JudiciaryConstitution of India, Article 142 - Writ petition seeking guidelines for judicial recusal - Held, recusal is a matter of judicial discretion and Article 142 cannot be invoked to frame such guidelines. Chandraprabha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 648Constitution of India - Referring to any court as a "Lower Court" or its records as "Lower Court Record" (LCR) is contrary to...
Judiciary
Constitution of India, Article 142 - Writ petition seeking guidelines for judicial recusal - Held, recusal is a matter of judicial discretion and Article 142 cannot be invoked to frame such guidelines. Chandraprabha v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 648
Constitution of India - Referring to any court as a "Lower Court" or its records as "Lower Court Record" (LCR) is contrary to the ethos of the Constitution. The Supreme Court directed that Trial Court records be referred to as "Trial Court Record" (TCR), reiterating its order dated 8 February 2024 and the subsequent Registry circular dated 28 February 2024. (Para 25) Sakhawat v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 626 : 2025 INSC 777
Court Managers - The concept of Court Managers was introduced by the 13th Finance Commission to assist judges in administrative functions and case management at district, sessions, and High Court levels, with similar recommendations from the Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC). Despite prior directions in the same proceedings (judgment dated August 2, 2018) to frame rules for their service conditions, duties, and regularization, many High Courts and State Governments failed to comply, resulting in Court Managers continuing on contractual or ad-hoc basis, with some services discontinued due to funding shortages. Whether existing Court Managers working on contractual or ad-hoc basis should be regularized, and whether High Courts should frame rules for their recruitment and service conditions to ensure administrative efficiency in the judiciary. Held, the Supreme Court, expressing concern over non-compliance with prior directions, directed the regularization of all existing Court Managers (subject to suitability tests) with effect from their initial appointment, without entitlement to salary arrears. High Courts were mandated to frame/amend recruitment rules modeled on the Assam Rules of 2018, with State Governments required to approve them within three months. Court Managers were to be classified as Class II gazetted officers, working under specified supervision, with duties ensuring no overlap with those of Registrars. Directions: 1. All High Courts to frame/amend rules on recruitment and service conditions of Court Managers, using Assam Rules of 2018 as model, and submit to State Governments within 3 months (with liberty for suitable changes). 2. State Governments to approve rules within 3 months. 3. Minimum classification as Class II gazetted officers for pay, allowances, and benefits. 4. High Court-appointed Court Managers to work under Registrar General's supervision. 5. District Court-appointed Court Managers to work under Registrar/Superintendent of concerned courts. 6. High Court Rules Committees to ensure duties do not overlap with Registrars'. 7. Existing contractual/ad-hoc Court Managers' services to continue and be regularized subject to suitability test under rules. 8. Regularization effective from initial appointment date, entitling continuation of service but no arrears or salary differences. 9. Personal regularization to be completed within 3 months of rule approval. 10. Registrar Generals of High Courts to adhere to timelines. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2025 INSC 713
High Court Rules (Calcutta) - Rule 26 - Roster Allocation - Chief Justice's Power - Judicial Discipline - Division Bench of the High Court lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide a writ petition when the case was not allocated to it by the Chief Justice, who is the master of the roster. The Court reiterated that consent of parties cannot confer jurisdiction, and any adjudication beyond the assigned roster is void. The impugned order of the Division Bench, which had allowed the writ petition, was set aside, and the case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration by a bench assigned by the Chief Justice. (Para 7) Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers v. GRSE Workmens Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 322 : 2025 INSC 363
In-House Inquiry Committee Report – The Writ Petition sought a writ of mandamus to initiate action against the third respondent based on allegations and the In-House Inquiry Committee's report. The report and the third respondent's response were forwarded by the Chief Justice of India to the President and Prime Minister of India. The Court declined to entertain the petition, observing that the petitioners had not sought redressal by filing a representation before the appropriate authorities. Mathews J. Nedumpara v. Supreme Court of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 649
Judges Protection Act, 1985 - Disciplinary proceedings cannot be initiated against quasi-judicial officer merely on ground of passing wrong order. Mere "wrong orders" without allegations of corruption, extraneous influence, or dishonesty cannot justify disciplinary proceedings against the officer. (Para 9 & 16) Amresh Shrivastava v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 376 : 2025 INSC 417
Judicial accountability - Freedom of Press - Sub judice debate - Contempt of Court - Liberal democracy - In a landmark pronouncement affirming the symbiotic relationship between the judiciary and the media in a liberal democracy, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's order directing the removal of a Wikipedia page detailing a defamation suit by Asian News International (ANI) against Wikipedia editors. The High Court had deemed the page "prima facie contemptuous" for reporting the judge's warning that Wikipedia risked shutdown in India absent deletion of allegedly defamatory content against ANI. The Court held that courts, as public institutions, must remain receptive to public discourse, debates, and constructive criticism, including on matters *sub judice*. Vigorous debate by the public and press on important issues—even pending before courts—is essential for democratic vitality and judicial introspection. The judiciary and media, as foundational pillars of India's constitutional framework, must mutually supplement each other to sustain a thriving liberal democracy. However, critics must refrain from scandalizing the court or judges, warranting contempt action where established (per *Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer*'s principles). Courts cannot proactively censor media by mandating content deletions; such overreach undermines free speech. The ruling echoes the Court's prior observations in the farmers' protests matter, rejecting blanket prohibitions on public protests during *sub judice* proceedings. Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2025 INSC 656
Judicial Proceedings - Held, statements and questions posed in judicial proceedings, even if uncomfortable to the parties, cannot be construed as public humiliation or defamation. Such inquiries are inherent to the court's duty to ascertain the truth and cannot form the basis for collateral challenges absent malice or extraneous motives. Petitioner No. 1, whose habeas corpus petition was dismissed upon her voluntary return home, sought clarification from police regarding their in-court assertion that she had divorced her husband and remarried. The High Court initially entertained the application but later dismissed it as infructuous, rejecting subsequent review petitions. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner claimed open-court humiliation and defamation. The Court dismissed the petition, observing that during court proceedings, many statements are made and questions are posed which may make a person uncomfortable, but all such statements or questions cannot be misconstrued as humiliating a person. After all, it is the duty of the Court to reach the truth of the matter and such exercise may demand putting forward certain questions and suggestions which may be uncomfortable to some. The grievance was deemed "totally misconceived," emphasizing that judicial discourse in pursuit of truth does not equate to actionable harm. Dhanlaxmi @ Sunita Mathuria v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 200 : 2025 INSC 196
Judicial Review - Contractual Matters – Scope of - Public-private partnerships - Conduct of Formula 4 racing - The High Court had permitted the event subject to several conditions, including financial obligations imposed on the private organizer (RPPL). The Supreme Court partly allowed RPPL's appeal, setting aside directions from the High Court. These directions constituted an impermissible interference with the contractual terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between RPPL and the Sports Development Authority of Tamil Nadu (SDAT). The Court emphasized the limited scope of judicial review in contractual matters involving the State and private entities, particularly in public-private partnerships. It also recognized the State's policy decision to promote motorsports and the benefits of public-private partnerships. The court upheld the High Court's directions regarding public safety and noise control measures. (Para 23) Racing Promotions v. Dr. Harish, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 270 : 2025 INSC 252
Judicial Service - Enhancement of Retirement Age - All India Judges Association Case - Petition filed for seeking enhancement of the retirement age of district judges in Madhya Pradesh to 62 years - M.P. High Court rejected the petition on the grounds that the decision of Apex Court in All India Judges Association Case (2002) does not allow it. Held, there is no impediment in permitting the state of Madhya Pradesh to increase the age of superannuation of judicial officers working in the state of MP to the age of 61 years. Relied on order passed in case of clarification sought by Telangana High Court wherein increase in the age of retirement was allowed citing it is beneficial to the Judicial Officers. If M.P. High Court rules framed by State permits and if High Court takes a decision to enhance the age of retirement to 61 years, the same would be permissible. Directed M.P. High Court on its administrative side to take a decision at its earliest within a period of 3 months. (Para 4 - 6) Madhya Pradesh Judges Association v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 664
Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71
Public Interest Litigation – Publicity – Dignity of CJI's Office – Protocol Lapse – Dismissal – Nominal Costs Imposed – The Supreme Court dismissed a PIL filed by a lawyer seeking action against Maharashtra officials for protocol lapses during the Chief Justice of India's visit to Mumbai on May 18, 2025. The Court labeled the petition as “publicity interest litigation” filed for “cheap publicity” and criticized the exaggeration of trivial issues. Noting the officials' apology and the CJI's request to close the matter, the Court deemed the petition unnecessary. Considering the petitioner's status as a young lawyer with seven years of practice, the Court imposed a nominal cost of Rs. 7,000 instead of heavier costs. The Court underscored the need to uphold the dignity of the CJI's office and cautioned against filing frivolous petitions that invite controversy to the institution. (Paras 6–10) Shailendra Mani Tripathi v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 623
