Alimony & Property Settlement – Held, alimony received after first divorce was not a relevant factor to determine the alimony payable after the divorce of the second marriage - The respondent's claim for Rs. 12 crores in permanent alimony and encumbrance-free ownership of the apartment as unjustified, considering that appellant-husband is an unemployed person and has responsibility...
Alimony & Property Settlement – Held, alimony received after first divorce was not a relevant factor to determine the alimony payable after the divorce of the second marriage - The respondent's claim for Rs. 12 crores in permanent alimony and encumbrance-free ownership of the apartment as unjustified, considering that appellant-husband is an unemployed person and has responsibility of an autistic child - Appeal allowed. [Para 17, 20] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926
Article 21 - Judicial Language - Condemnation of Misogynistic Terms - Gender Bias Addressed - The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's use of terms such as “illegitimate wife” and “faithful mistress” to describe a woman in a void marriage, holding that such language is misogynistic and violates the right to dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court noted a gender disparity, as similar derogatory terms were not applied to men in void marriages, highlighting judicial gender bias. The ruling aligns with the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes, which prescribes gender-just terminology for legal pleadings, orders, and judgments. The use of such misogynistic terms in judicial pronouncements was deemed unconstitutional and contrary to the constitutional ethos of dignity. (Para 24) Sukhdev Singh v. Sukhbir Kaur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2025 INSC 197
Child Custody - A father appealed a High Court decision dismissing his habeas corpus petition for custody of his child, who resided with him for nearly 10 years until the mother's death, after which the child was placed with maternal grandparents. The High Court denied custody, citing the child's comfort with the grandparents and the father's remarriage. Whether maternal grandparents have a superior claim to custody over the father, the natural guardian. Held: The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's decision, holding that the father, as the natural guardian, has a superior claim to custody over the grandparents. No allegations of matrimonial disputes, abuse, or factors disqualifying the father's legal rights or intent to seek custody were raised. The child's welfare was best served by granting custody to the father, an educated and employed natural guardian, with whom the child lived for 10 years. The High Court erred in overlooking this relationship. Grandparents cannot claim superior custody rights absent disqualifying factors against the natural guardian. Custody was granted to the father, with visitation rights allowed for the maternal grandparents. (Para 10) Vivek Kumar Chaturvedi v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2025 INSC 159 : (2025) 4 SCC 342
Child Custody - Best Interests of the Child - Mental Capacity - Expert Opinion - When there is uncertainty about the child's ability to make independent decisions, expert opinions confirming a disability should be prioritized over inferences drawn from direct interactions with the child. The Court emphasized the importance of relying on expert medical assessments to determine the capacity of individuals with disabilities to make independent decisions. When a specialist's expert opinion confirms a child's inability to make independent decisions, custody decisions should not be based on the child's implied or express consent, as it could have significant consequences for the child. (Para 22) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - Cognitive Capacity - Courts should give due credence to expert opinions on a person's mental capacity, especially when dealing with individuals with cognitive limitations. In child custody matters, the best interests and welfare of the child are paramount, even when considering the wishes of a child with limited capacity. The totality of circumstances must be considered when determining the best interests of the child, including their education, support system, emotional well-being, and familial relationships. (Para 32) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - Foreign Orders - Principle of comity of courts and a pre-existing order of a Foreign Court must yield to the best interests of the child, especially when the Court has decided to conduct an elaborate enquiry in this regard. Such cases must be decided on the sole and predominant criterion of 'what would serve the interests and welfare' of the minor. The preexisting order of a Foreign Court is merely one of the circumstances to consider when assessing the best interests and welfare of the person concerned. This doctrine was evolved to protect children who may, unwittingly, become collateral damage in their parents' legal disputes. It has gained significance over the past several years, owing to the frequency and ease of migration. (Para 31) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - International Parental Child Abduction - The Appellant (mother) and Respondent No. 4 (father) are US citizens, divorced in the US. Their elder son has mild intellectual developmental disorder and cerebral palsy, resulting in significant cognitive limitations. After the divorce, the father brought the child to India. The mother filed a petition in the High Court alleging illegal detention. The High Court, after a brief interaction with the child, ruled that he was consensually living with his father in India. The Supreme Court, doubting the child's capacity to make independent decisions, ordered a medical assessment at NIMHANS, Bengaluru. The assessment concluded that the child's cognitive abilities were equivalent to an 8–10-year-old, and he lacked the capacity to make complex decisions. Whether the child has the capacity to make independent decisions regarding his place of residence. What course of action would best serve the child's interests and welfare. Held, the Supreme Court relied on the expert opinions from NIMHANS and a previous evaluation by the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, concluding that the child does not possess the capacity to make independent, informed decisions on complex matters like long-term residence. The High Court erred in relying solely 2 on a brief interaction with the child. Applying the doctrine of parens patriae, the Supreme Court determined that the child's best interests lie in returning to the US. This decision considered the child's established life, education, support system, and close relationship with his younger brother, who also has special needs, in the US. