Advocate A right of an Advocate to appear for a party and to practice in the courts is coupled with the duty to remain present in the court at the time of hearing, and to participate and conduct the proceedings diligently, sincerely, honestly and to the best of his ability. Rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, and they are inherently connected with each other....
Advocate
A right of an Advocate to appear for a party and to practice in the courts is coupled with the duty to remain present in the court at the time of hearing, and to participate and conduct the proceedings diligently, sincerely, honestly and to the best of his ability. Rights and duties are two sides of the same coin, and they are inherently connected with each other. (Para 18) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364
Advocate-on-Record (AoR) - Misconduct in Filing Petition - Disciplinary Action - Split Verdict on Disciplinary Action against Advocate-on-Record and Assisting Advocate for Misconduct in Filing Petition - Justice Bela M. Trivedi held that the AoR and assisting Advocate abused the legal process by filing a second Special Leave Petition (SLP) challenging the same High Court judgment, despite the dismissal of the first SLP. Proposed a one-month suspension of the AoR from the Register of AoRs and directed the assisting Advocate to deposit Rs. 1 lakh with SCAORA for advocates' welfare, citing serious misconduct and failure to uphold the Supreme Court's dignity. Justice Satish Chandra Sharma acknowledged the misconduct but deemed the proposed punishment excessive. Accepted the unconditional apologies from the Advocates, noting their unblemished records, genuine remorse, and requests from the Supreme Court Bar Association. Issued a warning against future misconduct. Due to the split verdict, the matter was referred to the CJI for appropriate orders. N. Eswaranathan v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 437 : 2025 INSC 509
All India Bar Examination (AIBE) - Supreme Court dismissed a petition challenging Rs. 3,500 free and other incidental charges levied by the Bar council of India (BCI) for the AIBE - Bar Councils cannot charge more than a statutorily prescribed Rs. 750 for enrolment - Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 would apply in so far as enrolment fess are concerned - Bar Council of India would incur huge expenses for the purpose of conducting of such examination and if they are charging Rs. 3,500/- and Rs. 2,500/-, it cannot be termed as violative of any of the provisions of the Constitution or any of the provisions of the Advocates Act - Petition dismissed. [Paras 2-5] Sanyam Gandhi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 940
Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa filed a disciplinary complaint against an advocate alleging professional misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961, for obtaining a consent decree without the knowledge of a party and suppressing material facts from the Court – Held, at the stage of cognizance, the Bar Council must record reasons based on a prima facie case of misconduct before referring a complaint to the Disciplinary Committee. A cryptic or laconic reference order without minimum discussion of allegations does not satisfy statutory requirements - The advocate had only endorsed the identification of the plaintiff's authorized representative in the consent terms, which remain undisturbed to date, and had no professional relationship with the complainant. Therefore, proceedings for misconduct were not justified - The Court quashed the entire disciplinary proceedings, holding that the complaint was frivolous and lacked foundation, imposing costs on the Bar Council for dragging the advocate to the Court without merit - The referral of a complaint to the disciplinary committee requires a reasoned satisfaction of a prima facie case of misconduct - Supreme Court imposes Rs. 50,000 cost on Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa for entertaining frivolous compliant against advocates. [Paras 29, 30-42] Bar Council of Maharashtra and Goa v. Rajiv Nareshchandra Narula, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 943 : 2025 INSC 1147
Duty of Advocates - The legal profession's foundational ethos is service-oriented, not merely commercial. Young advocates must proactively volunteer to assist indigent or unrepresented litigants (e.g., parties-in-person) without expectation of fees, providing optimal legal aid to bridge communication gaps and facilitate amicable resolutions, especially in labour and matrimonial disputes. Such pro bono efforts affirm access to justice and equality before law in practice, support alternative mechanisms like mediation/conciliation, and counter the harmful perception—fueled by exorbitant fees and procedural delays—that the Apex Court serves only the affluent. The Amicus Curiae's dedicated, unpaid assistance exemplifies this "rare joy" amid the profession's commercialization, earning societal goodwill and fulfilling the constitutional duty to ease litigation access (Paras 12-14.2). Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Koolwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2025 INSC 200
