected candidate (appellant) qualified as a member of the 'Hindu Parayan' Scheduled Caste under Kerala's notification for contesting a reserved constituency, or if prior conversion to Christianity disqualified him under Section 5 of the 1951 Act. Held, the High Court's judgment was set aside; the election petition dismissed. Appellant entitled to all consequential benefits as MLA for the full term. The High Court erred in annulling the election without adjudicating the validity of the appellant's caste certificate, which was not challenged before it. Mere peripheral evidence (e.g., church record alterations, wedding photos) insufficient to conclusively establish religious conversion or non-membership in the specified Scheduled Caste, absent direct scrutiny of the certificate's authenticity. Section 5 requires membership in the State-specific Scheduled Caste/Tribe at election time; peripheral migration or nominal Christian associations do not vitiate eligibility where certificate stands unimpugned. Appeal Allowed; No Costs.

The Supreme Court of India disposed of a public interest litigation (PIL) filed under Article 32 of the Constitution challenging the use of public funds for constructing statues, parks, and memorials glorifying the Chief Minister and the election symbol of a political party. The petitioners alleged that the expenditure of crores of rupees from the state exchequer for such purposes was a misuse of public funds, violated the principles of free and fair elections, and was contrary to the constitutional duty of protecting public resources. The respondents defended the actions, stating that the memorials honored Dalit leaders and social reformers, and the expenditure was approved through proper budgetary processes. The Election Commission of India (ECI) had earlier declined to grant relief, citing the difficulty in assessing the impact of such constructions on elections. The Court, while disposing of the petition, emphasized the need for compliance with ECI guidelines issued in 2016, which prohibit the use of public funds or places for political propaganda. The Court refrained from adjudicating on the specific prayers but underscored the importance of adhering to the ECI's directives to ensure free and fair elections. Ravi Kant v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 107

Electricity Act, 2003

Alignment of PPAs with Regulations — Held that terms and conditions of a PPA are not unregulated and must be aligned with the Regulations framed by the Appropriate Commission under the 2003 Act - Even if a PPA is amended, it must factor in the statutory definitions of "COD" and "Unit" as provided in the CERC/State Regulations - An unapproved PPA that defines COD based on "Project Completion" (requiring combined cycle capacity) is in direct conflict with Regulations that recognize COD in relation to an individual "Unit" (Open Cycle) - Under Section 61(d) of the 2003 Act, the recovery of the cost of electricity in a reasonable manner must be ensured- Held that the respondent supplied continuous power (firm power) from the gas turbine unit during the relevant period, it is entitled to pro-rata fixed charges in addition to variable charges- Appeal dismissed. [Paras 25-32] Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. v. Penna Electricity Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1213 : 2025 INSC 1439

Allocation and apportionment of coal linkage - 'Change in law' events – Held, an appeal to Supreme Court under Section 125 of the Electricity Act is only tenable on a substantial question of law - This is similar to the grounds for appeal under Section 100 of CPC, 1908 - The coal supply from all modes of procurement must be considered for the power plant as a whole and not for specific Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) - The firm and tapering linkage coal must be apportioned pr-rata among all beneficiaries based on the power supplied to them - No single power distribution company (DISCOM) can claim a priority for power supply based on the date of their agreement or the source of coal - Supreme Court reinforced the principle of non-interference with decisions of expert bodies like CERC (Central Electricity Regulatory Commission) and APTEL (Appellate Tribunal for Electricity) unless their decisions are arbitrary, illegal or contrary to mandatory statutory provisions - Coal shortages and associated costs must be shared fairly by all electricity purchasers from a power plant and that no DISCOMS can claim priority for power supply in an event of coal shortage - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 19, 20, 23] Haryana Power Purchase Centre v. GMR Kamalanga Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 877 : 2025 INSC 1079

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2019 (CERC Regulations) - Maintainability of Writ Petition - Held, writ petition for modifying contractual agreement and aligning the Implementation Agreement with CERC's order is not maintainable - the interpretation of CERC Regulations falls within the exclusive domain of CERC and State Commissions as an expert and specialized regulator - Since CERC rejected respondent's prayer for modification and held that only Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Power Sale Agreements (PSAs) stood overridden - then Writ Petition by Respondent was not maintainable - Constitutional Courts while interpreting statutes, rules that fall within regulator's domain, must bear in mind the need to enable the regulator to exercise comprehensive jurisdiction - High Court's order set aside. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. MB Power (M.P.) Ltd. (2024) 8 SCC 513; Paras 7, 23, 24, 26, 27, 33, 40] State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2025 INSC 857

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2019 (CERC Regulations) - Regulation 55 - Implementation agreement between Petitioner-State and Respondent, obligating latter to supply 18% of net generation free of cost to the petitioner-State - Respondent sought to align contractual obligations with the CERC Regulations i.e. 13% free of cost supply - High Court allowed the same - This Court held that CERC Regulations, 2019 does not prohibit supply of free power beyond 13% - that Note 3 of Regulation 55 of CERC Regulations which specifies 13% cap for free power supply, is solely for the purposes of calculation and fixation of tariff and does not operate as a prohibition or restriction on a generating company from supplying beyond 13% as per its contractual obligation - Implementation Agreement does not stand overridden by the operation of CERC Regulations - Contractual obligation of respondent can be understood as a form of “royalty” payable to State as compensation, in lieu of being allowed to use river water, which is public resource for undertaking its commercial activity of power generation. Upheld Petitioner- State's right to 18% free power. [Paras 15-21] State of Himachal Pradesh v. JSW Hydro Energy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 716 : 2025 INSC 857

Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions of Tariff) Regulations, 2004; Regulation 53 - Additional Capital Expenditure - Transmission Utility - Replacement of Damaged Inter-Connecting Transformers (ICTs) - Operational Expense - Tariff Revision - Whether costs for replacing damaged ICTs qualify as additional capital expenditure under Regulation 53, allowing recovery through tariff revision - Held, replacement of transformers due to operational failure constitutes an operational expense, not "additional work" under Regulation 53. Such costs cannot be passed to consumers via tariff hikes, as maintaining a reliable transmission system, including replacing damaged equipment, falls within the utility's routine operation and maintenance responsibilities. The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of CERC and APTEL, affirming that operational risks are borne by the transmission utility. Power Grid Corporation of India's appeal to recover ₹24 crores for replacing damaged ICTs through tariff revision was dismissed. (Para 29) Power Grid Corporation v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 535 : 2025 INSC 626

Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) - Whether CSS under the Electricity Act, 2003, must be determined simultaneously with tariff rates or can be fixed separately based on prevailing tariff rates. Held, CSS is a statutory charge payable by open access consumers to compensate distribution licensees for subsidization losses. The Electricity Act, 2003, and Regulation 90 of the Rajasthan Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Determination of Tariff) Regulations, 2014, do not mandate simultaneous determination of CSS and tariff rates. The Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) erred in setting aside the Rajasthan State Commission's CSS determination, which was validly based on the prevailing tariff rates effective from 22 September 2016 until 2 November 2017. CSS can be determined independently under Regulation 90, provided it aligns with the prevailing tariff rates for the relevant financial year. The Supreme Court set aside APTEL's judgment and restored the State Commission's order dated 1 December 2016. Appeal allowed. (Paras 19 - 21) Jaipur Vidyut Vitaran Nigam Ltd. v. Rajasthan Textile Mills Association, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 529 : 2025 INSC 592

Electricity (Amendment) Rules, 2024 - Rule 23 – Held, any gap/regulatory asset, aligning with clause 8.2.2. of National Tariff Policy, 2006 - Under Rule 23, any gap created should not exceed 3% of the approved ARR and must be liquidated with carrying costs in a maximum of three equal yearly instalments from next financial year - Existing gaps should be liquidated in a maximum of 4 years - APTEL- Appellate tribunal under Section 111 of Electricity Act has appellate jurisdiction to re-appreciate facts and apply the law, examining legality, propriety or correctness of law and issue directions to Regulatory Commissions when they fail to comply with Act - Regulatory Commissions are accountable for managing regulatory assets effectively - The Court also directed all State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) to submit detailed time-bound roadmaps outlining the schedule for regulatory asset liquidation, including the associated carrying costs. [Paras 71, 70, 68, 69, 69.8] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Interpretation of Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and allocation of electricity in proportionate shares—Reimbursement of fixed charges and compensation for diversion of electricity—Application of principles as per Supreme Court judgments and earlier orders of State authorities- Emphasized the need to interpret the PPA as a whole, considering the entire context rather than isolated paragraphs, aligning with principles laid down in prior judgments - Noted that the obligations to declare the capacity of the entire plant and issue dispatch instructions emerged only after the declaration of availability, consistent with earlier rulings - Held that the proportionate principle for allocation of electricity and fixed charges adhered to the terms of the PPA, as interpreted in previous Supreme Court and GERC decisions - It clarified that any wrongful diversion of electricity to sister companies like ESL entitles the generator to compensation based on the HTP-1 Tariff Energy Charge, not just fixed charges, in accordance with principles established in prior case law - Rejected the APTEL's reversal of the reimbursement claim, reaffirming the earlier order of GERC and the Supreme Court, emphasizing adherence to the restitution principle for amounts paid without due supply - Supreme Court reaffirmed that the half-hourly metering and computation methodology, adopted at the behest of the parties and approved by the CEA, must be applied consistently for quantifying diversion-based claims - Clarified that the claim for damages or compensation must align with the interpretation of the PPA and the order principles laid down - Directed for fresh computation of the total dues owed to appellant, incorporating legal principles. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Essar Power Limited (2016) SCC 103; Paras 12, 14-16, 20-22, 31-33, 34, 38-41] Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar Power Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 972 : 2025 INSC 1160

Power Purchase Agreement – Change in Law – Compensation – Late Payment Surcharge – Principle of Restitution - Held, Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd. (APRL) was entitled to compensation and Late Payment Surcharge (LPS) under the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) for increased operational costs due to Coal India Limited's Evacuation Facility Charges (EFC) notification dated 19.12.2017, recognized as a “Change in Law” event. The Court applied the principle of restitution to restore APRL to its original economic position, as if the EFC had not been imposed, and upheld LPS at 2% above the State Bank Advance Rate (SBAR) from the notification date, per Article 10 of the PPA. Additional charges imposed by State instrumentalities after the cut-off date qualify as “Change in Law” events, entitling power generators to compensation. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. (JVVNL) and affirmed the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity's (APTEL) decision. [Relied on: GMR Warora Energy Ltd. v. CERC, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 329 (Paras 18–28)] Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power Rajasthan Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 631 : 2025 INSC 770

Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 56, 65, 73 – Held, Regulators cannot rewrite PPA under guise of equity - Sanctity of contract must prevail - PPA is a commercial arrangement with allocated risks and specific remedies - Parties rights and obligations must be governed by the explicit terms of contract - A delay in commissioning a 220kV evacuation system by a state instrumentality, even if beyond the developer's control does not constitute a Force Majeure event under the PPA's terms - Invoking the force majeure cluse requires a notice within 7 days of the event, which is a condition precedent - Omission to issue the required notice is fatal and cannot be remedied by relying on an inapplicable provision - A distribution licensee is entitled to encash the performance security if the developer fails to achieve the commercial operation date within the stipulated period, if no formal extension has been obtained or valid force majeure claim has been made - Right to invoke the guarantee is a specific contractual remedy that must be exercised in accordance with the contract's framework. [Paras 37-42] Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (CESC) v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 840 : 2025 INSC 1034

Regulatory Asset - Creation, continuation and liquidation - A “regulatory asset” is an intangible asset created by regulatory commissions to acknowledge an uncovered revenue gap or shortfall when a distribution licensee cannot fully recover reasonably incurred costs through tariff revenue - this amount is recoverable in future over a period of time - It is generally created when projected revenue from determined tariffs is significantly lower than the revenue required by the distribution company to recover costs and achieve a return on investment - the creation of a regulatory asset can also occur during truing up if actual revenue realization is less than the Annual Revenue Requirement (ARR) - Such assets are often created to prevent “tariff shock” to consumers by deferring recovery over subsequent years. [Para 67, 69] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Regulatory Asset - Statutory Basis and National Tariff Policy - the creation and continuation of a regulatory asset is not a statutory concept or a power explicitly granted under the Electricity Act, 2003 - The National Tariff Policy, 2006 mandates that a regulatory asset should be created only in exceptional circumstances, clearly defined through regulations and limited to natural causes or force majeure conditions - Held that recovery should be time-bound, preferably within the control period and not exceeding three years - Electricity is a public good and its distribution is statutorily regulated, being a material resource under Article 39 of Constitution, mandating equitable distribution. [Para 63, 67, 65, 70] BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 780 : 2025 INSC 937

Regulatory Jurisdiction – Held, jurisdiction of regulatory bodies like the State Commission and the appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) is to enforce the law and adjudicate disputes within four corners of a commercial contract - Regulatory bodies cannot under the guise of equity or fairness, rewrite the contractual terms, direct the restitution of amounts lawfully realized, or mandate alterations to tariffs and timelines in a manner inconsistent with the agreement - This principle applies even when the parties are state instrumentalities - Set aside order of APTEL - Appeal allowed. [Para 43] Chamundeshwari Electricity Supply Company Ltd. (CESC) v. Saisudhir Energy (Chitradurga) Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 840 : 2025 INSC 1034

Section 9, 42, 79, 86, 181 - Electricity Regulatory Commission (Terms and Conditions for Open Access) Regulations, 2016 (Rajasthan) - Validity of - Open Access – Jurisdiction of State Commission - Captive Power Plants - Grid Stability - Penalties and Scheduling Requirements – Held, the State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC) can regulate open access even for inter-state power supply if it affects their grid. While the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) holds jurisdiction over inter-state electricity transmission, this does not preclude State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) from regulating inter-state power supply when such transactions affect the state grid. Even when electricity is sourced from another state, the State Commission maintains regulatory oversight if the power supply has consequential impacts on the state's electricity network. (Para 44, 45, 47 & 67) Ramayana Ispat Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 384 : 2025 INSC 424 : (2025) 8 SCC 747

Section 18, 19 - Power of ERC's to amend/alter the terms of any license - Section 20 - Sale of a utility, in public interest – Issue - Whether ERCs have jurisdiction to review the functioning of a distribution licensee to supply electricity through a franchisee – Held, ERC may not directly regulate a franchise but it exercises regulatory oversight over the distribution licensee's functions and duties, including process of a distribution licensee delegating some of its functions and activities to a franchisee- Sections 16, 18, 19 and 20 of the 2003 Act prescribes 2 that ERC can stipulate/review the terms and conditions under which a distribution licensee may delegate its electricity distribution responsibilities to a franchisee - Sections 12-24 deals with licensing and all these stipulations are to regulate distribution licensee - there is no such stipulation to control or regulate relationship between a licensee and franchisee - contractual terms and conditions of authorization by the distribution licensee provided to the franchisee are privy to the said parties. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Global Feeds Feedback Energy Distribution Company Private Ltd. v. Govt. of Odisha 2019 SCC OnLine Ori 205; Paras 71, 72] Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Sections 61, 62, 64, 86 - Income Tax Act, 1961 (IT Act) - Section 32 - Income Tax Rules, 1962 (Rules, 1962) - Rule 5 - Accelerated depreciation - Tariff determination - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - State Instrumentality - Whether wind energy projects that did not avail accelerated depreciation were entitled to seek a separate tariff determination from the Gujarat Electricity Regulatory Commission (GERC), even after entering into PPAs with a fixed tariff applicable to projects availing accelerated depreciation – Held, tariff determination is an exercise of statutory power and not solely a matter of contractual volition, allowing for review by appropriate commission if public interest dictates - GUVNL-appellant is a State instrumentality and bound to promote the State's policy objectives, including development of renewable energy sources and cannot act as “model citizen” and cannot act like a “Shylock” - In IT Act and Rules, 1962, allow an assessee to choose between accelerated and normal depreciation at the time of filing their return for assessment year in which power generation commenced - This statutory liberty cannot be curtailed by appellant unilaterally fixing a binding price in a PPA entered into long before statutory option is to be exercised - Merely signing PPAs with a tariff applicable to projects availing accelerated depreciation did not bind respondent companies to that price for entire life of their projects - Appellant's conduct, seeking to bind the companies to an inapplicable tariff, was patently unfair and did not reflect positively on a State instrumentality - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 13, 14, 17, 20, 24] Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Green Infra Corporate Wind Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 767 : 2025 INSC 922

Section 61, 62, 86(1)(b) and 178 — Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) — Commercial Operation Date (COD) — Firm vs. Infirm Power — Conflict between unapproved PPA and Statutory Regulations — The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the TNERC and APTEL, holding that power supplied continuously from a Gas Turbine in Open Cycle mode after successful synchronization cannot be termed "infirm power" merely because the project-wide COD (Combined Cycle) had not been reached- held that the electricity supplied by them from the date of synchronization of their power generation to the grid is entitled to receive fixed charges, even if the entire project is not fully commissioned. [Relied on PTC India Limited vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 4 SCC 603; Tata Power Company Limited vs. Reliance Energy Limited (2009) 16 SCC 659; KKK Hydro Power Limited vs. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1847; Paras 30-31] Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. v. Penna Electricity Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1213 : 2025 INSC 1439

