Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs Article 226 - Constitutional Jurisdiction - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and...
Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs
Article 226 - Constitutional Jurisdiction - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and direct statutory authorities to process a redevelopment proposal in favour of a new developer, even during the pendency of CIRP - Such directions fall in the public law domain and do not encroach upon the NCLT's jurisdiction or offend the moratorium, especially where the corporate debtor has no subsisting contractual or proprietary interest in the project. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Amit Gupta and others 2021 7 SCC 209; Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others 2020 13 SCC 308; Para 17, 20] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366
Article 226 – CBI investigation - Power of the High Court to direct a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry - Judicial restraint in ordering CBI investigation - Held, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI inquiry must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional situations - It should not be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party levels allegations against the local police - There must be sufficient material to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is a need for such an inquiry, and a commission of a criminal offence is prima facie disclosed - The direction is justified only when the integrity of the process is compromised to a degree that shakes the conscience of the Courts or public faith, often involving high-ranking officials or systemic failure - In matters relating to recruitment, it would not be appropriate to direct CBI investigation in the routine course unless the facts are so abnormal that they shake the conscience of the Court - The High Court's direction for a CBI inquiry was based on mere 'doubt,' 'assumption,' and 'inexplicable details' concerning the external agency's master data, which did not satisfy the prima facie threshold required for such an investigation - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and directed a CBI enquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment process for the U.P. Legislative council and Assembly Secretaries - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Paras 11, 14- 23] Legislative Council U.P. Lucknow v. Sushil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1012 : 2025 INSC 1241
Article 226, 227 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 - Section 528 - Quashing of FIR / Chargesheet - Jurisdiction of High Court – Held, Article 226 cannot be invoked to quash chargesheet if cognizance has been taken, remedy is available under Section 528 - FIRs or chargesheets may be quashed under Article 226 before cognizance is taken but once cognizance is taken, the remedy lies under Section 528 BNSS, to challenge both FIR/Chargesheet and even the cognizance order - The High Court did have the jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS to consider the petitioner's grievance for quashing the FIR, chargesheet and any cognizance order - High Court misunderstood the ruling in Neeta Singh v State of U.P. 2024 - Order of High Court was set aside. [Paras 7-10] Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 875
Article 226 – Public Interest Litigation (PIL) - Misuse of Public Funds - Naming of government schemes after political leaders - Supreme Court deprecated the practice of using courts to settle political scores between rival political parties, stating that political battles should be fought before the electorate - Held that writ petition challenging a government welfare scheme named “ungaludan Stalin” was misconceived in law and an abuse of the process of law - Petitioner rushed to High Court within 3 days of making the representation to the ECI, without giving the ECI an opportunity to decide on the matter - Previous judgments in Common Cause I, II, III, and IV dealt with the use of photographs of political leaders and heads of executive in public-funded advertisements, they do not prohibit a scheme from being names after a political leader - Supreme Court dismissed writ petition with costs of Rs. 10 lakhs to be deposited with the State for implementation of welfare schemes for the underprivileged - Appeals allowed. [Paras 17-25] Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam v. Thiru. C.Ve. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 796 : 2025 INSC 976
Article 226 - Public Trust Doctrine – Transparent Allocation of Public Resources – Industrial Land Allotment – Systemic Flaws in UPSIDC Process - The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a 125-acre industrial land allotment to Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) due to payment defaults, as confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 2017. The Court criticized UPSIDC for systemic flaws in allotting the land in 2003 within two months without competitive bidding, violating the Public Trust Doctrine. This doctrine mandates transparent, fair, and publicly beneficial allocation of state resources, requiring consideration of economic benefits, environmental sustainability, and regional development. The Court noted that UPSIDC's non-transparent process deprived the public exchequer of revenue and undermined the State's fiduciary duty to citizens. It directed Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC to ensure future allotments are transparent, non-discriminatory, and aligned with public interest, industrial development, and environmental goals, with the subject land to be re-allotted strictly per these principles. (Paras 29 - 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Article 226 - Cancellation of Land Allotment – Validity of Legal Notice - The Supreme Court dismissed the Trust's