Enrolment Fees - Contempt Petition - Bar Councils can't collect any amount as “optional fee” during enrolment - Supreme Court closed a contempt petition after the Bar Council of India (BCI) affirmed its commitment to ensuring State Bar Councils (SBCs) comply with judgment in Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 519 which prohibits charging enrolment fees beyond the stipulated amount under Section 24(1)(f) of the Advocates Act, 1961 - Supreme Court clarified that no “optional” fees can be collected by any State Bar Council or the BCI, and fees must strictly adhere to the direction in the main judgment. [Paras 4-9] K.L.J.A. Kiran Babu v. Karnataka State Bar Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786
Fraudulent Settlement - Misrepresentation by Counsel - Supreme Court Ordered BCI inquiry after client denies engagement of advocates who settled his case - Directed BCI to conduct a detailed inquiry into an alleged fraudulent settlement agreement - Restored SLP after respondent claimed that he never authorized any counsel to appear on his behalf or enter into a settlement - Deemed it necessary to examine in detail the facts surrounding the disposal of SLP based on alleged settlement agreement - Supreme Court refrained from drawing conclusions at present stage but directed an inquiry into the role of advocates involved in preparation and filing of the settlement agreement and conduct of proceedings by the end of October 2025. [Paras 5-7] Bipin Bihari Sinha @ Bipin Prasad Singh v. Harish Jaiswal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 794
Genuineness of the power of attorney - Advocate's Role - Discharge - Advocate cannot be held criminally liable for merely failing to verify the genuineness of a power of attorney which was handed over by a litigant to file a case. When a litigant claiming to be a power of attorney holder of others, approaches a member of the Bar and shows him the original power of attorney and engages him to file a case, the Advocate is not expected to get the genuineness of the power of attorney verified, unless he has a reasonable doubt about its genuineness. In this case, where the advocate's actions were limited to filing the case and the depositions were attested by another person, no case for framing charges is made out against the advocate. The advocate is entitled to discharge. (Para 9 - 11) Ismailbhai Hatubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 267
High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 (Bombay) - Civil Manual - Pursis Claiming 'No Instructions' - Withdrawal of Vakalatnama - Whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with the suit after the 'no instructions' pursis was filed by the defendants' advocate, claiming no instructions, without serving a fresh notice on the defendants - Held that the Appellate Court's finding that the Trial Court did not commit a wrong in proceeding with the matter was a plausible view based on the material on record and did not warrant interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution - Held that the pursis was simply an intimation of prospective action and did not reflect a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama - The Trial Court rightly decided to ignore such pursis as it was not a valid notice/intimation to the Court about the withdrawal of the Vakalatnama as contemplated under the Advocates Act and Civil Manual - The procedure prescribed for the withdrawal of a Vakalatnama (Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual and Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII of Schedule VII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960) requires the advocate to file a note requesting permission to withdraw and also file a copy of the intimation to the client along with its written acknowledgment, or a letter from the client instructing withdrawal - This procedure was not applicable as the pursis did not pray for, nor was it treated as, a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama by the Trial Court - Held that the High Court, in considering the procedure for withdrawal of Vakalatnama, clearly exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the Appellate Court - Held that power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors - The Appellate Court's order was not amenable to interference - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 675; Paras 15-23] Shri Digant v. P.D.T. Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1140 : 2025 INSC 1352
High Court of Orissa (Designation of Senior Advocate) Rules, 2019- Rule 6(9)- Suo moto power to the full court of High Court to designate an advocate as 'Senior Advocate'- the 2019 Rules were formulated in the backdrop of the Indira Jaising v Supreme Court of India (2017)- High Court held Rule 6(9) to be ultra vires and not in lines with the Indira Jaisingh judgement- Held- that suo moto designations by Full court are upheld as they adhere to the constitutional principles of fairness, transparency and objectivity- Courts are not expected to grant this status arbitrarily or as favour- process for designation must be merit based, transparent and fair- conferment of Senior Advocate status is a privilege, not an entitlement- Set aside order passed by the High Court on its judicial side is set aside and designation as senior advocates is held to be valid. [Concur with Jitender @Kalla v. State (Govt.) NCT of Delhi & Anr. (2025); Para 17, 18] Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2025 INSC 839