Judicial Officers' Pay - Implementation of Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) Recommendations - The Court addressed the non-implementation of the SNJPC recommendations, particularly regarding the payment of super-time scale and selection grade scales for judicial officers, which were approved by the Court in its order dated 19.05.2023. The Court emphasized the need for timely payment of arrears and directed the constitution of Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary (CSCDJ) in each High Court to oversee the implementation of these recommendations. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Remuneration for Special Judicial Magistrates - The Court clarified that Special Judicial Magistrates are entitled to a minimum remuneration of Rs. 45,000/- per month, along with a conveyance allowance of Rs. 5,000/- per month, effective from 01.04.2019. The Court directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay arrears to these magistrates within three months. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Risk Allowance and Higher Qualification Allowance - The Court addressed issues related to the admissibility of risk allowance for judicial officers and clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every Assured Career Progression (ACP) stage, rejecting the argument that such allowances would lead to unjust enrichment. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Individual Grievances - Miscellaneous Applications - The Court disposed of several intervention applications and clarified that individual grievances should be addressed by the respective High Courts through the newly constituted Committees. The Court directed the Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary in the High Court of Telangana to address the grievance of a petitioner regarding inadequate pension, in line with the Court's earlier orders. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Directions - Increase of posts of District Judges - Constitution of Committees - Payment of Arrears - Regular Meetings - Clarification on Allowances - The Supreme Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to frame rules regarding the increase of posts of District Judges in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale categories. All High Courts were directed to constitute Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary within four weeks, with a Nodal Officer appointed to address day-to-day grievances of judicial officers. States were directed to pay arrears to judicial officers, including Special Judicial Magistrates, within three months. The Committees were directed to meet at regular intervals (not exceeding three months) to ensure timely resolution of grievances. The Court clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every ACP stage, irrespective of promotions or ACP benefits. The Court emphasized the importance of timely implementation of its orders and the need for institutional mechanisms to address the service conditions of judicial officers. The directions were issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, binding all State Governments and High Courts to comply. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Vacancies - Expediting long-pending cases in the Allahabad High Court - The Supreme Court expressed deep concern over the numerous writ petitions seeking expeditious disposal of cases pending for over three decades in the Allahabad High Court. In this particular case, a 95-year-old litigant sought urgent hearing of her Second Appeal pending since 2013. The Court acknowledged the heavy caseload on each judge of the Allahabad High Court (approximately 15,000 to 20,000 cases per judge). The Court noted the significant vacancy in the High Court, with only 84 judges working against a sanctioned strength of 160. The Court emphasized the urgent need to fill judicial vacancies based on merit and ability to alleviate the backlog. The writ petition was treated as a representation to the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court, directing the Registry to forward a copy of the petition and the order. The Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court was requested to examine the matter and take appropriate administrative action. The writ petition was disposed of. (Para 1 – 10) Kamla Bai v High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 152
Retired High Court Judges – Medical Reimbursement – Supreme Court clarifies that medical reimbursement for retired High Court Judges, their spouses, and dependants shall be borne by the State Government of either the Judge's first appointment or the State where the High Court from which the Judge retired is situated, addressing cases involving judicial transfers. Non-compliance with court orders on medical facilities, including cashless treatment, reimbursement for private hospital treatment without prior approval, and uniformity in benefits, may lead to contempt proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1981. States directed to file fresh affidavits, with matter listed for April 29, 2025. Justice V.S. Dave v. Kusumjit Sidhu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 470
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015
Sections 15 and 94(2) - Juvenile Justice Board — Lack of Review Jurisdiction — Contradictory Findings on Juvenility Impermissible - The Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) constituted under the JJ Act, 2015 possesses no power of review, either expressly or by necessary implication, over its prior orders determining juvenility. Once the JJB accepts documentary evidence such as a school certificate establishing the date of birth of a child in conflict with law (in this case, 08.09.2003), it cannot in subsequent proceedings disregard the same, adopt a contradictory stance, or resort to medical opinion (e.g., ossification test estimating age as 21 years) to reopen the issue. Such action amounts to an impermissible review of its earlier order. Under Section 94(2) of the Act, medical evidence is admissible only in the absence of conclusive documentary proof; school records carry superior evidentiary value and cannot be overridden by subsidiary ossification tests. The Supreme Court thus upheld the High Court's grant of bail to the juvenile respondent, holding that a preliminary assessment under Section 15 recommending trial as an adult does not negate the statutory right to bail absent evidence of threat to the juvenile or society. Appeal dismissed. (Para 29) Rajni v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2025 INSC 737
Sections 3(xiv), 24 - Disclosure of Juvenile Conviction in Character Certificate - Whether disclosure of a juvenile's conviction in a character certificate violates Section 24 and affects future employment prospects. Held, Section 24 protects juveniles by prohibiting disqualification from past convictions and mandating non-disclosure of such records in public or official documents. The Court quashed the portion of the appellant's character certificate disclosing his juvenile conviction and directed authorities to refrain from disclosing such records in future verifications. The High Court's dismissal of the appellant's petition for availability of an alternative remedy was erroneous, as it overlooked the violation of the JJ Act's rehabilitative intent. Section 24 promotes rehabilitation by preventing stigma from past convictions and mandates destruction of records after a specified period. Disclosure in official certificates undermines reintegration and contravenes the JJ Act's protective framework. As the appellant's offense was not heinous, its inclusion in records was unwarranted, posing no threat to public safety. Appeal allowed; character certificate quashed to the extent of disclosing juvenile conviction; authorities directed to ensure non-disclosure and prevent disqualification based on juvenile record. (Para 9, 14, 16) Lokesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 245
Issue of juvenility and the failure of the judicial machinery to recognize and act upon the constitutional mandate regarding juvenile justice. The appellant was convicted of culpable homicide amounting to murder in 1994 and sentenced to death. Throughout the legal proceedings, he consistently claimed to be a juvenile at the time of the offense, but his plea was ignored by the trial court, High Court, and even the Supreme Court in earlier rounds of litigation. Held, a plea of juvenility, which was not properly considered by Courts as per due procedure, cannot be treated as final. Therefore, a fresh plea of juvenility can be raised when the plea of juvenility was improperly adjudicated upon in the previous rounds. The Court emphasized the paramount duty of the judiciary to unearth the truth and ensure justice, particularly in cases involving juveniles. Procedural and substantive laws should not obstruct the discovery of truth, especially in social welfare legislations like the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court reiterated that the plea of juvenility can be raised at any stage, even after the final disposal of a case, and must be adjudicated upon in accordance with the law. The Supreme Court found that the appellant was indeed 14 years old at the time of the offense, as evidenced by school certificates and medical reports. The Court criticized the lower courts for ignoring crucial documents and failing to follow the procedural mandates of the Juvenile Justice Act. The appellant's incarceration for over 25 years was a grave injustice, and directed his immediate release, while maintaining his conviction. The Court also ordered the State Legal Services Authority to assist in his rehabilitation and reintegration into society. This judgment underscores the importance of the judiciary's role in ensuring justice for juveniles and the need for courts to actively seek the truth, particularly in cases involving vulnerable individuals. The Court's decision to allow the plea of juvenility even after final disposal of the case sets a significant precedent for future cases involving juvenile offenders. Om Prakash @ Israel @ Raju @ Raju Das v State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 35
Labour Law
For a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct masterservant relationship must be established on paper. (Para 7) Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education v. Raj Kumar Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 343
Indefinite temporary employment for permanent roles is contrary to labour jurisprudence and principles of fairness. (Para 14 & 15) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144
Termination without adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for employees engaged in essential duties, is illegal. Bureaucratic limitations cannot override the rights of workmen serving in de facto regular roles for extended periods. (Para 17) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144
Industrial Dispute - Reliance on Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 to deny regularization to daily-wage employees is misplaced where the employment is irregular, not illegal, and the employer has engaged in exploitative practices for years. (Para 14) Industrial Dispute - Regularization - A general ban on fresh recruitment cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or unfair labour practices, especially where the work is perennial and essential. (Para 14) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144
Industrial Dispute - The principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be casually disregarded when workers have served for extended periods in roles resembling those of permanent employees. (Para 13) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144
Industrial Dispute - The employer's engagement of workmen in perennial municipal functions, while denying them statutory benefits and equal pay for equal work, constitutes an unfair labour practice. (Para 13) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P.) - Whether an individual is classified as regular or temporary is irrelevant as retrenchment obligations under the Act must be met in all cases attracting Section 6N. Any termination thus effected without statutory safeguards cannot be undertaken lightly. (Para 10) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144
Land Law
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Highest bona fide sale exemplar must be considered when determining land acquisition compensation to ensure a fair market value for the acquired land. While determining the compensation, crucial factors such as the close proximity of the acquired land to the developed zone and non-agricultural utility should also be kept into consideration. (Relied: Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab, (2012) 5 SCC 432, Para 19 & 31) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441
Land Acquisition - Principles of Escalation and De-Escalation - The principle of escalation signifies adjusting the base value of land upwards to account for appreciation in market value over time. The principle is used when the reference sale deed or award is from an earlier period than the acquisition date. Whereas, the principle of de-escalation signifies adjusting the base value downward to account for time gaps when the reference point is from a later period, but the land was acquired earlier. (Para 25 - 28) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Principle of de-escalation - the Supreme Court allowed the landowner's plea seeking enhancement of compensation fixed by the High Court and enhanced the compensation from ₹55.71 lakh to ₹1.18 crore per acre for lands acquired in Dharuhera village (Haryana) in 2008 under the Act, 1894 by applying the principle of de-escalation. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to selectively rely on lower-value exemplars while ignoring comparable higher-value transactions. The High Court committed an error by ignoring evidence of proximity and potential for non-agricultural use since the acquired land was in a controlled urban area surrounded by various Multinational Companies and had a big residential colony opposite to it with multiple schools and townships within 1KM range. (Relied: BESCO Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2023), (Para 34 - 38) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441
