Mere Participation In Arbitration Won't Bar Challenge To Arbitrator's Eligibility, Waiver Must Be "Express & In Writing" : Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has ruled that a party's involvement in arbitral proceedings does not, in itself, constitute a waiver of its right to object to an arbitrator's eligibility. The Court clarified that the right to object can only be waived by an express written agreement, rejecting any notion of a "deemed waiver" arising from conduct alone under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration &...
The Supreme Court has ruled that a party's involvement in arbitral proceedings does not, in itself, constitute a waiver of its right to object to an arbitrator's eligibility. The Court clarified that the right to object can only be waived by an express written agreement, rejecting any notion of a "deemed waiver" arising from conduct alone under Section 12(5) of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996.
“The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication. The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement.”, observed a bench of Justices JB Pardiwala and KV Viswanathan.
The Court endorsed the Delhi High Court's decision in Govind Singh v. Satya Group Pvt. Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine Del 37, where it was held that “it is not necessary to even examine whether the appellant had raised an objection. Even if the appellant had participated in the proceedings without raising any objection, it cannot be said that he had waived his right under Section 12(5) of the Act, 1996.”
The case arose from a licence agreement between Bhadra International and the Airports Authority of India (AAI), under which Clause 78 empowered the Chairman of AAI to appoint a sole arbitrator. After disputes arose and arbitration was invoked, the Chairman appointed an arbitrator pursuant to this clause. The appellants challenged the appointment, contending that it violated Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule of the Act, which mandates independence and impartiality of arbitrators.
Aggrieved by the High Court's decision to reject the its plea to set aside the award passed by the unilaterally appointed arbitrator, the Appellant moved to the Supreme Court.
The High Court's said that the appointment was not unilateral as the arbitration had been invoked by the appellants.
Setting aside the impugned order, the judgment authored by Justice Pardiwala, reiterating the law laid down in Perkins Eastman Architects DPC & Anr. v. HSCC (India) Ltd.,(2020) 20 SCC 760 that a person who is statutorily ineligible to act as an arbitrator is equally barred from appointing one, observed that merely participating in the arbitral proceedings does not amount to consent to a one-sided appointment mechanism, and it wouldn't automatically waive the Appellant's right to challenge the ineligibility of the arbitrator.
The Court said that at the pre-award stage, the aggrieved party can approach to the court for substitution of an arbitrator, and at the post-award stage the aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside of an arbitral award.
“When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated. In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator. Whereas, when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award.”, the court observed.
In light of the aforesaid, the Court drew the following conclusions:
"i. The principle of equal treatment of parties provided in Section 18 of the Act, 1996, applies not only to the arbitral proceedings but also to the procedure for appointment of arbitrators. Equal treatment of the parties entails that the parties must have an equal say in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
ii. Sub-section (5) of Section 12 provides that any person whose relationship with the parties or counsel, or the dispute, whether direct or indirect, falls within any of the categories specified in the Seventh Schedule would be ineligible to be appointed as an arbitrator. Since, the ineligibility stems from the operation of law, not only is a person having an interest in the dispute or its outcome ineligible to act as an arbitrator, but appointment by such a person would be ex facie invalid.
iii. The words “an express agreement in writing” in the proviso to Section 12(5) means that the right to object to the appointment of an ineligible arbitrator cannot be taken away by mere implication. The agreement referred to in the proviso must be a clear, unequivocal written agreement.
iv. When an arbitrator is found to be ineligible by virtue of Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule, his mandate is automatically terminated. In such circumstance, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14 read with Section 15 for appointment of a substitute arbitrator. Whereas, when an award has been passed by such an arbitrator, an aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 34 for setting aside the award.
v. In arbitration, the parties vest jurisdiction in the tribunal by exercising their consent in furtherance of a valid arbitration agreement. An arbitrator who lacks jurisdiction cannot make an award on the merits. Hence, an objection to the inherent lack of jurisdiction can be taken at any stage of the proceedings."
Cause Title: BHADRA INTERNATIONAL (INDIA) PVT. LTD. & ORS. VERSUS AIRPORTS AUTHORITY OF INDIA
Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 4
Click here to download judgment
Appearance:
For Petitioner(s) :Mr. Navin Pahwa, Sr. Adv. Mr. Ashish Mohan, Sr. Adv. Mr. Akshit Mago, Adv. Mr. Akshit Pradhan, AOR
For Respondent(s) :Mr. Parag Tripathi, Sr. Adv. Mr. Sonal K Singh, Adv. Mr. Ayan De, Adv. Mr. Shivang Singh, Adv. Mr. Anmol Adhrit, Adv. Ms. Sukanya Lal, AOR