Section 63 - Determination of tariff by bidding process - Importance of harmonizing the provisions of the Electricity Act with environmental laws - Whether the application under Section 63 of the Act could have been made by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) which is a “local authority” within the meaning of Section 2(41) of the Act ? Held: Section 63 of the Act allows local authorities like the MCD to file applications for tariff adoption. Section 63 does not restrict the filing of tariff adoption applications only to distribution licensees or generating companies. The MCD, as a local authority, was entitled to file an application under Section 63 for the adoption of tariffs determined through a competitive bidding process for a Waste-to-Energy (WTE) project. The MCD was fulfilling its statutory obligations under the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016, and the project was in the public interest to address Delhi's waste management crisis. The Delhi Electricity Regulatory Commission (DERC) had the authority to approve the tariff of Rs. 7.38/KWh for the WTE project, as the bidding process was transparent and complied with the guidelines. The WTE project aligned with the National Tariff Policy, 2016, and the Renewable Purchase Obligation (RPO). The judgment reaffirmed the DERC's orders which had approved the tariff and dismissed challenges to the MCD's authority to issue tariff-based bids. The Supreme Court criticized APTEL for adopting a hyper-technical approach and failing to consider the larger public interest served by the WTE project. The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of harmonizing electricity and environmental laws to promote renewable energy projects. The judgment underscores the role of local authorities in addressing urban waste management challenges through sustainable solutions. The appeals were allowed, and set aside APTEL's judgment. Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gagan Narang, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 5

Section 79 - Jurisdiction of Central Electricity Regulatory Commission ('ERC') - Section 86 - Functions of State ERCs – Facts - Respondent 4 filed petition questioning legality and validity and propriety of Distribution Franchisee Agreement entered between appellant (distribution franchisee) and respondent 3 (distribution licensee) and prayed for investigation of conduct of respondent 2 and 3 in appointing the appellant as franchisee for distribution of electricity in Agra. Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Section 79(1), 178 - CERC's functions under Section 79(1) are inherently regulatory, serving as a comprehensive repository of powers to regulate the electricity sector, including transmission planning and execution. Absent Section 178 regulations, CERC is not rendered powerless; it may exercise Section 79(1) to issue interstitial or case-specific directives to prevent regulatory lacunae from impeding statutory objectives. A regulation cannot be created via adjudication, but this does not impose a blanket prohibition on CERC issuing regulatory orders under Section 79(1). The 2014 Tariff Regulations' silence on delay-attributable compensation does not bar such relief. The High Court's writ admission was erroneous given the exhaustive statutory remedies under the Act, reinforcing the principle against bypassing specialized forums. Affirms CERC's proactive regulatory role in inter-state transmission disputes, promoting accountability for delays without awaiting legislative rulemaking. The judgment underscores the Electricity Act's intent for efficient grid development, potentially influencing similar claims in energy infrastructure projects. Power Grid Corporation v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2025 INSC 697

Section 79(1), 178 - The appellant, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd. (PGCIL), completed construction of an inter-state transmission line and substation at Indore but could not operationalize it due to the respondent, Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Co. Ltd. (MPPTCL), delaying the downstream intra-state transmission infrastructure. PGCIL claimed compensation from CERC for revenue losses attributable to MPPTCL's delay. CERC, exercising powers under Section 79(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, awarded compensation to PGCIL via orders dated 21.01.2020 and 27.01.2020. MPPTCL challenged these orders before the High Court via writ petition, arguing CERC lacked jurisdiction absent specific regulations under Section 178 framing such compensation. The High Court admitted the petition despite available statutory remedies under the Act, prompting PGCIL's appeal to the Supreme Court. Whether the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) possesses authority under Section 79(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, to issue case-specific regulatory orders awarding compensation for delays in inter-state transmission projects, even in the absence of general regulations promulgated under Section 178. Held, Yes. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and upheld CERC's jurisdiction. Section 79(1) confers broad regulatory powers on CERC, enabling it to pass tailored orders addressing regulatory gaps where no Section 178 regulations exist, without conflating regulation with adjudication. Power Grid Corporation v. Madhya Pradesh Power Transmission Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2025 INSC 697

Section 86(1)(b) – Held, the fixing of the price for purchase of electricity and Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) that incorporates such a price must be reviewed and approved by the State Electricity Regulatory Commission - A generating company and a distribution licensee cannot, through a private agreement, unilaterally execute a PPA or set a tariff for the supply of electricity within a State without the Commission's review and approval under Sector 86(1)(b) of the Act - Mandatory requirement of Section 86(1)(b) of the Act requires the Commission's review and approval for any changes to electricity purchase prices - Supplementary PPA dt. September 10, 2010, was executed independently and unilaterally by the parties and was never submitted to Commission for approval - Commission's order dt. February 9, 2010, which increased the tariff from Rs. 2.87 per kWh to Rs. 2.95 per kWh, did not apply to the appellant's case since its PPA stipulated a tariff of Rs. 2.50 per kWh, not Rs. 2.87 per kWh - Supreme Court did not interfere with the APTEL's order because it appeal was not filed against it - Revised tariff of Rs. 2.60 per kWh (based on weighted average) has been in use for a long time, and upsetting the process would not be appropriate at this late stage - Private agreements to change tariffs without Commission approval are invalid - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 21-31] KKK Hydro Power Ltd. v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 856 : 2025 INSC 1057

Section 128 - Investigation of certain matters - Respondent 4 sought investigation under section 128 of the Act – Held, A petition under section 128 is not maintainable - investigation is limited in only two cases - i. if the licensee fails to abide by the terms of license and ii. If licensee acts in contravention to the provisions of the Act, 2003 - the threshold of “satisfaction” required to order an investigation under section 128 was not met in this case- Held, 2003 Act does not provide for direct regulatory oversight over distribution franchisees and same can be regulated only through distribution licensee- hence, under section 128, it is the distribution licensee which can be investigated, not its franchisee- this is in line with the Principle of agency - any action of franchisee is equivalent to such action having been committed by a distribution licensee satisfactory grounds are to be given for initiating an investigation – Held, U.P. ERC and Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) could not have micromanaged the distribution franchisee transaction or questioned the various aspects of franchisee's/Appellant's functioning. [Paras 57, 68, 75] Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Whether any individual can invoke jurisdiction of a State ERC on the plea of Public interest – Held, State ERC's have broader jurisdiction under Section 86, to adjudicate upon all disputes between licensees and generating companies - even when the jurisdiction of State ERC is enlarged, it does not include within it the power to adjudicate disputes involving consumers and their grievances, irrespective whether such issue is raised in furtherance of public interest - ERCs are not competent to entertain a matter on singular ground of public interest - ERCs are required to entertain matters in public interest wherever mandated by the Act, 2003 i.e. in matters related to tariff, procurement of power processes etc. which requires safeguarding of consumer interest alongside commercial interest - ERCs are creatures of a statute, derive their jurisdiction and powers from provisions of 2003 Act- they cannot exercise powers not expressly vested in them. [Rajeev Hitendra Pathak v. Achyut Kashinath Karekar (2011) 9 SCC 541; Para 43] Torrent Power v. U.P. Electricity Regulatory Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 705 : 2025 INSC 838

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) - "dependent" - Whether the definition of "dependent" as per Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the Act, specifically whether widowed sisters of the deceased, who were not minors, could be considered dependents entitled to compensation – Held, Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the 1923 Act defines dependents to include a "minor brother, or an unmarried sister, or a widowed sister if a minor" and noted the incongruity with present-day realities, referring to the context of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which makes the occurrence of a "widowed minor sister" unlikely - Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court judgment which treated widowed adult sisters as dependents, allowing compensation - Supreme Court left the question of law about the definition of "dependent" open and recommended the Law Commission of India to consider suitable amendments to the Employees Compensation Act to reflect current social realities. [Paras 2 - 6] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kogga, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1039

Sections 2(8), 3 - Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) - Sections 2(8), 51E - Interpretation of “accident arising out of and in the course of employment” - High Court reversed Commissioner's order for compensation citing that accident of deceased-watchmen did not originate from his employment because it happened outside factory premises – Held, the phrase “accident arising out of and in the courts of his employment” as it appears in section 3 of EC Act, includes accidents that occur when an employee is travelling to or from their place of work - Introduction of Section 51E into the ESI Act in 2010, which explicitly states that an accident while commuting to work is “deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment”, provided a nexus between the accident and the employment is established - This interpretation is based on the principle that the EC Act and ESI Act are statutes in pari materia and serve the common goal of social security for employees - This amendment to be “clarificatory in character” and therefore, it has a retrospective effect - Both EC Act and ESI Act are beneficial legislations - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 15, 16, 18, 23, 37, 39, 40, 44, 47, 55] Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2025 INSC 904

Courts are not strictly bound by the schedule under the Act, 1923, when determining compensation for functional disability. Courts may deviate from the statutory schedule to account for the actual loss of earning capacity due to functional disability, adopting a liberal interpretation of the Act as beneficial legislation. Overturning the High Court's reduction of disability from 100% to 34% for an employee who lost four fingers, the Court assessed the functional disability at 50%, considering the severe mutilation of the employee's right hand. It awarded enhanced compensation of ₹1,60,177.5 with 12% interest from the date of the accident and a penalty of ₹80,088.75. (Paras 8-12) Kamal Dev Prasad v. Mahesh Forge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 510 : 2025 INSC 591

Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (PF Act)

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 5 and Rule 33 – Effect of nomination becoming invalid upon subscriber "acquiring a family" – Distribution of GPF proceeds - Nomination vs. Succession - Supreme Court reaffirmed that a nomination does not confer absolute title or beneficial interest upon the nominee - It serves only as an indication of the person authorized to receive the amount, while the actual entitlement is governed by the law of succession – Held, where the original nomination form stipulates that the nomination becomes ineffective/invalid upon the subscriber acquiring a family (marriage), such nomination becomes void by function of that condition - Even if the subscriber fails to formally cancel or update the nomination after marriage, the earlier nomination cannot be held valid - Under Rule 33(i)(b) of the GPF(CS) Rules and Note 2 to Rule 476(V) of the Official Manual, if no valid nomination in favor of a family member subsists at the time of death, the GPF amount must be distributed among all eligible family members in equal shares - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi (1984) 1 SCC 424; Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar (2024) 4 SCC 642; Shipra Sengupta v. Mridul Sengupta (2009) 10 SCC 680; Paras 7-10] Bolla Malathi v. B. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1177 : 2025 INSC 1391

Order of Payment from Sale Proceeds: From the proceeds of the sale of the assets by the secured creditor - i. The first charge would be for the dues under the EPF&MP Act (including contribution, interest, penalty, and damages); ii. The remaining proceeds are then applied in satisfaction of the secured debt of the appellant-bank; iii. Workmen are granted liberty to approach the appropriate authority under the MRTU & PULP Act to determine their dues, which would only be satisfied if any amount remains after satisfaction of the provident fund dues and the secured creditor's debt. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Paras 17-27] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335

Section 11(2) - Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 26E - Priority of Dues - First Charge Vs. Priority to Secured Creditors – Held, the statutory first charge created under Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act in respect of provident fund dues has precedence over the priority conferred on a secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act - While Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act (introduced later in 2020) provides an overriding non-obstante clause conferring priority to a secured creditor's debts over all other debts and government dues, this priority cannot be equated with a "first charge" - Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act expressly creates a statutory first charge on the establishment's assets for the amount due, and this first charge prevails over the priority given under Section 26E of the SARFAESI. [Paras 22 - 24] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335

Section 11(2) - Supreme Court set aside Karnataka High Court order and restored a writ petition, remanding the matter for a fresh decision after impleading Axis bank as a respondent - High Court is directed to examine the priority of first charge between the EPFO and the secured creditors in light of Section 11(2) of the PF Act and High Court must also consider if the EPFO created a charge on the properties to be auctioned by Axis bank prior to the auction - High Court has to first deal with this issue and determine if Axis Bank has the first charge and priority over the EPFO to satisfy its dues from secured property under the SARFEASI Act, 2002 - Appeal allowed. [Para 8 - 13] Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Ltd. v. Regional Pf Commissioner II and Recovery Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2025 INSC 1045

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948

Section 2(17) - Principal Employer - A person exercising supervisory control over an establishment, irrespective of their official designation, qualifies as a 'principal employer' under Section 2(17) of the ESI Act. The Court upheld the conviction of a company's General Manager for failing to remit ESI contributions to the ESIC, sentencing him to six months' imprisonment and a ₹5,000 fine, emphasizing that liability persists for individuals acting as managing agents or supervising the establishment. Arguments that only the company bears responsibility were dismissed. (Paras 20 & 23) Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2025 INSC 500

Employees State Insurance (ESI) Corporation Act 1948- Section 45A- Jurisdiction under Section 45A: Whether the Employees State Insurance (ESI) Corporation can invoke summary determination powers under Section 45A of the ESI Act, 1948, in cases where the employer has produced records and participated in hearings, but the Corporation perceives such records as "inadequate" or "deficient."- held that Section 45A is an "extraordinary procedure" and a "residuary power"- It can only be invoked if two specific pre-conditions are met: (a) No returns, particulars, or records are submitted/maintained under Section 44; or (b) An official is obstructed from exercising duties under Section 45- clarified that "mere inadequacy of the record" does not confer jurisdiction under Section 45A- The statutory threshold is "non-production," not "inadequate production"- Dissatisfaction with the quality of documents does not permit the Corporation to treat production as non-production. [Relied on ESI Corpn. vs. C.C. Santhakumar (2007) 1 SCC 584] Carborandum Universal Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1232 : 2025 INSC 1455

Limitation and Statutory Architecture: Whether the Corporation can bypass the five-year limitation period prescribed under the proviso to Section 77(1A)(b) by incorrectly resorting to Section 45A when the legal pre-conditions for such an invocation are not met- When records are produced and cooperation is forthcoming, the Corporation must carry out the assessment under Section 75(2)(a). If the Corporation believes the employer's computation is incorrect, the proper course is to raise a dispute under Section 75 within the limitation period prescribed by Section 77(1A)(b)- While there is no limitation period for proceedings properly initiated under Section 45A, the Corporation cannot use Section 45A as an alternative mechanism to bypass the five-year limitation bar under Section 77(1A)(b) for stale claims when the employer has been cooperative - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and ESI Court orders, ruling that since the appellant had produced ledgers, cash books, and returns, and attended numerous hearings, the invocation of Section 45A was "misconceived" and "wholly untenable"- Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-20, 24-30] Carborandum Universal Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1232 : 2025 INSC 1455

Environmental Law

Auroville Foundation Act, 1988 - National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) and 14 - Not every environmental dispute constitutes a "substantial question relating to environment" under Section 2(1)(m) of the NGT Act. A substantial question must involve a direct violation of a specific statutory environmental obligation under the enactments in Schedule I. The NGT cannot assume jurisdiction and interfere with an approved Master Plan under the guise of applying the "Precautionary Principle" when no substantial environmental question arising from the implementation of Schedule I enactments is established. The Auroville Foundation Act, 1988, being a special Act with overriding effect, must be considered in assessing the validity of NGT directions. (Para 9, 13 & 14) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347

Compensation - The appeals arose from the pollution caused by tanneries in Vellore District, Tamil Nadu, particularly the discharge of untreated effluents into the River Palar, leading to severe environmental degradation, health hazards, and loss of livelihood for local communities. The Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee and the All India Skin and Hide Tanners and Merchants Association (AISHTMA) challenged the orders of the High Court regarding compensation and the liability of tanneries for ongoing pollution. The State Government is directed to disburse the compensation to all affected individuals/families as per the awards dated 07.03.2001 and 24.08.2009. The State shall recover the compensation amount from the polluters under the Revenue Recovery Act or other legal means. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Conservation of Endangered Species – Great Indian Bustard (GIB) and Lesser Florican (LF) – Balancing Wildlife Protection with Renewable Energy Goals – the Supreme Court has held that Corporate Social Responsibility cannot be divorced from Corporate Environmental Responsibility, observing that companies cannot claim to be socially responsible while disregarding the protection of wildlife and fragile ecosystems affected by their operations- The Supreme Court approved the recommendations of an Expert Committee to protect the critically endangered Great Indian Bustard while facilitating India's green energy transition- Key Rulings & Directions- i. Revised Priority Areas- Supreme Court accepted the expansion of the "Priority Area" for GIB conservation in Rajasthan to 14,013 sq. km, including an additional 850 sq. km based on recent sightings and habitat suitability; ii. Restrictions on New Projects - No new wind turbines or solar plants exceeding 2 MW capacity are permitted within the revised Priority Areas - Future overhead powerlines in these areas are prohibited except through dedicated, optimized power corridors; iii. Undergrounding of Powerlines - Immediate undergrounding was ordered for 80 km of identified 33 kV lines in Rajasthan - Rerouting of specific existing lines (66 kV and above) must be completed within two years; iv. Bird Flight Divertors (BFDs) - While acknowledging their potential, directed further scientific assessment of BFD efficiency and durability by the Wildlife Institute of India (WII) and another independent agency before mandatory large-scale deployment; v. Ecological Significance - Supreme Court emphasized an "ecocentric" perspective, noting the deep cultural and historical ties between the GIB (locally known as Godawan) and communities like the Bishnois, who practice eco-veneration. [Relied on Centre for Environmental Law, World Wide Fund-India v. Union of India (2013) 8 SCC 234; U.P. Public Service Commission v. Rahul Singh (2018) 7 SCC 254; Paras 47-49, 61-63, 67, 76] M.K. Ranjitsinh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1233 : 2025 INSC 1472