appeal, affirming that UPSIDC's cancellation of the allotment complied with procedural requirements under Clause 3.04(vii) of the UPSIDC Manual. The appellant argued that only the notice dated 13.11.2006 qualified as a "legal notice," claiming three consecutive notices were required. However, the Court held that prior communications dated 14.12.2004 and 14.12.2005 also met the criteria for valid legal notices, as they clearly outlined the default, breach, intent to take legal action, and consequences, despite not being explicitly labeled as such. A valid legal notice requires clear facts, notice of breach, intent to hold the recipient liable, and compliance with statutory provisions, without suppressing material information. No prejudice was caused to the appellant, and the High Court's decision was upheld. (Paras 22 - 24) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Article 226 - In academic matters, the Courts are generally reluctant to interfere, inasmuch as they do not possess the requisite expertise for the same. However, when the academicians themselves act in a manner that adversely affects the career aspirations of lakhs of students, the Court is left with no alternative but to interfere. (Para 8) Siddhi Sandeep Ladda v. Consortium of National Law Universities, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 584 : 2025 INSC 714
Article 226 - Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565
Article 226 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Property Rights - Unlawful Occupation - Held, Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is discretionary and can be exercised in exceptional cases to address prolonged injustice, despite the availability of alternative remedies. The High Court erred in dismissing a writ petition seeking recovery of flats unlawfully occupied by the Maharashtra Police Department since 1940, without rent payment since 2008, by citing the availability of a civil suit. The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction due to alternative remedies is a rule of discretion, not compulsion. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, criticizing its failure to consider the 84-year unlawful occupation, likely initiated by forcible taking during British rule in the 1940s. The Court directed the Deputy Commissioner of Police to file an affidavit undertaking to vacate the flats within four months and hand over possession to the appellants. Appeal allowed; Maharashtra Police Department ordered to vacate the flats within four months. Neha Chandrakant Shroff v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 430 : 2025 INSC 484
Article 226 - CBI Investigation - High Courts should not order CBI investigation in a routine manner or on basis of vague allegations. Mere bald allegations against the incompetence of the local police to investigate the case without any kind of substantiation would not justify the transfer of the investigation to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Court set aside the High Court's decision which had transferred the investigation from local police to CBI based on bald allegations of the complainant that the local police was incompetent to investigate the case. The High Courts should direct for CBI investigation only in cases where material prima facie discloses something calling for an investigation by CBI. The “ifs” and “buts” without any definite conclusion are not sufficient to put an agency like CBI into motion. (Para 8 & 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - CBI Investigation - In the present, an FIR was registered against the appellant for impersonating an IB officer and extorting ₹1.49 crore from the complainant, respondent no. 3. The complainant sought a transfer of investigation to the CBI, alleging collusion between the appellant and the police. The High Court allowed this transfer. Setting aside the High Court's decision, the Court noted the High Court's decision to transfer investigation to CBI was based on vague allegations (appellant's acquaintance with police) without substantiated evidence. The Court found that the investigation into the case was underway by the Special Investigation Team (SIT) under the Assistant Commissioner of Police (ACP), and there was no evidence suggested by the complainant that the local police were incapable or biased. After going through the records of the case, held, that the present case is not the one where CBI investigation ought to have been directed by the High Court. Resultantly, the appeal was allowed. (Para 2 - 9) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - Contempt of Court - CBI Investigation - Breach of Stay Order - CBI registered FIR despite Supreme Court's interim stay - Contempt petition filed - CBI officer offered unconditional apology, citing mistake - Remedial steps taken - Apology accepted, contempt petition disposed. (Para 12) Vinay Aggarwal v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 417 : 2025 INSC 433 : (2025) 5 SCC 149
Article 226 - Suo motu powers - It is not only the duty of the writ courts in the country to enforce Fundamental Rights of individuals, who approach them, but it is equally the duty of the writ courts to guard against breach of Fundamental Rights of others by the three organs of the State. Writ Courts have the authority to exercise suo motu powers to strike down subordinate legislation if it violates fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution, rendering it void and unconstitutional. Constitutional Courts possess inherent powers to strike down patently unconstitutional subordinate legislation in exceptional cases, even without a formal challenge, provided the State is heard. (Para 33) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Article 226 - The responsibility, of fixing qualifications for purposes of appointment, promotion etc. of staff or qualifications for admissions, is that of expert bodies (in the present