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court judgment, and ordered the repatriation of the child to the US under the sole custody of the mother. The father was directed not to impede their return and to maintain contact with his sons. The US Consulate General, Chennai was directed to return the child's passport and facilitate his return. (Para 41) Sharmila Velamur v. V. Sanjay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2025 INSC 299
Child Custody - Welfare of child – Issue - Permanent Child custody - Respondent became aware of Petitioner's remarriage and her intention to relocate the child to Malaysia and also the child's religion had been changed from Hindu to Christian, respondent filed for permanent custody of child - Trial Court granted permanent custody to the mother and extended visitation rights to father - High Court reversed Trial Court order and granted permanent custody to father-respondent citing that relocation to Malaysia would not be in the child's best interest - Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, confirming custody with the father - Petitioner filed review petitions on ground that the new of the child's imminent separation from his mother caused immense negative impact on his health – Held - that Clinical Psychologist's Report was filed revealing the minor child was exhibiting anxiety and fears, with a high risk for separation anxiety disorder - Report recommended avoiding separation from his current family and conducting regular psychotherapy session – Held - that child's deteriorating mental health and the psychological assessment reports constituted new evidence, which was a post-decision development and not known at the time of appeal - child's custody is paramount in custody matters and changing permanent custody would disrupt child's stable environment - child has been with mother since he was 11 months and is comfortable with his step-father and sibling, and now, sending him with father who is akin to a stranger in an alien household would be harsh and insensitive - Stability and security of child is an essential ingredient for full development of child's talent and personality - Court restored permanent custody to Petitioner-mother with virtual and in-person visitation rights. Review petition allowed. [Paras 25-30, 34] N v. R, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 714 : 2025 INSC 853
Cruelty and Dowry Harassment - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Allegations Lacking Specificity and Evidence - Family Court Findings Relevant – The Supreme Court quashed criminal proceedings initiated under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, against a husband, father-in-law, and mother-in-law. The Court found that the allegations made by the complainant were general, lacked specificity, and were devoid of substantive evidence. Notably, the Family Court had already granted a divorce to the husband on grounds of cruelty by the complainant, finding her allegations of dowry demand and harassment to be baseless and false. The Supreme Court emphasized that criminal law should not be used as a tool for harassment or vendetta, and that criminal proceedings cannot continue in the absence of sufficient evidence to prima facie establish the commission of an offense. The continuation of such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. (Para 13 – 15) P.V. Krishnabhat v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 149
Divorce by Mutual Consent - Mediation - Property Settlement - Stamp Duty Exemption - Where parties in a transfer petition for divorce, referred to mediation, reached a mutual agreement to dissolve their marriage and settle their property dispute, the Supreme Court, exercising its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, directed the dissolution of the marriage by mutual consent. The Court further directed the transfer of absolute ownership of a jointly owned flat to the wife, waiving stamp duty on registration, relying on Section 17(2)(vi) of the Registration Act, 1908, which exempts registration fees for decrees or orders of the Court, except compromises involving immovable property outside the subject matter of the proceedings. As the flat was the subject of the compromise within the proceedings, the exemption applied. The Court also directed the Sub-Registrar to register the flat in the wife's name without any encumbrances, and the wife waived her right to alimony. (Para 6 & 7) Arun Rameshchand Arya v. Parul Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 305
Family Courts Act, 1984 - Legitimacy - Jurisdiction of Civil and Family Courts - Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy. The Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the original suit regarding legitimacy, as the Family Court's exclusive jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984, applies only to matters involving marital relationships. Since the case involved an alleged extra-marital relationship, the Civil Court was the appropriate forum. The Family Court's jurisdiction is limited to matters involving marital relationships, and it cannot entertain claims based on alleged extra-marital relationships. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118
Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Section 12(c) - Adoption and Property Rights - Doctrine of Relation Back - The appellant was adopted by defendant No.1, on 16.07.1994, after the death of her husband. The appellant claimed a half share in the suit schedule properties, arguing that he became the legal heir upon adoption. Held, under Section 12(c) of the Act an adopted child cannot divest any person of any estate that vested before the adoption. The court applied the "Doctrine of Relation Back," which states that adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property. However, lawful alienations made by the widow before the adoption are binding on the adopted child. The court upheld the validity of the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.2 and 3, as the alienation was made after defendant No.1 had become the absolute owner of the property. The appellant's challenge to the sale deed was dismissed. The court declared the gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favor of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void. The court found that the gift deed lacked the necessary prerequisites for a valid gift, such as delivery and acceptance of the property. The trial court's decision to grant the appellant the entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 was restored. Sri Mahesh v. Sangram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 6
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Section 6(a) - Custody of Minor Child - Welfare of Child - Supreme Court while upholding the High Court's order placing the minor son, who is above five years of age, in the custody of his father, rejected the mother's appeal, noting that the custody issue had not been finally closed and the mother could pursue her remedies under relevant statutes - Noted that the child is a male child and is now aged above five years - Noted that the child was not willing to part company with his father - The fact that both parents are working and cannot always be physically with their children should not be a ground to place custody with one who may be temporarily working from home - It is a matter of common knowledge that married couples work to secure better education and future for their ward - Rejected the notion that a parent working from home provides better care than one who visits the office - The distance from home to school as "not a relevant consideration" particularly when both parties reside in the National Capital Region and the child is travelling for "better education."- Travel time being a few minutes less or more "hardly matters" - Noted that the child continues to be a student at the same school (Heritage School), and his education is not disturbed - The father has elder family members at home, including grandfather, who are giving company to the child - Considering the overall welfare, the male child being above five years old and continuing in the same school with no desire to part from his father, Supreme Court did not find a reason to interfere with the High Court's order. [Paras 7 - 14] Poonam Wadhwa v. Ajay Wadhwa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1165
Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956; Section 8(2) and (3) - Voidable transaction - Repudiation by Minor – Held, disposal of immovable property by a natural guardian in contravention of sub-Section (1) or sub-Section (2) of Section 8 (i.e., without the previous permission of the court) is voidable at the instance of the minor or any person claiming under him - It is not mandatory for a minor, upon attaining majority, to file a suit for the cancellation of a sale deed executed by their natural guardian in contravention of Section 8(2) of the Act - A voidable transaction executed by the guardian of the minor can be repudiated and ignored by the minor within the prescribed time on attaining majority either by instituting a suit for setting aside the voidable transaction or by repudiating the same by his unequivocal conduct - Avoidance or repudiation by conduct is permissible because - i. The minor may not be aware of the transaction and thus not in a position to institute a suit; ii. The transaction may not have been given effect to, and the party acquiring the right may not have possession, giving the impression that the property is intact in the minor's hands, making a suit seem unnecessary - Transferring the property himself on attaining majority within the prescribed time period is an example of an implied repudiation by conduct - Noted that such an act is sufficient to repudiate the earlier sale deed executed by the father/guardian - The effect of avoidance is that the voidable transaction becomes void from its very inception, and the avoidance relates back to the date of the transaction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Madhegowda vs Ankegowda (2002) 1 SCC 178; G. Annamalai Pillai vs District Revenue Officer and Ors. (1993) 2 SCC 402; Paras 11-14, 22, 32, 34] K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 981 : 2025 INSC 1195
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 2(2) - Applicability to Scheduled Tribes (ST) - Customary Law - Justice, Equity and Good conscience - Article 14, 15, 38, 46 of the Constitution of India – Issue - Whether a tribal woman or her legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in her ancestral property - Trial Court and High Court dismissed the suit filed by appellant (heirs of a tribal woman) citing that mother had no right in her father's property as members of Scheduled Tribe are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as per section 2(2) and nothing proved by custom - This Court Held - Exclusion of female from inheritance is unreasonable and discriminatory - that Hindu Succession Act is not applicable to the Scheduled Tribes, it does not mean that tribal women are automatically excluded from inheritance - it needs to be seen by Court whether there exists any prevailing custom restricting the female tribal right to share in the ancestral property - In this case parties could not establish the existence of any custom which excluded women from inheritance - Customs are too like the law, cannot remain stuck in time and others cannot be allowed to take refuge in customs or hide behind them to deprive others - Held in absence of any specific tribal custom or codified law prohibiting women's right, courts must apply “justice, equity and good conscience” - Where there is no custom prohibiting succession to women, still denying them succession is in violation of Article 14, 15 read with Articles 38 and 46, ensuring that there is no discrimination against women. Held legal heirs of tribal woman entitled to share in the property, set aside order of High Court. Appeal allowed. [Relied on Western U.P. Electric Power and Supply Co. ltd. v. State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCC 817; Para 13, 19, 20, 21] Ram Charan v. Sukhram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 717 : 2025 INSC 865
