Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of...
Administrative Law – Interest Liability – Delay by Government Authority: The Supreme Court upheld the TDSAT's finding that the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) could not levy interest for the period during which it "slept over the matter." - Interest is only payable from the expiry of the notice period stipulated in the show-cause notice (December 8, 2014), rather than the date of the Court's order in 2013, as the delay in issuing the demand was attributable solely to the DoT - For successful bidders in the fresh auction, the liability to pay the interim reserve price ceases on the date the Letter of Intent (LoI) is issued, as the LoI stipulates the commencement of the new 20-year term – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Centre for Public Interest Litigation and others vs. Union of India and others (2012) 3 SCC 1; Paras 14-17] Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174
Civil Law – Hereditary Pujari Rights – Suit for Possession – Effect of Withdrawing Previous Suit – The Appellants claimed hereditary pujariki (priest) rights based on a 1901 decree - noted that the Appellants' predecessor had filed a subsequent suit specifically seeking possession of the temple and an injunction - This subsequent filing constituted a categorical admission that the Appellants were not in possession at that time - held that a party in settled possession does not sue for possession - the Appellants withdrew the 1944 suit with liberty to file a fresh one but failed to do so for 36 years, leading to an "inevitable inference" that they had reconciled with the factual reality of not having possession. [Paras 18–20] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 151 and 152 – Scope of "Clarification" vs. Substantive Modification – High Courts cannot make substantive changes to the quantum of compensation or redistribute liability under the guise of a "clarification" application - Section 152 CPC is strictly confined to correcting clerical or arithmetical mistakes arising from accidental slips - Any modification affecting substantive rights amounts to a review in substance and must meet the requirements of Order XLVII CPC. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188
Code of Civil Procedure — Concurrent Findings — Scope of Interference by Supreme Court — While the Supreme Court ordinarily does not reappreciate facts where the NCLT and NCLAT have recorded concurrent findings, an exception exists when the perversity of such findings is clearly established – Noted that the NCLT and NCLAT erred by ignoring binding contractual terms of the DTD based on "surmises, conjectures and assumptions"- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Innoventive Industries Limited vs. ICICI Bank and another (2018) 1 SCC 407; Indus Biotech Private Limited vs. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund and others (2021) 6 SCC 436; Para 18-22] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Admissibility of Post-Mortem Report — Section 294 CrPC — The non-examination of the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem is not fatal to the prosecution if the defense admits the genuineness of the report under Section 294 CrPC - Once admitted, the report serves as substantive evidence of the correctness of its contents - Intention — Intention is a state of mind gathered from the cumulative effect of circumstances: nature of weapons, body parts targeted, force used, premeditation, and prior enmity - Even if weapons like lathis are used, their lethality is determined by the manner of use and the multiplicity of injuries on vital parts – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Daya Nand v. State of Haryana (2008) 15 SCC 717; Pulicherla Nagaraju v. State of A.P. (2006) 11 SCC 444; Akhtar v. State of Uttaranchal (2009) 13 SCC 722; Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel v. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel (2018) 7 SCC 743; Paras 41-45, 61-67, 69, 70] Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313 – Examination of the Accused – Failure to put specific material circumstances – Prejudice to the Accused – The underlying object of Section 313 is based on the principle of audi alteram partem to enable the accused to explain incriminating circumstances - a generalized presumption of prejudice cannot be made merely because of inadequate or general questions - To vitiate a trial, the accused must demonstrate that the non-examination on a particular circumstance actually and materially prejudiced them, resulting in a failure of justice - In the present case, while questions were general, the incriminating circumstances were put to the appellants, and no specific prejudice was shown - Held, the testimony of eye-witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they are related to the deceased. If their presence at the site is natural and their testimony remains consistent under cross-examination, minor inconsistencies do not weaken the prosecution's. [Relied on Rakesh and Anr. Vs. State of U.P. and Anr. (2021 INSC 321; Suresh Chandra Bahri vs. State of Bihar (1995 Suppl (1) SCC 80); Om Pal and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. (now State of Uttarakhand) (2025 INSC 1262); Para 5-9] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194
Code of Criminal Procedure – Discharge in Police Case vs. Statutory Complaint – A discharge order passed by a Magistrate in a criminal case arising from an FIR (Police Investigation) has no bearing on a separate complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28 of the PCPNDT Act - The Act mandates cognizance only upon a complaint by the authorized authority, and police investigation is generally discouraged for these specialized offences – appeal dismissed. [Relied on Ravinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2024 SCC Online SC 2495; Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283; Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspector (Investigation), New Delhi, (1974) 1 SCC 345; Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 822; Paras 28, 37, 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Code of Criminal Procedure – Postponement of issue of process – Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction – Mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC vs. Proviso to Section 200 CrPC – Public Servant Exemption - The Supreme Court held: The mandatory requirement of conducting an inquiry or investigation under Section 202(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in cases where the accused resides beyond the Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction must be construed harmoniously with the proviso to Section 200 CrPC - When a complaint is filed in writing by a public servant acting in the discharge of their official duties, the Magistrate is exempted from examining the complainant and witnesses on oath - the legislature has placed public servants on a "different pedestal," and the lack of a specific Section 202 inquiry does not vitiate the summoning order when the complaint is lodged by a competent official authority (such as a Drugs Inspector). State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200