case, the AICTE), and so long as qualifications prescribed are not shown to be arbitrary or perverse, the Courts will not interfere. In other words, normally, courts should not interfere with the decisions taken by expert statutory bodies regarding academic matter: may it relate to qualification for admission of students or qualification required by teachers for appointment, salary, promotion, entitlement to a higher pay scale etc. However, this does not mean that Courts are deprived of their powers of judicial review. It only means that courts must be slow in interfering with the opinion of experts in regard to academic standards and powers of judicial review should only be exercised in cases where prescribed qualification or condition is against the law, arbitrary or involves interpretation of any principle of law. Consequently, where a candidate does not possess the minimum qualifications, prescribed by an expert body, for appointment or promotion to a particular post in an educational institution, such a candidate will not be entitled to get appointed or will be deprived of certain benefits. (Para 25) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605
Article 226 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 (Equivalent to Section 528 BNSS) - The High Court wrongly concluded the poem disturbed social harmony without evidence, relying solely on its “tenor” and social media responses. No absolute bar exists against quashing an FIR at a nascent stage if no offence is prima facie made out. The High Court failed to prevent an abuse of process. (Para 35 & 37) Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 362 : 2025 INSC 410
Article 226 - Judicial Review - Administrative Decisions - Courts should be cautious in interfering with the administrative decisions of the Governing Board, particularly when such decisions are in furtherance of implementing a statutorily approved Master Plan. (Para 16) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638
Article 226 - Writ Petition - Suppression of Material Facts - Abuse of Process - Doctrine of Clean Hands – Costs - A litigant who suppresses material facts in a writ petition disqualifies themselves from obtaining relief. The doctrine of "clean hands" mandates full disclosure of relevant facts to the court. Repeatedly filing petitions with substantially similar reliefs, without disclosing the dismissal of earlier petitions, constitutes an abuse of the process of law. Litigants who abuse the process of law by filing frivolous petitions may be burdened with costs. (Para 9, 11 & 19) Auroville Foundation v. Natasha Storey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 313 : 2025 INSC 348 : AIR 2025 SC 1638
Article 226 - Conflicting Supreme Court Judgments - When two Supreme Court decisions appear inconsistent, High Courts must not prefer one over the other but should attempt to reconcile both, following the decision most aligned with the facts of the case at hand. (Para 35) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274
Article 226 - Mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not deprive a High Court of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant appropriate relief. If the State disputes facts solely to create grounds for rejecting a writ petition, the High Court must reject such contentions and investigate the disputed facts when required in the interest of justice. The Court clarified that issues like possession, as in this case involving the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, may constitute a mixed question of law and fact, not purely a factual dispute. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, which had overturned a Single Judge's ruling, and restored the Single Judge's judgment, emphasizing that Article 226 remains effective even in cases involving disputed facts if the State's objections are merely tactical. (Para 48) A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. Tahsildar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2025 INSC 274
Article 226 - While exercising judicial review of administrative action in the context of Statutes, laws, rules or policies establishing statutory or administrative bodies to implement the provisions of the Act or its policy, the first duty of constitutional courts is to ensure that these bodies are in a position to effectively and efficiently perform their obligations. (Para 22) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269
Article 226 - The power of judicial review in matters concerning implementation of policy objectives should transcend the standard power of judicial review to issue writs to perform statutory duty and proceed to examine whether the duty bearers, the authorities and bodies constituted properly and also whether they are functioning effectively and efficiently. By ensuring institutional integrity we achieve our institutional objectives. Further, effective and efficient performance of the institutes can reduce unnecessary litigation. (Para 23) Lifecare Innovations v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2025 INSC 269
Article 226 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interference with IBC Proceedings via Writ Jurisdiction – Whether the High Court, under Article 226, can halt insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor at the preliminary stage by determining waiver of liability, bypassing the statutory mechanism under the IBC. Held, the appointment of a Resolution Professional under Section 97 of the IBC to examine and report on the debt (under Section 99) is a mandatory preliminary step. The Adjudicating Authority is not required to ascertain the existence of debt before this stage. The High Court's exercise of writ jurisdiction was erroneous as it: (i) disrupted the statutory process under the IBC, and (ii) prematurely adjudicated the existence of debt, a mixed question of law and fact within the Adjudicating Authority's jurisdiction under Section 100 of the IBC. While High Courts possess judicial review powers, they should not act as the decision-making authority in place of statutory tribunals tasked with adjudicating specific legal and factual issues. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order, which had barred insolvency proceedings against a personal guarantor by holding that the guarantor's liability was waived, as it interfered with the IBC's statutory framework. The appellant's application before the Adjudicating Authority was restored, with directions for expeditious disposal, considering the matter's pendency since 2021. [Para 9, 11, 12] Bank of Baroda v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 234 : 2025 INSC 253 : AIR 2025 SC 1591