Procedure for Summoning an Advocate (in exceptional cases) - Status of in-house counsel - Supreme Court laid down procedure for summoning advocates in exceptional cases - i. An Investigating Officer (I.O.) can only summon an Advocate if the I.O. has knowledge of an issue that falls under the exceptions to Section 132 of the BSA (e.g., communication made in furtherance of an illegal purpose)- In such a case, the summons must specifically mention the exception under which the Advocate is being summoned; ii. Any summons issued against an Advocate by an I.O. must be with the prior approval and satisfaction of the hierarchical Superior, not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police (SP), and a reasoned order must be recorded; iii. In-house counsel are not entitled to the professional privilege under Section 132 of the BSA since they are not Advocates practicing in Courts as spoken of in the BSA- they would be entitled to the protection under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of their employer- The protection under Section 134 cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel themselves. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Paras 48-50, 59-67] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275
Supreme Court orders – Modification of - Expunging observations regarding conduct of counsel – Waiver of costs imposed while dismissing SLP – Decorum of proceedings – Role and duty of counsel – Held, once a Bench has indicated its inclination and requested counsel to refrain from making further submissions, such direction must be respected, as continued insistence thereafter serves no purpose and affects the decorum of proceedings - Emphasized that persistent submissions despite the Court expressing its mind is improper and undermines court decorum - Acknowledged the assurance from senior bar leaders that such conduct would not reoccur and the advocate's remorse - Considering the apology and it being a first instance, the application was allowed with a caution, deleting adverse remarks and waiving the costs - Advocates are bound to respect the Court's indication and maintain decorum to ensure orderly proceedings - however, genuine remorse and apology may warrant recall of adverse observations and costs - Application allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] State Election Commission v. Shakti Singh Bharthwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1038 : 2025 INSC 1261
Treatment of Advocate's Digital Devices and Confidentiality- Supreme Court held that - i. While examining any digital device of an Advocate, care shall be taken by the Court not to impair the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the Advocate; ii. The discovery shall be strictly confined to the information sought by the Investigating Officer, provided it is found to be permissible and admissible. [Paras 54 - 58] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275
Advocates Act, 1961
Section 16 – Designation of Senior Advocates – Indira Jaising v. Supreme Court of India (2017) and (2023) partially overruled - 1. Point-based assessment system discontinued: The Supreme Court has set aside the structured 100-point marking system (20 marks for years of practice, 50 for reported judgments, 5 for publications, 25 for interview) evolved through Indira Jaising-I (2017) and Indira Jaising-II (2023) and directed that it shall no longer be followed either by the Supreme Court or by any High Court. 2. Decision-making shifted to Full Court: Henceforth, the conferment of senior designation shall be decided solely by the Full Court of the High Court (or the Supreme Court for its own Bar) on a holistic consideration of the candidate's stature, standing at the Bar, and special knowledge or experience in law. 3. High Courts directed to frame fresh rules within four months: All High Courts must amend or substitute their existing Rules/Guidelines within four months in light of the following mandatory guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court: (i) Decision to rest exclusively with the Full Court; (ii) All applications found eligible by the Permanent Secretariat, along with complete material, to be placed before the Full Court; (iii) Endeavour for consensus; in its absence, decision by democratic voting (secret ballot or otherwise to be decided by the High Court in the facts of each case); (iv) Minimum 10 years' practice criterion retained; (v) Applications may continue, but designation can also be conferred suo motu in deserving cases; (vi) No scope for individual judges (Supreme Court or High Court) to recommend candidates; (vii) At least one designation exercise every calendar year; (viii) Ongoing processes initiated under the erstwhile Indira Jaising judgments to be governed by those judgments; no fresh processes to commence until new rules are framed. 