Correct systemic weaknesses in tiger governance, the Supreme Court issued several pan-India directions- i. All States must notify core and buffer areas within 6 months; ii. All States must prepare or revise Tiger Conservation Plans within 3 months; iii. Steering Committees for each Tiger Reserve must be constituted within 2 months and meet twice annually; iii. NTCA must monitor whether TCPs and Steering Committees are effectively functioning; iv. Community-based tourism models must replace mass tourism- The Court further held that Critical Tiger Habitats under the Wildlife Protection Act must be treated at par with Critical Wildlife Habitats under the Forest Rights Act, ensuring consistency in recognition of ecological value and rights of forest dwellers. [Paras 47, 48 - 50] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Delhi Ridge– Morphological Ridge– Protection and Identification– Supreme Court reiterated that areas possessing the morphological features of the Ridge (Geological Ridge), even if not notified as "Reserved Forest," require equal protection – Directed the DRMB to ensure the identification process of the Morphological Ridge is completed and to remove encroachments from both the notified Ridge and Morphological Ridge – Criticized the GNCTD for the 30-year delay in issuing the final Section 20 notification under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Kenneth Builders & Developers (P) Ltd., (2016) 13 SCC 561; Paras 11-13, 34-37, 57(iii)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090

Directions Issued - The State Government shall pay compensation to affected individuals/families within six weeks and recover the amount from polluters. A committee shall be constituted to oversee ecological restoration and ensure ZLD compliance. The State shall implement a comprehensive rejuvenation plan for the River Palar, including desilting and pollution removal. Quarterly inspections of tanneries shall be conducted, and non-compliant industries shall face strict action. The State shall promote sustainable practices, including waste recycling and reuse, and ensure the health and safety of workers. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Ecological Restoration - A committee, chaired by a retired High Court Judge, shall be constituted to oversee the implementation of a comprehensive scheme for ecological restoration, including the establishment of Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) and Individual Effluent Treatment Plants (IETPs), and ensure Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD). Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Environment & Mining – Aravali Hills and Ranges – Conservation and Regulation of Mining – Importance of Aravalis as a "green barrier" against desertification – Uniform Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges – Prohibition of Mining in Core/Inviolate Areas – Need for a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) on the lines of the Saranda Forest Plan- Supreme Court directed the Centre to prepare a comprehensive Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) before any new mining activity is permitted in the ecologically fragile region of “Aravali Hills and Ranges” spread across the states of Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat- Supreme Court accepted the operational definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges recommended by the Committee constituted on May 9, 2024, for the purpose of regulating mining- i. Aravali Hills: Any landform in Aravali districts having an elevation of 100 metres or more from the local relief- The entire landform within the area enclosed by the lowest contour is part of the Aravali Hills; ii. Aravali Range- Two or more Aravali Hills located within a proximity of 500m from each other. [Para 40, 42-48] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 - District Survey Report = Environmental Clearance - Sand Mining - EIA Notification, 2006 - Precautionary Principle - The Uttar Pradesh government issued an e-auction notice for sand mining leases under Category B2 minor mineral projects, relying on a 2017 District Survey Report (DSR) that had expired after its five-year validity in 2022, and a draft 2023 DSR not yet finalized. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) invalidated the auction, holding it violative of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 (as amended in 2016), which mandates a valid DSR as a prerequisite for environmental clearance (EC). The State appealed. Whether an expired or draft DSR can form the basis for granting EC and auctioning mining leases, absent a valid and subsisting DSR prepared in accordance with EIA Notification procedures. Held, a valid and subsisting DSR—not older than five years—is a mandatory precondition for EC applications under the EIA Notification for Category B2 projects. Neither an expired DSR nor a draft DSR suffices, as the latter is "virtually non-existent" for EC purposes. The NGT's order invalidating the auction is affirmed. The DSR, prepared per Appendix-X and Para 7(iii)(a) of the EIA Notification, is a "document of seminal importance" enabling informed appraisal of ecological sensitivities. It must cover all districts, be publicly displayed for 21 days, hosted on district websites, and maintained at the Collectorate. Its five-year lifespan reflects the precautionary principle, accounting for rapid environmental changes; post-expiry, a fresh DSR is required. District Environment Impact Assessment Authority (DEIAA) and District Environment Appraisal Committee (DEAC) bear statutory duty to prepare and update DSRs every five years, ensuring real-time eco-fragility assessment. Non-compliance renders EC applications incomplete and auctions unlawful. Strict enforcement is imperative to uphold environmental safeguards. The appeal is dismissed. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Gaurav Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 548 : 2025 INSC 650

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986– Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006– Judicial Discipline and Precedent– Review– Per Incuriam- Supreme Court in Review Petition recalls its earlier judgment (JUR: Vanashakti v. Union of India) which had struck down the 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum providing for ex post facto Environmental Clearance (EC) in certain circumstances- Held that a Bench of two-Judges is bound by an earlier view taken by another Bench of co-equal strength- If a subsequent Bench considers that the law laid down earlier by a co-equal Bench requires reconsideration, the only available option is to refer the matter to a larger Bench- The judgment delivered by a subsequent Bench of two Judges in ignorance of the earlier binding judgment of a Bench of co-equal strength is per incuriam in law- The earlier judgment (JUR), being a two-Judge Bench, failed to notice the binding co-ordinate Bench judgments in D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Others and Pahwa Plastics Private Limited and Another v. Dastak NGO and Others on the issue of ex post facto EC, rendering it per incuriam- The failure to consider binding co-ordinate precedents constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, making the review warranted and imperative- Writ Petition and Appeal are restored. [Relied on Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1; Paras 80-101, 115-127] Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1116 : 2025 INSC 1326

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986– Section 3(3)– Constitution of Statutory Delhi Ridge Management Board (DRMB)– The Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) to constitute the DRMB as a statutory body under Section 3(3) of the EP Act– Held, the Board effectively functioned without statutory backing for decades, merely on Court orders; giving it statutory status ensures accountability, transparency, and subjection to the jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) and Constitutional Courts– The Board shall act as a “single-window” authority for all issues concerning the Delhi Ridge to avoid conflicting orders from multiple committees. [Paras 40-42, 45, 57(i)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090

Environment Pollution - Air Quality – Firecrackers - Green Crackers - Delhi-NCR Ban - Right to Life - Right to Profession - Relaxation; Diwali – NEERI - Supreme Court allows limited sale and use of NEERI-approved Green Crackers in NCR for a specified period (18 October 2025 till 20 October, 2025) around Diwali as a temporary 'test case' measure, relaxing the previous complete ban - Directs strict compliance with time restrictions and regulatory terms - Supreme Court decided to take a balanced approach to avoid compromising environmental concerns while acknowledging the interests of the industry and the practical difficulty in enforcing a complete ban - Noted that the situation is different now as both the Central and NCTD Governments are seeking relaxation of the ban. [Relied on Arjun Gopal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. W.P. (C) No. 728, 2025; Paras 20-23] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1005

Environment Pollution - Supreme Court issued directions - i. Sale shall only be from designated locations in the entire NCR, to be identified by District Collectors/Commissioners in consultation with the District Superintendent of Police and given wide publicity; ii. Use of firecrackers shall be confined between 6:00 AM to 7:00 AM and 8:00 PM to 10:00 PM on the two days, i.e., the one before and on the Diwali day; iii. Only green crackers as uploaded on the NEERI website, manufactured by those registered with NEERI and licensed by PESO; iv. Banned items like firecrackers joined in series, barium, no sale or purchase through e-commerce networks; v. Patrolling teams shall be constituted to keep vigil, conduct regular reconnaissance, take random samples for analysis, and ensure only permitted products with QR Codes are sold; vi. Violations will lead to penalties and cancellation of PESO/NEERI licence/registration. [Para 24] M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1005

Environmental and Heritage Preservation - Construction of Verandah at Punjab and Haryana High Court - Compliance with UNESCO World Heritage Guidelines - Preservation of Chandigarh Capitol Complex's World Heritage Status - Development of Green Paver Blocks in Kutcha Parking Area - Balancing Sustainable Development with Chandigarh Master Plan, 2031. Held, the construction of a verandah in front of Court Room No. 1 aligns with the existing architectural design and complies with UNESCO's Operational Guidelines (para 172) for the Chandigarh Capitol Complex, a World Heritage Site. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's directions to construct the verandah and develop the kutcha parking area with green paver blocks and tree plantation within the High Court premises. The verandah, a non-invasive structure, addresses the need to protect Court Room No. 1 from environmental damage while preserving the Outstanding Universal Value (OUV) of the Capitol Complex. Modern architectural techniques ensure aesthetic and structural integrity, and ex post facto approval from UNESCO may be sought if necessary. The Court directed the High Court administration to consult landscaping experts to optimize parking capacity, enhance green cover, and provide shade, ensuring compliance with the Chandigarh Master Plan, 2031. Contempt proceedings for non-compliance were held in abeyance for 12 weeks to allow implementation. The Court emphasized balancing public interest (facilities for lawyers and litigants) with environmental sustainability and heritage preservation. Green paver blocks mitigate dust, pollution, and sludge in the parking area, promoting ecological sustainability. Appeals and pending applications disposed of, with directions to implement the High Court's orders while adhering to heritage and environmental guidelines. (Para 39, 45 & 46) Chandigarh Administration v. Registrar General, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 639 : 2025 INSC 786

Environmental Compensation – Validity of Calculation Method – Jurisdiction of NGT under PMLA - The Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board (PCB) determined environmental compensation against Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. for polluting groundwater by storing hazardous chromium waste. The National Green Tribunal (NGT) disapproved of the PCB's method for calculating the compensation, which was based on the total waste found at the site (62225 MT) without properly considering the appellant's actual contribution. The NGT imposed compensation of Rs. 25,39,68,750/- and also held the appellant liable under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Held; the Supreme Court set aside the NGT's decision, noting that the PCB's method of calculating compensation was flawed as it did not accurately attribute the waste to the appellant. The Court remanded the matter to the PCB for redetermination of the environmental compensation in accordance with law. The NGT exceeded its jurisdiction by holding the appellant liable under the PMLA, especially since no criminal complaint or FIR was filed for any scheduled offence under the PMLA. Citing Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 Live law (SC) 633 the Court emphasized that proceedings under PMLA require a registered scheduled offence. The Court expressed doubt on the jurisdiction of the NGT to direct prosecution under PMLA but did not decide on it, as the impugned order was set aside on other grounds. The appeal was partly allowed. The PCB was directed to re-evaluate the environmental compensation. The NGT's findings on liability under the PMLA were set aside. Waris Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. v. Uttar Pradesh Pollution Control Board, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 87

Environmental Law - Matheran Eco - Sensitive Zone - Paver Blocks on Roads - Supreme Court accepted recommendations of IIT Bombay Report and NEERI Report (expert bodies) and permitted the State government to lay clay paver blocks on the main road - Directed that no concrete bed should be used under the paver blocks, but other measures recommended by expert bodies, such as a non-woven geotextile layer, cambering of roads, and lateral drains, should be implemented - It was clarified that no paver blocks should be laid on internal roads or trekking routes. In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 854 : 2025 INSC 996

Environmental Law - National Green Tribunal (NGT) - Polluter Pays Principle - Environmental Compensation (EC) – Held, NGT has no power to direct ED probe under PMLA - NGT lacks jurisdiction to issue such a directive, as its powers are limited by Section 15 of NGT Act of 2010 - An FIR must be registered for a scheduled offence before invoking the PMLA - NGT's penalty, which was based on the company's turnover, lacked a rational nexus with the alleged pollution - A company's revenue or its quantum has no connection to the penalty for environmental damage - If the NGT found the penalty to be minimal, it should have referred to the CPCB's (Central Pollution Control Board) methodology instead of a company's turnover - Question of the maintainability of PIL at this stage, noting that initial reports from Joint Committee indicated violations of environmental laws - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-13] C.L. Gupta Export Ltd. v. Adil Ansari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 836 : 2025 INSC 1035

Environmental Law - Powers of Pollution Control Boards – Held, environmental regulators have a compelling duty to adopt and apply preventive measures irrespective of actual environmental damage - Ex-ante action is necessary for this purpose and a certain measure in exercise of powers under Section 33A and 31A of the Water and Air Acts is essential - The powers of Boards under above sections are identical to those under section 5 of Environment Protection Act, which includes power to direct polluting industries to pay amounts for remedial measures - Boards are empowered to take similar actions - Recent 2024 amendments to Water & Air Acts, introducing decriminalization and the office of “Adjudicatory Officer” do not create a conflict with the State Board's power to direct payment of environmental damages - Boards have the discretion to decide appropriate action against a polluting entity, whether its punishment by penalty or immediate restoration, or both - This power must be guided by transparency and non-arbitrariness - Supreme Court directed that necessary subordinate legislation (Rules and Regulations) must be notified to ensure fair, transparent and non-arbitrary imposition of restitutionary and compensatory environmental damages, with procedural certainty - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10, 12, 27, 31, 33, 35, 36] Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2025 INSC 923

Environmental Law - Supreme Court expresses grave concerns over “unscientific construction” and “human greed” causing environmental devastation in Himachal Pradesh (HP) - Dismissed appellant's plea against 'Green Area' notification and initiates suo motu PIL to address the broader environmental issues in State - Supreme Court expressed severe anguish over the extensive environmental damage and ecological imbalance in H.P., attributing to lack of proper planning - Held that situation in H.P. has “gone from bad to worse”, leading to serious natural calamities, including floods and landslides that have claimed hundreds of lives and destroyed thousands of properties - Emphasized that humans, not nature, are responsible for phenomena like continuous landslides, collapses buildings and road subsidence - Identified major causes of destruction as Hydro Power Projects, four lane roads, deforestation and multi-storey buildings, deforest and forest degradation, climate change and glacier retreat - Noted that uncontrolled tourism leads to traffic congestion waste generation, noise pollution, overuse of water resources and encroachment into ecologically sensitive areas - “Earning revenue is not everything” and “revenue cannot be earned at the cost of environment and ecology” and warned that if the current trend continues the entire Himachal Pradesh 'may vanish in thin air from the map of the country'- Directed State to submit appropriate report detailing the steps taken on the concerns expressed by the Court. Pristine Hotels and Resorts Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 759

Environmental Law - Supreme Court struck down a part of Centre's January 29, 2025 notification that had exempted construction projects related to industrial sheds, schools, colleges and hostels from obtaining prior environmental clearance under the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006 – Held, Education is now an industry and strikes down Centre's exemption for educational buildings from environmental clearance - This exemption, contained in Note 1 to Clause 8(a) of the amended schedule, was arbitrary and contrary to the purpose of the Environment Protection Act - Rest of the notification was upheld - Court applied a literal interpretation to 2006 notification and found that it did not provide for applicability of General Conditions to projects under Entry 8(a) and 8(b) of the Schedule - Wherever the General conditions were intended to apply, it was specifically mentioned in column 5 of the Schedule - SEIAA is a statutory body of experts and is better equipped to conduct environmental impact studies for projects within their respective states - 2006 notification itself outlines the composition and procedure for the SEIAA - Note 1 to Entry 8(a) of Notification dt. 29th January, 2025 was upheld - Petition partly allowed. [Paras 22, 26, 40, 42, 46] Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 808 : 2025 INSC 961

Environmental Law - Water (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Water Act) - Section 33A - Air (Prevention & Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (Air Act) - Section 31A - Polluter Pays Principle – Compensatory / Restitutionary Damages vs. Penalties – Held, Pollution Control Boards can impose environmental compensation on polluting entities but was not empowered to levy compensatory damages under Section 33A of Water Act and Section 31A of Air Act as such actions amounted to imposition of penalties for which a specific procedure under Chapters VII & VI of respective Act was contemplated - There is distinction between a direction for payment of restitutionary and compensatory damage as a remedial measure for environmental damage and a punitive action of fine - Punitive action can only be taken through procedure prescribed in statute - Environmental restitution is a constitutional and statutory obligation, not punitive action. [Paras 19, 20, 27, 30] Delhi Pollution Control Committee v. Lodhi Property Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 766 : 2025 INSC 923

Environmental Protection Act, 1986 - Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notifications – Held, a valid and subsisting District Survey Report (DSR) is mandatory for the grant of environmental clearance (EC) for sand mining - A draft DSR is untenable in law - DSR is prepared under Para 7(iii) of the EIA notification dt. 15.01.2016, following the procedure in Appendix X and the Sustainable Sand Mining management Guidelines, 2016 and Enforcement and Monitoring Guidelines for Sand Mining 2020 - Purpose of a DSR is to scientifically locate sand mining sites by calculating the annual rate of replenishment - Just as forest conservation requires assessing tree growth before timber harvesting, a replenishment study ensures that sand extraction does not exceed the replenishment rate - Excessive sand extraction can have adverse impacts on a river's physical characteristics, such as bed elevation, flow velocity and sediment transport, which can disturb the ecological equilibrium - DSR is valid and tenable only when a proper replenishment study has been conducted - J&K EIA authority erred in granting an environmental clearance based on a DSR that lacked a replenishment report - Upheld order by NGT citing that no provision exists to dispense with the requirement for a DSR and replenishment study - Using heavy machinery like JCBs and excavators for excavation is a violation of the EC conditions - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 20, 26, 29, 30, 32-33, 37-39] Union Territory of J & K v. Raja Muzaffar Bhat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 829 : 2025 INSC 1025