Article 226 - Contempt Proceedings - Mediation - Validity of High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without mutual consent - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order referring a contempt matter to mediation without the consent of both parties. Mediation is a consensual process and cannot be thrust upon unwilling parties, particularly in contempt proceedings where compliance with judicial orders is at stake. The Court criticized the High Court's approach of referring the matter to mediation based solely on the State's willingness to offer alternative land, despite opposition from the appellant. The Supreme Court directed the State to comply with the High Court's earlier judgment dated 10th February 2020, failing which the Chief Secretary was ordered to appear before the Court. High Court's mediation order set aside; State directed to comply with High Court's judgment. (Para 9, 10, 12) Rupa and Co. v. Firhad Hakim, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 233 : 2025 INSC 245
Article 226 - Blacklisting of Contractors - An authority's power to blacklist a contractor must be exercised judiciously, based on substantial grounds, not mere allegations of contractual breach. A show cause notice for blacklisting must comply with judicial principles, ensuring careful evaluation of facts and the nature of the alleged violation. Blacklisting, being a severe measure that can ruin a contractor's livelihood, requires significant deviation or aberrant conduct, as held in Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of W.B., (1975) 1 SCC 70. Issuing a show cause notice without sufficient grounds is a hollow formality, leading to avoidable litigation. Relying on Kulja Industries Limited v. Chief General Manager, Western Telecom Project BSNL & Ors., AIR 2014 SC 9, the Court identified three grounds for blacklisting: habitual failure to supply equipment on time, unsatisfactory performance of supplied equipment, or unjustified failure to honor a bid. In this case, the appellant faced a show cause notice for blacklisting and forfeiture of EMD due to delays in printing books caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Supreme Court quashed the blacklisting portion of the notice as unjustified, while upholding other parts. The Court criticized authorities for issuing show cause notices with predetermined intent to blacklist, burdening High Courts with unnecessary litigation. Authorities must apply judicial principles at the notice stage to prevent such outcomes. (Para 30, 32) Techno Prints v. Chhattisgarh Textbook Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 217 : 2025 INSC 236
Article 226 - High Court Remand Order—Scope of Appellate Review - An appellate court (Division Bench) cannot remand a matter as a matter of routine where it has already affirmed procedural validity and exhaustively evaluated merits based on evidence. Remand must not be an "empty formality"; appellate courts should dispose of appeals on merits to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. Judicial review under Article 226 targets the decision-making process, not substitution of views on merits. Held: The Division Bench's remand to the Single Judge for merits reconsideration (while upholding procedure) was legally flawed and untenable, as the dissolution's substantive validity was conclusively determined. Remand set aside; matter finally resolved in favor of dissolution. Appeal Dismissed. State Government's dissolution order upheld; High Court's remand quashed. No costs. [Relied on: Nadekerappa since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. v. Pillamma since Deceased by LRs. And Ors. (2022 SCC OnLine SC 387); Gohil Vishvaraj Hanubhai and Ors v. State of Gujarat and Ors.; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham (1997 SCC OnLine SC 135)]. CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211
Article 226 - Goa (Prohibition of Further Payments and Recovery of Rebate Benefits) Act, 2002 - Promissory Estoppel - Public Interest - Electricity Tariff Rebates - Recovery of Incentives - Public Exchequer - Whether the Goa Government's withdrawal of electricity tariff rebates under the 1991 Notification and recovery of rebates erroneously granted under the 1996 amendments, as mandated by the 2002 Act, violates promissory estoppel. Held: The Supreme Court upheld the Goa Government's authority to withdraw electricity tariff rebates in the public interest, particularly when such incentives strain public finances. The doctrine of promissory estoppel does not apply rigidly when government promises conflict with public interest, as safeguarding the public exchequer prevails over private commercial interests. The Court affirmed the High Court's ruling that demand notices for recovery of rebates were valid, relying on Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. v. State of Goa, (2010) 6 SCC 499, which upheld the constitutionality of the 2002 Act. The 1996 amending notifications, which purported to extend rebate benefits, were declared void ab initio by the Bombay High Court in 2001, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court. Citing Pawan Alloys & Casting (P) Ltd. v. UP SEB, (1997) 7 SCC 251, the Court reiterated that public interest overrides strict enforcement of promissory estoppel in cases involving withdrawal of incentives. The appeal by the industrial units was dismissed, as they were not entitled to rebates post the rescission of the 1991 Notification on 31 March 1995, despite applying for power supply prior to its withdrawal. (Para 28) Puja Ferro Alloys v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2025 INSC 217