4. Diversity and representation: While framing rules, High Courts must ensure adequate representation to lawyers practising predominantly in trial courts and to underrepresented sections. 5. No role for Bar members in formal decision-making: The inclusion of the Attorney General/Advocate General or other Bar members in the Permanent Committee for awarding marks stands disapproved. 6. Appreciation recorded: The Court placed on record its appreciation for Senior Advocate Ms. Indira Jaising for her persistent efforts towards reform of the senior designation process. Paragraph 73.7 of Indira Jaising-I as amended by Indira Jaising-II (the point-based system) not to be implemented henceforth; High Courts directed to frame fresh rules on the above lines within four months; Supreme Court to similarly amend its own rules. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667
Section 16(2) - Criteria under - Designation of Senior Advocates – Supreme Court elucidates the true meaning of “ability”, “standing at the Bar” and “special knowledge or experience in law” – Mere longevity of practice or long presence at the Bar held not a rational or major criterion – Assigning points solely on the basis of number of years of practice requires reconsideration. The Supreme Court has authoritatively interpreted the statutory grounds for designation of Senior Advocates under Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and laid down the following principles: 1. Standing at the Bar is a composite attribute comprising integrity, respect, fairness, courtroom decorum, priority of duty to the court over client, adherence to professional ethics, mentoring of juniors, pro bono work and esteem within the fraternity. It has no correlation with the mere length of practice. Long years at the Bar, with or without substantial appearances, cannot by itself justify designation. 2. Ability encompasses (i) sound and deep knowledge of law, particularly in the practitioner's chosen field(s), (ii) advocacy skills including effective presentation and mastery over cross-examination (where applicable), (iii) scholarly contributions such as writing articles/commentaries, and (iv) the capacity for rational critique of judicial decisions. 3. Special knowledge or experience in law includes recognised expertise in specialised branches such as Arbitration, Insolvency & Bankruptcy, Company Law, Intellectual Property, Taxation, etc. 4. Advocates practising predominantly in Trial/District Courts or before specialised tribunals are not inferior in status and can equally satisfy the statutory criteria. Exceptional drafting skills and proficiency in cross-examination at the trial stage are relevant facets of “ability”. Confining designation only to lawyers appearing in the Supreme Court/High Courts would render the provision arbitrary and violative of Article 14. 5. While honesty and integrity are non-negotiable for every advocate, they are threshold qualities and do not by themselves entitle an advocate to senior designation. The standards for Senior Advocates must be demonstrably higher. The Court expressed the view that the prevailing practice of awarding points primarily on the basis of years of practice does not subserve the object of Section 16(2) and warrants reconsideration. Guidelines and marking systems for designation of Senior Advocates must align with the statutory touchstones of ability, standing at the Bar, and special knowledge/experience in law, rather than treating longevity of practice as a dominant or rational criterion. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667
Section 16(2) - Senior Advocate Designation – Inclusivity and Diversity – Rejection of Points-Based System - 1. Held that designation as Senior Advocate cannot remain a monopoly of lawyers practising predominantly in the High Courts and Supreme Court. High Courts are constitutionally bound to evolve mechanisms to actively consider Advocates regularly practising in Trial Courts, District Courts and specialised Tribunals for senior designation, as their role is “no inferior” to that of lawyers appearing before the higher courts. 2. Conferring designation only upon lawyers practising in the Supreme Court and High Courts would render Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Advocates practising before subordinate courts and Tribunals can equally possess the qualifications prescribed under Section 16(2). 3. To ensure consideration of such Advocates, High Courts may seek views of Principal District Judges, Heads/Presiding Officers of Tribunals and the Guardian/Administrative Judges of the concerned districts. 4. Diversity and inclusivity are integral to the designation process. Equal opportunity must be extended to members of the Bar belonging to different classes, including first-generation lawyers. 5. Minimum income criterion cannot be introduced as an eligibility condition, as it would defeat inclusivity; income may be one of the several factors for assessment, but not a threshold requirement. 6. Minimum ten years' standing at the Bar is a reasonable requirement, as standing can be assessed only after an Advocate has practised for a reasonably long period. 7. The process of designation must be objectively fair, transparent and guided by clear criteria. At least one designation exercise must be conducted every year. 8. The practice of Senior Advocates wearing distinctive gowns has no statutory basis in the Advocates Act, 1961; the question whether it should be discontinued is left to the rule-making discretion of respective High Courts. Points-based evaluation system struck down; High Courts directed to frame fresh guidelines in light of the judgment. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667