Land Acquisition – Large areas do not attract the same price as is offered for the small plots of lands. Therefore, some amount of deduction is also normally permissible on account of largeness in area. Thus, deduction of at least 10% has to be applied to determine the rate of compensation. (Para 12) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Determination of Market Value - The determination of the prevalent market value of the acquired land is not an algebraic formula and that cannot be determined in a precise or an accurate manner. Some amount of guess work is always permissible. Therefore, a judge has to sit in an arm chair and without much taxing his mind has to determine the market value in a prudent manner. (Para 13) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Income from Fruit-Bearing Trees – Compensation for trees requires documentary proof of income, not mere presence. (Para 15) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Enhancement of Compensation - Supreme Court enhanced compensation for acquired agricultural land from Rs. 30 per sq. mt. to Rs. 95 per sq. mt., based on GIDC's allotment of nearby commercial plot at Rs. 180 per sq. mt. in 1988 - Adjusted for 5% price rise over one year to Rs. 190 per sq. mt., followed by 50% deduction (40% for development costs, 10% for larger area). (Para 14) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Natural Justice - Whether the High Court's reliance on the respondent's affidavit without granting the petitioner an opportunity to respond violates principles of natural justice. Held: The Supreme Court quashed the acquisition proceedings initiated by the development authority, holding that the High Court's Division Bench violated principles of natural justice by relying solely on the authority's affidavit and closing the matter on the same day without allowing the appellant to respond. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, and permitted the High Court to conduct a spot inspection if necessary. (Para 14, 15) D.M. Jagadish v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 172 : 2025 INSC 157
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 23(1A) & (2)) and Section 28 - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 the Supreme Court declared Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 unconstitutional to the extent it denied solatium (under Section 23(1A) & (2)) and interest (under Section 28 proviso) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to landowners whose properties were acquired by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) between 1997 and 2015. Post-judgment, NHAI sought clarification that the ruling apply prospectively, precluding recalculation of compensation in cases where acquisition proceedings had attained finality, citing financial burden (approx. Rs. 100 crores) and risk of reopening settled matters. Whether the Tarsem Singh ruling, striking down the exclusion of solatium and interest for NH Act acquisitions, operates prospectively or requires retrospective application to rectify pre-2015 disparities without disturbing final judgments. Held, the Court dismissed NHAI's plea, holding that the 2019 ruling applies to all eligible acquisitions between 1997 and 2015, mandating computation and payment of solatium and interest by competent authorities. Prospective application would nullify the intended relief and perpetuate unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Andhra Pradesh) – "Land Grabbing" - Definition of – Unauthorized Possession – Peaceful Occupation - mens rea - Whether peaceful, non-violent unauthorized possession of land constitutes "land grabbing" under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act. Held, violence or criminality is not a prerequisite for an act to qualify as "land grabbing" under the Act. Peaceful, unauthorized occupation of land without legal right falls within the ambit of "land grabbing" as per the Act. Mens rea required is the intention to illegally possess land through unlawful or arbitrary means, including for unauthorized use, construction, or creation of third-party rights. The appellant, who occupied land (Survey No. 9) without legal title despite believing he purchased an adjacent plot (Survey No. 10), was declared a "land grabber" under the Act. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision. [Para 7] V.S.R. Mohan Rao v. K.S.R. Murthy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 619 : 2025 INSC 708
Issue of non-payment of compensation to land owners whose land was acquired for the construction of a water tank. The Court expressed strong disapproval of the conduct of the State authorities, who had failed to pay the compensation despite a final award in favor of the land owners. The Court directed to ensure the release of the compensation amount, along with interest and punitive costs. The Court also mandated an explanation from the Collector and warned of contempt proceedings if the payment was not made by the stipulated date. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with these directions, and the Court clarified that its observations were not against any individual officer. Kondiram Manikrao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 54
Lease and Allotment - Difference Between - Explained - Lease is a temporary grant whereas allotment though is a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee but does not include a grant by way of a lease. Dalip Ram v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 13
Although the land acquisition compensation is to be determined at the market rate prevailing on the date of issuance of the notification regarding the acquisition of land, the compensation can be determined based on a later date in exceptional circumstances when the delay in the disbursal of the compensation has been inordinate. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2
Constitution of India - Articles 142 and 300-A – Compensation – Delay in Determination and Disbursal – Held, the appellants were deprived of their legitimate compensation for over 22 years due to the inaction and lethargy of the State and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). The delay violated the appellants' constitutional right under Article 300-A, which guarantees the right to property, mandating adequate and timely compensation for deprivation of property. The Court found that despite the statutory framework requiring prompt disbursal, the compensation was determined only in 2019 after contempt proceedings were initiated, using the market value from 2011 as the base. It was held that awarding compensation at the 2003 market value would result in gross injustice and render Article 300-A meaningless. In exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to determine compensation based on the market value as of April 22, 2019, along with statutory benefits under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the judgment and orders of the High Court's Division Bench were set aside, and the appellants' writ petition was allowed. The Court clarified that the inter se dispute between the State, KIADB, and Respondents 6 and 7 regarding the delay in compensation payment must be resolved as per the agreements between them, without affecting the appellants' entitlement. Respondents 6 and 7 were granted liberty to pursue remedies in law if aggrieved. Appeals allowed; fresh award to be determined within two months based on the 2019 market value; statutory benefits to be provided. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 11 - Under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the market value of acquired land must be determined based on the date of the Section 11 notification, as mandated by the proviso to Section 26(1). Overturning the High Court's decision to fix the valuation date as January 1, 2014 (the Act's enforcement date), the Court emphasized that the legislative intent is to ensure fair compensation reflecting the current market value at the time of acquisition. The use of "shall" in the proviso makes the Section 11 notification date mandatory for valuation, and courts lack discretion to select an alternative date. (Paras 9 - 11) Sumitraben Singabhai Gamit v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 448 : 2025 INSC 521
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 26 - Determination of Market Value - Theory of Deduction - Circle Rates - Held, theory of deduction applied under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to adjust market value for development costs, is not mandatory under the Acquisition Act, 2013. Section 26(1) mandates compensation based on the highest of: (a) market value under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899; (b) average sale price of similar land; or (c) consented amount. Explanation 4 allows the Collector discretion to adjust this value if it does not reflect actual market value, potentially applying deduction, but requires recorded reasons. Absent such adjustment, circle rates fixed under the Stamp Act govern. Public authorities must adhere to State-fixed circle rates, which citizens pay as stamp duty. Appeals dismissed emphasizing scientific fixation of circle rates for equitable compensation and governance. (Para 37 - 43) Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 364 : 2025 INSC 408
Language
Display of an additional language was not a violation of the Maharashtra Local Authorities (Official Languages) Act, 2022 and that there was no prohibition in the said Act on the use of Urdu. The purpose of the use of Urdu is merely "effective communication" and diversity in language must be respected. Varshatai v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 427 : 2025 INSC 486
Lease
Agreement to Lease - An agreement to lease does not automatically confer leasehold rights until a formal lease deed is executed. Where the Delhi Development Authority ("DDA") executed an agreement to lease in 1957 but a formal lease deed was never executed, and the property was subsequently sold through liquidation proceedings, the auction purchaser acquired only those rights, if any, held under the agreement to lease. The auction sale, conducted on an "as is where is" basis, did not confer ownership or leasehold rights upon the auction purchaser. The DDA retained the right to pursue remedies for possession and unearned income, and that any regularization of the transaction would require the auction purchaser to apply to the DDA and for the DDA to consider such application in accordance with law. Funds held in liquidation proceedings could not be appropriated for unearned income payments without considering the claims of other creditors, particularly where the liquidation was still ongoing. (Para 10 - 16) Delhi Development Authority v. S.G.G. Towers (P) Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 306 : 2025 INSC 337
Limitation Act, 1963
Need for legislative reform to ensure uniformity in limitation periods across statutes. Suggested that courts should have broader discretion to condone delays beyond the fixed condonable periods, especially in cases of genuine hardship. My Preferred Transformation & Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 49
Section 5 - Condonation of Delay - Dispute over Government Land - Liberal Approach - Substantial Justice - Although a delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical grounds of limitation. A liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays when the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. (Para 14) Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 : 2025 INSC 382
Articles 58, 59 and 65 - Suit for cancellation of a sale deed and recovery of possession - Limitation period is determined by the primary relief of cancellation, which is 3 years under Article 59 of the Act, from the date the right to sue first accrues. The 12-year limitation for possession under Article 65 is ancillary and does not apply when cancellation is the core relief. The suit, filed in 2003 for a 1992 sale deed, was deemed time-barred, as the right to sue accrued in 1992. (Referred: Rajpal Singh v. Saroj (2022) 15 SCC 260, Sopanrao v. Syed Mehmood (2019) 7 SCC 76 (Held not good law); Para 23, 30 & 31) Rajeev Gupta v. Prashant Garg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 471
Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007