Code of Criminal Procedure – Quashing of FIR – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, and 471 – Civil Dispute given a criminal cloak – Abuse of process of law – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR lodged 11 years after the execution of a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA), holding that the dispute was essentially of a civil nature - While considering a prayer to quash an FIR, allegations are ordinarily taken at face value to assess if a prima facie cognizable offence is made out - where the cause is essentially civil, the Court must assess whether it has been given a "cloak of criminal offence." - In such cases, the Court is not restricted to the FIR's contents but may consider admitted facts and documents recited therein, such as the JVA - A delay of 11 years in lodging the FIR (JVA dated 2010; FIR lodged 2021) indicates the absence of dishonest intention from the inception. If a stark dishonest intention existed, it would have been reported promptly. [Relied on: Paramjeet Batra v. State of Uttarakhand and others, (2013) 11 SCC 673; Para 15, 25-27] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 – Rule 3 – Transfer of proceedings to NCLT – Where a "second motion" for a Scheme of Arrangement was pending and not "reserved for orders" at the time the 2016 Rules came into effect (December 15, 2016), the High Court was mandated to transfer the proceedings to the Tribunal - In this case, a second motion filed belatedly in 2009 and left pending for years should have been transferred to the NCLT. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189
Constitution of India – Article 136 – Concurrent Findings of Fact – The Supreme Court reiterated that its jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised sparingly, particularly when dealing with concurrent findings of fact from the courts below - Interference is only warranted if such findings are "manifestly perverse" - In this case, the findings of the First Appellate Court and the High Court in favor of the Respondents were found to be legally sound and based on a careful appreciation of the factual matrix – Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 24] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Constitution of India – Article 19(1)(a) – Freedom of Speech and Expression – Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions – Cinematograph Act, 1952 – Film Certification – Judicial Interference – Petition filed seeking to restrain the release of the film "Ghooskhor Pandat," alleging offensive stereotyping against the Brahmin community - The Respondent/Producer filed an affidavit unequivocally withdrawing the title and undertaking that any new title would not be evocative of the earlier one - Supreme Court disposed of the petition, noting that the grievances were suitably addressed by this undertaking. Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment – The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the right to a clean and healthy environment is an inseparable part of the Right to Life guaranteed under Article 21 – Held that the State has an affirmative duty to protect the environment to ensure the well-being of all citizens, noting that the time is ripe for the rigorous implementation of this constitutional guarantee. Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182
Constitution of India – Article 226 – Writ Jurisdiction – Interim Relief – Alternative Remedy – The Supreme Court reiterated that once a High Court declines to entertain a writ petition on the ground of an available efficacious alternative remedy, it cannot pass interim orders (such as a stay or status quo) to operate until the petitioner approaches the alternative forum - Order – Interim relief can only be granted in aid of, and as ancillary to, the main relief available upon the final determination of rights - It is impermissible for a High Court to grant interim relief as the "only and final relief" while simultaneously declining to decide on the merits of the case or the rights of the parties. Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185
Constitution of India – Fraternity and Constitutional Duty – Articles 51A and 51A(e) – Supreme Court noted that fraternity is a guiding philosophy of the Constitution - It is the fundamental duty of every citizen to promote harmony and the spirit of common brotherhood - Vilifying or denigrating any community based on religion, language, caste, or region is constitutionally impermissible. [Para 11-14] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193
Constitution of India – Standards for Judging Film Content – "The Ordinary Reasonable Man" – The effect of words or expressions in a movie must be judged by the standards of "reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men," and not by those of weak or hypersensitive minds – Noted that the "man on the top of a Clapham omnibus" standard - Freedom of expression cannot be held to ransom by an intolerant group of people – Noted that if the rights of artists were subjected to popular notions of what is acceptable, the constitutional guarantee would be rendered illusory - Once a competent statutory Board grants a certificate, no individual or group can create disturbances in the exhibition of the film - Courts must be at the forefront to zealously protect the freedom of speech and expression, even if Judges personally dislike the spoken or written words. [Para 19, 22-24, 32-34] Atul Mishra v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 193
Construction of Documents — Literal Rule vs. Purposive Construction — Supreme Court emphasized that a contract must first be constructed in its plain, ordinary, and literal meaning - If the words are clear, the intention of the parties must be derived directly from the text. Reliance on the ex-post facto conduct of parties (such as the lessor continuing to occupy a portion not demised) is unnecessary and improper when the literal expression is unambiguous – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, AIR 1959 SC 1262; Paras 15-21] General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199
Consumer Protection – Joint Development Agreement (JDA) – Liability of Landowners for Delay in Construction – Held: Landowners cannot be held jointly and severally liable with the developer for deficiency in service arising from construction delays if the obligation to construct rests solely with the developer under the JDA and the General Power of Attorney (GPA) - The developer's right to enter into sale agreements and undertake construction for their share of the property, coupled with indemnity clauses protecting landowners from the developer's breaches, shifts the liability for delay compensation exclusively to the developer. Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172
Consumer Protection – Principal and Agent Relationship – General Power of Attorney – Held: The execution of a GPA by landowners in favor of a developer to facilitate sale agreements and title transfers does not automatically make the landowners liable for the developer's specific failures in construction, especially when no acts or omissions are attributed to the landowners regarding the delay - Held: While landowners are not liable for construction delay compensation, they remain jointly responsible with the developer to ensure the transfer of title and execution of sale deeds in favor of the flat buyers – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 12-16] Sriganesh Chandrasekaran v. Unishire Homes Llp, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 185 : 2026 INSC 172