Article 226 - High Courts, under Article 226, exercise discretionary powers and may refrain from interfering in cases of procedural violations if it serves substantial justice. The Court set aside a High Court judgment that invalidated a 2007 bank auction sale due to a procedural lapse (non-issuance of 15-day notice), emphasizing that such technicalities should not override equitable considerations when the auction had attained finality. The appellant, an auction purchaser, faced frivolous litigation initiated by the guarantor in 2008, despite the sale certificate being issued and significant investment (approx. Rs. 1.5 Crore) made in the property. The High Courts should adopt a practical approach, considering the factual context and equities, rather than acting as a court of appeal. Appeal allowed; High Court's order set aside; no costs imposed on the respondent. [Para 5, 8, 10] M.S. Sanjay v. Indian Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 193 : 2025 INSC 177
Article 226 - Habeas Corpus - Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159 : (2025) 4 SCC 342
Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111
Article 226 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : 2025 INSC 91 : (2025) 4 SCC 1
Article 226 - Judicial Review - Disciplinary Proceedings - Bank Officials - Adequacy of the evidence adduced during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction. (Para 16) General Manager Personnel Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601
Article 226 - Writ Jurisdiction - Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63
Article 226 - Delay and laches are valid grounds for dismissing a writ petition, especially when the petitioner has an alternative remedy and fails to act within a reasonable time. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183
Article 226 - Interpretation of Statutes - A statutory provision must be interpreted harmoniously to avoid rendering any part of the statute nugatory. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Century Textiles and Industries Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 34 : 2025 INSC 36 : AIR 2025 SC 731 : (2025) 3 SCC 183
Article 226 - Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2025 INSC 9 : AIR 2025 SC 1083 : (2025) 3 SCC 266
Article 226 - Delay and Laches - Natural Justice in CIRP - The Court emphasized that the respondent's delay of nearly three years in approaching the High Court, despite being aware of the proceedings, was fatal to their case. The initiation of parallel proceedings under the IBC further undermined the justification for invoking writ jurisdiction. The High Court had set aside the resolution plan on the ground of violation of natural justice due to inadequate notice (less than 24 hours) for a Committee of Creditors (CoC) meeting. The Supreme Court, however, found that the delay in approaching the High Court and the availability of alternative remedies under the IBC rendered the writ petition untenable. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 226 - Finality of CIRP Proceedings - The Supreme Court reiterated the importance of timely conclusion of CIRP proceedings, as delays undermine the objectives of the IBC. The Court set aside the High Court's order and directed the Adjudicating Authority to resume the proceedings from the stage they were interdicted and conclude them expeditiously. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the High Court's judgment, and restored the resolution plan approved by the CoC. The Adjudicating Authority was directed to expedite the completion of the CIRP proceedings. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 226 - Jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 in Insolvency Matters - Held, the High Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to interfere with Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) proceedings under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC), 2016, especially when statutory remedies are available. The IBC is a complete code with its own checks, balances, and appellate mechanisms. Mohammed Enterprises v. Farooq Ali Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 19 : 2025 INSC 25 : AIR 2025 SC 1079
Article 227 - Judicial restraint in arbitration matters - Whether the High Court was justified in granting an additional opportunity to cross-examine the witness, despite the Arbitral Tribunal's refusal to do so. During the arbitration, the respondent sought multiple extensions to cross-examine the witness, which the Arbitral Tribunal eventually denied, citing lack of preparedness and excessive delay. The respondent challenged the Tribunal's decision before the High Court which granted an additional opportunity for cross-examination, citing "exceptional circumstances." Held, the Arbitral Tribunal had provided sufficient opportunity for cross-examination, with the respondent having already cross-examined RW-1 for over 12 hours across multiple sessions. The High Court's interference was unjustified, as it failed to demonstrate any perversity in the Tribunal's order, which is a prerequisite for judicial intervention under Article 227. The Tribunal's decision to deny further cross-examination was upheld, and the arbitration process was directed to proceed without further delay. Serosoft Solutions v. Dexter Capital Advisors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 14 : 2025 INSC 26 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 376