The Act does not mandate automatic eviction of children from parents' homes. Eviction orders are not obligatory in every case under the Act. The primary objective is to ensure maintenance and welfare of senior citizens, with eviction permissible only in exceptional circumstances to safeguard their well-being. The Tribunal must exercise discretion judiciously, ordering eviction only when necessary. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to set aside an eviction order in a case where an elderly mother sought to evict her son from their ancestral home, citing insufficient grounds for eviction and pending civil disputes over property shares. The Court expressed concern over declining family unity and the increasing prevalence of disputes between elderly parents and their children. [Referred: S. Vanitha v. Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730; Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, (2025) 2 SCC 787; Paras 32 & 33] Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 445 : 2025 INSC 404
Eviction Authority of Tribunal - Self-Acquired Property - A 75-year-old appellant sought eviction of his son and daughter-in-law (Respondents 8 and 9) from his selfacquired property, used as a rest house, alleging encroachment, harassment, and threats of false criminal cases - Maintenance Tribunal ordered eviction; Single Judge upheld, but Division Bench set aside, suggesting rent determination - Held, Tribunal has authority under the Act to order eviction to ensure senior citizens' maintenance and protection, as affirmed by S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner and Rule 21 (2) (i) of the Bihar Senior Citizens Rules, 2012 - Property was self-acquired, not ancestral - Respondents' worsening behavior justified eviction - The appeal was allowed, and the Division Bench's order was set aside. The Tribunal's eviction order was restored. (Para 10 – 12) Rajeswar Prasad Roy v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 418
Section 23 - Requirements - Scope and interpretation of - Beneficial Legislation - Breakdown of Relations - Senior Citizens' Rights - Conditions in property transfers involving senior citizens - Tribunal's Power - Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the Tribunal's order granting relief under Section 23 - Held, the Act is a welfare-oriented statute aimed at protecting the rights of senior citizens. It must be interpreted liberally to further its objectives. For a property transfer to be void under Section 23, it must be shown that the transfer was conditional upon the transferee maintaining the transferor and that the transferee failed to fulfill these conditions. The Court noted the appellant's allegations of neglect and abuse by the respondent, holding that such behavior violated the conditions implied in the Gift Deed and related promissory note. The Court reaffirmed the Tribunal's authority under the Act to cancel property transfers and order possession transfer if necessary to protect senior citizens. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the Division Bench judgment of the High Court, and the respondent was directed to restore possession of the property to the appellant. It restored the orders of the Single Judge and the Tribunal, quashing the Gift Deed executed by the appellant in favor of the respondent. The judgment reinforced the Act's purpose of providing senior citizens with simple, expedient remedies against neglect or abuse. Tribunal Powers. Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 3
Media
The Delhi High Court directed the deletion of a Wikipedia page titled "Asian News International v. Wikimedia Foundation," stemming from ANI's defamation suit against Wikimedia, on grounds that the page's content—allegedly citing media reports and user contributions—was prima facie contemptuous and interfered with ongoing proceedings. Wikimedia challenged this order before the Supreme Court, arguing it violated principles of open justice and free speech. Whether a court may order the removal of online content reporting on sub judice judicial proceedings without establishing contempt or substantial risk of prejudice to the trial. Held, the Supreme Court set aside the Delhi High Court's order, holding that courts, as open public institutions, cannot lightly curb media or public reporting on judicial proceedings, including sub judice matters. Directions to delete or take down content are impermissible absent proof of contempt or real prejudice; such measures must satisfy the twin tests of necessity and proportionality under Sahara India Real Estate Corpn. Ltd. v. SEBI, (2012) 10 SCC 603. The High Court's broadly worded injunctions to remove "false, misleading, and defamatory content" were vague and unimplementable. Reaffirming Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1, the Court emphasized that public scrutiny via debate and criticism fosters judicial accountability and public confidence, serving as a check against caprice. Judiciary and media, as democratic pillars, must supplement each other; courts should welcome constructive criticism but act only on proven contempt. It is not the judiciary's duty to micromanage content removal, as judges cannot respond to critiques, and robust discourse—even on pending cases—is essential for systemic improvement. The order's enforcement was stayed, preserving Wikipedia's user-generated, media-sourced content as protected speech. Wikimedia Foundation Inc. v. ANI Media, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 550 : 2025 INSC 656
Medical Education
AYUSH Admissions—NEET-UG Requirement—Retention of Degrees Post-Completion of Course - Where undergraduate students were admitted to AYUSH courses without qualifying the NEET-UG 2019 examination due to lack of notice regarding the mandatory requirement, and a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court set aside a Single Judge's order permitting such admissions on grounds of inadequate publication of the NEET mandate (noting a 2018 newspaper notice and compliance by other candidates), the Supreme Court, in allowing the students to retain their degrees after course completion, held: Admissions without NEET qualification were irregular and impermissible; however, withholding examination results or degrees after students had fully completed the prescribed course would occasion immense hardship disproportionate to the initial procedural lapse. Vacating an interim order suspending result declaration, the Court emphasized equity in balancing regulatory compliance with completed academic investment, directing release of results and conferral of degrees without prejudice to regulatory actions against the admitting institution. Ebtesham Khatoon v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 219
Constitutional Law - Equality Principle - Disability Rights - Rights of Persons with Disabilities (RPwD) Act, 2016 - MBBS Admission - Reasonable Accommodation - Ableism - Functional Assessment - Whether the National Medical Commission's (NMC) guideline requiring candidates with disabilities to have “both hands intact, with intact sensations, sufficient strength, and range of motion” for MBBS admission is arbitrary and violative of the RPwD Act and Article 41 of the Constitution. Held, NMC's “both hands intact” condition is arbitrary, antithetical to the RPwD Act, and promotes ableism, violating the equality principle and the concept of reasonable accommodation. The Court allowed the appellant, a candidate with a 58% locomotor and speech disability, to secure admission to the MBBS course at Government Medical College, Sirohi, Rajasthan, and directed a functional assessment by a five-member AIIMS committee, including Professor Dr. Satendra Singh. Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256
Medical Admissions - NEET-PG Counselling - Seat-Blocking - Transparency and Fairness - Uniform Counselling Code - Aadhaar-Based Seat Tracking - Third-Party Oversight - Penalties for Violations Issues - Large-scale seat-blocking in NEET-PG counselling causing inequity and undermining merit-based selection; lack of synchronization between All India Quota (AIQ) and State counselling rounds; absence of transparent fee disclosure and uniform regulatory framework; challenge to High Court's 2018 order addressing NEET-PG aspirants' grievances from 2017-18 regarding mop-up round seat allotments. The Allahabad High Court (2018) addressed grievances of NEET-PG aspirants alleging less meritorious candidates, including those allotted seats in earlier rounds, were allowed in mop-up rounds, securing better seats (e.g., Radiology). The Court ordered Rs. 10 lakh compensation per petitioner, inquiry into admission lapses, and reforms to curb seat-blocking. The Supreme Court stayed these directions in April 2018, noting subsequent reforms, including a four-round AIQ counselling scheme (2021) following Nihila P.P. v. Medical Counselling Committee (2021 SCC OnLine SC 3283). (Paras 7, 8, 12 & 16) State of U.P. v. Miss Bhavna Tiwari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2025 INSC 747
Medical Admissions - NEET-PG Counselling - Directions - Synchronize AIQ and State counselling rounds to prevent seat-blocking. Mandate private/deemed universities to disclose tuition, hostel, caution deposit, and miscellaneous fees before counselling. Establish a Centralized Fee Regulation Framework under the National Medical Commission (NMC). Permit admitted candidates to upgrade seats without reopening counselling to new entrants. Publish raw scores, answer keys, and normalization formulae for multi-shift exams. Impose penalties for seat-blocking: forfeiture of security deposit, disqualification from future NEET-PG exams for repeat offenders, and blacklisting of complicit colleges. Prevent multiple seat holdings and misrepresentation. Hold State authorities and institutional DMEs liable for contempt or disciplinary action for rule/schedule violations. Standardize eligibility, mop-up rounds, seat withdrawal, and grievance timelines across States. Mandate NMC to conduct annual audits of counselling data, compliance, and admission fairness. (Para 16) State of U.P. v. Miss Bhavna Tiwari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2025 INSC 747
Medical Admissions - Seat-Blocking - NEET-PG Counselling - Seat-blocking distorts seat availability, disadvantages higher-ranked aspirants, and undermines merit-based selection. Systemic issues include fragmented governance, lack of transparency, and weak policy enforcement. Reforms require structural coordination, technological modernization, and robust regulatory accountability. The Supreme Court upheld the need for reforms to ensure merit, fairness, and transparency in NEET-PG counselling, reducing the High Court's compensation from Rs. 10 lakh to Rs. 1 lakh per petitioner. Noted that post-2018 reforms, including the 2021 AIQ counselling scheme, addressed some concerns but required further implementation. Established a comprehensive framework to curb seat-blocking, enhance transparency, and ensure equitable access to postgraduate medical seats. (Paras 7, 8 & 16) State of U.P. v. Miss Bhavna Tiwari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2025 INSC 747
MBBS Admission - Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - Reasonable Accommodation - Petitioner, an SC/PwBD candidate with congenital absence of multiple fingers and left foot involvement (42% disability), secured rank 176 in NEET UG 2024. Denied disability certificate and deemed ineligible for MBBS under National Medical Commission (NMC) guidelines. Held, denial of admission unjustified per Om Rathod, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 770 and Anmol, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236, which mandate assessment of disabilities with assistive devices and reasonable accommodations, and declare restrictive NMC guidelines arbitrary. The medical Board and the High Court failed to consider vital factors such as the academic excellence of the petitioner, his performance in the NEET examination, the high placement in merit and that there are assistive devices which could be used by the petitioner as a matter to ensure reasonable accommodation. NMC's ongoing guideline revision no basis to defer relief. Directed fresh assessment by five-member AIIMS Medical Board, including locomotor disability specialist and neuro-physician. (Para 19 & 20) Kabir Paharia v. National Medical Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 406 : 2025 INSC 623