Contempt Jurisdiction – Interim Orders – Noted that the High Court's order directing the framing of charges in a contempt petition while a fresh, detailed government rejection order remained unchallenged was found improper - Contempt should not be a shortcut for relief when appealable orders exist - The Supreme Court permitted the respondents to challenge the latest government order via a fresh writ petition to be heard alongside the contempt proceedings - The High Court is directed to pass a final order on merits and strictly prohibited from remanding the matter back to the authorities for further reconsideration, given the government's clear stance. [Paras 14-18] Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971; Section 12 & 15 - Article 215 of the Constitution of India - Doctrine of Merger - Maintainability of Contempt Petition in High Court after Supreme Court affirmation - High Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of its own order does not cease to operate merely because said order has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in appeal - Even if the doctrine of merger applies, the order to be executed remains the directions issued by the High Court - Held: If contempt petitions were driven to the Supreme Court in every case of affirmation by a non-speaking order, the Apex Court would be flooded with such petitions - The legal provisions cannot be used to coerce a litigant to approach the Supreme Court without resorting to filing a Contempt Petition in the High Court. [Paras 13-14] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 154 — Revisional Powers — Maintainability — Supreme Court ruled that the revisional power under Section 154 is "extremely wide" and is not denuded by the availability of alternative remedies under Rule 107(13) or (14) - A revision to annul a sale confirmation that is void ab initio (due to violation of mandatory rules) does not require a pre-deposit of the decretal amount under Section 154(2A)- that Rule 107(11)(h) serves a larger public purpose beyond the interest of the creditor, ensuring the sanctity of public auctions and preventing price manipulation by non-serious bidders - Supreme Court set aside the auction sale dated 29.01.2005 and the confirmation order dated 18.03.2005, declaring them null and void - directed a fresh auction for the property and ordered the Bank to refund the auction purchaser's deposit with 6% interest per annum. [Relied on Shilpa Shares & Securities and others vs. National Co-operative Bank Ltd. and others (2007) 12 SCC 165; Paras 39-42, 55-58] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197
Co-operative Societies — Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 — Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) — Mandatory Nature of Deposit Timelines — The Supreme Court held that the requirement to deposit the remainder of the purchase money within fifteen days (as per the Rule at the relevant time) from the date of auction sale is mandatory - Failure to deposit the full purchase money within this prescribed period renders the auction sale a nullity and not a mere irregularity. Supreme Court clarified that the Recovery Officer has no discretion to extend the time for making payment of the remainder of the purchase money, unlike the extension permitted for the cost of stamp duty. [Paras 47-55] Adishakti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2026 INSC 197
Criminal Law – Grant and Cancellation of Bail – Unlawful Assembly (Sections 143, 147, 148, 149 IPC) – SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Murder (Section 302 IPC) - Bail – Parameters for interference by Superior Court – Distinction between 'cancellation of bail' for misconduct and 'reversal' of an erroneous bail order – Supreme Court held that while cancellation under Section 439(2) CrPC (Section 483(3) BNSS) typically involves the accused misusing liberty, a superior court can reverse a bail order if it ignores relevant material, is based on extraneous considerations, or fails to consider the gravity of the offence. [Para 20] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181
Customs Act, 1962 – Section 135(1)(b)(i) – Smuggling of foreign wrist watches – Admissibility of Section 108 statements – Sentencing – Reduction of sentence to period already undergone – The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the appellants for the illegal import and handling of 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 straps - upheld the High Court's finding that statements recorded by Customs Officers under Section 108 are substantive pieces of evidence and are not barred by Sections 24, 30, or 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, provided they are voluntary. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180
Doctrine of Merger - Effect of Granting Leave - Once the Supreme Court grants leave in a Special Leave Petition and the appeal is thereafter decided, the doctrine of merger applies, whether the Supreme Court's order is one of reversal, modification, or mere affirmation - Distinguished cases where SLP is dismissed without granting leave, where no merger occurs – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2000) 6 SCC 359; Khoday Distilleries Limited & Ors. v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal, (2019) 4 SCC 376; Paras 11-12] United Labour Federation v. Gagandeep Singh Bedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2026 INSC 204
Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 18(a)(vi) read with Rule 74, 18-B, 22(1)(cca), 27(d), and 28-A – Record Maintenance – Limitation for Filing Complaint – Jurisdiction of Courts – Held that i. Non-Maintenance of Records as a Substantive Offence: The Appellants were prosecuted for failing to maintain records as stipulated under Schedule M and Schedule U of the Drugs and Cosmetics Rules, 1945, specifically regarding the drug Pseudoephedrine - held that allegations regarding the contravention of Section 18(a)(vi) of the Act (manufacturing/stocking in contravention of rules) are punishable under Section 27(d); ii. Limitation Period for Prosecution: The Appellants argued that the offence fell under Section 18-B (punishable under Section 28-A), which carries a maximum punishment of one year, thus attracting a one-year limitation period under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. - The Supreme Court rejected this, clarifying that since the allegations included violations of Section 18(a)(vi) punishable under Section 27(d) (imprisonment up to two years), the limitation period is three years as per Section 468 Cr.P.C; iii. Jurisdiction and Committal to Special Court/Sessions: Under Section 32(2), no court inferior to a Court of Session shall try an offence punishable under Chapter IV of the Act - While Section 36-A allows for summary trials by a Magistrate for certain offences, it explicitly excludes those triable by the Special Court or Court of Session - the committal of the case to the Special Judge-I (a Court of Session) was legally sound – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Miteshbhai J. Patel Vs. Drug Inspector, 2025 SCC online SC 2203; Paras 27-32] SBS Biotech v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 181 : 2026 INSC 171