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 2 (2) – Applicability to Scheduled Tribes – Held, HSA does not apply to members of STs - Section 2(2) of the HSA, 1956 explicitly states that nothing contained in the Act shall apply to the members of any Scheduled Tribe within the meaning of clause (25) of Article 366 of the Constitution, unless the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, otherwise directs - The words of the section are explicit, and the HSA, 1956, cannot apply to Scheduled Tribes - Supreme Court set aside High Court's order directing that daughters in tribal areas in the state of H.P. shall inherit property in accordance with HSA and not as per customs and usages - High Court's directions were beyond the scope of the appeal, as the issue was neither directly nor substantially involved in the intra-party appeal, and the directions were not emanating from any of the issues framed or pleas raised by the parties - Set aside order of High Court. [Relied on Tirith Kumar & Ors. vs. Daduram & Ors., (2024) SCC OnLine SC 3810; Paras 4-6] Nawang v. Bahadur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1025
Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Section 29, 8 - Locus standi of State - Validity of will - Rajasthan Escheats Regulation Act, 1956 - Probate of will – Held, State cannot invoke Doctrine of Escheat to challenge a will which is granted probate - Government is a stranger to the property when a Hindu hireless male dies with a will - The state's locus standi to assail the probate grant was negated by the Court, as the case involved testamentary succession, not intestate succession attracting Section 29 of HAS - The Court emphasized the doctrine of escheat under section 29 applies only when an intestate leaves no heir qualified under the HAS - It has to be ascertained as to whether there are any Class1 or Class 2 heirs, agnates or cognates - Only on the failure of any qualified heir being present to succeed to the properties, under the HAS Act, Section 29 of the said Act would apply as it would be a case of failure of heirs - Since probate was granted by the High Court, the legatees under the will, had the right to succeed - Held that it is only in the event of intestate succession. Section 29 of the HAS Act applying that there would be a devolution of the estate of a deceased male Hindu on the government and not otherwise - Supreme Court imposed Rs. 1 lakh each on Petitioners for suppression and clarified that only heirs or persons entitled to succeed could seek revocation under Section 263 of Indian Succession Act, if probate was wrongfully granted. Appeal dismissed. [Paras 5 - 6] State of Rajasthan v. Ajit Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 906
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - Civil Procedure Code, 1908- Section 114, Order 47 Rule 1 - Preliminary Decree - Review Jurisdiction - Scope of Review – Held, review proceedings are not an appeal in disguise and are limited to correcting apparent errors of fact or law, not for rehearing or substituting a view - An error apparent on the face of the record is a patent error, not one that requires a 'long-drawn process of reasoning' to establish - Courts ought not to mix-up or overlap one jurisdiction with another jurisdiction - High Court's review order exceeded its jurisdiction- the review order recorded fresh findings on facts and overturned the earlier findings of the fact of the High Court - High Court had exercised or exceeded its jurisdiction by overturning the earlier findings of fact - Set aside High Court's order denying daughter her coparcenary right - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13-18] Malleeswari v. K. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 876 : 2025 INSC 1080
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - Eviction Authority of Tribunal - Self-Acquired Property - A 75-year-old appellant sought eviction of his son and daughter-in-law (Respondents 8 and 9) from his selfacquired property, used as a rest house, alleging encroachment, harassment, and threats of false criminal cases - Maintenance Tribunal ordered eviction; Single Judge upheld, but Division Bench set aside, suggesting rent determination - Held, Tribunal has authority under the Act to order eviction to ensure senior citizens' maintenance and protection, as affirmed by S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner and Rule 21 (2) (i) of the Bihar Senior Citizens Rules, 2012 - Property was self-acquired, not ancestral - Respondents' worsening behavior justified eviction - The appeal was allowed, and the Division Bench's order was set aside. The Tribunal's eviction order was restored. (Para 10 – 12) Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 418