Medical Council Act, 1956; Sections 13(4B), 33 - Foreign Medical Institution Regulation, 2002; Clause 8(iv) - Constitutional Validity - The Supreme Court upheld the Medical Council of India's (now National Medical Commission) regulations mandating that candidates seeking to pursue MBBS from foreign medical institutions must qualify the National Eligibility-cum-Entrance Test (NEET) to obtain an Eligibility Certificate. The requirement, introduced through Section 13(4B) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 (amended in 2001) and Clause 8(iv) of the Foreign Medical Institution Regulation, 2002 (amended in 2018), was deemed constitutional, fair, and transparent. The Court rejected the petitioners' challenge, holding that the regulations, issued under Section 33 of the Act, were neither ultra vires nor arbitrary. The petitioners' request for a one-time exemption from the NEET requirement was also dismissed, as candidates who sought admission in foreign institutions post-amendment were bound by the regulations. The Court clarified that the regulations do not restrict the right to practice medicine outside India but set essential eligibility criteria for practicing within the country. (Para 4, 5) Arunaditya Dubey v. Medical Council of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 225
Medical Education - Directions - The appellant was permitted to secure MBBS admission based on a proper functional assessment. The NMC was directed to file an affidavit on the status of revised guidelines by March 3, 2025, in compliance with prior judgments. The matter was listed for further hearing on March 3, 2025, to monitor NMC's compliance. (Para 20, 21, 25, 28, 29, 34-36, 45, 46) Anmol v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 236 : 2025 INSC 256
National Board of Examination (NBE)- NEET PG 2025 - Held, directed NBE to make arrangements to hold NEET PG 2025 in a single shift ensuring transparency. Holding exam in two shifts creates arbitrariness and also does not keep all the candidates at the same level. Any two question papers can never be said to be of an identical level of difficulty or ease. The exam is to be held all over the country, not just one city and contention that examining body could not find enough centres to hold the examination and one shift could not be accepted, considering technological advancements. Hefty examination fees of Rs. 3,500/- from general category and Rs. 2,500/- from SC/STPWD category candidate, therefore, commission has more than enough funds to hold examination in one shift in sufficient number of centres. Process of Normalisation may be applied in exceptional cases but not in a routine manner year after year. Directed Respondents to make arrangements for holding examination in one shift and also ensure that full transparency is maintained and secured centres are identified. (Para 9, 10) Dr. Aditi v. National Board of Examination in Medical Sciences, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 665
Natural Justice - Pharmacy Education - Arbitrary Rejection of Approvals by Pharmacy Council of India (PCI) - Held, statutory bodies must comply with principles of natural justice and non-arbitrariness. Approvals cannot be rejected without conducting inspections or providing an opportunity to rectify deficiencies. PCI's arbitrary actions lead to increased litigation. The Court directed the Registrar to forward the order to the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to curb such litigation, emphasizing that arbitrary rejections harm students' careers. PCI's rejection orders set aside. (Para 3, 5 & 7) Shree Ram College of Pharmacy v. Pharmacy Council of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 621
NEET-PG 2024 - The Supreme Court granted interim relief to a NEET-PG 2024 candidate denied admission to ICARE Institute of Medical Sciences and Research, Haldia, despite paying Rs. 27 lakh in fees, due to delayed reporting. The Court directed the college to allow the petitioner, a validly counselled candidate allotted a seat under the Private Management Quota in the Special Stray Vacancy Round, to commence classes from June 26, 2025. The petitioner had paid the fees online before the March 20, 2025, admission deadline, despite disputes over additional fee demands and non-issuance of a Medical Counselling Committee (MCC) card. The High Court had previously dismissed the petitioner's plea, citing late reporting on March 27, 2025. The Supreme Court's order was issued after confirming the seat remained vacant, ensuring no third-party rights were affected. (Para 13) Kadam Girish Shriram v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 688
Residence-based reservation in PG Medical Courses is constitutionally impermissible. Such reservations violate Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees equality before the law. The concept of regional or provincial domicile is alien to the Indian legal system. All citizens of the country carry a single domicile, which is the "domicile of India". Institutional preference is permissible to a reasonable extent. The Court upheld the reservation of 32 seats for students who completed their MBBS from the same institution, as it creates a reasonable classification with a nexus to the object sought to be achieved. State Quota seats must be filled strictly based on merit in the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test (NEET). The Court clarified that its decision would not affect students already admitted under the residence-based reservation, as they had completed their courses or were in the process of doing so. Higher education, especially in specialized fields like medicine, must prioritize merit to maintain national standards and development. Dr. Tanvi Behl v. Shrey Goel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 122
Medical Negligence - Hospital's Vicarious Liability for Doctor's Negligence - The Supreme Court upheld the NCDRC's ruling holding a hospital vicariously liable for a doctor's medical negligence causing a patient's death. There was sufficient evidence (medical records, treatment history) to conclude negligence, and the hospital failed to disprove negligence despite claiming adherence to standard care. The Court confirmed ₹10 lakh compensation (with accrued interest) as sufficient, considering the deceased's age and modest earnings. (Paras 10 & 15) Kamineni Hospitals v. Peddi Narayana Swami, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 453 : 2025 INSC 527
Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006
Section 18 and 19 - Maintainability of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council (MSEFC) under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act). The Court examined conflicting judgments, including Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. State of Rajasthan, 2021 LiveLaw SC 753 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Limited v. Mahakali Foods Private Limited, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893 regarding whether the MSEFC, after acting as a conciliator, could also act as an arbitrator, and whether a writ petition could be entertained against its orders. The Court also considered the mandatory pre-deposit requirement under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, which mandates a 75% deposit of the awarded amount for challenging an award. The Court expressed reservations about the absolute bar on writ jurisdiction and referred the following questions to a larger Bench of five Judges: (i) Whether the judgment in M/s India Glycols Limited, 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 992 completely bars writ petitions against MSEFC orders. (ii) If not absolute, under what circumstances the principle of alternative remedy would not apply. (iii) Whether MSEFC members, after conciliation, can act as arbitrators under Section 18 of the MSMED Act, despite Section 80 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is a constitutional right and part of the basic structure, and its exercise is not precluded by statutory remedies, especially in cases involving violations of natural justice, jurisdictional errors, or challenges to the vires of a statute. The matter was referred to a larger Bench for further consideration. Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Ltd. v. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 95
Section 8 - Filing of a memorandum under Section 8 is discretionary. Section 8 of the MSMED Act grants discretion to micro and small enterprises to file a memorandum. The Act does not mandate registration as a precondition for availing the benefits or remedies under the Act. The Court also referred to the Expert Committee Report on MSMEs, which highlighted that many MSMEs operate in the informal sector and that registration is not mandatory for availing benefits under the Act. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46
Section 8 and 18 - Whether an MSME (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise) can refer a dispute to the Facilitation Council under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 (MSMED Act) if it was not registered under Section 8 of the Act before the execution of the contract with the buyer. Interpretation of the term "any party to a dispute" under Section 18 of the MSMED Act and whether it is restricted to a "supplier" registered under Section 8. Held, registration under Section 8 is not a precondition for referring a dispute under Section 18. The phrase "any party to a dispute" in Section 18 is not restricted to a "supplier" registered under Section 8. The text, context, and purpose of Section 18 indicate that it is an open-ended remedy for dispute resolution, available to any party involved in a dispute regarding delayed payments under the MSMED Act. The Court rejected the appellant's argument that the term "any party" must be interpreted as a "supplier" registered under Section 8, emphasizing that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the Act, which is to provide an effective remedy for MSMEs. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46
Section 8 and 18 - Distinction from previous judgments - Reference to a larger Bench - The applicability of previous judgments, including Silpi Industries v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, (2021) 18 SCC 790 and Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Mahakali Foods Pvt. Ltd., 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 893, to the present case. The Court distinguished the present case from Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods, noting that the issue of whether registration under Section 8 is a precondition for invoking Section 18 was not directly addressed in those cases. The observations in those cases were made in different contexts and did not involve a detailed analysis of the statutory provisions. The Court emphasized that the decisions in Silpi Industries and Mahakali Foods were not binding precedents on the issue at hand, as the issue was neither raised nor fully considered in those cases. While the Court expressed a clear opinion on the interpretation of Section 18, it deemed it appropriate to refer the matter to a larger Bench of three Judges for an authoritative pronouncement, given the need for clarity and legal certainty on the issue. NBCC (India) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 46
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957
Whether the State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth from private lands leased by brick kiln owners, even if the ownership of the land is not vested in the State. Whether the declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, empowers the State to levy royalty irrespective of land ownership. The respondents, brick kiln owners, leased private lands and excavated brick earth for brick manufacturing. They challenged the State's imposition of royalty, contending that brick earth did not vest in the State under the Wajib-ul-arz (village land records) and that no provision in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, or the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, authorized such levies. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suits, holding that brick earth, declared a minor mineral, vested in the State under Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act. The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the respondents, holding that mere declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral did not confer ownership or royalty rights on the State. Held, the State's right to levy royalty on brick earth is independent of land ownership. Once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act, the State is empowered to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The ownership of the land is irrelevant for royalty purposes, as the Mineral Rules require a certificate of approval (Form “B”) for mining operations, and royalty is payable on the production and disposal of minor minerals. The High Court erred in focusing on land ownership rather than the State's statutory right to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The appeals were allowed, and the Trial Court's dismissal of the suits was restored. The Court clarified that it made no adjudication on the ownership of the lands in question. The State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth, irrespective of land ownership, once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Trial Court's decision was reinstated. State of Punjab v. Om Prakash Brick Kiln Owner, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 93