Economic Policy and Legislative Intent — Excessive Judicial Review — Supreme Court cautioned against the strategic use of litigation by unsuccessful resolution applicants to delay the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). Excessive judicial scrutiny beyond narrow statutory boundaries leads to value destruction, erodes the going-concern status of the Corporate Debtor, and discourages future bidders by introducing legal uncertainty - The IBC prioritizes speed, finality, and predictability to ensure efficient resource allocation in the economy. [Relied on Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited vs. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531; Kalyani Transco vs. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2093; Swiss Ribbons Private Ltd. vs. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC 17; Pratap Technocrats Private Ltd. vs. Monitoring Committee of Reliance Infratel Limited, (2021) 10 SCC 623; Paras 7-14] Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Economic Viability and Fiscal Prudence – Comparative data from Rajasthan reveals OCIs are significantly more cost-effective than closed prisons - Per-prisoner per-day expenditure in closed prisons is approximately Rs. 333.12, whereas in open prisons, it is only Rs. 49.60 - Staffing ratios also show marked efficiency: 6:1 in closed prisons versus 80:1 in open camps - While "Prisons" is a State subject (Schedule VII, List II), States are urged to implement the Model Prison Manual, 2016 and the Model Prisons and Correctional Services Act, 2023 to ensure uniformity and modernization - Specific Directions – i. Establishment of High-Powered Committee (HPC): Constituted under the Executive Chairmanship of Hon'ble Mr. Justice S. Ravindra Bhat (Retd.) to formulate Common Minimum Standards for OCI governance, eligibility, and management; ii. Expansion of Infrastructure: States lacking OCIs (e.g., Arunachal Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Telangana) must assess feasibility and develop protocols for establishment within three months; iii. Mandatory Monitoring: All High Courts directed to register a suo motu writ petition as a continuing mandamus to oversee compliance; iv. State Monitoring Committees: Every State/UT to constitute a committee headed by the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority within four weeks. [Relied on D. Bhuvan Mohan Patnaik v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 185; Mohammed Giasuddin v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1977) 3 SCC 287; Dharambir v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1979) 3 SCC 645; Vikram Deo Singh Tomar v. State of Bihar (1988) SCC OnLine SC 450; Paras 33-36, 47-51, 67-71, 73] Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198
Employees' Compensation Act, 1923; Section 4A(3)(b) — Liability to pay Penalty — The Supreme Court reiterated that while an Insurance Company is liable to indemnify the employer for the principal compensation amount and interest, it cannot be fastened with the liability to pay the penalty component - Noted that the penalty under Section 4A(3)(b) is imposed due to the "personal fault and negligence" of the employer for failing to deposit compensation within the stipulated one month. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177
Employees' Compensation Act, 1923 - Statutory Interpretation — Section 4A — Following the 1995 Amendment, the components of compensation/interest (Clause 'a') and penalty (Clause 'b') have been severed - The legislative intent behind this severance was to ensure that the burden of penalty which is not a natural corollary of the indemnity contract remains a deterrence for the employer rather than being passed onto the insurer - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order regarding the penalty. It held that the employer (Respondent No. 4) is solely liable to pay the penalty amount of Rs. 2,57,838/- within eight weeks. [Relied on Ved Prakash Garg v. Premi Devi (1997) 8 SCC 1; Paras 10-22] New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Rekha Chaudhary, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2026 INSC 177
Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Section 5 – Directions for Implementation – To bridge significant implementation gaps and ensure readiness for the 2026 Rules, Supreme Court issued nationwide directions: i. Three-Tier Enforcement: Failure to comply shall be treated as more than an administrative lapse, involving: Tier 1 (immediate fines), Tier 2 (criminal prosecution), and Tier 3 (prosecution of responsible officials for neglect of oversight duties); ii. Role of Elected Representatives: Mayors, Councillors, and Ward Members are designated as lead facilitators for source-segregation education; iii. Infrastructure and Monitoring: Mandated infrastructure audits by District Collectors and the establishment of multi-tier monitoring task forces by 15.03.2026; iv. Bulk Waste Generators (BWGs): Must register on a centralized portal and operate on-site wet waste processing facilities or procure EBWGR certificates by 31.03.2026. [Paras 12-19] Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182
Evidence – Admissibility of Evidence Collected in Illegal Search – Rule of Relevancy – Even if a search is conducted in infraction of statutory procedures (such as Section 30 of the PCPNDT Act), the materials or records seized during such search are not automatically discarded. Materials gathered in an illegal search remain admissible in evidence subject to the test of relevancy and genuineness – Noted that Court must, however, examine such evidence with greater care. [Paras 50 - 52] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Evidence and Pleadings – Oral Evidence vs. Pleadings – Supreme Court noted that a party asserting a competing claim to hereditary rights must specifically plead material particulars, such as when they entered possession and when obstruction began - The Appellants' written statement was silent on these aspects – Noted that the settled legal principle that oral evidence cannot serve as a substitute for pleadings, and a case not made out in the pleadings cannot be established through evidence alone. [Para 23] Ogeppa v. Sahebgouda, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2026 INSC 191