Section 16(2) - Senior and other advocates - this provision recognizes power of a High Court to confer the distinction of Senior Advocate, by virtue of his ability, standing at the Bar, or special knowledge or experience in law- standards of designation of Senior Advocates must be significantly higher than those applicable to other advocates. [Para 9] Orissa High Court v. Banshidhar Baug, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 695 : 2025 INSC 839
Section 16(2) - Supreme Court directs Delhi High Court to reconsider applications for senior advocate designations deferred or rejected in November 2024, in accordance with the High Court of Delhi Designations of Senior Advocates Rules 2024. The Court found that marks assigned by one member of the Permanent Committee were not considered, necessitating a fresh evaluation. The Registrar General is to reconstitute the Permanent Committee, and the Government must nominate members within one week of requisition. The Court declined to set a four-week deadline for the process, emphasizing the need for thorough review. The petition challenging the designation process was disposed of, with the Court reiterating that the Permanent Committee's role is limited to assigning points, not making recommendations, as per the Indira Jaising (2017) and Jitender Kalla (2025) judgments. (Paras 4 & 5) Raman Alias Raman Gandhi v. Registrar General, High Court of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 485
Section 16(2) - Supreme Court of India scraps 100-point-based system for designation of Senior Advocates; holds it failed to achieve objectivity and transparency; interviewing advocates violates dignity of the profession. The Supreme Court set aside paragraph 73.7 of Indira Jaising-1, as modified in 2023 Indira Jaising-2, thereby scrapping the point-based assessment mechanism (100 marks) for designation of Senior Advocates under Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 read with Rule 2 of Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. Held, 1. The experience of the last seven-and-a-half years established that calibre, legal acumen, standing at the Bar, and overall suitability of advocates cannot be rationally or objectively assessed through a rigid point-based format. The system failed to achieve the desired goals of uniformity, transparency, and elimination of lobbying. 2. Subjecting advocates of standing to a brief interview (25 marks) by the Permanent Committee violates the dignity of the noble profession. A few minutes' interaction is insufficient to assess personality and suitability and often rewards performative ability rather than merit. 3. Involvement of a Bar member in the Permanent Committee in the actual scoring/allotment of marks is statutorily impermissible, as Section 16(2) vests the exclusive power of designation in the Full Court of the Supreme Court/High Court. 4. Awarding up to 20 marks merely on the basis of years of practice (10–20+ years) is irrational; longevity alone does not reflect merit or standing at the Bar. 5. The requirement of submitting 10 reported + 10 unreported judgments and written submissions (50 marks) is impractical, imposes enormous burden on judges, and fails to fairly attribute quality of work in team efforts. Outsourcing evaluation to court staff or external bodies is impermissible. 6. Assigning fixed points (5 marks) for publications / articles / books is unjust; while quality scholarship adds to standing, it is not an essential criterion and cannot be mechanically quantified. 7. The point system completely omitted any specific weightage or objective mechanism to assess integrity, character, and honesty — qualities fundamental to the conferment of seniority. 8. Though the Permanent Committee's report is technically non-binding, in practice the point-based scoring operates as a recommendation, thereby undermining the Full Court's independent decision-making power. The Court clarified that its earlier directions in Indira Jaising-1 & 2 were never intended to be cast in stone (paragraph 74 of Indira Jaising-1 and paragraph 51 of Indira Jaising-2 expressly permitted modifications based on experience). Accordingly, the 100-point format stands discontinued with immediate effect, restoring the pre-2017 practice of holistic consideration by the Full Court based on merit, reputation, and integrity without any mechanical point allocation or mandatory interviews. Jitender @ Kalla v. State (Govt.) of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 555 : 2025 INSC 667