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988
Right to Safe Pedestrian Infrastructure – Right to unobstructed, accessible, and disabled-friendly footpaths forms an integral part of the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution – Supreme Court directs all States and Union Territories to formulate and implement guidelines for pedestrian safety, ensuring compliance with Indian Roads Congress standards and High Court directives – States and Union Territories to file compliance reports within two months – Union of India to submit policies on pedestrian rights within two months – National Road Safety Board under Section 215B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, to be constituted within six months. (Paras 1 - 6) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 643
Road Accidents - Protocols for Road Accident Victims - 8-Hour Work Limit for Drivers - The Supreme Court mandated all states and union territories to establish swift response protocols within six months to ensure immediate assistance for road accident victims, addressing delays in medical and rescue services. The Court highlighted the need for state-specific mechanisms to deliver timely aid. Additionally, under Section 91 of the Motor Vehicles Act and the Motor Transport Workers Rules, 1961, the Court directed the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways to work with states/UTs to enforce an 8-hour daily work limit for transport vehicle drivers to prevent fatigue-related accidents. The Ministry is tasked with holding meetings, considering penal measures for non-compliance, and submitting a consolidated compliance report by August 2025. (Paras 1 & 9) S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 487
Sections 140, 166, 168 MV Act - Entitlement of a married daughter and an elderly mother to compensation in a motor accident claim as dependents of the deceased. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision denying compensation for loss of dependency to the married daughter, holding that she is presumed to be financially supported by her husband or his family unless proven otherwise. The married daughter is entitled only to compensation under Section 140 as a legal representative, not as a dependent. The Court set aside the High Court's order denying compensation to the deceased's elderly mother, aged approximately 70 years, who was solely dependent on the deceased with no independent income. Recognizing the duty of a child to maintain their parent in old age, the Court awarded ₹19,22,356/- as compensation to the elderly mother, considering her dependency and potential future hardship. Appeal partly allowed. Compensation denied to the married daughter for loss of dependency but granted to the elderly mother. [Para 13 - 20] Deep Shikha v. National Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 561 : 2025 INSC 675 : AIR 2025 SC 2929
Insurer's Liability - Tractor and Trailer - Third-Party Liability - Negligence - Compensation - Whether the insurer of a tractor is liable for the death of a passenger in an uninsured trailer caused by the tractor's negligence. Held, the insurer of a tractor is liable for an accident involving an uninsured trailer if the accident results from the tractor's negligence and not from any independent fault of the trailer. A trailer, when attached to and towed by an insured tractor, is deemed an extension of the tractor, requiring no separate insurance. The Court dismissed the insurer's appeal, upholding the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal's (MACT) order directing the insurer to compensate the claimants for the death of a woman in a trailer that overturned due to the negligent driving of the insured tractor. The Court endorsed the High Court's ruling in United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Koduru Bhagyamma, 2007 SCC OnLine AP 830, confirming that a trailer attached to an insured tractor does not require separate insurance. The quantum of compensation and the insurer's liability were upheld. (Para 11 & 14) Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance v. Honnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 533 : 2025 INSC 625 : AIR 2025 SC 2641
Loss of Dependency - Unemployed Husband - Held, unemployed husband can be presumed to be partially dependent on deceased wife's income. In determining insurance compensation, the deceased's husband cannot be excluded as a dependent merely because he is an able-bodied man. In the absence of proof of the husband's employment status, his dependency on the deceased's income cannot be disregarded and would be treated as partially dependent on his wife's income. (Para 7) Malakappa v. Iffco Tokio General Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 511 : 2025 INSC 590
Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, Rule 9 - Whether the absence of the endorsement in the driver's license to drive a vehicle carrying a hazardous vehicle absolved the insurer from honouring the claim because of a breach of condition? Held, Insurer can 'pay and recover' if driver of vehicle meant to carry hazardous substance did not have endorsement under Rule 9. An endorsement under Rule 9 is mandatory in the driving license for driving a vehicle carrying any dangerous or hazardous goods. Rule 9 mandates specialized training (including defensive driving, emergency handling, and product safety) and an endorsement for drivers of vehicles carrying hazardous goods. This training is integral to safe operation, rejecting arguments that the endorsement is a mere formality. The absence of such training directly relates to driving competence, especially for vehicles designed for hazardous cargo. (Para 12, 15 & 17) Chatha Service Station v. Lalmati Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 408 : 2025 INSC 468 : AIR 2025 SC 2324
Compensation - Directions for Direct Bank Transfer of Compensation to Road Accident Victims and Workmen - The Supreme Court, in a suo motu case initiated based on a letter from a retired District Judge, issued comprehensive directions to ensure direct bank transfer of compensation to claimants under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923. Noting that over Rs 282 crores and Rs 6.61 crores remain unclaimed in Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (MACTs) and Labour Courts in Gujarat, respectively, with similar issues in other states, the Court emphasized the need to address the serious concern of unclaimed compensation. The directions include mandatory submission of claimants' bank account details, Aadhar, PAN, and email IDs; verification of bank accounts by MACTs; and direct transfer of compensation to claimants' accounts. The Court also mandated High Courts to issue practice directions, create dashboards for tracking deposited amounts, and initiate drives with Legal Services Authorities to trace claimants. These directions apply until states frame relevant rules, with compliance reports due by July 30, 2025. (Para 9) In Re Compensation Amounts Deposited with MACT and Labour Courts, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 455 : 2025 INSC 530
Contributory Negligence – Learner's License - In a motor accident claim, contributory negligence cannot be presumed merely from the driver's possession of a learner's license. The collision at the trailer's tail-end did not inherently indicate negligence by the driver. Negligence must be proved by evidence, with preponderance of probabilities as the standard. (Para 12 & 13) Srikrishna Kanta Singh v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 352 : 2025 INSC 394
Foreign Earnings - Multiplier in motor accident claims cannot be reduced on the ground that the deceased was earning in foreign currency. The multiplier is fixed on the basis of the age of the victim and cannot be altered based on the ground of foreign income. The exchange rate prevailing as on the date of the filing of the petition has to be adopted. (Para 9 & 10) Shyam Prasad Nagalla v. Andhra Pradesh State Board Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 351 : 2025 INSC 193
Discrepancy in the make of the vehicle cannot be a ground to deny a rightful claim when the vehicle's registration number and other key details are consistent and correctly mentioned. (Para 4) Parameshwar Subray Hegde v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 334
Direct Bank Transfer of Compensation - Streamlining Payment Process – Directions issued. (Para 17 - 21) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : 2025 INSC 361 : AIR 2025 SC 1713
Enhancement of Compensation - 100% Disability – The Supreme Court enhanced compensation awarded to a 21-year-old claimant who suffered 100% permanent disability (quadriplegia) in a motor vehicle accident. The Court reassessed the claimant's income, considering his qualifications and potential, and granted future prospects. Additional compensation was awarded for attendant charges, special diet, pain and suffering, future medical expenses, loss of marriage prospects, and physiotherapy. (Para 8 - 13) Parminder Singh v. Honey Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 318 : 2025 INSC 361 : AIR 2025 SC 1713
Determination of compensation – Monthly income of deceased fruit seller – Multiplier – Deduction for personal expenses – Inclusion of father and sister as dependents – Liability of insurer to pay and recover from driver and owner - Deceased, aged 24, died in a motor vehicle accident. Tribunal awarded compensation based on a notional income of Rs. 4,500 per month, deducting 1/3rd for personal expenses, and excluding the deceased's father and sister as dependents - High Court affirmed - Whether the Tribunal and High Court correctly assessed the monthly income, applied the appropriate multiplier, made the correct deduction for personal expenses, and rightly excluded the father and sister as dependents – Held, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts' assessment of the deceased's monthly income. Considering the deceased's occupation as a fruit seller, the Court adopted the minimum wage for an unskilled worker (Rs. 6,500 per month) as a basis. The multiplier of 18, as applied by the High Court, was upheld as per National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, entitling them to compensation. Therefore, the deduction for personal expenses was reduced to 1/4th. The insurance company must first pay the award and then recover from the driver and owner of the offending vehicle, as the driver lacked a valid license. The total compensation was enhanced from Rs. 9,77,200 to Rs. 17,52,500. The appeals was allowed, and the tribunals order was modified. (Para 16 & 17) Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309
Legal Representative - A legal representative is one, who suffers on account of death of a person due to a motor vehicle accident and need not necessarily be a wife, husband, parent or child. The term 'legal representative' under the Motor Vehicle Act should not be given a narrow interpretation to exclude those persons as claimants who were dependent on the deceased's income. The father and sister, being financially dependent, were legal representatives under the Act entitling them to compensation. (Para 13 – 15) Sadhana Tomar v. Ashok Kushwaha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 309
Sections 163A, 166 MV Act – The Supreme Court referred Deepal Girishbhai Soni v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2004) 5 SCC 385 to a larger bench for reconsideration. The precedent held that claimants cannot pursue compensation under Section 163A (no-fault liability) if their claim under Section 166 (fault-based liability) is dismissed. Recognizing the beneficial purpose of Section 163A, the Court questioned the precedent and referred the issue to the Chief Justice for constituting a three-judge bench. Section 163A, a social security provision, does not require proof of negligence, unlike Section 166. In this case, arising from a fatal accident, the Tribunal and High Court dismissed the claimants' Section 166 petition due to the driver's negligence and rejected their request to convert the claim to Section 163A, relying on Deepal Girishbhai Soni. The Supreme Court held that tribunals should permit conversion of claims to Section 163A in suitable cases and noted that no-fault liability could be enforced against the insurer as a third-party claim. The matter awaits reconsideration by a larger bench. (Paras 8 - 12) Valsamma Chacko v. M.A. Titto, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 271