Evidentiary Value of Confessional Statements – noted that the conviction was not based solely on confessions, but was supported by the discovery of incriminating material (contraband and money) documented via panchnamas - Such discoveries constitute independent and relevant evidence under Sections 6, 10, and 11 of the Evidence Act. Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 61(3)(ii) — Material Irregularity — Seeking clarifications from resolution applicants by the Resolution Professional (RP) under the specific instructions of the CoC does not constitute "material irregularity." - The RP acts as a communicator for the CoC's queries to ensure a comprehensive evaluation of the feasibility and viability of resolution plans - Such conduct does not amount to an independent or unilateral modification of the process by the RP. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 30(2), 31, 61(3), and 62 — Doctrine of Commercial Wisdom — Scope of Judicial Review — The Supreme Court reaffirmed that the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is paramount and non-justiciable - The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) and Appellate Authority (NCLAT) have limited jurisdiction to interfere with the CoC's decision, restricted strictly to ensuring compliance with statutory requirements under Section 30(2) and identifying material irregularities under Section 61(3) – Held that courts cannot act as courts of equity or substitute their commercial assessment for that of the CoC, which comprises financial creditors who bear the economic consequences of the corporate debtor's failure. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Debenture Trust Deed (DTD) — Modification of Terms — Procedure for Restructuring — Supreme Court observed that the Corporate Debtor's claim of an existing moratorium was based on unilateral e-mail exchanges with only one debenture holder (ECLF) – Held that such negotiations could not bind other debenture holders or the Debenture Trustee in the absence of express authorization - Any modification, amendment, or waiver of the DTD terms must strictly adhere to the procedure prescribed within the deed itself—specifically requiring a "Special Resolution" passed by a three-fourths majority of debenture holders and a written document signed by all parties. [Paras 13-15, 18] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Discretion of Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) – Section 7 vs. Section 9 – Held: The use of the word "may" in Section 7(5)(a) confers a degree of discretion upon the NCLT to admit a financial creditor's application, whereas "shall" in Section 9(5)(a) for operational creditors is mandatory - this discretion must be exercised reasonably and not arbitrarily – Noted that the NCLT should admit a Section 7 application upon satisfaction of financial debt and default, unless there are "good reasons" to the contrary. [Relied on BRS Ventures Investments Ltd. v. SREI Infrastructure Finance Ltd. & Anr. (2025) 1 SCC 456; Maitreya Doshi v. Anand Rathi Global Finance Ltd. (2023) 17 SCC 606; Axis Bank Ltd. v. Vidarbha Industries Power Ltd. (2022) 8 SCC 352; Paras 77-104] ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Doctrine of Election – Applicability to IBC Claims – Held: The doctrine of election is not attracted in the context of filing claims against both the debtor and the guarantor - Restricting a creditor to elect between the two would defeat the purpose of a guarantee and potentially lead to the loss of rights under the "clean slate" principle if the full debt is not claimed in a concluding CIRP - There is no statutory proscription in the IBC against filing such simultaneous claims. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Double Enrichment – Safeguards under 2016 Regulations – Held: While concerns regarding double enrichment (recovering more than the total debt) are well-founded, they do not justify a bar on simultaneous proceedings - Sufficient safeguards exist in Regulation 12A (obligation of the creditor to update claims upon partial satisfaction from any source) and Regulation 14 (duty of the Resolution Professional to revise admitted claim amounts based on new information) of the IBBI (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Interaction between IBC and Benami Act – Overriding Effect – Held: While the IBC is a later and special enactment, it does not displace the statutory mechanism of the Benami Act regarding the determination of "tainted" assets - The "residuary jurisdiction" of the NCLT under Section 60(5) cannot be used to "short-circuit" the specialized adjudicatory hierarchy (Adjudicating Authority, Appellate Tribunal, and High Court) established under the Benami Act. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Liquidation Estate and Beneficial Ownership – Section 36 IBC – Held: Only assets beneficially owned by the corporate debtor form part of the liquidation estate - Since a benamidar (the corporate debtor in this case) possesses no beneficial interest and holds property in a fiduciary capacity, such property is expressly excluded from the liquidation estate under Section 36(4)(a)(i) and cannot be distributed to creditors. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Moratorium – Section 14 IBC – Scope – Held: The moratorium under Section 14 is intended to protect the corporate debtor from "creditor actions" for debt recovery -It does not act as an automated stay against sovereign in rem proceedings initiated for the attachment or confiscation of property under penal statutes like the Benami Act - The protection under Section 32A is "event-based" and only triggered upon the approval of a resolution plan or a liquidation sale to an unconnected third party -It does not validate a defective title or retrospectively convert benami property into assets of the corporate debtor during the pendency of proceedings. [Relied on Embassy Property Developments (P) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308; State Bank of India v. Union of India (2026 INSC 153); Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta (2021) 7 SCC 209; Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra (1981) 2 SCC 121; Paras 13-24] S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Resolution Plan — Modification vs. Clarification — Clarifications that reaffirm existing terms of a Resolution Plan—such as confirming the treatment of Bank Guarantees or the Net Present Value (NPV) of deferred payments—do not amount to an unauthorized enhancement or modification of a commercial offer after the conclusion of negotiations. Torrent Power v. Ashish Arjunkumar Rathi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 207 : 2026 INSC 206
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) — Admissibility of Application — Existence of Debt and Default — The Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the NCLT and NCLAT which had refused to initiate CIRP against the Corporate Debtor - held that for admission of an application under Section 7, the adjudicating authority is only required to examine and satisfy itself that a financial debt exists and there is a default in relation thereto - The concept of a "pre-existing dispute," relevant for operational creditors under Section 9, has no bearing on applications filed by financial creditors under Section 7. [Para 12] Catalyst Trusteeship Ltd. v. Ecstasy Realty Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 192 : 2026 INSC 186