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 — Ss. 2 & 7 — Illegal diversion of reserved forest land — Nexus between politicians, bureaucrats, and builders — Constitution of SITs by States/UTs for investigation and reclamation — Supreme Court quashed allotment and sale of 11.89 hectares of reserved forest land in Pune (notified in 1879) to private family (1998) for agricultural use and subsequent transfer to housing society (1999) as front arrangement, without prior Central Government approval; held actions in breach of public trust by Revenue Minister and Divisional Commissioner; quashed 2007 environmental clearance for residential/commercial complex; directed handover of land to Forest Department; issued pan-India directions to States/UTs to: (i) constitute SITs to probe illegal allotments of reserved forest land held by Revenue Departments to private entities; (ii) reclaim possession or recover market value (for afforestation); (iii) form special teams for implementation within 1 year; (iv) restrict reclaimed lands to afforestation only. In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 590

Forest and Environment Law – Judicial Discipline – Interference with Pending Supreme Court Proceedings – Contempt of Court - Supreme Court has strongly criticised the Uttarakhand High Court for entertaining a plea and staying a sanction order that was passed during the pendency of proceedings before the Apex Court concerning illegal constructions and felling of trees in the Corbett Tiger Reserve - The High Court, no doubt, is a Constitutional Court and not inferior to this Court. However, in judicial matters, when this Court is seized of the matter, it is expected of the High Courts to keep their hands away - Notice is issued to Shri Rahul (IFS), Chief Conservator of Forests, to remain present and show cause as to why an action for committing contempt of this Court be not initiated against him. [Paras 9 - 13] In Re: T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1046

Forest Conservation Act, 1980 and Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Survey of encroachment on forest land - Encroachments and depleting forest cover in Tamil Nadu's Agasthyamalai landscape - Conflict between forest conservation and rehabilitation of displaced tea estate workers - The Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) to conduct a scientific survey within 12 weeks to demarcate forest boundaries, identify encroachments, and recommend measures for restoring reserved forests, tiger habitats, elephant corridors, and wildlife sanctuaries, while ensuring state support for the process. (Para 27 – 30) A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2025 INSC 443

Forests form the lungs of the ecosystem, and any depletion / destruction of forest areas has a direct impact on the entire environment. The world at large is facing the calamities caused by the climate change, and the primary culprit behind this is the depleting forest cover owing to a myriad of issues including rapid urbanization, unchecked industrialization, encroachments, etc. - India has a forest cover of about 7,15,343 sq. km as per 'India State of Forest Report 2023', which is about 21.76% (approx.) of the total landmass of the country. Nepal has 44.74% (approx.), Bhutan has 72% (approx.), and Sri Lanka has 29% (approx.) forest cover. Hence, clearly the forest cover in India is not adequate and needs to be enhanced. A recent report, submitted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, in proceedings before the National Green Tribunal indicates that almost 13000 sq. kms. area of forests is under encroachment. This Court has time and again taken up this issue and passed mandatory directions to remove the encroachments from the forest areas and to curb any attempt to reduce the forest cover in the country. (Para 2 & 4) A. John Kennedy v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 395 : 2025 INSC 443

Government Responsibility - The State and Central Governments are responsible for enforcing environmental laws, ensuring compliance, and taking preventive measures to protect the environment. The "Government Pay Principle" is invoked, holding the government accountable for regulatory lapses. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 16(h) - Limitation for Appeal against Environmental Clearance (EC) - Commencement of Period of Limitation - Duty to Communicate EC - "Earliest of the Date" Principle – Held, Section 16(h) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 provides a period of thirty days from the date on which the order granting Environmental Clearance (EC) is "communicated" to an "any person aggrieved" to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal - The Proviso allows for a further period not exceeding sixty days for filing the appeal if the Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause - The maximum condonable period is 90 days (30 days + 60 days) - The communication contemplated under Section 16(h) is intended to be in rem and not in personam, as environmental issues operate as public law concerns, and the expression "any person aggrieved" must receive a liberal construction - The obligation to "communicate" the EC order vests in a plurality of duty holders, including: (i) the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC), (ii) the Project Proponent, and (iii) the Pollution Control Board(s) (SPCB/SEIAA). This obligation flows from the Environment Protection Act, 1986, read with the Environment Impact Assessment Notification 2006 (specifically Paragraph 10) and the conditions of the EC. [Relied on Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2011) 9 SCC 126] Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1123 : 2025 INSC 1331

Health and Safety of Workers - The State shall ensure that tannery workers are provided with protective gear, health check-ups, and insurance coverage. The Factories Act and other labor laws shall be strictly enforced. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee shall operate with the following broad Terms of Reference- i. The Committee shall oversee and ensure full, faithful and time-bound implementation of the directions contained in the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, including those issued based on the recommendations of the Justice P.C. Tatia Committee; ii. The Committee shall prepare a scientifically grounded, time-bound River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the river system that includes Rivers Jojari, Luni and Bandi and formulate a comprehensive plan for its execution in coordination with the State Government and concerned authorities/agencies- This plan shall incorporate scientific, technical and administrative measures for remediation of contaminated topsoil, rejuvenation of groundwater aquifers, restoration of river ecology, revival of flora and fauna, prevention of future contamination, and long-term environmental monitoring. iii. In order to accurately map the sources of pollution, the Committee may conduct a comprehensive on ground survey of every discharge point, pipeline, drain, channel or outlet that leads into the Jojari, Bandi or Luni rivers or any of their tributaries- The Committee shall identify all legal and illegal discharge points, determine the nature of effluents released through each of them, and ascertain whether such discharges comply with statutory standards. iv. The Committee may, with the assistance of suitable expert bodies, examine the feasibility of making all existing SCADA meters fully online and integrated into a common monitoring dashboard to enable effective and continuous oversight and real time data monitoring of discharge of industrial effluents- The Committee shall also assess the feasibility of installing SCADA meters, or any other compatible monitoring devices, at all Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) so that the quantity and quality of effluent discharged from such plants can be monitored on a real-time basis- v. The Committee may schedule and conduct audits including surprise checks of the CETPs, STPs, oxidation ponds, drainage systems, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) units and industrial primary treatment plants at appropriate intervals- The Committee shall specify compliance benchmarks and ensure that non-compliance is addressed promptly- vi. The performance audits of Common Effluents Treatment Plants (CETPs) and Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) undertaken by educational institutions engaged by the State of Rajasthan shall be submitted to the Committee, which shall examine the findings, direct remedial measures and ensure that deficiencies identified in the audits are rectified without delay; vii. All action plans, technical reports, feasibility studies and remedial proposals prepared by IIT Jodhpur, MNIT Jaipur, MBM Engineering College, BITS Pilani or any other institution engaged by the State shall be placed before the Committee- The Committee shall evaluate the scientific soundness, feasibility and environmental efficacy of each recommendation and give its suggestions on their implementation; viii. The Committee shall assess the existing treatment capacity vis-à-vis actual industrial and municipal discharge and prepare a timebound infrastructural augmentation plan- This may include, wherever necessary, the installation of new CETPs or STPs, enhancement of existing capacity, creation of additional conveyance pipelines, adoption of 56 Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) technologies, and establishment of integrated waste management systems- ix. The Committee shall identify officials, authorities or industries/industrial units responsible for non-compliance or dereliction of their obligations- Upon identification of such individuals and/or industries/industrial units, the Committee shall recommend appropriate disciplinary action, prosecution under applicable statutes, and/or recovery of environmental compensation, as the facts may justify- It shall ensure that the principle of “Polluter Pays” is applied effectively and that no violator is permitted to escape liability; xi. The Committee shall have full authority to call for records, issue directions to State and local bodies, seek technical assistance from national institutions including but not limited to National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (CISR-NEERI) and ensure strict implementation of all environmental safeguards; xii. The Committee shall also be at liberty to examine and address all such matters as may be incidental, ancillary or consequential to the aforesaid Terms of Reference- This shall include any issue which, in the considered view of the Committee, bears a nexus with the prevention of pollution, restoration of the river ecosystem, augmentation of treatment infrastructure, or enforcement of environmental norms- The Committee shall have full authority to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to secure the objectives of the directions issued by this Court and to ensure that the environmental and constitutional rights of the affected communities are effectively safeguarded. [Para 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341

Institutional Framework– Inclusion of Central Empowered Committee (CEC)– Held that to prevent duplication of work and two separate levels of scrutiny, directed that a representative of the CEC be made a formal member of the DRMB– Further directed the constitution of a "Standing Committee" headed by the CEC member to handle day-to-day functioning and conservation efforts, as the full DRMB (chaired by the Chief Secretary) cannot meet daily- Relying on the principle of restoration, the Supreme Court held that the State cannot merely penalize culprits but must actively restore damaged ecosystems– The DRMB's core function is defined as the preservation, scientific management, and ecological restoration of the Ridge. [Paras 48-50, 55-56, 57(ii)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090

Liability of tanneries for environmental pollution under the "Polluter Pays Principle" and "Precautionary Principle." Continuation of liability for compensation beyond 1998 until ecological damage is reversed - Implementation of schemes for ecological restoration and compensation to affected individuals/families - Role of the State and Central Governments in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring compliance - Explained. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) – Held, recognizing the Aravalis' ecological fragility, rich biodiversity (including 22 wildlife sanctuaries, 4 tiger reserves, and wetlands), and water recharging function, the Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) to prepare a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) through ICFRE (Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education) for the entire continuous geological ridge extending from Gujarat to Delhi, on the lines of the MPSM for Saranda- i. No new mining leases are to be granted until the MPSM is finalised by the MoEF&CC through ICFRE; ii. The MPSM must- Identify permissible, ecologically sensitive, conservation-critical, and restoration priority areas where mining shall be strictly prohibited or permitted only under exceptional/scientifically justified circumstances; Incorporate an analysis of cumulative environmental impacts and the ecological carrying capacity of the region; Include detailed post-mining restoration and rehabilitation measures. [Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338

Monitoring and Compliance - The State Pollution Control Board (TNPCB) and Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) shall monitor industries, enforce emission standards, and ensure real-time water quality monitoring. Industries failing to comply with environmental norms shall face strict action, including closure. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

National Green Tribunal (NGT) Act, 2010 - Section 19, 22 - Principles of natural justice - Right to a hearing - NGT cannot abdicate its adjudicatory functions by relying solely on the report of a Joint Committee - Held that adjudicatory functions of NGT cannot be assigned to committees, even expert committees, decisions have to be that of NGT - An expert's committee's role is to assist the tribunal with a factfinding exercise, but the final adjudication must be done by the NGT itself - The NGT cannot 'outsource an opinion and base its decision on such opinion' - An adverse order cannot be passed against a person without impleading them as a party to the proceedings and giving them an opportunity of hearing - The NGT's approach in condemning a person unheard is contrary to settled principles of natural justice. [Paras 28] Triveni Engineering and Industries Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 863 : 2025 INSC 1060

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(1)(m) - Substantial question relating to environment - Auroville Township Project – National Green Tribunal barred the Auroville Foundation from developmental activities in their township in Puducherry - Held, no substantial question relating to environment had arisen, nor violation of any of the enactments specified in Schedule-I was alleged. The Tribunal therefore had committed gross error in assuming the jurisdiction and giving directions untenable in law. (Para 18 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347

Nationwide mandate to notify Eco-Sensitive Zones for all Tiger Reserves - The Court has directed that all Tiger Reserves must have notified Eco-Sensitive Zones (ESZs) within one year - Supreme Court endorsed the MoEF&CC's 2018 advisory stating that the minimum extent of ESZs must cover the entire buffer and fringe areas, with at least a one-kilometre radial cushion around critical habitat where the buffer is missing - Held that ESZs, traditionally notified around National Parks and Sanctuaries, must apply equally to Tiger Reserves, reinforcing the ecological shield around these landscapes - Once notified, the same restrictions as those under the 9 February 2011 ESZ Notification will apply - This includes a complete ban on mining within one kilometre of tiger habitats, buffer areas or ESZ boundaries, whichever is larger. [Paras 47] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Polluter Pays Principle - The tanneries are absolutely liable for the environmental damage caused by their operations. The liability extends not only to compensating affected individuals/families but also to restoring the damaged ecology. The liability continues until the pollution is curbed and the ecological damage is reversed. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Principle of Commencement of Limitation ('First Accrual') - Project Proponent's Obligation to Advertise - When the duty to communicate the EC vests in multiple authorities, the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 16(h) will commence from the earliest of the date on which the communication is carried out by any of the duty bearers. This is based on the principle of "first accrual," where, if a legal challenge is based on multiple grounds, the period of limitation runs from the date when the right to sue first accrues - The communication must be clear and complete. Once this condition is satisfied by one duty bearer, the person aggrieved cannot "pick and choose later communications from other duty bearers for reckoning the period of limitation" - It is not a legal requirement that the entirety of the environmental clearance is published in the newspaper - It is sufficient compliance if the project proponent publishes the grant of the EC and indicates the substance of the conditions and safeguards - The advertisement is sufficient if it notifies the public of the EC grant and where the complete and comprehensive information is available (e.g., the website of MoEF&CC/SEIAA or with the SPCB) - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Medha Patkar & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests, UOI and Ors. 2013 SCC Online NGT 63; V. Sundar Proprietor Chemicals, India v. Union of India & Ors. 2015 SCC Online NGT 145; Paras 15-21] Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1123 : 2025 INSC 1331

Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (Kerala) – Sections 3(1), 3(2) & 3(3) – Private Forest – Exemption for Bona Fide Plantation - Burden of Proof and standard of proof – Held, burden of proof to claim exemption from vesting under Section 3(2) or Section 3(3) of the Act lies on the claimant (owner) - the standard of proof in such civil proceedings is merely the preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt - The claimant is required to lead evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder can conclude that the ingredients of the exemption are more likely than not satisfied - The concurrent factual findings of the Forest Tribunal and the High Court are liable to be overturned where they are vitiated by a clear disregard of relevant materials or an application of wrong legal standards, such as an unrealistic burden of proof - Supreme Court observed while declaring that 37.5 acres of land in South Wayanad, cultivated with coffee and cardamom, is private plantation land and not a vested forest under the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Joseph & Another v. State of Kerala & Another (2007) 6 SCR 347; Paras 33-43] M. Jameela v State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1023 : 2025 INSC 1254

Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 (MPFA) (Maharashtra) — Section 3(1) read with Section 2(f)(iii) (Vesting of Private Forest) — Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) — Section 35(3) (Notice) — Mandatory Preconditions – Held, vesting of private land in the State as 'private forest' under the MPFA, based on a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, requires strict adherence to the statutory sequence - The expression "issued" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA comprehends due service of the notice on the owner as contemplated by Section 35(5) of the IFA - The requirement of service is mandatory because it alone triggers the owner's right to object, which the State is obliged to consider - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2014 3 SCC 430; Para 13-15] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296

Prohibited activities in buffer and fringe areas - The Supreme Court approved the Expert Committee's list of prohibited activities, including - i. commercial mining; ii. Sawmills; iii. polluting industries; iv. commercial firewood use; v. major hydroelectric projects; vi. introduction of exotic species; vii. hazardous substance production; viii. low-flying aircraft and tourism aircraft; ix. waste discharge into natural ecosystems; x. tree felling without approval- Held that regulated activities, such as hotels, water use, road widening and night vehicular movement, will require adherence to strict wildlife safeguards and must be consistent with Tiger Conservation Plans. [Paras 47] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Prohibition in Core/Inviolate Areas - Supreme Court accepted the recommendation for prohibition of mining in core/inviolate areas - These areas include - i. Protected Areas (including tiger reserves and all identified tiger corridors); ii. Areas covered under Draft or Final Eco Sensitive Zone (ESZ)/Eco Sensitive Area (ESA) or the default ESZ as per Supreme Court orders; iii. Areas within 1.0 km of the boundary of a Protected Area; iv. Areas where plantations have been raised with government/agency funds; v. Areas within 500 m from the boundary of Ramsar sites and Wetlands. [Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338

Public Participation - The State shall establish platforms for citizens to report pollution incidents and ensure transparency in environmental data. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Regulation of Existing Mining – Held, mining activities already in operation are permitted to continue strictly in compliance with the recommendations made by the Committee in paragraph 8 of its report - Supreme Court declined to impose a complete ban on ongoing legal mining, citing the ill consequences, such as the rise of illegal mining and criminalisation. [Relied on State of Bihar and Others v. Pawan Kumar and Others 2022 2 SCC 348; Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338

Restoration of Khajuria Lake - Directions - The Supreme Court set aside the Bombay High Court's 2018 direction to restore Khajuria Lake, a natural water body filled by the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (BMC) to construct a municipal park. The Court directed that the park be preserved in perpetuity as a green space for public use without predominant commercial activity. An expert committee was ordered to be constituted within 3 months to explore creating an alternative water body, and comprehensive ecological restoration of other water bodies in the municipal area was mandated within 12 months. The Court considered: (1) the lake's prior condition, noting its deteriorated state as a garbage dumping ground by 2009; (2) the park's current ecological and recreational value as a vital urban green space; and (3) the impracticality of restoration due to high costs, ecological harm, and lack of a natural catchment area, which could lead to health hazards. The Court also noted the petitioner's 5-year delay in raising the grievance, deeming the park's transformation an irreversible fait accompli. (Para 21) Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pankaj Babulal Kotecha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 653 : 2025 INSC 792

Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (FRA); Section 3(2) - Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FCA) - Basic Housing for Forest Dwellers - Whether the construction of a pakka (permanent) dwelling house for a forest dweller is an exempted facility under Section 3(2) of the FRA, thereby overriding the requirement for prior approval under the FCA – Held, Section 3(2) is a limited exception - Section 3(2) of the FRA, which contains a non-obstante clause, provides an exemption from the mandate of the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (FCA), but this exemption is strictly limited to the facilities specifically provided therein and to activities undertaken by the Government -Exemption does not include pakka houses - The construction of a pakka dwelling house is not included in the list of exempted activities/facilities specified under Section 3(2) of the FRA - Duty to Balance Rights and Conservation - The issue requires the Court to balance the important value of providing minimum basic housing to forest dwellers with the State's and citizen's obligation to protect the national forest resource - Direction to Government for Mechanism - Since pakka housing is not covered by the Section 3(2) exemption, the Supreme Court directed the Union of India (through the Ministry of Tribal Affairs and the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change) to file an affidavit setting out the mechanism or policy that the Government proposes to frame to address the need for basic housing for forest dwellers while ensuring full compliance with the mandate of the FCA. [Paras 4-6] Sugra Adiwasi v. Pathranand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 995

The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a balanced approach between economic development and environmental protection. The tanneries' liability for pollution is absolute and continuing until the ecological damage is reversed. The State and Central Governments have a crucial role in enforcing environmental laws and ensuring compliance to protect public health and the environment. Vellore District Environment Monitoring Committee v. District Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Though it is true that precautionary principle and polluter pays principle are part of the environmental law of the country, it is equally true that while the right to clean environment is a guaranteed fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the right to development equally claims priority under the fundamental rights, particularly under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution. Therefore, there is a need for sustainable development striking a golden balance between the right to development and the right to clean environment. (Para 17) Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersap Mody, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 312 : 2025 INSC 347

Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017 – Rule 2(1)(g) - Definition, Applicability and Public Trust Doctrine – Held, the Futala Tank, Nagpur, being a man-made lake constructed in 1799 for irrigation and drinking water purposes, does not fall within the statutory definition of 'wetland' under Rule 2(1)(g) 2017 Rules, as the definition expressly excludes human-made waterbodies specifically constructed for recreation, aquaculture, salt production, and irrigation purposes - affirmed the High Court's observation that although Futala Lake is not a statutory wetland, the restrictions under Rule 4(2)(vi) concerning prohibition on permanent construction may still apply in spirit to preserve the ecological integrity of such waterbodies, consistent with the Office Memorandum dated 08.03.2022 of the MoEFCC - It reiterated the Public Trust Doctrine, affirming that the State is a trustee of natural and environmental resources, which are meant for public use and cannot be converted for private or commercial purposes - This doctrine extends not only to natural but also man-made environmental assets that promote ecological balance and sustainable development - Recreational and beautification projects such as the Viewer's Gallery, Musical Fountain, and Artificial Banyan Tree were found to be within permitted construction norms and adequately sanctioned by competent authorities, without any proven ecological detriment - The Banyan Tree structure was held temporary and removable, not amounting to a permanent construction- upholding the High Court's balanced directives for maintaining Futala Lake in an ecologically sustainable manner while allowing limited public utility and recreational use - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M.K. Balakrishnan v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 230 of 2001; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388; Paras 5-11] Swacch Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2025 INSC 1199

Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - Restoration Ecology - Corbett Tiger Reserve - Ecological Damage – Restoration - The Supreme Court accepted the recommendations of the Expert Committee regarding the ecological damage caused in the Corbett Tiger Reserve (CTR) - The State of Uttarakhand is directed to restore the ecological damage caused to the CTR under the supervision, guidance, and control of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - Restoration Principle – Ecocentrism - The principle of restoration requires the State to take steps for the identification and effective implementation of active restoration measures that are localized to the particular ecosystem that was damaged - The focus must be on restoration of the ecosystem as close and similar as possible to the specific one that was damaged - Reiterated that the approach for Tiger Safaris and conservation must be of ecocentrism and not of anthropocentrism, and the precautionary principle must be applied - Reaffirmed the directions from the earlier judgment in T.N. Godavarman case concerning the sourcing of animals for Tiger Safaris - i. Animals sourced for Safaris shall not be from outside the Tiger Reserve; ii. Only injured, conflicted, or orphaned tigers may be exhibited as per the 2016 Guidelines; iii. The contrary provisions in the 2019 Guidelines, which permitted the sourcing of animals from zoos, were quashed - Noted that despite earlier directions, Uttarakhand has not completed the departmental proceedings against delinquent Indian Forest Service officers - The State has been given three further months to conclude the process. [Paras 43 - 46] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897

Sections 2, 3, and 4 – Maharashtra Prevention and Containment of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Regulations – Regulation 10- Supreme Court examined whether a notice issued by a Municipal Corporation directing a private doctor to keep his clinic open during the lockdown constitutes "requisitioning" of services - Interpretation of "Requisitioning" – Noted that High Court had held that a notice directing a private practitioner to keep their clinic open was merely to ensure continuity of essential services and did not amount to a specific requisition for COVID-19 duty - Supreme Court reversed this narrow interpretation, holding that given the "compelling situation" of the pandemic and the invocation of the Epidemic Diseases Act, such notices constitute "requisition" of services - Declared that a conjoint reading of the Epidemic Diseases Act, the Maharashtra COVID-19 Regulations, and specific Municipal confirms the requisition of services of doctors and medical professionals - Supreme Court refused to accept the "simplistic submission" that the absence of an individual letter of appointment or specific "drafting" meant there was no requisition - The invocation of special laws to mandate service under threat of criminal prosecution (Section 188 IPC) is sufficient to infer requisitioning - While the Court established the fact of "requisition," it clarified that individual claims still depend on evidence - The claimant must prove the deceased lost their life while performing COVID-19-related duties - Held that the families of doctors who died while doing their duties during the Covid-19 pandemic are entitled to the Central Government's insurance coverage scheme "Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package: Insurance Scheme for Health Workers Fighting COVID-19", even if they were not formally requisitioned by the Government. [Paras 16 - 30] Pradeep Arora v. Director, Health Department, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1199 : 2025 INSC 1420

Evidence Law

Circumstantial Evidence - Last Seen Theory - Absence of Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Value of Scientific Evidence – Principles - The Supreme Court reiterated the 'five golden principles' for sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence - the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt, of a conclusive nature, must exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt, and must form a complete chain of evidence leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence - Held dock identification without Test Identification parade unreliable when witness had no familiarity with accused - noted that It is well settled that dock identification without a prior TIP has little evidentiary value where the witness had no prior familiarity with the accused - Both witnesses identified the Appellants for the first time in court, which, in the absence of a TIP, renders their dock identification less credible - Their testimonies, therefore, cannot constitute reliable evidence of identification - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1984 4 SCC 116; P. Saikumar v. State; Paras 27-28] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Circumstantial Evidence - Last seen theory - Supreme Court acquitted accused for rape-murder case, on following grounds - i. Prosecution failed to establish a clear and convincing motive; ii. Testimonies of the witnesses who claimed to have last seen the accused with the victim were unreliable due to significant delays in recording their statements and the fact that they did not see the victim with the accused; iii. The links in the chain of circumstances were broken; iv. There is strong inference of evidence planting; v. the DNA report, which was primary basis for conviction, was considered unreliable and inconsistent - Held that death penalty can only be imposed in the rarest of rare cases on unimpeachable evidence - Trial Court had not properly evaluated mitigating circumstances before awarding it and therefore, the conviction could not be sustained - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12, 51- 56] Akhtar Ali @ Ali Akhtar @ Shamim @ Raja Ustad v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 890 : 2025 INSC 1097

Circumstantial Evidence – Murder – Motive - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 120B, 302, 201 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Sections 27, 65B – Held - Upheld conviction of appellant relying on - i. motive of appellant was proved by statement of her close friend who clearly stated that appellant confessed her unwillingness to marry the deceased; ii. Call Record Details (CDR) were proven to be admissible under Section 65-B(4) of Indian Evidence Act (IEA) considering certificates furnished by Airtel and Reliance; iii. CDR proved communications between the accused persons during engagement ceremony of appellant, at the time of incident and even immediately after the incident; iv. Recovery of scooter and iron steel used for attacking the deceased was upheld and separate 'voluntary' statements of the two appellants were also recorded; v. delay in sending steel rod for FSL analysis was rejected as a ground to discard the evidence (Relying on State of M.P. v. Chhaakki Lal and anr. (2019) 12 SCC 326) vi. Absence of messages on phones, coupled with the failure of accused to offer a sufficient explanation for their exhaustive communications right before incident, would establish the offence under section 201 IPC - Held chain of circumstantial evidence was complete, leading to confirmation of conviction. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra (2017) 3 SCC 760; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 54, 56-59, 83-86, 96] Kum. Shubha @ Shubhashankar v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 715 : 2025 INSC 830

Circumstantial Evidence - Rape and Murder – Acquittal – Held, prosecution failed to establish a complete chain of incriminating circumstances and pointed out several significant issues - i. DNA report was inconclusive and a supplementary report was inadmissible as the expert witness was not examined and the report was not presented to the accused under Section 313 CrPC; ii. 'Suspicious conduct' of the accused, cited by prosecution witnesses, was found to be a natural action for a labourer returning home from work and could not be considered an incriminating circumstance; iii. Recovery of a comb used, by the sniffer dog was deemed doubtful due to contradictory witness testimonies regarding its color - Procedure involving the dog squad was also not properly documented; iv. Recovery of the victim's underwear from the accused's field was found to be a 'planted recovery' as it was not mentioned in the original complaint filed by the victim's father- Present case is yet another classic example of lacklustre and shabby investigation and so also laconic trial procedure which has led to the failure of a case involving brutal rape and murder of an innocent girl child - The prosecution had 'fallen woefully short of proving the guilt of the accused-appellants by clinching evidence and acquitted them, giving them the benefit of doubt - Appeal allowed. [Paras 65 - 79] Putai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 841 : 2025 INSC 1042

Criminal Law – Evidence – Appreciation of Evidence – Hostile Witness – Settlement of Law – Supreme Court reiterated that the evidence of a witness who has been declared hostile cannot be rejected in its entirety - Such evidence must be subjected to closer scrutiny, and the portions consistent with either the prosecution or the defense's case may be accepted - Held that the High Court erred in ignoring the testimony of PW-4 solely on the ground of him being declared hostile. [Relied on State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra (1996) 10 SCC 360; Para 19] Dadu @ Ankush v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1178 : 2025 INSC 1395

DNA Evidence handling Guidelines - directions to be followed - 1. DNA samples once made after due care and compliance of all necessary procedure including swift packaging including - a. FIR number and date; b. section and statute involved; c. details of Investigating Officer (I.O.), police station; and d. serial number shall be duly documented. Document recording selection shall have signatures and designations of medical professional, I.O. and independent witness - Absence of medical witness shall not be taken to be compromising to the collection of evidence - 2. I.O. shall be responsible for transportation of DNA evidence to police station or hospital or forensic laboratory not later than 48 hours - If in any case 48-hour timeline cannot be complied with then reason for delay shall be duly recorded in the case diary - 3. DNA samples are stored pending trial, appeal etc, no package shall be opened, altered or resealed without authorization of Trial Court - 4. From the point of collection to the logical end i.e. conviction or acquittal of the accused, a Chain of Custody Register shall necessarily be annexed as part of Trial Court record- failure to do the same, I.O. shall be responsible for lapse. Directed Director General of Police of all states to prepare sample forms of Chain of Custody Register. [Para 43, 44] Kattavellai @ Devakar v. State of Tamilnadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 703 : 2025 INSC 845

Dock Identification After Long Delay – Unreliable - Held, identification of the accused for the first time in Court after 8½ years, that too through video-conferencing, by an elderly witness with weak distant vision, is inherently unsafe to rely - The witness was not wearing spectacles despite admitting weak eyesight; no prior TIP was conducted with her presence; improvement regarding clothes (black shirt) introduced for first time during deposition - all cumulatively render dock identification unreliable. [Paras 52 - 56] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322

Dying Declaration – Multiple dying declarations – Evidentiary value – Corroboration by independent evidence - Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the High Court's order, affirming the conviction – Held, in a case of multiple dying declarations, each must be considered independently - The first dying declaration given to the independent witness, which stated the appellant poured kerosene and set the deceased ablaze, and disclosed the motive, was found to be duly proved and trustworthy - Minor discrepancies in subsequent statements do not weaken first dying declaration if found reliable and consistent - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769; Paras 10-14] Jemaben v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1042 : 2025 INSC 1268

Evidence of Eye-witnesses – Reliability – Held, when the genesis and manner of the incident itself are doubtful, conviction cannot be sustained - When the prosecution has suppressed the origin and genesis of the occurrence, the proper course is to grant the accused the benefit of doubt - The conflicting versions given by the eye-witnesses, coupled with the suppression of the genesis of the occurrence and the shifting of the place of the incident, demolish the very substratum of the prosecution case - It is unsafe to uphold a conviction based on testimony full of contradictions and inherent improbabilities - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192; Bhagwan Sahai and Another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 2714; Paras 57-60] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Expert Witness (Medical Evidence) - is examined for their specialized knowledge to prove the contents of reports like a post-mortem report - Evidence provided by an expert is advisory in nature, and its credibility depends on the reasons and underlying data supporting their conclusions - An accused cannot be convicted of murder solely based on medical evidence. [Paras 27, 28] Narayan Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 771 : 2025 INSC 927

Extra-Judicial Confession - Held that an extra-judicial confession is considered a weak piece of evidence and must be accepted with great care and caution - Standard of Proof: The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was genuinely made, voluntary, and its contents were true - The standard is even higher when the entire case rests on the EJC – Corroboration - Held that the court will generally look for independent, reliable corroboration before relying on an EJC, especially if suspicious circumstances surround it - Held that the circumstances, taken together, do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a conviction, even in the case of a heinous crime - Supreme Court held that evidence not clear, there can't be moral conviction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (1984) 4 SCC 116 Para 35; Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab: (2023) 7 SCC 727; Paras 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25] Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Hostile Witness - Sole Eye-witness – Held, testimony of prosecution witness is not be discarded in its entirety merely because the witness has turned hostile - Courts are entitled to rely upon any portion of such testimony which is found to be credible and is corroborated by other evidence on record - Maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” does not apply in India - Conviction can be bases on testimony of a single eyewitness, if such testimony is found to be trustworthy and inspires confidence. [Paras 16] Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 789 : 2025 INSC 957

Principles for Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - Supreme Court reiterated the established principles governing cases of circumstantial evidence, noting that the chain of events must be so established that the Court has no option but to come to one and only one conclusion: the guilt of the accused person. If any doubt creeps in at any stage, the benefit must flow to the accused. The chain of circumstances must be so complete as to lead to only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused, and mere suspicion, however strong, cannot be a substitute for proof. If two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted - Supreme Court pointed out several deficiencies in prosecution's case - i. Non-examination of material witness; ii. Doubtful arrest and recovery; iii. Lack of forensic; iv. Last seen theory weakness - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 13-18, 20-30] Mohamed Sameer Khan v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1045 : 2025 INSC 1269

Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence – Classification of Witnesses - Supreme Court reiterated the guiding principles for assessing the credibility of witnesses, classifying them into: (1) Wholly reliable; (2) Wholly unreliable; and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable - For the third category, corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony is required - Held that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614; Para 28] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Scientific Evidence – Inconclusive FSL Report – Motive – Held, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reported that no complete DNA profile could be generated from the exhibits (rope, axe, and clothes), making the only scientific evidence neutral, as it neither connected the Appellants to the crime nor corroborated the oral testimony - Noted that an inconclusive or exculpatory scientific report cannot be dismissed as inconsequential in a circumstantial evidence case, and to convict on doubtful testimony while ignoring scientific tests is to substitute suspicion for proof - The alleged motive of revenge for an insult was vague and unproven - Noted that the absence of motive in a circumstantial case assumes significance and tilts the balance in favor of the accused. [Relied on Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 52- 56] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

The prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused's failure to explain certain circumstances does not alleviate this burden. In circumstantial evidence cases, the chain of evidence must be complete, consistent, and exclude all reasonable alternative hypotheses. While absence of motive is not a basis for acquittal, it is a relevant factor in evaluating guilt in such cases. (Para 26) Vaibhav v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 680 : 2025 INSC 800 : (2025) 8 SCC 315

Validity of secretly obtained evidence - three-fold test of relevance, identification and accuracy has to be satisfied before court admits a recorded conversation in evidence - conversation was recorded without consent and knowledge of person speaking is not a prohibition on admissibility of the evidence. [Relied on R. M. Malkani vs. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCR 417 (Para 10)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829