Assessment of contributory negligence in a motor accident claim - Contributory negligence cannot be presumed on mere allegations of high-speed driving without direct or corroborative evidence. Contributory negligence must be established through direct or corroborative evidence. Tribunal's assessment of negligence, based on evidence and spot inspection, should be upheld unless demonstrably erroneous. (Para 10 & 11) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293
Assessment of Income - Income assessment in compensation cases should consider proven income as per payslips and bank statements, and not be arbitrarily reduced. The High Court had reduced the deceased's monthly income from Rs. 62,725/- (as determined by the Tribunal) to Rs. 50,000/-. The Supreme Court restored the Tribunal's assessment, holding that the deceased's last drawn salary of Rs. 62,725/- (as per pay slip) was the correct basis for calculating compensation. (Para 14) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293
Determination of just compensation - The claimants (dependents of the deceased) sought ₹3,00,00,000 as compensation before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). The Tribunal awarded ₹75,97,060 with 9% interest per annum, based on a monthly income of ₹62,725. The High Court modified the Tribunal's findings, attributing 25% contributory negligence to the deceased and reducing the assessed income to ₹50,000 per month, awarding ₹77,50,000 at 6% interest per annum. The claimants challenged the High Court's assessment of contributory negligence and reduction of income. The Supreme Court recalculated the compensation, awarding a total of Rs. 1,20,84,925/- to the appellants (claimants). This included future prospects (40% of income), deductions (1/4th for personal expenses), and application of a multiplier of 15 (based on the deceased's age of 38 years). The Tribunal's award of 9% interest per annum was upheld. The appeals were allowed, and the compensation was enhanced from Rs. 77,50,000/- (as awarded by the High Court) to Rs. 1,20,84,925/-. The impugned judgments of the High Court and Tribunal were modified accordingly. (Para 15 & 16) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293
Principles of Evidence - Standard of proof in motor accident claim cases - In motor accident claims, the standard of proof is based on the preponderance of probability, not the strict standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt used in criminal trials. (Para 13) Prabhavathi v. Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 266 : 2025 INSC 293
Disability Certified by Medical Board – Held, a disability certificate issued by a Medical Board, being expert evidence, is binding unless a reassessment is ordered by the court. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision reducing the appellant's disability from 100% to 50% without ordering a reassessment, as such re-determination lacks legal basis. The appellant, rendered comatose due to multiple injuries from a vehicular collision, was awarded Rs.48,70,000/- in compensation, reversing the High Court's enhancement from Rs.16,29,465/- to Rs.19,39,418/-. Tribunals or courts questioning a Medical Board's disability certificate must order a reassessment rather than substituting their own judgment. (Para 9) Prakash Chand Sharma v. Rambabu Saini, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 186 : 2025 INSC 180
Insurance Claim - National Permit - The appellant's truck, registered in Bihar and covered under a valid insurance policy, suffered an electrical short-circuit fire on June 8, 2014, while operating within Bihar. The insurer repudiated the claim, contending that the national permit (valid from October 14, 2012, to October 13, 2017) was invalidated due to non-payment of the state authorization fee beyond October 14, 2013. The State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bihar, allowed the claim, but the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission set it aside, holding no valid permit existed. Whether non-payment of the state authorization fee for a national permit invalidates an insurance claim when the vehicle is used solely within its home state and a valid national permit subsists. Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the NCDRC order and restoring the State Commission's decision. A valid national permit remains operative for insurance purposes even without payment of the state authorization fee, provided the vehicle operates within its registered state. Such fee is required only for inter-state movement. Here, the incident occurring in Bihar rendered the repudiation frivolous, entitling the appellant to the claim. The Court emphasized that the national permit, issued by Bihar authorities, complied with policy terms absent any out-of-state travel. Binod Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 171 : 2025 INSC 154
Constitutional Law—Legislative Competence and Repeal of Statutes—Delegation of Quasi-Judicial Powers—Motor Vehicles Act, 1988—Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 3 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 ("2003 Amendment Act"), which repealed the Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 ("1976 Act"). The 1976 Act, previously upheld by the Court, had nationalized private contract carriages under state control. The repeal, aimed at liberalizing the transport sector and addressing public transport shortages, fell within the State Legislature's plenary powers and did not require fresh Presidential assent, as a repeal extinguishes prior provisions without recreating a new framework or overriding judicial precedents. The Court further validated the delegation under Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ("MV Act"), read with Rule 56(1)(d) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ("KMV Rules"), empowering the Secretary of the State Transport Authority ("STA") to grant non-stage carriage permits (including contract, special, tourist, and temporary permits). Rejecting claims that such delegation undermined the quasi-judicial nature of permit-granting—requiring a multi-member body—the Court held that administrative law permits express statutory delegation of routine quasi-judicial functions to a single officer for efficiency, provided it is calibrated (e.g., excluding complex stage carriage permits) and subject to oversight. This delegation prevents STA overload, reduces delays, and aligns with the MV Act's intent to enhance public transport delivery without arbitrary discretion. Appeal allowed; Karnataka High Court's declaration of the 2003 Amendment Act as unconstitutional set aside. No infringement of legislative competence or delegation doctrines; repeal and delegation constitutionally sound as policy-driven reforms. S.R.S. Travels v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2025 INSC 152
The appellants, daughters of the deceased, filed claims for compensation after their parents died in a road accident involving a bus owned by Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation and a Tempo Traveler insured by Oriental Insurance Company. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded Rs. 58,24,000/- for the father and Rs. 93,61,000/- for the mother. The High Court reduced the compensation to Rs. 26,68,600/- for the father and Rs. 19,22,680/- for the mother. Whether the High Court erred in reducing the compensation awarded by the Tribunal, particularly in light of the appellants' contention that the business run by their deceased parents suffered a significant loss due to their inexperience. Held, the takeover of the deceased persons' business by dependents does not justify reducing motor accident compensation. The deceased persons' contribution to the business must be considered in assessing compensation claims. The Tribunal's award was well-considered and based on reliable evidence, including Income Tax Returns. The High Court's reduction of compensation was unjustified, as it failed to consider the appellants' lack of experience and the consequent decline in business profitability. The Court emphasized that the transfer of business ownership to the appellants did not automatically mean they could run the business as effectively as their parents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Tribunal's award, holding that the compensation was just and reasonable. S. Vishnu Ganga v. Oriental Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 132
Motor Accidents Claim - The insurance company contended that the vehicle involved was not the one insured and challenged the liability. The MACT found the insurance company, driver, and owner jointly and severally liable. The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the MACT and the High Court that the insured vehicle was involved in the accident, rejecting the insurance company's claim of ambiguity regarding the vehicle's registration number. Insurance coverage is effective from the date of premium payment, irrespective of policy issuance timing. The insurance policy was deemed effective from the date of premium payment, even if the issuance was delayed, thus covering the accident. An insurance company bears the burden of proving a breach of policy conditions to avoid liability. The allegation of fraud by the insurance company was dismissed as unproven, reiterating that fraud must be specifically pleaded and proven with evidence. Allegations of fraud require specific pleading and proof. The appeals were dismissed, affirming the compensation awarded by the MACT and upheld by the High Court. The insurance company was held liable to indemnify the owner and compensate the claimants. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Maya Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 58
Disability Assessment - Compensation for Pain and Suffering - The appellant, a diamond cutter by profession, suffered grievous injuries, including complete loss of vision in one eye, due to a collision caused by the negligence of an auto-rickshaw driver. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, had awarded Rs. 8,70,000/- as compensation, which was later enhanced to Rs. 10,57,500/- by the High Court. The Supreme Court, however, found the High Court's computation of disability at 65% insufficient, given the nature of the appellant's profession, which requires precise vision. The Court held that the functional disability should be assessed at 100%, considering the appellant's inability to continue his vocation as a diamond cutter. Additionally, the Court enhanced the compensation for "pain and suffering" from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 1,50,000/-, recognizing the profound impact of the accident on the appellant's life and career. The total compensation awarded by the Supreme Court was Rs. 15,98,000/-, with an interest rate of 8% from the date of the claim petition. Appeal was allowed modifying the compensation awarded by the High Court. Jayanandan v. Varkey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 44
Section 162 - Implementation of - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Motor Vehicle Accident Fund - Directions Issued - Despite the provision being in force since April 1, 2022, no such scheme has been formulated. The Court emphasized the importance of the golden hour in saving lives and noted that delays in treatment due to financial or procedural reasons often lead to fatalities. The Court referred to Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 286 which underscored the duty of hospitals to provide immediate medical aid to accident victims. The Court expressed concern over the lack of a scheme under Section 162(2) despite the creation of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund under Section 164-B and the framing of related rules in 2022. The draft concept note submitted by the Central Government proposed a maximum treatment limit of ₹1,50,000 and coverage for only seven days, which the Court found inadequate to achieve the objective of saving lives during the golden hour. The Court noted that 1,026 claims under the hit-and-run compensation scheme were pending as of August 31, 2024, due to documentation deficiencies. The Central Government was directed to frame and implement the scheme under Section 162(2) by March 14, 2025, and submit an affidavit detailing the implementation plan by March 21, 2025. The General Insurance Council (GIC) was directed to process pending claims based on seven essential documents and to develop a portal for streamlined claim processing by March 14, 2025. The judgment reinforces the right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution and highlights the statutory obligation of the Central Government to ensure timely medical treatment for road accident victims during the golden hour. The Court's directions aim to address systemic delays and ensure the effective utilization of the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund. The Central Government is mandated to expedite the formulation of a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, with strict compliance deadlines set by the Court. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36