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 7 vs. Companies Act, 1956 – Sections 391-394 – Overriding effect of IBC – Redundancy of Scheme of Arrangement (SOA) due to gross delay – The Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 7 of the IBC cannot be stalled on the grounds of "judicial discipline" due to a pending Scheme of Arrangement under the Companies Act, especially when such a scheme has become defunct and inoperative due to a decade-long delay and non-compliance with statutory timelines - Noted that the IBC is a special statute aimed at the revival of companies, and its provisions prevail over inconsistent provisions in other laws by virtue of Section 238. Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 14, 36, 60(5), and 238 – Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988 – Sections 24 and 27 – Jurisdiction of NCLT/NCLAT over Benami Proceedings – Held: The National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) do not have the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the legality or validity of provisional attachment orders or confiscation proceedings initiated under the Benami Act - Such proceedings fall within the realm of public law and sovereign functions of the State, which are distinct from private proprietary disputes or debt recovery actions. S. Rajendran v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2026 INSC 187
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Sections 7, 60(2), and 60(3) – Simultaneous Proceedings – Maintainability of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) against Principal Debtor and Corporate Guarantor – Held: Simultaneous proceedings for CIRP under the IBC against both the principal debtor and its corporate guarantor (or vice-versa) are maintainable - The liability of a surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor under Section 128 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 - The IBC permits separate or simultaneous proceedings to be initiated by a financial creditor against both entities. ICICI Bank v, Era Infrastructure, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 203 : 2026 INSC 201
Judicial Discipline – Supreme Court observed that when proceedings are terminated due to the existence of an alternative remedy, the proceedings do not survive and must end immediately - Passing interim orders in such circumstances "circumvents" statutory provisions and exceeds the scope of Article 226. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta (1952) AIR 1952 SC 12; Paras 6, 7, 8] Mangal Rajendra Kamthe v. Tahsildar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 194 : 2026 INSC 185
Judicial Discipline vs. Economic Implications – While judicial discipline is a cornerstone of justice, it cannot be used by "tardy litigators" to jeopardize public funds or put the economy in a "hostage situation." - In cases with significant economic implications, the larger national interest of rehabilitating an industry and ensuring financial probity takes pre-eminence – Appeals allowed. [Relied on A. Navinchandra Steels (P) Ltd. v. Srei Equipment Finance Ltd. (2021) 4 SCC 435; Paras 13-20] Omkara Assets Reconstruction v. Amit Chaturvedi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2026 INSC 189
Judicial Scrutiny of Bail Orders – Held that the High Court's decision to grant bail by dissecting medical evidence and questioning the "intent to kill" due to a gap between the assault and death (septicaemia) was found to be premature - Such detailed analysis is reserved for the trial - The presence of multiple injuries, including cerebral damage from blunt trauma, outweighed the "extraneous considerations" of pending civil litigation and lack of specific role attribution – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: (2025) 1 SCC (Cri) 320; Shabeen Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025) 4 SCC 172; Victim 'XX' v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2025) INSC 877; Paras 21, 22, 29 - 31] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181
Limitation – Commencement of Period – Identity of Offender – Section 468 & 469(1)(c) CrPC - The Supreme Court held: In cases involving misbranded or substandard drugs where an investigation is necessary to establish the exact chain of supply and the identity of the manufacturers/distributors, the limitation period for taking cognizance commences from the date the identity of the offender is known to the aggrieved person or the investigating officer, as per Section 469(1)(c) of the CrPC - The three-year limitation period under Section 468(2)(c) is computed from the date the identity of all accused persons is clearly established by the competent authority, not necessarily from the date of the initial tip-off or the date of the offense. State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Procedural Safeguards for Deductions – Proof of Receipt – Deductions from MVA compensation cannot be made based on mere assumptions of eligibility - The Tribunal must first determine the full compensation; claimants must then file an affidavit/declaration regarding the receipt of benefits under the 2006 Rules before the executing court - Adjustments to prevent double recovery are to be made only after receipt is established – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance v. Shashi Sharma (2016) 9 SCC 627; Jayalakshmi Coelho v. Oswald Joseph Coelho (2001) 4 SCC 181; State of Punjab v. Darshan Singh (2004) 1 SCC 328; Paras on 6, 7, 8] Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 173 – Compensation – Deduction of Compassionate Financial Assistance – Haryana Compassionate Assistance to Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 – Rule 5 – The Supreme Court reiterated that financial assistance received under the 2006 Rules which directly replaces "pay and allowances" (loss of income) must be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act to prevent double recovery - components such as family pension, life insurance, and provident fund are not deductible as they do not correspond to the specific head of loss of income. Reliance General Insurance v. Kanika, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 196 : 2026 INSC 188
Penal Code, 1860 - Cheating – Section 420 IPC – Absence of False Representation – No offence of cheating was made out as there was no false representation in the JVA - The agreement did not contain a specific statement that "no litigation was pending"; rather, it provided an indemnity to the second party for any loss due to disputes - The representation that no "restraint order" existed was not shown to be false. [Paras 20-26] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Penal Code, 1860 - Criminal Breach of Trust – Section 406 IPC – Non-refundable Security Deposit – The allegation regarding non-refund of security money does not constitute a criminal offence when the JVA stipulates that the deposit is non-refundable and only adjustable against future sale proceeds - Non-fulfillment of such contractual obligations gives rise to a civil cause of action, not a criminal one. [Para 22 - 28] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Penal Code, 1860 Culpable Homicide vs. Murder — Section 299, 300 Clause (3), and 304 Part II IPC — Vicarious Liability under Section 149 IPC — The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment which had toned down the conviction of 19 accused persons from Section 302/149 IPC to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC - held that when an unlawful assembly waylays a victim with premeditation, uses lathis to inflict 29 injuries (including four bone-deep head fractures), and acts out of caste-based retaliation, the intention to cause such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death is clearly established. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Penal Code, 1860 - Forgery – Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC – Document not traceable in records – Merely because a document (such as a Tehsildar's letter) is not traceable in official records 11 years after its purported issuance, it cannot be deemed "forged" or "false" under Section 464 IPC. Official records are not always maintained in perpetuity. [Para 24] Vandana Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2026 INSC 192