Exports

Merchandise Exports from India Scheme (MEIS) - Inadvertent clerical error in filing shipping bills - Whether such an error, once rectified under Section 149 of Customs Act, can defeat a claim for MEIS benefits – Held, an inadvertent clerical error in shipping bills, once permitted to be corrected under Section 149 of the Customs Act, cannot defeat an exporter's substantive entitlement to MEIS benefits - Procedural mistakes, once corrected, cannot extinguish substantive rights - Beneficial schemes should be construed liberally and administrative technology should aid, not obstruct, the implementation of the law - PRC's rejection was arbitrary and violated the principles of natural justice because no reasons were given and no hearing was granted - Directed respondents to process the appellant's claim for MEIS benefits based on amended shipping bills and pass appropriate orders within 12 weeks - Emphasized the need for systemic correction by the Union of India, DGFT and the Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs to prevent genuine exporters from being forced into litigation over rectified procedural lapses - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11- 16] Shah Nanji Nagsi Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 842 : 2025 INSC 1032

Factories Act, 1948

Section 2 (k) and (m) - Interpretation of "Factory" and "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning as Manufacturing - Welfare Legislation - Applicability of Definition under Central Excise Act – Held, the definition of "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948, clearly encompasses "washing and cleaning" of any article or substance with a view to its delivery. The Act is a welfare legislation aimed at protecting workers' health and safety, and therefore, its provisions must be interpreted liberally to give effect to the legislative intent. The Court rejected the High Court's reliance on the definition of "manufacture" under the Central Excise Act, 1944, stating that the Factories Act provides its own specific definition, which must be applied. The Court underscored that the inclusion of "washing and cleaning" in the 1948 Act, absent in the 1934 Act, was a deliberate expansion to include previously excluded undertakings. Thus, a laundry business involving cleaning and washing clothes, including dry cleaning, using power and employing more than ten workers, falls within the definition of "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. (Paras 30, 36, 38 & 42) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2025 INSC 306

Section 2(k) and 2(m) - Interpretation of - "Manufacturing Process" - Washing and Cleaning - Applicability to Laundry Services - Effect of ESIC Act Amendments – Held, the activity of washing and cleaning, including dry cleaning, carried out by a laundry service, constitutes a "manufacturing process" under Section 2(k) of the Factories Act, 1948. This activity, aimed at the use, delivery, or disposal of cleaned linen, squarely falls within the definition. Consequently, the premises where such activity is conducted, employing more than ten workers with the aid of power, qualifies as a "factory" under Section 2(m) of the Act. The Court rejected the respondent's contention that dry cleaning does not render a product usable or saleable, emphasizing the plain meaning of the statutory definition. The Court distinguished prior judgments under the Employees' State Insurance Corporation (ESIC) Act, noting that the definition of "manufacturing process" was incorporated into the ESIC Act only in 1989, and thus, earlier decisions based on the pre-amendment definition are inapplicable. The 1948 Act's definition, which explicitly includes "washing and cleaning," must prevail. The registration of the respondent as a factory under the ESIC Act, although not the sole basis of the decision, supports the conclusion that the respondent's activities fall within the scope of the Factories Act, 1948. (Para 42 - 49) State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2025 INSC 306

Family Law

Alimony & Property Settlement – Held, alimony received after first divorce was not a relevant factor to determine the alimony payable after the divorce of the second marriage - The respondent's claim for Rs. 12 crores in permanent alimony and encumbrance-free ownership of the apartment as unjustified, considering that appellant-husband is an unemployed person and has responsibility of an autistic child - Appeal allowed. [Para 17, 20] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Divorce by Mutual Consent - Mediation - Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305

Family Courts Act, 1984

Legitimacy - Jurisdiction of Civil and Family Courts - Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy, as the Family Court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984, applies only to matters involving marital relationships. Since the case involved an alleged extra-marital relationship, the Civil Court was the appropriate forum. The Family Court's jurisdiction is limited to matters involving marital relationships, and it cannot entertain claims based on alleged extra-marital relationships. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118

Finance Act, 1994

Section 65(88) read with Section 65(105)(v)– Real Estate Agent– Service Tax Liability– Held, the definition of 'Real Estate Agent' is service-centric and requires a contract of agency– Where a developer acquires land and transfers title to a corporate entity based on a 'fixed average rate' as per an MOU, acting on a principal-to-principal basis, the activity constitutes trading in land/transfer of title and not a taxable service– The profit or loss arising from the difference between the negotiated land price and the fixed rate is not a commission or consultancy charge – Transfer of title in immovable property is expressly excluded from the definition of 'Service' under Section 65B(44)(a)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994. [Para 34, 38-44] Commissioner of Service Tax v. Elegant Developers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1088 : 2025 INSC 1299

Section 73(1) Proviso– Extended Period of Limitation– Suppression of Facts– Mere non-payment of service tax or failure to file returns without an element of intent or deliberate suppression is insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation– Where transactions are conducted through valid banking channels and duly recorded in books of account, no wilful suppression can be inferred- Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE & ST, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1412; Para 48-53, 49] Commissioner of Service Tax v. Elegant Developers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1088 : 2025 INSC 1299

Section 73(1) - Extended Period of Limitation - A show-cause notice must ordinarily be issued within 1 year from relevant date - Whether show cause notices issued by Respondent are barred by limitation and can extension under Section 73 Finance Act be invoked – Held, to invoke extended period of limitation, there must be an active and deliberate act on part of assesses to evade payment of tax - There is absence of fraud, collusion or wilful misstatement of facts on part of assesses - mere non-payment of service tax does not justify the invocation of the extended limitation period - The show cause notice issued by Respondent-department is set aside. Set aside order of CESTAT. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Padmini Products v. CCE (1989) 4 SCC 275; Paras 8, 9, 9.3, 9.4] Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 707 : 2025 INSC 841

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006

Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006; Section 97 - Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; Section 20AA - Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 - Appellants convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 ("PoFA") for offences committed between 1976 and 2006 (PoFA's repeal by Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 ("FSS Act")). They sought probation under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, invoking Articles 14 & 21 (equality & right to life) and reformative justice principles, arguing legislative shift to leniency in FSS Act (omission of PoFA's s. 20AA bar) warranted retrospective benefit under Article 20(1) via lighter FSS sentencing. Whether s. 20AA of PoFA (barring probation for non-minors) applies to bar relief under Probation of Offenders Act for offences during 1976–2006, despite FSS Act's repeal, or if FSS's omission of probation bar and savings clause (s. 97) permits retrospective leniency. Held, Probation of Offenders Act inapplicable. S. 20AA of PoFA expressly excludes probation for food adulteration offences (post-1976 insertion), and s. 97 of FSS Act preserves PoFA penalties for pre-repeal offences, blocking retrospective modification. Public health imperatives in food adulteration override reformative justice; no retrospective leniency absent explicit legislative intent. Appeal partly allowed—conviction upheld; sentence modified to fine only. [Distinguished: T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe, (1983) 1 SCC 177; Followed: Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2004) 3 SCC 609] Nagarajan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2025 INSC 703 : (2025) 8 SCC 331

The State Government has no authority to impose additional restrictions or interpretations on qualifications for the post of Food Safety Officer (FSO) as prescribed by the Central Government. (Para 23 – 27) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2025 INSC 372 : (2025) 9 SCC 740

Foreigners Act, 1946

Section 3 - Foreigners (Tribunal) Order, 1964 - Whether a Foreigners Tribunal has the authority to reopen and review its own concluded judgment on citizenship. Held, Foreigners Tribunal lacks the power to sit in appeal over its own judgment or reopen a concluded issue of citizenship. The Court set aside the Tribunal's order dated December 24, 2019, which reopened an inquiry into the appellant's citizenship despite a prior final order on February 15, 2018, declaring the appellant an Indian citizen. The Court also set aside the High Court's judgment upholding the Tribunal's action, noting that the State failed to challenge the original order and no legal provision permitted the Tribunal to review its own findings. The February 15, 2018, order was deemed final and unchallengeable by the State or Union. (Para 7, 8) Rejia Khatun @ Rezia Khatun v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 238

Section 9 - Whether inclusion in the draft National Register of Citizenship (NRC) can invalidate a prior Foreigners Tribunal declaration of non-citizenship under the Act, 1946 - Held, inclusion in the draft NRC does not annul a Foreigners Tribunal's declaration that a person is a foreigner. The Tribunal's decision takes precedence, as affirmed by the High Court, and NRC inclusion holds no legal value in such cases, as per Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604. The appellant failed to discharge the burden of proof under Section 9 of the Foreigners Act to establish citizenship. Appeal dismissed, upholding the Tribunal's declaration of the appellant as a foreigner. (Para 27) Rofiqul Hoque v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2025 INSC 730

Section 9 - Indian Citizenship - Foreigners Tribunal - Res Judicata - Abuse of Process - Whether initiating a second Foreigners Tribunal proceeding against a person previously declared an Indian citizen violates the principle of res judicata. Whether the High Court erred in declining to quash the subsequent proceeding against the appellant. Held, the findings of a Foreigners Tribunal are binding and operate as res judicata unless successfully challenged or set aside through permissible legal remedies. No provision for review of such orders was established. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had declined to quash a second Foreigners Tribunal proceeding initiated in 2018 against the appellant, who was declared an Indian citizen in 2016. Initiating fresh proceedings on identical grounds was barred by res judicata, as the earlier Tribunal order, supported by credible documentary and oral evidence, had attained finality. The State's failure to challenge or seek recall of the 2016 order provided no legal basis for the subsequent proceeding, which constituted an abuse of process. The appeal was allowed, and the 2018 proceeding was quashed. [Followed: Abdul Kuddus v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 604 (Para 9)] Tarabanu Begum @ Tarabhanu Khatun v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 527

Whether a Foreign Registration Officer or Civil Authority must be impleaded in bail applications filed by foreigners under the Foreigners Act, 1946. The Court held that it is not necessary to implead such authorities in bail applications, as they have no locus to oppose bail unless the offence falls under Section 14 of the Foreigners Act. However, the Court directed that upon granting bail to a foreign national, the prosecuting agency or State must immediately inform the concerned Registration Officer, who will then notify the Civil Authority. This ensures compliance with the Foreigners Order, 1948, and allows authorities to take appropriate legal steps. The Court emphasized that this process avoids unnecessary delays in bail proceedings while safeguarding the interests of the State. Frank Vitus v. Narcotics Control Bureau, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 23

Foreign Trade Policy

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - International Competitive Bidding (ICB) – Held, deemed export benefits under the FTP are contingent upon a strict adherence to the necessity of procuring goods through ICB - Reliance on a tariff-based competitive bidding process for the selection of the power developer cannot be equated with the mandatory ICB for the supply of goods as required by the FTP - The appellant failed to produce evidence that an ICB process was adopted for the procurement of components, having instead entered into contracts directly with subsidiaries or related companies - Appeals dismissed. [Para 68-71] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002 : (2025) 5 SCC 353

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) - 'Change in Law' Clause - PPA between parties defined a 'Change in Law' as an enactment, promulgation, amendment or repeal of any law – Held, Public Notices issued by Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT) are administrative policy instruments and do not meet the contractual threshold of a 'change in law' as they are not statutory enactments or regulations by a competent authority - Government decisions and clarifications including Press releases could not be considered as 'change in law'. [Paras 41-45] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002 : (2025) 5 SCC 353

Foreign Trade Policy 2009-2014 (FTP) - 'Deemed exports'- Applicability to Power Projects – Held, the concept of 'deemed exports' under the FTP is designed to incentivize the domestic production of movable and marketable goods for export or deemed export - A power generating station being an integrated immovable asset assembled on-site, does not qualify as a 'manufactured good' capable of being exported under FTP - Mere act of assembling individual components at the project site does not transform the entire plant into a 'good' eligible for deemed export benefits - An immovable property, especially a machinery embedded to earth would fail to qualify as 'goods' - Benefit of deemed exports were not available to a coal based thermal power plant. [Paras 57, 60-62] Nabha Power Ltd. v. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 820 : 2025 INSC 1002 : (2025) 5 SCC 353

Gangsters

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 3 – Gang Membership – Mere inclusion of multiple accused in a list, without evidence of their organizational roles, command structure, or prior/continued coordinated criminal activities, fails to satisfy the stringent criteria for establishing gang membership under the Act. (Para 17) Lal Mohd. v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : 2025 INSC 811

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 3 – Gang Membership – Habitual Criminality – Communal Clash – Organized Crime – Quashing of FIR – Held, involvement in a single communal clash does not warrant invocation of the Act absent proof of habitual or organized criminal conduct. The Act targets habitual offenders, not individuals involved in isolated incidents. The FIR, arising from a communal protest on 10.10.2022, lacked evidence of a hierarchical structure, systematic planning, or ongoing criminal activity. The gang chart, prepared post facto on 29.04.2023, was an attempt to recharacterize the incident as organized crime without new evidence. Consequently, the FIR under Section 3(1) was quashed, as its continuation would amount to an abuse of process. (Paras 18–20) Lal Mohd. v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 685 : 2025 INSC 811

Police Act, 1963 (Karnataka) - Section 87 - Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 (Karnataka) - Section 17(1) - Gambling - Moral Turpitude - Held, playing cards, for which the appellant was convicted under Section 87 of the Karnataka Police Act, does not inherently involve moral turpitude. Not every instance of playing cards, particularly when done as a form of entertainment, constitutes moral turpitude, which requires conduct that is inherently base, vile, or depraved. The appellant, not a habitual gambler, was fined Rs. 200 without trial for playing cards on a roadside. The disqualification of the appellant from the Board of Directors of a Cooperative Society was disproportionate to the misconduct. The Supreme Court set aside the disqualification, restoring the appellant's election to the Board, as the impugned action was unsustainable. (Paras 5 - 7) Hanumantharayappa Y.C. v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 647

Strict scrutiny of the FIR is required registered under stringent laws like the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters Act to prevent its misuse in property or financial disputes. Jay Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2025 INSC 198

Haj Policy

These Writ Petitions, filed by various Haj Group Organisers (HGOs), challenged the Union of India's quota allocation for Haj pilgrims under the Haj-2025 Policy. The petitioners alleged arbitrary and discriminatory allocation. The Court, after hearing the parties, initially directed a meeting to facilitate equitable redistribution of quota among HGOs. Following this, some redistribution occurred, and the Court extended the deadline for submission of revised Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) to allow for further discussions. The Court clarified that it was not interfering with the Haj-2025 Policy itself, but addressing its initial implementation issues. The petitions were disposed of, with liberty granted to parties to raise future grievances before the appropriate forum. Interlocutory applications seeking to raise additional issues were dismissed as not maintainable. (Para 8 – 12) Kolkata Tours and Travels v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 335

Hate Speech

Intolerance for Hate Speech & Communal Hatred - Attempts to spread communal hatred, indulge in hate speech, or provoke disharmony—particularly in sensitive contexts like Waqf Act challenges—must be dealt with an "iron hand" as criminal offenses. Hate speech erodes dignity, self-worth, tolerance, and equality in a multi-cultural society, fostering alienation and humiliation of targeted groups. Authorities are reminded to act suo motu (per 2023 directions) without awaiting complaints, ensuring strict enforcement to preserve social cohesion. (Para 5 - 10) Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 547 : 2025 INSC 647

Hindu Law

Temples and Religious Practices - Interim Relief Granted - Supreme Court grants interim relief in a Petition for Special Leave to Appeal, directing the Respondents to continue performing the Udayasthamana Pooja at the Guruvayur Sree Krishna Temple on Vrishchikam Ekadasi (01.12.2025), strictly in accordance with the temple's tradition and without any change - Any ritual which has become a long-standing tradition and assumed religious significance "ought not be unsettled on the apprehension that there would be potential public inconvenience"-  The "faith of the worshippers at large ought not to be put aside on the anvil of managerial and administrative concerns and must be given precedence and respect as far as possible" - Inconvenience to the public cannot be a ground to discontinue / alter the rituals / pooja to be performed on the sacred day for the deity. [Paras 5 - 8] P.C. Hary v. Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1055

Power of Karta to alienate Joint Family Property - Legal necessity - Onus to proof - Supreme Court reiterated that the Karta of a Hindu undivided Family (HUF) has the power to alienate joint family property for legal necessity or benefit of estate, and such sale binds the interests of all undivided members, including minors and widows - The discretion of the Karta in determining legal necessity is wide and each case turns into its facts - Noted that family necessities may include payment of government revenue, marriage expenses (of male coparceners or daughters), maintenance, necessary litigation to recover property, funeral expenses, and debts for family business - The existence of legal necessity must be judged on the facts and circumstances of each case - Appeal allowed. [Paras 11, 20, 21] Dastagirsab v. Sharanappa @ Shivasharanappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 915 : 2025 INSC 1120

Partition - Family Settlement - Oral family settlement - Registered will - Where a will distributes properties in defines proportions among family members and an oral family settlement also distributes properties in almost the same properties and there is material to establish that the testator anticipated conflicts and divided properties to avoid them - Then the existence and persuasive nature of the oral family settlement can be countenanced - especially when supported by the fact of possession of the properties - Supreme Court upheld genuineness of will [Paras 9,10-12] Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2025 INSC 879

Will - Registered Will - Proof of execution - Presumption of Genuineness - Burden of Proof – Held, a registered will carries a presumption of genuineness - The burden of proof to establish that a registered will was not executed as alleged or that suspicious circumstances render it doubtful, lies on the party disputing its existence. The genuineness of the registered will was beyond doubt - Set Aside order of High Court and restored order of Trial Court - Appeals allowed. [Para 9] Metpalli Lasum Bai v. Metapalli Muthaih, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 734 : 2025 INSC 879