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - Section 22-24 – Held, the Tribunal under the 2007 Act, has the power to order the eviction of a child from the property of the senior citizen, if there is a breach of obligation to maintain senior citizen - The High Court erred in allowing the appeal on the ground that the respondent was also a senior citizen as per Section 2(h) of the 2007 Act because at the time of filing the application before the Tribunal, the respondent was not yet a senior citizen (Respondent's age was 59 years at that time) - The relevant date is the date of filing of the application - 2007 Act being a welfare legislation should be construed liberally to advance its beneficent purpose of protecting senior citizens - It is well settled that the Tribunal can order eviction of a child or relative from the property of the senior citizen where there is a breach of obligation to maintain the senior citizen - The respondent, despite being financially sound, did not allow the appellant to reside in his properties, thereby frustrating the object of the Act - High Court's decision was untenable and erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Paras 6, 7] Kamalakant Mishra v. Additional Collector, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 947
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - Section 23 - Requirements - Scope and interpretation of - Beneficial Legislation - Breakdown of Relations - Senior Citizens' Rights - Conditions in property transfers involving senior citizens - Tribunal's Power - Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal's order granting relief under Section 23 - Held, the Act is a welfare-oriented statute aimed at protecting the rights of senior citizens. It must be interpreted liberally to further its objectives. For a property transfer to be void under Section 23, it must be shown that the transfer was conditional upon the transferee maintaining the transferor and that the transferee failed to fulfill these conditions. The Court noted the appellant's allegations of neglect and abuse by the respondent, holding that such behavior violated the conditions implied in the Gift Deed and related promissory note. The Court reaffirmed the Tribunal's authority under the Act to cancel property transfers and order possession transfer if necessary to protect senior citizens. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench judgment of the High Court, and the respondent was directed to restore possession of the property to the appellant. It restored the orders of the Single Judge and the Tribunal, quashing the Gift Deed executed by the appellant in favor of the respondent. The judgment reinforced the Act's purpose of providing senior citizens with simple, expedient remedies against neglect or abuse. Tribunal Powers. Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 3 : (2025) 2 SCC 787
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (2007 Act) - The Act does not mandate automatic eviction of children from parents' homes. Eviction orders are not obligatory in every case under the Act. The primary objective is to ensure maintenance and welfare of senior citizens, with eviction permissible only in exceptional circumstances to safeguard their well-being. The Tribunal must exercise discretion judiciously, ordering eviction only when necessary. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside an eviction order in a case where an elderly mother sought to evict her son from their ancestral home, citing insufficient grounds for eviction and pending civil disputes over property shares. The Court expressed concern over declining family unity and the increasing prevalence of disputes between elderly parents and their children. [Referred: S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730; Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, (2025) 2 SCC 787; Paras 32 & 33] Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2025 INSC 404
Matrimonial Disputes - Malafide Complaints - Quashing of FIR - High Court's Duty under Section 482 CrPC - Vague Allegations - The Supreme Court quashed proceedings under Sections 498A and 411 IPC against the father-in-law and mother-in-law, while allowing continuation against the husband. Allegations raised after 14 years of marriage, filed three days after the husband initiated divorce proceedings, required scrutiny for malafide intent. Under Section 482 CrPC, High Courts must assess complaints in matrimonial disputes for ulterior motives, particularly when allegations lack specificity. Vague claims of "taunts" by in-laws over trivial matters, being part of ordinary domestic life, are insufficient to sustain criminal proceedings. Courts must exercise caution to prevent vexatious prosecution of family members in such disputes. (Paras 11 - 13) Kamal v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 440 : 2025 INSC 504
Matruka Property (Inheritance) - Held that Matruka property is the property (both movable and immovable) left by a deceased Muslim - It simply refers to property left behind by the deceased person and nothing more - The scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - The balance is distributable among heirs as per Mohammedan Law rules of intestate succession – Held, the scheme for distribution of matruka property first requires separating the part covered by a valid will (maximum one-third of the total matruka, and not in favor of an heir without other heirs' consent) - Sharers are entitled to a prescribed share of the inheritance and wife being a sharer is entitled to 1/8th the share but where there is no child or child of a son how low so ever, the share to which the wife is entitled is 1/4th. [Relied on Trinity Infraventures Ltd. v. M.S. Murthy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 738; Paras 8-15] Zoharbee v. Imam Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1014 : 2025 INSC 1245
Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 - Section 3(1)(d) - Right of divorced Muslim woman to recover properties given at the time of marriage - Purposive Construction of Act – Issue - Whether goods given to a daughter or the bridegroom at the time of marriage could be returned to the daughter after divorce under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (1986 Act) - Held that the 1986 Act must be given a purposive construction, keeping the goals of equality, dignity, and autonomy in mind, especially to secure the financial protection of a Muslim woman post-divorce, which aligns with her rights under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - Held that the High Court erred by treating the matter purely as a civil dispute and missing the 'purposive construction goalpost' - observed that Section 3(1)(d) of the 1986 Act entitles a divorced woman to receive "all the properties given to her before or at the time of marriage or after her marriage by her relatives or friends or the husband or any relatives of the husband or his friends" - This section clears the way for a woman to set up a claim against her husband, or claim back properties given, as the case may be - directed Respondent to remit the amount directly to the wife's bank account, the non-compliance of which would attract interest at 9% per annum - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Daniel Latifi v. Union of India, (2001) 7 SCC 740; Paras 7-10] Rousanara Begum v. S.K. Salahuddin @ Sk Salauddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1160 : 2025 INSC 1375
Order VII Rule 11 CPC - Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 - Partition Suit - Exception Pleaded - A partition suit seeking division of joint family property cannot be dismissed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC at the preliminary stage when the plaintiff invokes an exception to the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988. Rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) requires the suit to be manifestly barred by law without requiring evidence. However, determining whether properties are benami or joint family assets involves factual inquiries, such as the source of funds and family arrangements, necessitating a trial. When an exception to the Benami Act is pleaded, the plaint cannot be rejected at the pleading stage, as it raises disputed questions of fact requiring evidence-based adjudication. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellants' challenge to the trial court and High Court's refusal to reject the plaint, upholding the continuation of the partition suit for trial to resolve factual disputes regarding the nature of the property. Appeal dismissed; plaint upheld for trial. (Para 28) Shaifali Gupta v. Vidya Devi Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2025 INSC 739
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Extradition Order Quashed - The Trial Court's order directing extradition of the appellant (husband) residing in the USA, due to his non-appearance, was held untenable, especially given the illegal impoundment of his passport. (Para 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Issuance of bailable warrant - Proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi-criminal and do not warrant such coercive measures unless there is a violation of a protection order. Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 33
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Physical Presence in DV Act Proceedings - Proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature and do not mandate the personal presence of a party, except in cases of breach of a protection order under Section 31. (Para 18, 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 - Power of High Courts to quash complaints under Section 12(1) or orders under Sections 18 to 23 using inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) - Held, High Courts can exercise inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC (Section 528 BNSS) to quash proceedings under Section 12(1) of the DV Act, 2005, or orders under Sections 18 to 23, to prevent abuse of process or secure the ends of justice. The notion that Section 482 CrPC is inapplicable due to the predominantly civil nature of DV Act proceedings is incorrect. However, High Courts must exercise caution and restraint, intervening only in cases of patent illegality or abuse of process, given the DV Act's purpose as welfare legislation to protect women from domestic violence. A cautious approach is recommended to avoid undermining the Act's objectives. The civil nature of DV Act proceedings does not preclude the application of Section 482 CrPC. (Paras 37, 39) Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : AIR 2025 SC 2598 : 2025 INSC 734
Section 112 IEA - DNA Test and Balancing of Interests - The Court emphasized that DNA tests should not be ordered as a matter of course. The right to privacy and dignity of the parties must be balanced against the child's interest in knowing their biological father. In this case, there was no “eminent need” for a DNA test, as the presumption of legitimacy had not been rebutted, and the respondent's claim was based on unsubstantiated allegations. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Res Judicata - The dispute arose from a maintenance petition filed by the respondent claiming that the appellant was his biological father. The respondent and his mother sought to establish paternity through a DNA test, but the courts consistently upheld the presumption of legitimacy, as the respondent's mother failed to prove non-access during the relevant period. The Family Court initially closed the maintenance petition but allowed its revival if the respondent succeeded in challenging the legitimacy presumption in civil proceedings. When the civil courts upheld the presumption, the Family Court nonetheless revived the maintenance petition, leading to the present appeal. Whether the Family Court was entitled to reopen the maintenance petition. Whether the second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata. Held, the principle of res judicata bars the re-agitation of issues that have already been conclusively decided by a court of competent jurisdiction. The second round of litigation was barred by the principle of res judicata, as the issue of legitimacy had already been conclusively decided by the High Court in 2011, and the Family Court erred in reviving the maintenance petition. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the High Court's judgment and the Family Court's order reviving the maintenance petition. The proceedings in the maintenance petition were quashed, and the Court reiterated the importance of finality in litigation under the principle of res judicata. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Section 112 IEA - Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity - Whether the presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, determines paternity unless rebutted by proof of non-access. Held, legitimacy and paternity are not independent concepts. Under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act, a child born during a valid marriage is presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband unless non-access is proven. The presumption of legitimacy is conclusive and cannot be displaced by mere allegations of adultery or requests for DNA tests without strong evidence of non-access. The presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is conclusive and can only be rebutted by proving non-access. DNA tests should be ordered sparingly, considering the rights to privacy and dignity of the parties involved. Ivan Rathinam v. Milan Joseph, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2025 INSC 115 : AIR 2025 SC 1004
Section 122 IEA - Communications during marriage - Constitution of India - Article 21 - Right to privacy – Facts - Appellant-husband in a matrimonial dispute relied on recorded conversation with his wife to prove allegations of cruelty, to which respondent-wife alleged breach of her fundamental right to privacy- High Court held that permitting such recordings in evidence would be unjustified, as conversations were recorded per se cruelty by one party – Held, Section 122 is worded in two parts - “compellability” and “permissibility”- when one of the spouse is not willing to disclose communication made to the other, latter cannot be compelled by any court or authority - “permissibility” if any spouse is willing to disclose communication, then it is not court that can give consent / permission to disclosure but only other spouse can give the same - Rationale behind section 122 was to protect sanctity of marriage and not the right to privacy of the individuals involved - Right to privacy is not a relevant consideration in such disputes - A secretly recorded telephonic conversation of the spouse is admissible as evidence in matrimonial proceedings - That spousal privilege under first part of Section 122 has to be construed in light of the exception provided in same provision - Exception under Section 122 has to be construed in light of the right to a fair trial which is also an aspect of Article 21 of the Constitution - Section 122 carves out an exception to right to privacy between spouses and cannot be applied horizontally at all - Section 122 recognizes right to fair trial, right to produce relevant evidence and right to prove one's case against the spouse so as to avail relief - Court rejected argument that permitting such evidence would disturb domestic harmony in matrimonial relationships, defeating objectives of section 122 – Held, if marriage has reached a stage where spouses are actively snooping on each other, it is in itself a sign of a broken relationship and depicts lack of trust between them - that content of a common law right may be similar to that of a fundamental right, but they are distinguished by the incidence of their duties on private entities and State. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Poonan, (1969) 1 SCC 37 (Para 8, 8.8, 12)] Vibhor Garg v. Neha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 694 : 2025 INSC 829
Section 125 (4) Cr.P.C. - Interpretation of - Whether a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, is absolved of paying maintenance to his wife under Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if the wife refuses to comply with the decree and return to the matrimonial home? Held, a wife's refusal to comply with a decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically disqualify her from claiming maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The refusal must be assessed in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, including whether the wife had justifiable reasons for not returning to the matrimonial home. The Supreme Court emphasized that the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C. is to provide social justice and prevent destitution. A decree for restitution of conjugal rights does not automatically bar a wife from claiming maintenance if she has valid reasons for refusing to return to her husband. This judgment clarifies that the mere existence of a restitution decree does not override a wife's right to maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The Court must examine the facts of each case to determine whether the wife's refusal to comply with the decree is justified. The ruling reinforces the protective intent of maintenance laws in ensuring the financial security of women. Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena v. Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47 : 2025 INSC 55 : AIR 2025 SC 644 : (2025) 3 SCC 33
Section 125 Cr.P.C. – Maintenance – Whether a woman is entitled to claim maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC from her second husband while her first marriage is allegedly legally subsisting – Held, a woman is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. from her second husband, even if her first marriage was not legally dissolved. A formal decree of dissolution is not mandatory. If the woman and her first husband mutually agreed to separate, the absence of a legal divorce does not prevent her from seeking maintenance from her second husband. The right to maintenance u/s. 125 CrPC is not a benefit received by a wife but rather a legal and moral duty owed by the husband. (Para 17 & 18) N. Usha Rani v. Moodudula Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 156 : 2025 INSC 129