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 r/w Section 34 – Conviction for Murder – Non-recovery of weapons of assault – Effect of – Held, recovery of the weapons of assault is not a sine qua non for convicting an accused if the evidence on record, particularly reliable ocular testimony, establishes the guilt beyond reasonable doubt - Even if the Investigating Officer fails to bring on record the weapons described by eye-witnesses, this omission cannot benefit the accused when the version of eye-witnesses is found to be consistent, reliable, and corroborated by medical evidence. [Para 7, 8] Ghanshyam Mandal v. State of Bihar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2026 INSC 194
Penal Code, 1860 - Unlawful Assembly – Individual Role Attribution – Noted that the High Court erred in granting bail on the ground that the individual role or specific injury caused by each accused could not be ascertained - The Supreme Court clarified that where an offence is committed by an unlawful assembly, every member is equally responsible for acts done in furtherance of the common object - Under Section 149 IPC, the prosecution is not obligated to identify the specific weapon or injury attributable to a particular member at the bail stage. [Paras 27 - 30] Shobha Namdev Sonavane v. Samadhan Bajirao Sonvane, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 188 : 2026 INSC 181
Penal Code, 1860 - Vicarious Liability (Section 149 IPC) — Individual Attribution — Once the existence of an unlawful assembly and a common object to commit murder is established, the individual attribution of the fatal blow becomes inconsequential - Section 149 IPC fastens constructive liability on every member of the assembly, regardless of who delivered the "crucial act" or fatal injury - The High Court's reasoning that all accused could not be convicted under Section 302 because the specific assailant who caused the fatal head injury was unidentified was held to be "perverse" and "self-contradictory" as it ignored the fundamental principle of vicarious liability. Sitaram Kuchhbedia v. Vimal Rana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 189 : 2026 INSC 178
Practice and Procedure – The "Consider Jurisprudence" – The Supreme Court criticized the routine practice of courts issuing directions to "consider" or "reconsider" claims as a means to "throw the ball out of the Court" - Such practice is counterproductive, harms the legal system, and delays justice - Courts must articulate directions in clear terms, specifying the method and manner of compliance to leave the government with no choice but to comply, appeal, or face contempt. Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 – Section 30(1) – Search and Seizure – Collective Decision Required – The power to authorize a search under Section 30(1) must be exercised by the "Appropriate Authority" collectively as defined under Section 17 - An individual member, including the Chairperson/Civil Surgeon acting alone, cannot legally authorize a search – Noted that in this case, the search was directed solely by the Civil Surgeon without the association of the other two members (District Programme Officer and District Attorney), rendering the search technically illegal. [Paras 41 - 50] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Rules, 1996 – Rule 9 and Rule 10 – Maintenance of Form F – Maintenance of records in "Form F" is mandatory and not a mere procedural formality - Non-maintenance or inaccurate maintenance of records constitutes a "springboard" for the offence of female foeticide and amounts to a contravention of Sections 5 and 6 of the Act - Even if sex determination is not proven, the failure to maintain statutory records is a punishable offence under Section 23. [Paras 33 - 54] Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2026 INSC 176
Prison Reforms – Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) – Overcrowding – Constitutional Rights of Prisoners – Gender Discrimination – Cost-Effectiveness – Supreme Court issues comprehensive directions for the assessment, establishment, and expansion of Open Correctional Institutions (OCIs) and open/semi-open barracks across all States and Union Territories to address chronic prison overcrowding (occupancy rate of 120.8% nationally) and facilitate the reformative objective of punishment. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198
Right to Life and Dignity – Article 21 – The guarantee of life and personal dignity extends beyond prison gates; incarceration must not degenerate into inhumanity - Convicts are not denuded of all fundamental rights by mere reason of conviction. OCIs, based on trust and self-discipline, align with the constitutional vision of viewing prisons as institutions of correction and social reintegration - Exclusion of women prisoners from OCIs in several states (e.g., Assam, Gujarat, UP, West Bengal) or failing to transfer eligible women constitutes blatant gender discrimination - States directed to develop gender-sensitive protocols to ensure women have equal access to reformative facilities. Suhas Chakma v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 205 : 2026 INSC 198
Sentencing Discretion – While the statutory minimum was six months, Supreme Court exercised its discretion to reduce the three-year rigorous imprisonment sentence to the period already undergone (approximately one year) - This decision was based on the advanced age of the surviving appellants, the fact that the incident occurred nearly four decades ago (1985), and the prolonged pendency of the proceedings – Appeals partly allowed. [Relied on K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721; Paras 20-22, 27-28] Amad Noormamad Bakali v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 190 : 2026 INSC 180
Service Law – Salary Payment and Creation of Posts – Private Aided vs. Self-Financed Schemes – Respondents (lecturers) sought government salary payments and post sanctions for subjects run under a self-financed scheme - The High Court had repeatedly issued "reconsideration" directions without deciding the existence of a legal right, leading to a "Second Season" of episodic litigation spanning 16 years - Held: Constitutional and statutory remedies are not for academic discourse; if a case deserves relief, it must be granted "then and there, unflinchingly". Mahendra Prasad Agarwal v. Arvind Kumar Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 195 : 2026 INSC 175