Partition of Joint Family Property – Self-Acquired Property – Whether the suit property, acquired by Defendant No. 1 post-partition, was ancestral (joint family) or self-acquired property. Held, upon partition of joint Hindu family property, shares allotted to coparceners become their self-acquired property, with absolute rights to sell, transfer, or bequeath. No presumption exists that property is joint family property merely due to the existence of a joint Hindu family; the claimant must prove it is joint family property, typically by showing a joint family nucleus used for its acquisition. Ancestral property is limited to that inherited from paternal ancestors within three generations. The doctrine of blending requires clear intention by the owner to relinquish self-acquired property into the joint family pool; mere use by family members or acts of generosity do not suffice. Here, Defendant No. 1's purchase of his brother's share post-partition, using a loan and not joint family funds, established the property as self-acquired. The subsequent sale to the Appellants was valid. The High Court's judgment, invalidating the sale by misapplying the doctrine of blending and overlooking evidence of independent acquisition, was set aside. Appeal allowed; suit property held to be self-acquired by Defendant No. 1, and sale to Appellants upheld. (Paras 13 - 20) Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 494 : 2025 INSC 532

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956

Section 12(c) - Adoption and Property Rights - Doctrine of Relation Back - The appellant was adopted by defendant No.1, on 16.07.1994, after the death of her husband. The appellant claimed a half share in the suit schedule properties, arguing that he became the legal heir upon adoption. Held, under Section 12(c) of the Act an adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate that vested before the adoption. The court applied the "Doctrine of Relation Back," which states that adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property. However, lawful alienations made by the widow before the adoption are binding on the adopted child. The court upheld the validity of the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.2 and 3, as the alienation was made after defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of the property. The appellant's challenge to the sale deed was dismissed. The court declared the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void. The court found that the gift deed lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid gift, such as delivery and acceptance of the property. The trial court's decision to grant the appellant the entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 was restored. Sri Mahesh v. Sangram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 6

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955

Section 13 - Divorce – Cruelty – Desertion – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - Duty of Court: Supreme Court directed that before concluding that a marriage has broken down irretrievably, it is imperative upon the Family Court or the High Court to determine which party is responsible for breaking the marital tie and forcing the other to live separately- A finding of irretrievable breakdown is likely to have devastating effects, especially on children, unless there is cogent evidence for wilful desertion or refusal to cohabit and/or look after the other spouse- The conclusion regarding irretrievable breakdown puts the Courts under an onerous duty to deeply analyse the entire evidence, consider social circumstances, and the background of the parties- The Supreme Court found that the High Court, in granting divorce on the ground of cruelty, failed to advert to the wife's plea that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home and did not undertake the necessary exercise to determine the essential issues- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the law- Appeal allowed in part. [Paras 4-7] A v. I, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1143

Section 13(1)(ia) & (ib) - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Divorce - Supreme Court orders husband to pay Rs. 1.25 crores permanent alimony to his wife while dissolving marriage – Held, there is no possibility of reconciliation between parties and they have been living separately since 15 years - There is no vestige of matrimonial relationship between them and neither party has shown any inclination to resolve their differences - Mediation efforts also failed - Since the respondent-wife and child have not received any financial support from appellant-husband, Rs. 1.25 crores was directed to be paid - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-9] X v. Y, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2025 INSC 978

Section 13B - Settlement Agreement - Mutual Consent Divorce- Withdrawal of consent - Supreme Court acknowledged that the respondent-wife's withdrawal from the mutual consent divorce agreement at the second motion was a valid exercise of her statutory right - Held that subsequent demand of wife for a higher alimony demonstrated an intention to coerce a better settlement, and her allegations of coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud regarding the initial settlement were unsubstantiated. [Para 18] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956

Section 6(a) - Custody of Minor Child - Welfare of Child - Supreme Court while upholding the High Court's order placing the minor son, who is above five years of age, in the custody of his father, rejected the mother's appeal, noting that the custody issue had not been finally closed and the mother could pursue her remedies under relevant statutes - Noted that the child is a male child and is now aged above five years - Noted that the child was not willing to part company with his father - The fact that both parents are working and cannot always be physically with their children should not be a ground to place custody with one who may be temporarily working from home - It is a matter of common knowledge that married couples work to secure better education and future for their ward - Rejected the notion that a parent working from home provides better care than one who visits the office - The distance from home to school as "not a relevant consideration" particularly when both parties reside in the National Capital Region and the child is travelling for "better education."- Travel time being a few minutes less or more "hardly matters" - Noted that the child continues to be a student at the same school (Heritage School), and his education is not disturbed - The father has elder family members at home, including grandfather, who are giving company to the child - Considering the overall welfare, the male child being above five years old and continuing in the same school with no desire to part from his father, Supreme Court did not find a reason to interfere with the High Court's order. [Paras 7 - 14] Poonam Wadhwa v. Ajay Wadhwa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1165

Section 8(2) and (3) - Voidable transaction - Repudiation by Minor – Held, disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (2) of Section 8 (i.e., without the previous permission of the court) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him - It is not mandatory for a minor, upon attaining majority, to file a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed executed by their natural guardian in contravention of Section 8(2) of the Act - A voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within the prescribed time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the same by his unequivocal conduct - Avoidance or repudiation by conduct is permissible because - i. The minor may not be aware of the transaction and thus not in a position to institute a suit; ii. The transaction may not have been given effect to, and the party acquiring the right may not have possession, giving the impression that the property is intact in the minor's hands, making a suit seem unnecessary - Transferring the property himself on attaining majority within the prescribed time period is an example of an implied repudiation by conduct - Noted that such an act is sufficient to repudiate the earlier sale deed executed by the father/guardian - The effect of avoidance is that the voidable transaction becomes void from its very inception, and the avoidance relates back to the date of the transaction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Madhegowda vs Ankegowda (2002) 1 SCC 178; G. Annamalai Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 402; Paras 11-14, 22, 32, 34] K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2025 INSC 1195

Hindu Succession Act, 1956

Suit for Partition and Separate Possession - Validity and Effect of Release Deeds – Admissibility of Unregistered Partition Deed (Palupatti) for Collateral Purposes – Computation of Shares under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Unamended Section 6) – Held, a registered relinquishment deed releasing share of a coparcener in the joint family property, operates immediately regardless of its implementation - Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the High Court and Trial court, which refused to consider the Appellant's exclusive share in the suit property, despite there being a registered relinquishment deeds by Appellant's two brothers releasing their respective shares in Appellant's favor, and a subsequent family settlement (palupatti) in 1972, which formally recorded the separation of the remaining coparceners and delineated their respective shares, which had been independently managed ever since - A family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral use - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Elumalai v. M. Kamala [(2023) 13 SCC 27; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa [(2019) 6 SCC 409; Paras 7-9] P. Anjanappa v. A.P. Nanjundappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1074 : 2025 INSC 1286

Section 2 (2) – Applicability to Scheduled Tribes – Held, HSA does not apply to members of STs - Section 2(2) of the HSA, 1956 explicitly states that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution, unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs - The words of the section are explicit, and the HSA, 1956, cannot apply to Scheduled Tribes - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order directing that daughters in tribal areas in the state of H.P. shall inherit property in accordance with HSA and not as per customs and usages - High Court's directions were beyond the scope of the appeal, as the issue was neither directly nor substantially involved in the intra-party appeal, and the directions were not emanating from any of the issues framed or pleas raised by the parties - Set aside order of High Court. [Relied on Tirith Kumar & Ors. vs. Daduram & Ors., (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3810; Paras 4-6] Nawang v. Bahadur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1025

Section 29, 8 - Locus standi of State - Validity of will - Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 - Probate of will – Held, State cannot invoke Doctrine of Escheat to challenge a will which is granted probate - Government is a stranger to the property when a Hindu hireless male dies with a will - The state's locus standi to assail the probate grant was negated by the Court, as the case involved testamentary succession, not intestate succession attracting Section 29 of HAS - The Court emphasized the doctrine of escheat under section 29 applies only when an intestate leaves no heir qualified under the HAS - It has to be ascertained as to whether there are any Class1 or Class 2 heirs, agnates or cognates - Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the HAS Act, Section 29 of the said Act would apply as it would be a case of failure of heirs - Since probate was granted by the High Court, the legatees under the will, had the right to succeed - Held that it is only in the event of intestate succession. Section 29 of the HAS Act applying that there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased male Hindu on the government and not otherwise - Supreme Court imposed Rs. 1 lakh each on Petitioners for suppression and clarified that only heirs or persons entitled to succeed could seek revocation under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, if probate was wrongfully granted. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5 - 6] State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 906

Section 2(2) - Applicability to Scheduled Tribes (ST) - Customary Law - Justice, Equity and Good conscience - Article 14, 15, 38, 46 of the Constitution of India – Issue - Whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property - Trial Court and High Court dismissed the suit filed by appellant (heirs of a tribal woman) citing that mother had no right in her father's property as members of Scheduled Tribe are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as per section 2(2) and nothing proved by custom - This Court Held - Exclusion of female from inheritance is unreasonable and discriminatory - that Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the Scheduled Tribes, it does not mean that tribal women are automatically excluded from inheritance - it needs to be seen by Court whether there exists any prevailing custom restricting the female tribal right to share in the ancestral property - In this case parties could not establish the existence of any custom which excluded women from inheritance - Customs are too like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others - Held in absence of any specific tribal custom or codified law prohibiting women's right, courts must apply “justice, equity and good conscience” - Where there is no custom prohibiting succession to women, still denying them succession is in violation of Article 14, 15 read with Articles 38 and 46, ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. Held legal heirs of tribal woman entitled to share in the property, set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. ltd. v. State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCC 817; Para 13, 19, 20, 21] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865

Homoeopathy

National Commission for Homoeopathy Act, 2020—Sections 4(2) & 19—Interpretation of "Leader - Section 4(2) requires the Chairperson of the National Commission for Homoeopathy to possess a postgraduate degree in Homeopathy and at least twenty years' experience in the field, including not less than ten years as a "leader" in healthcare delivery, growth/development of Homeopathy, or its education. The term "leader" denotes the "Head of a Department" or "Head of an Organisation," connoting a substantive decision-making position with supervisory authority over subordinates, as discerned from organizational structure and official orders. Equivalent experience cannot be inferred from mere administrative allocations or junior roles without explicit designation as "Head"; ipse dixit assertions by appointing authorities, unsupported by documents, are perverse and unsustainable. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956

Child Trafficking and Commercial Sexual Exploitation – Judicial Appreciation of Minor Victim's Testimony – Held: The evidence of a minor victim of sex trafficking must be appreciated with sensitivity and realism, keeping in view their socio-economic vulnerability and the layered structure of organized crime networks - Minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not be used to discard an otherwise reliable prosecution case - If the version appears credible and convincing, a conviction can be maintained on her sole testimony, as a minor victim is not an accomplice but an injured witness. [Para 11] K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran v. State by Peenya Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1234 : 2025 INSC 1473

Age Determination of Minor Victim – Precedence of School Certificate over Medical Opinion – Held: Determination of the age of a minor victim of a sexual offence is to be done with reference to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules - The date of birth recorded in the school certificate from the first school attended by the victim takes precedence over medical opinions such as ossification tests - Age determined through an ossification test is a mere approximation and cannot have better probative value than a school certificate. [Para 14] K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran v. State by Peenya Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1234 : 2025 INSC 1473

Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 1956 – Section 15(2) – Procedural Irregularity in Search – Held: Non-compliance with the strict requirement of calling two or more respectable inhabitants of the locality (including a woman) to witness a search under Section 15(2) of the ITPA is an irregularity that does not per se vitiate the trial unless it is shown that there has been a failure of justice - The principles governing irregular searches under the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable to cases under the ITPA. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh and Others, (1996) 2 SCC 384; Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263; Bai Radha v. State of Gujarat, (1969) 1 SCC 43; Para 16] K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran v. State by Peenya Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1234 : 2025 INSC 1473

Guidelines On Appreciating Victim Testimony- While appreciating the evidence of a minor victim of trafficking, the Court ought to bear in mind: i. Her inherent socio-economic and, at times, cultural vulnerability when the minor belongs to a marginalised or socially and culturally backward community; ii. Complex and layered structure of organised crime networks which operate at various levels of recruiting, transporting, harbouring and exploiting minor victims. Such organised crime activities operate as apparently independent verticals whose insidious intersections are conveniently veiled through subterfuges and deception to hoodwink innocent victims. Such diffused and apparently disjoint manner in which the crime verticals operate in areas of recruitment, transportation, harbouring and exploitation make it difficult, if not impossible for the victim, to narrate with precision and clarity the interplay of these processes as tentacles of an organised crime activity to which she falls prey. Given this situation, failure to promptly protest against ostensibly innocuous yet ominous agenda of the trafficker ought not to be treated as a ground to discard a victim's version as improbable or against ordinary human conduct; iii. Recounting and narration of the horrible spectre of sexual exploitation even before law enforcement agencies and the Court is an unpalatable experience leading to secondary victimisation. This is more acute when the victim is a minor and is faced with threats of criminal intimidation, fear of retaliation, social stigma and paucity of social and economic rehabilitation. In this backdrop, judicial appreciation of victim's evidence must be marked by sensitivity and realism; iv. If on such nuanced appreciation, the version of the victim appears to be credible and convincing, a conviction may be maintained on her sole testimony. A victim of sex trafficking, particularly a minor, is not an accomplice and her deposition is to be given due regard and credence as that of an injured witness. K.P. Kirankumar @ Kiran v. State by Peenya Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1234 : 2025 INSC 1473

Income Tax Act, 1961

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 37(1) – Non-Compete Fee – Revenue vs. Capital Expenditure – The Supreme Court held that non-compete fees paid to ward off competition and facilitate more efficient business operations without creating a new asset or profit-earning apparatus are deductible as revenue expenditure - Observed that even if a benefit is of an enduring nature, it is not conclusive of capital expenditure if it merely facilitates carrying on business more profitably and efficiently without adding to the fixed capital. [Paras 28, 29] Sharp Business System v. Commissioner of Income Tax-III N.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1241 : 2025 INSC 1481

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 36(1)(iii) – Interest on Borrowed Funds – Commercial Expediency – Interest on borrowed funds advanced to a sister concern or subsidiary is allowable if the nexus of "commercial expediency" is established - The revenue cannot substitute its judgment for that of a prudent businessman regarding the necessity of the expenditure - The investment made for controlling interest in an associate concern is clearly for commercial expediency. [Relied on S.A. Builders Ltd. v. CIT (Appeals), (2007) 1 SCC 781; Empire Jute Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1980) 4 SCC 25; CIT v. Coal Shipments (P) Ltd., (1971) 3 SCC 736; Paras 34, 39] Sharp Business System v. Commissioner of Income Tax-III N.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1241 : 2025 INSC 1481

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 2(47) - Whether the reduction in share capital of a subsidiary company, resulting in a proportionate reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee, constitutes a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, thereby allowing the assessee to claim a capital loss. The respondent-assessee, M/s. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd., held 99.88% shares in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd. (ANNPL). Due to financial losses, ANNPL filed for a reduction in share capital, which was approved by the High Court. The share capital was reduced from 15,35,05,750 shares to 10,000 shares, and the assessee's shareholding was proportionately reduced from 15,33,40,900 shares to 9,988 shares. The face value of the shares remained unchanged at Rs. 10. The assessee claimed a long-term capital loss of Rs. 164,48,55,840/- due to the reduction in share capital. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, stating that the reduction did not amount to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, as there was no extinguishment of rights or sale of shares. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer's decision, but the ITAT allowed the assessee's claim, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47). The High Court affirmed the ITAT's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Kartikeya v. Sarabhai v. CIT (1997) 7 SCC 524, which held that the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset, even without a sale, constitutes a transfer. The Court emphasized that the reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee resulted in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset, and the assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss. The Court also noted that the face value of the shares remaining unchanged did not negate the fact that the assessee's rights in the shares had been extinguished. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2025 INSC 38 : (2025) 8 SCC 500

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 2(47) - "transfer" - Reduction of Share Capital - Capital Loss - Legal Principles - The definition of "transfer" includes the extinguishment of any rights in a capital asset, even if there is no sale or exchange. A reduction in share capital, resulting in the extinguishment of a shareholder's rights, constitutes a transfer under Section 2(47). The assessee is entitled to claim a capital loss when there is a reduction in share capital that results in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset. The Supreme Court held that the reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and the consequent reduction in the assessee's shareholding amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss, and the petition filed by the Revenue was dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2025 INSC 38 : (2025) 8 SCC 500

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 276CC, 279(2) - Compounding of offences - "First offence" under Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014 - Interpretation - Assessee filed delayed returns for AY 2011-12 (due 30.09.2011, filed 04.03.2013) and AY 2013-14 (due 31.10.2013, filed 29.11.2014), leading to prosecution proposals under Section 276CC - Compounding application for AY 2011-12 accepted on 11.11.2014 post show-cause notice dated 27.10.2014 - For AY 2013-14, show-cause notice issued 12.03.2015; compounding rejected on ground it was not "first offence" due to prior compounding – High Court upheld rejection – Held, Offence u/s 276CC committed on day immediately following due date for filing return (01.10.2011 for AY 2011-12; 01.11.2013 for AY 2013-14), relying on Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT, (2004) 9 SCC 686 - Subsequent belated filing does not erase commission of offence - "First offence" u/para 8.1 of 2014 Guidelines (superseding 2008 Guidelines) means offence committed prior to issuance of show-cause notice or intimation of prosecution, whichever earlier - Both offences here preceded respective show-cause notices - Prior compounding for AY 2011-12 immaterial as each offence assessed independently against "first offence" criteria - Rejection of compounding for AY 2013-14 set aside; assessee directed to file fresh application within 2 weeks - If accepted, trial proceedings abate - Appeal allowed. (Para 35, 41, 44, 69, 70) Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2025 INSC 155

Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 10, 11 and 12-AA - Charitable Trust - Income Tax Exemption - Proposed Activities – Held, since Section 12AA pertains to the registration of the Trust and not to assess of what a trust has actually done, the term 'activities' in the provision includes 'proposed activities'. Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 10, 11 and 12-AA - Whether registration of a charitable trust under Section 12-AA of the Act, 1961, for income tax exemptions under Sections 10 and 11 should be based on the trust's proposed activities or actual activities. Held: The Supreme Court reiterated that registration under Section 12-AA of the Act, 1961, must be decided based on the trust's proposed activities rather than its actual activities, affirming the precedent set in Ananda Social, (2020) 17 SCC 254. The Commissioner must satisfy themselves of the genuineness of the trust's objects and proposed activities. However, mere registration does not guarantee exemptions under Sections 10 and 11, and the assessing officer may deny exemptions if the trust's materials are not convincing or genuine. The Supreme Court rejected the Revenue's contention that actual activities should be considered and declined to refer the Ananda Social decision to a larger bench. The High Court's order upholding the Appellate Tribunal's direction to grant registration was affirmed. Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 10, 11 and 12-AA - The respondent, a charitable trust engaged in education and medical aid, sought registration under Section 12-AA for tax exemptions. The Commissioner denied registration, citing insufficient evidence of actual charitable activities. The Appellate Tribunal reversed this, directing registration, which the High Court upheld. The Commissioner challenged this via a Special Leave Petition. Held, Section 12-AA requires the Commissioner to verify the genuineness of a trust's objects and activities for registration to claim benefits under Sections 11 and 12. The Court relied on Ananda Social, (2020) 17 SCC 254, which clarified that “activities” under Section 12-AA include “proposed activities,” and the Commissioner must assess the trust's objects and their alignment with proposed activities. Appeal dismissed; High Court's decision upheld. (Para 9, 13, 15) Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 214

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 132 and 271AAA - Penalty for undisclosed income - Search and seizure - Levy of penalty u/s. 271AAA(1) - Discretion of Assessing Officer – Mere surrender of undisclosed income during search insufficient to attract penalty; Assessing Officer must prove that income was "found in the course of search" as defined in Explanation to s. 271AAA(1) - Discretion to levy penalty not arbitrary but must be exercised judiciously, guided by law. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 132 and 271AAA - Penalty for undisclosed income - Held, Penalty leviable only where conditions satisfied; expression "found in the course of search" not confined to documents seized from assessee's premises but extends to materials obtained in continuation thereof, e.g., sale deeds procured from third party (society) triggered by initial search. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 271AAA - Exemption from penalty u/s. 271AAA(2) – Conditions - Assessee admits undisclosed income in statement u/s. 132(4) during search; substantiates manner of derivation; pays tax together with interest - No specific time-limit prescribed for payment - Delayed payment does not disentitle assessee from exemption. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 271AAA - Exemption from penalty u/s. 271AAA(2) –Held, If conditions (i)-(iii) of s. 271AAA(2) fulfilled, 10% penalty normally not leviable, even with delay in tax payment. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 132 and 271AAA - During search u/s. 132 at assessee's premises, assessee admitted undisclosed income of Rs. 2,27,65,580 for AY 2011-12 in statement u/s. 132(4) and later substantiated source, paying tax with interest (albeit delayed). Penalty imposed u/s. 271AAA on this amount and additional sum detected via sale deeds obtained from housing society post-search. Tribunals/High Court upheld penalty; assessee appealed to Supreme Court. Held, Appeal partly allowed - No penalty on admitted income of Rs. 2,27,65,580 as Section 271AAA(2) conditions complied with; 10% penalty payable only on additional undisclosed income from sale deeds, held to be "found in the course of search". Matter remitted for recomputation of penalty on latter amount. (Para 29, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41) K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208

Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 269ST, 271DA - Prohibition of Cash Transactions Exceeding ₹2,00,000 - Mandatory Reporting by Courts and Sub-Registrars - Disciplinary Action for Non-Compliance - Role of Income Tax Authorities - Circulation of Judgment - Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, 1961 prohibits cash transactions of ₹2,00,000 or more in a single transaction, aggregate per day, or for a single event, except through account payee cheque, bank draft, or electronic clearing systems. Violations attract penalties under Section 271DA to promote digital transactions and curb black money. Courts are obligated to report to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department any suit involving cash transactions of ₹2,00,000 or more to verify compliance with Section 269ST. Sub-Registrars must report documents (e.g., sale agreements) presented for registration indicating cash payments of ₹2,00,000 or above. Failure to report by officials will lead to disciplinary action initiated by the Chief Secretary of the State/Union Territory. The jurisdictional Income Tax Authority shall investigate reported transactions for potential violations. The Registrar (Judicial) was directed to circulate this judgment to all High Court Registrar Generals, Chief Secretaries of States/Union Territories, and the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax for strict compliance. The case involved a property dispute where a charitable trust, in possession since 1929, challenged a 2018 sale agreement claiming ₹75,00,000 in cash, violating Section 269ST. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the trust's revision petition, dismissed the respondents' suit as defective and speculative, and emphasized mandatory reporting of high-value cash transactions by courts and Sub-Registrars to ensure compliance with tax laws. Appeal allowed. (Para 18) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490

Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 263 - Power of Commissioner to revise assessment - Distinction between failure to investigate and wrong decision by Assessing Officer - Where Assessing Officer conducts investigation but makes no addition, it implies acceptance of assessee's plea - Commissioner can revise under Section 263 by deciding on merits and making additions, not by remanding for lack of investigation - Remand justified only if superficial or random investigation established with recorded error and prejudice to Revenue - High Court and Tribunal orders upheld - Special Leave Petition dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 v. V-Con Integrated Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 435

Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 80-IA(9) - Scope of - Deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB and 80-HHC – Deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB (industrial undertaking profits) and Section 80-HHC (export profits) can be computed independently. Resolving the split verdict in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Micro Labs Limited, (2015) 17 SCC 96, the Court held that Section 80-IA(9) does not mandate reducing the gross total income by the Section 80-IA/80-IB deduction before computing deductions under Section 80-HHC. Instead, it restricts the aggregate deductions under heading 'C' of Chapter VI-A to the extent of eligible business profits, preventing double benefits on the same profits. Approving the High Court's reasoning in Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, (2011) SCC OnLine Bom 27, the Court clarified that Section 80-IA(9) limits the allowability, not the computability, of deductions. For example, if business profits are Rs. 100 and Rs. 30 is allowed under Section 80-IA, a computed deduction of Rs. 80 under Section 80-HHC would be restricted to Rs. 70 to ensure the total deduction does not exceed the profits. The reference was answered accordingly, permitting independent computation of deductions while capping their aggregate to the eligible profits. (Para 20, 21 & 23) Shital Fibers v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2025 INSC 743

Section 36(1)(viii) – Deduction for Special Reserve – Profits "Derived From" Long-Term Finance – - Interpretation of "Derived From" vs. "Attributable To"- Scope and Interpretation- Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the National Cooperative Development Corporation (NCDC), holding that specific income heads- namely dividend income from shares, interest on short-term bank deposits, and service charges for monitoring Sugar Development Fund (SDF) loans- do not qualify for deduction under Section 36(1)(viii) of the Act- Supreme Court emphasized that the phrase "derived from" is narrower than "attributable to.”- Following the amendment by the Finance Act, 1995, the legislature intended to "ring-fence" this fiscal benefit to only those profits having a direct, first-degree nexus with the core activity of providing long-term finance- Any income that is even a "step removed" from such core activity is excluded. [Relied on Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1978) 2 SCC 644; Paras 9-16] National Cooperative Development Corporation v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1193 : 2025 INSC 1414

Specific Heads of Income Disallowed- Dividend Income- Held that dividends are a return on investment in share capital, not a "loan or advance."- A shareholder is not a creditor and cannot sue for debt; thus, the nexus to "long-term finance" is absent- Interest on Short-term Deposits: Interest earned on idle surplus funds parked in banks is "at best attributable" to the business but not "derived from" the activity of long-term financing- Supreme Court distinguished between the broad genus of "Business Income" and the specific species of profits defined under Section 36(1)(viii)- Held that since the funds belonged to the Government and the appellant acted only as a nodal agency/intermediary without risking its own capital, the service fee received is an agency commission and not profit from providing finance- Held that The 1995 Amendment was specifically designed to prevent financial corporations from claiming deductions on diversified, non-core income. The appellant's receipts failed the strict rigor of the "derived from" test and the definition of "long-term finance" provided in the Explanation to Section 36(1)(viii)- Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT (1954) 2 SCC 563; Paras 21-28] National Cooperative Development Corporation v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1193 : 2025 INSC 1414

Section 245HA – Revival of Appellate Proceedings – Held, Appellate proceedings will stand revived and Section 245HA of the 1961 Act will be applicable only if the application for settlement is rejected without providing for terms of settlement - The stand of the Revenue that the assessee must give up his right to contest the assessment order on merits, if the settlement application is rejected without providing for terms of settlement, is misconceived and must be rejected - Where an application is pending before the Settlement Commission, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) should keep the appellate proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of the application by the Settlement Commission in terms of the 1961 Act - Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was  Justified in condoning delay and setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and restoring the first appeal, considering the peculiar facts of the case - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 3 - 7] Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 Surat v. M. D. Industries Pvt Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1111

Section 37(1) - Business Expenditure – Deduction – Held, a "lull in business" for a non-resident company engaged in oil drilling activities, due to the non-procurement of a contract during the relevant assessment years (1996- 97, 1997-98, 1999-2000), does not amount to a "cessation of business" - Where the company continued to engage in systematic and organized activities, such as continuous business correspondence with ONGC regarding manpower supply and submitting an unsuccessful bid, it demonstrated a clear intention to carry on business - the company was entitled to claim deduction of business expenditure (administrative charges, audit fees, etc.) under Section 37(1). Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247

Section 71 - Set-off of Loss from Other Heads - Interpretation of 'Business' – Held, the expenditure, though disallowed as a deduction under the head 'Income from Business' by the ITAT (as the only income was 'Interest on Tax Refunds' taxable as 'Income from Other Sources'), was allowed to be set off against the 'Income from Other Sources' under Section 71 of the Act, on the finding that the appellant was still carrying on business - The word 'business' has a wide import and connotes a "real, substantial and systemic or organised course of activity or activity with a set purpose" - The expression 'for the purpose of business' is wider than 'for the purpose of earning profits' and includes "many other acts incidental to the carrying on of a business". Pride Foramer S.A. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1015 : 2025 INSC 1247

Section 144C v. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation - Dissenting Opinion (Nagarathna, J.) – Held, provisions of section 144C and section 153 are not mutually exclusive but are mutually inclusive - the period of limitation prescribed under Section 153(2A) or 153(3) is applicable, even when matters are remanded - the non-obstante clause in section 144C(1) does not extend to the timelines prescribed under section 153 - The timelines under Section 153 does not automatically include the process conceived under Section 144C - the entire proceedings, including the hearing and directions by the Dispute Resolution Panel (DRP), must be issued within 9 months as contemplated under Section 144C(12) of the Income Tax Act - the Act is workable even if Section 144C proceedings are subsumed within the limitation prescribed under Section 153(1) or (3) - no final assessments orders can be passed in these cases as same would be time-barred - Appeal Dismissed. [Para 15] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946

Section 144C v. Section 153 – Assessment – Limitation - Supreme Court delivers split verdict on time limit for assessments under Section 144C - Interpretation of section 144C in light of Section 153 of IT Act – Held, Section 144C was introduced as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to facilitate expeditious resolution of tax disputes, especially for foreign companies - To reduce the time consumed in making assessment orders for eligible assesses - Satish Chandra Sharma; J. held that timelines in 144C (4) & (13) are independent and in addition to the timeline under Section 153(3) and that section 153(3) applies only to the passing of the draft assessment order - If entire Section 144C procedure were subsumed within Section 153(3), it would make the system unworkable and lead to a “complete catastrophe for recovering tax” - Section 153(3) applies to the passing of draft assessment order and Section 144C extends the timeline for the final order - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6.1, 6.2, 8] Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Shelf Drilling Ron Tappmeyer Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 783 : 2025 INSC 946

Departmental Circulars and Guidelines - Binding nature on revenue authorities – Held, Court relied on Circulars issued by Ministry of Finance and Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT), including the 2008 Circular and 2009 Prosecution Manual, which state that prosecution under Section 276C(1) should be initiated only after the IT Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) confirms a penalty for concealment of income - These Circulars are binding on the revenue authorities and can 'tone down the rigour of the statutory provision' - The revenue authorities in this case, failed to adhere to these binding instructions by filing the complaint before any such confirmation - The prosecution, lodged in defiance of the department's own binding circulars and continued even after the Settlement Commission's conclusive finding that there was no suppression of facts, amounted to a 'blatant disregard' of their own directives, citing such actions as a 'serious lapse' and are not justified - Set aside order of High Court and imposed costs of Rs. 2 lakhs on the revenue, payable to the appellant - Appeal allowed. [Paras 31-33, 35- 38] Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2025 INSC 1048

Section 276C(1) - Wilful attempt to evade tax - Quashing of prosecution - Whether the continuation of the prosecution, initiated before the Settlement application, was abuse of court's process – Held, the Settlement Commission's order was conclusive, and it found that the appellant had made a full and true disclosure of his income, satisfying the conditions of Section 245H - Commission's finding that there was no suppression of material facts meant there was no 'wilful attempt' to evade tax, a key element required for a successful prosecution under Section 276C(1). [Paras 12, 18-21] Vijay Krishnaswami @ Krishnaswami Vijayakumar v. Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 851 : 2025 INSC 1048

Section 2(47) - Whether the reduction in share capital of a subsidiary company, resulting in a proportionate reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee, constitutes a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, thereby allowing the assessee to claim a capital loss. The respondent-assessee, M/s. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd., held 99.88% shares in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd. (ANNPL). Due to financial losses, ANNPL filed for a reduction in share capital, which was approved by the High Court. The share capital was reduced from 15,35,05,750 shares to 10,000 shares, and the assessee's shareholding was proportionately reduced from 15,33,40,900 shares to 9,988 shares. The face value of the shares remained unchanged at Rs. 10. The assessee claimed a long-term capital loss of Rs. 164,48,55,840/- due to the reduction in share capital. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, stating that the reduction did not amount to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, as there was no extinguishment of rights or sale of shares. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer's decision, but the ITAT allowed the assessee's claim, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47). The High Court affirmed the ITAT's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Kartikeya v. Sarabhai v. CIT (1997) 7 SCC 524, which held that the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset, even without a sale, constitutes a transfer. The Court emphasized that the reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee resulted in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset, and the assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss. The Court also noted that the face value of the shares remaining unchanged did not negate the fact that the assessee's rights in the shares had been extinguished. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : (2025) 8 SCC 500

Section 2(47) - "transfer" - Reduction of Share Capital - Capital Loss - Legal Principles - The definition of "transfer" includes the extinguishment of any rights in a capital asset, even if there is no sale or exchange. A reduction in share capital, resulting in the extinguishment of a shareholder's rights, constitutes a transfer under Section 2(47). The assessee is entitled to claim a capital loss when there is a reduction in share capital that results in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset. The Supreme Court held that the reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and the consequent reduction in the assessee's shareholding amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss, and the petition filed by the Revenue was dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : (2025) 8 SCC 500

Sections 276CC, 279(2) - Compounding of offences - "First offence" under Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014 - Interpretation - Assessee filed delayed returns for AY 2011-12 (due 30.09.2011, filed 04.03.2013) and AY 2013-14 (due 31.10.2013, filed 29.11.2014), leading to prosecution proposals under Section 276CC - Compounding application for AY 2011-12 accepted on 11.11.2014 post show-cause notice dated 27.10.2014 - For AY 2013-14, show-cause notice issued 12.03.2015; compounding rejected on ground it was not "first offence" due to prior compounding – High Court upheld rejection – Held, Offence u/s 276CC committed on day immediately following due date for filing return (01.10.2011 for AY 2011-12; 01.11.2013 for AY 2013-14), relying on Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT, (2004) 9 SCC 686 - Subsequent belated filing does not erase commission of offence - "First offence" u/para 8.1 of 2014 Guidelines (superseding 2008 Guidelines) means offence committed prior to issuance of show-cause notice or intimation of prosecution, whichever earlier - Both offences here preceded respective show-cause notices - Prior compounding for AY 2011-12 immaterial as each offence assessed independently against "first offence" criteria - Rejection of compounding for AY 2013-14 set aside; assessee directed to file fresh application within 2 weeks - If accepted, trial proceedings abate - Appeal allowed. (Para 35, 41, 44, 69, 70) Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria v. Chiefs Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2025 INSC 155