Section 125 Cr.P.C. - Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents- Question of enhancement of permanent alimony awarded to unmarried wife as per Standard of living wife enjoyed during the marriage – Held, appellant-wife who is unmarried and is living independently, is entitled to a level of maintenance that is reflective of the standard of living she enjoyed during marriage and which reasonably secures her future - High Court noted Respondent-husband's income, financial disclosures and past earnings establish that he is in a position to pay higher amount and enhanced the maintenance amount to Rs. 50,000/- per month, subject to a 5% increase every two years to ensure financial stability for appellant-wife - Appeal was allowed. (Paras 7 - 9) Rakhi Sadhukhan v. Raja Sadhukhan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 660 : 2025 INSC 789
Section 125 Cr.P.C. - Refusal to Grant Maintenance - The Family Court erred in relying on a compromise deed filed before a 'Court of Kazi' to hold the appellant-wife responsible for the marital dispute, as the deed contained no admission of fault by the wife. The Supreme Court also rejected the Family Court's assumption that a second marriage precludes dowry demands, deeming it speculative and legally untenable. The Supreme Court set aside the Family Court's findings and directed the husband to pay Rs. 4,000 per month as maintenance to the appellant from the date of filing the maintenance petition. [Paras 14 & 15] Shahjahan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 495 : 2025 INSC 528
Section 13(1)(ia) & (ib) - Irretrievable breakdown of marriage – Divorce - Supreme Court orders husband to pay Rs. 1.25 crores permanent alimony to his wife while dissolving marriage – Held, there is no possibility of reconciliation between parties and they have been living separately since 15 years - There is no vestige of matrimonial relationship between them and neither party has shown any inclination to resolve their differences - Mediation efforts also failed - Since the respondent-wife and child have not received any financial support from appellant-husband, Rs. 1.25 crores was directed to be paid - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5-9] X v. Y, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 813 : 2025 INSC 978
Section 13B - Settlement Agreement - Mutual Consent Divorce- Withdrawal of consent - Supreme Court acknowledged that the respondent-wife's withdrawal from the mutual consent divorce agreement at the second motion was a valid exercise of her statutory right - Held that subsequent demand of wife for a higher alimony demonstrated an intention to coerce a better settlement, and her allegations of coercion, misrepresentation, and fraud regarding the initial settlement were unsubstantiated. [Para 18] A v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 773 : 2025 INSC 926
Section 13 - Divorce – Cruelty – Desertion – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - Duty of Court: Supreme Court directed that before concluding that a marriage has broken down irretrievably, it is imperative upon the Family Court or the High Court to determine which party is responsible for breaking the marital tie and forcing the other to live separately- A finding of irretrievable breakdown is likely to have devastating effects, especially on children, unless there is cogent evidence for wilful desertion or refusal to cohabit and/or look after the other spouse- The conclusion regarding irretrievable breakdown puts the Courts under an onerous duty to deeply analyse the entire evidence, consider social circumstances, and the background of the parties- The Supreme Court found that the High Court, in granting divorce on the ground of cruelty, failed to advert to the wife's plea that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home and did not undertake the necessary exercise to determine the essential issues- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the law- Appeal allowed in part. [Paras 4-7] A v. I, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1143
Sections 140, 166, 168 MV Act - Entitlement of a married daughter and an elderly mother to compensation in a motor accident claim as dependents of the deceased. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision denying compensation for loss of dependency to the married daughter, holding that she is presumed to be financially supported by her husband or his family unless proven otherwise. The married daughter is entitled only to compensation under Section 140 as a legal representative, not as a dependent. The Court set aside the High Court's order denying compensation to the deceased's elderly mother, aged approximately 70 years, who was solely dependent on the deceased with no independent income. Recognizing the duty of a child to maintain their parent in old age, the Court awarded ₹19,22,356/- as compensation to the elderly mother, considering her dependency and potential future hardship. Appeal partly allowed. Compensation denied to the married daughter for loss of dependency but granted to the elderly mother. [Para 13 - 20] Deep Shikha v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2025 INSC 675 : AIR 2025 SC 2929
Validity of an oral gift (Hiba) - Succession rights - Limitation pertaining to declaratory suits regarding immovable property – Held, an oral gift (hiba) under the Muslim Law cannot be projected as a “surprise instrument” to stake claims over a property - To constitute, a valid Hiba, all its necessary ingredients - i. declaration by donor, ii. acceptance by donee and iii. taking possession of land - are done publicly rather than secretly - Oral gift (hiba) is permissible in Mohammedan law, the evidence of acting under the gift - such as collecting rent, holding title, or effecting mutation is essential to substantiate the claim of possession - Oral gift was not proved by contemporaneous delivery of possession - The registered sale deeds and mutations carry presumption of validity and unchallenged possession by the defendants - Lack of effecting mutation in revenue records can be a crucial factor invalidating such a claim of gift, in the absence of other evidence of possession - Set aside order - Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Mansoor Saheb v. Salima 2023 SCC OnLine SC 3809; Rasheeda Khatoon v. Ashiq Ali, (2014) 10 SCC 459; Paras 34-42, 49] Dharmrao Sharanappa Shabadi v. Syeda Arifa Parveen, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 973 : 2025 INSC 1187