Solid Waste Management Rules, 2026 – Statutory Nature and Enforcement – Supreme Court observed that the SWM Rules, 2026 (effective from 01.04.2026), framed under Sections 3, 6, and 25 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, and placed before Parliament as per Section 26, are not mere delegated legislation but represent the "will expressed by the parliament" - The transition to a "digital-first circular economy framework" introduces Extended Bulk Waste Generator Responsibility (EBWGR) and mandates a four-stream waste segregation (Wet, Dry, Sanitary, and Special Care). Bhopal Municipal Corporation v. Dr. Subhash C. Pandey, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 182
Telecom Law – Spectrum Allocation – Liability for Reserve Price – Effective Date for Commencement of Liability - The Supreme Court held that telecom licensees whose Unified Access Service (UAS) licences were quashed by the Court on February 2, 2012, but who continued operations to ensure non-disruption of services to the general public, are liable to pay the reserve price fixed for the November 2012 auction starting from February 2, 2012 – Held that the liability commences from the date the original licences were declared illegal and quashed, not from the date of subsequent orders or the date of fresh auctions. Union of India v. Sistema Shyam Teleservices, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 184 : 2026 INSC 174
Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Section 105 and Section 108 — Indian Easements Act, 1882; Section 52 — Lease vs. Licence — Interpretation of Deeds — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court judgment that had re-characterized a registered 99-year lease deed as a licence - held that when the nomenclature, text, and context of a document clearly indicate a "lease simpliciter," courts should not resort to purposive construction or ex-post facto circumstances to infer a different intention - A unilateral cancellation of such a registered lease deed, without bilateral agreement or meeting conditions under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, is illegal and non-est. General Secretary, Vivekananda Kendra v. Pradeep Kumar Agarwalla, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2026 INSC 199
University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Direction to Universities — Respondent – Supreme Court directed the Universities to furnish information to the UGC regarding students who obtained questionable degrees in technical branches - The UGC shall then take decisions based on the principles laid down in Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro - Order passed in the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction to do complete justice in the specific facts and circumstances of the case. [Relied on Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. VS. Rabi Sankar Patro & Ors., (2018) 1 SCC 468; Paras 6-8] University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183
University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 — Distance Education — Technical Degrees — Validity of Degrees — Primacy of Statutory Bodies — The Supreme Court upheld the primacy of the UGC in making regulations for distance education - it modified a High Court order that had validated technical degrees obtained via distance learning through interim orders – Held that technical education (Engineering) requires practical, hands-on training and cannot be conducted via distance mode without express AICTE approval - Following the precedent in CMJ Foundation & Ors. vs. State of Meghalaya & Ors., Supreme Court held that the UGC is the appropriate statutory authority to consider the consequences of its orders and take necessary actions regarding the annulment of illegal degrees. University Grants Commission v. Annamalai University, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 183
Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (UP) – Schedule II, Part A, Entry 103 vs. Schedule V, Entry 1 (Residuary Entry) – Classification of "Sharbat Rooh Afza" - The Supreme Court held that "Sharbat Rooh Afza" is classifiable as a "fruit drink" under Entry 103 of Schedule II, Part A of the UPVAT Act, taxable at the concessional rate of 4%, rather than as an unclassified item under the residuary entry taxable at 12.5%; held that - 1. Inclusive Nature of Entry 103 - Supreme Court observed that Entry 103 is an inclusive and umbrella entry covering "processed or preserved vegetables and fruits, fruit drink and fruit juice."- Since the entry does not prescribe a minimum quantitative threshold for fruit content, it is improper to read a rigid percentage requirement into it that the Legislature did not provide; 2. Essential Character Test - Supreme Court applied the "Essential Character Test" as embodied in Rule 3(b) of the HSN Explanatory Notes - It held that while invert sugar syrup constitutes 80% of the volume, it merely acts as a carrier and preservative - The flavor, aroma, and beverage identity are derived from the 10% fruit juice and herbal distillates, which impart the product's distinctive character as a refreshing drink; 3. Common Parlance vs. Regulatory Classification - Supreme Court clarified that regulatory classifications under food safety laws (like the Fruit Products Order, 1955) are intended for quality control and safety, not fiscal classification - A fiscal statute must be interpreted based on how the product is understood in common or commercial parlance; 4. Burden of Proof on Revenue for Reclassification - Supreme Court reiterated that the burden of proof lies squarely on the Revenue to establish that a product falls within a residuary entry or an entry different from that claimed by the assessee - In this case, the Revenue failed to produce trade inquiries or market evidence to displace the appellant's classification; 5. Avoidance of Residuary Clause - Recourse to a residuary entry is impermissible when a commodity can reasonably be brought within the ambit of a specific entry. Denying a product "parentage" in a specific entry and consigning it to the "orphanage of the residuary clause" is against the principles of classification – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Dunlop India Ltd v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 241; Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. (1987) 1 SCC 424; Hindustan Ferodo Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise (1997) 2 SCC 677; CCE v. Connaught Plaza Restaurant (P) Ltd (2012) 13 SCC 639; Paras 16, 19-22, 24-27, 30] Hamdard (Wakf) Laboratories v. Commissioner of Commercial Tax, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2026 INSC 195
Vicarious Liability – Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 – Section 34 – Directors' Responsibility - The Supreme Court held: Whether Directors of a company were "in charge of" and "responsible to" the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offense is a question of fact - Quashing a complaint at the threshold on the ground of insufficient compliance with Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is premature; such determinations are best left to the Trial Court to be decided at the appropriate stage based on evidence – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Cheminova India Limited v. State of Punjab, (2021) 8 SCC 818; Paras 32-59] State of Kerala v. Panacea Biotec Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2026 INSC 200