Section 162 - Implementation of - Scheme for cashless treatment of road accident victims during the "golden hour" (the critical one-hour period following a traumatic injury) - Statutory Provisions - Section 162 (1) requires insurance companies to provide cashless treatment for road accident victims, including during the golden hour. Section 162 (2) obligates the Central Government to create a scheme for cashless treatment during the golden hour, which may include provisions for a dedicated fund. Section 164B establishes the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund to provide compulsory insurance cover and compensation for road accident victims, including those involved in hit-and-run cases. S. Rajaseekaran v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 36
The appellant suffered severe injuries in a motor accident resulting in 60% permanent disability. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT) awarded compensation of Rs. 19,43,800/- with 7% interest. The High Court partially allowed the appellant's appeal, enhancing the compensation for loss of income from Rs. 11,23,200/- to Rs. 27,21,600/- but did not address other heads of compensation adequately. The appellant argued that the MACT and High Court failed to consider the doctor's recommendations and the long-term impact of his disabilities. The Respondent contended that the High Court correctly assessed the notional income and future prospects, and that the compensation under other heads was adequate based on the evidence. The Court reiterated the principles laid down in Sarla Verma, Pranay Sethi, and other precedents regarding the assessment of compensation in motor accident cases, emphasizing the multiplier method and the need for uniformity. The Court found that the High Court correctly enhanced the compensation for loss of income but failed to adequately address other heads of compensation, such as future medical expenses, speech therapy, physiotherapy, and attendant charges, which were not in line with medical recommendations. The Court also noted that the compensation under non-pecuniary heads was insufficient and needed enhancement. The Supreme Court emphasized the need for a comprehensive and just assessment of compensation in motor accident cases, ensuring that all heads of compensation, including future medical needs and non-pecuniary damages, are adequately addressed. The Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 48,00,000/- to reflect the appellant's long-term needs and the impact of his disabilities. Atul Tiwari v. Oriental Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26
Motor Accident Compensation – Deduction for Personal Expenses - The High Court erred in not deducting one-third of the deceased's income towards personal expenses. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18
Motor Accident Compensation – Income Assessment - Xerox copies of Income Tax Returns - Whether the High Court erred in assessing the deceased's income without proper proof - The Tribunal rightly disregarded xerox copies of Income Tax Returns and made a reasonable estimation of income based on surrounding circumstances. The High Court's assessment of the deceased's income, though based on assumptions, was reasonable given the circumstances and the age of the deceased. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18
Motor Accident Compensation – Conventional Heads - The appeals arose from a motor vehicle accident resulting in the death of the appellant's parents and younger brother. The appellant, the legal heir of the deceased, sought enhancement of compensation awarded by the Motor Vehicles Accident Tribunal, while the insurer (respondent) sought reduction of the compensation. The Tribunal had awarded Rs. 14,78,000/- for the father's death, Rs. 13,33,936/- for the mother's death, and Rs. 2,45,000/- for the brother's death. The High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 30,58,000/-, Rs. 16,34,000/-, and Rs. 5,00,000/- respectively. Whether the High Court erred in awarding compensation exceeding the limits set under conventional heads. The Court upheld the High Court's award under conventional heads, noting that the judgment was delivered prior to the Pranay Sethi decision, which capped such awards at Rs. 70,000/-. However, the Court declined to reduce the compensation, as the difference was not excessive and the appellant had suffered significant loss. The Supreme Court dismissed all appeals, upholding the High Court's enhanced compensation, finding it just and reasonable in light of the appellant's tragic loss and the principles of just compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Sonigra Juhi Uttamchand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 18
Negligence in Motor Accident Cases - Reliability of Police Records - Fraud Allegations Unsubstantiated - Negligence is to be determined on the basis of preponderance of probabilities, not beyond a reasonable doubt. Police records, including FIRs and charge sheets, are admissible evidence for determining negligence. The Tribunal and High Court were justified in relying on such documents to conclude that the driver of the offending vehicle was rash and negligent. The appellant's contention that the respondents connived with the police to prepare a fraudulent charge sheet was rejected due to lack of evidence. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the compensation awarded by the Tribunal and affirmed by the High Court. ICIC Lombard General Insurance Co Ltd v. Rajni Sahoo, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 9
National Highways Act, 1956 - Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002; Section 23 - Highway Administration Rules, 2004; Rule 3 (amended 2019) - Duty of Central Government to maintain National Highways free from encroachments - Ineffective enforcement of statutory provisions for encroachment removal - Safety hazards due to encroachments and lack of enforcement - Petition highlighted 53,181 deaths on Indian highways in 2017 (per “Road Accidents in India – 2017” report), attributing unsafe conditions to encroachments and enforcement failures. Previous orders noted absence of mechanisms for detecting unauthorized occupations and mandated inspection and grievance redressal systems. Section 23 of the 2002 Act designates highway land as Central Government property, imposing duties to maintain highways, prevent encroachments, and ensure safety. Noted deficiencies in enforcement, unclear grievance redressal processes via Rajmargyatra app and toll-free number, and non-compliance with Rule 3 of the 2004 Rules. Directions: (i) Highway Administration to file affidavit within three months detailing compliance with Rule 3 duties; (ii) Union of India and Highway Administration to widely publicize Rajmargyatra app through print, electronic, and social media within three months; (iii) MoRTH and NHAI to report on complaints received, actions taken, and creation of grievance redressal portal within three months; (iv) Highway Administration to issue detailed SOP for highway inspection teams; (v) Union Government to form surveillance teams with State Police for highway patrolling, with compliance reported within three months; (vi) Highway Administration to consider and implement Amicus Curiae suggestions, including inspection team circulars, surveillance teams, CCTV installation, and enhancements to Rajmargyatra app and grievance portal. (Paras 6, 14) Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2025 INSC 753
Partnership Act, 1932
Section 14 - A contribution made by the partner to the partnership firm becomes the firm's property and neither the partner nor his legal heirs would have an exclusive right over the firm's property after the partner's death or retirement except the share in profit in proportion to the contribution made in partnership firm. No formal document is required to be made for transferring the property to the partnership firm, as the transfer occurs by virtue of the partner's contribution to the firm. However, a relinquishment deed could be made to formalise the transfer of property to the partnership firm. (Para 14 - 16) Sachin Jaiswal v. Hotel Alka Raje, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 342 : 2025 INSC 275
Section 69 - Effect of Non-Registration - A partner of an unregistered firm cannot institute a suit to enforce a right arising from a contract against another partner. The prohibition under Section 69(1) is mandatory and applies even if the partnership business has not commenced, as the partnership deed itself constitutes a contractual agreement. The appropriate legal remedy would have been to file a suit for dissolution of the partnership firm and rendition of accounts, which is permitted under the exception in Section 69(3). Section 69 is mandatory, and suits by partners of unregistered firms are void if enforcing contractual rights. The suit for recovery of money by the petitioners, being partners of an unregistered partnership firm, is not maintainable under Section 69(1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. Sunkari Tirumala Rao v. Penki Aruna Kumari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 99
Payment of Bonus Act, 1965
Sections 1(3)(a), 10, 11, 32(v)(a) and (c) – Workers cannot be denied bonus saying factories are run by charitable trust. (Para 16 & 19) Management of Worth Trust v. Secretary, Worth Trust Workers Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2025 INSC 432
Post-Poll Violence
Cancellation of Bail Granted by High Court to Five Accused in a Case Involving Rioting, Vandalism, Assault, and Attempted Rape - Allegations of targeted violence against a supporter of an opposition party by accused linked to the ruling party - Impact on democratic principles and fair trial concerns - The Supreme Court found the allegations grave, terming the incident a “concerted attack” to exact vengeance on the complainant for supporting the opposition, constituting an assault on democratic foundations. The Court noted the accused's influence over local police, evidenced by the initial refusal to register the FIR, and the complainant's reasonable apprehension of their clout. Prima facie evidence established that the accused formed an unlawful assembly, vandalized and looted the complainant's house, and attempted sexual assault. The trial's delay since 2022 was attributed to the accused's non-cooperation, raising concerns about potential tampering with evidence or witness intimidation. The gravity of the offences and the risk of interference with a fair trial justified bail cancellation. The High Court's bail orders were set aside. The accused were directed to surrender within two weeks, failing which coercive measures would be initiated. The trial court was ordered to conclude the trial within six months, with any stay on proceedings vacated. The Home Secretary and DGP were directed to ensure protection for the complainant and key witnesses, with any lapses to be reported to the Supreme Court. The incident reflected a “vengeful attitude” to suppress opposition supporters, undermining democratic principles. The Court held that bail cancellation is warranted when allegations shock judicial conscience or threaten fair trial integrity, with local police inaction reinforcing the complainant's fears of the accused's influence. (Paras 13–17) Central Bureau of Investigation v. Sekh Jamir Hossain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 651
Practice and Procedure
All constitutional courts in India accept oral statements made by counsels on behalf of parties, and an order cannot be reviewed solely on the ground that consent was not provided in writing. Rimpa Saha v. District Primary School Council Malda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 143
Injunction Order - Defamation case against Wikipedia - Interim injunction granted by the High Court set aside due to overly broad and unenforceable terms, lacking clarity in identifying false, misleading, or defamatory content. Liberty granted to file a fresh application for a specific interim injunction. Court criticized the practice of filing voluminous Special Leave Petitions with unnecessary documents and excessive legal citations. Wikimedia Foundation Inc v. ANI Media, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 465
Modification of Orders - Oral Mention - The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of seeking modification of judicial orders through oral mentions, particularly after a significant lapse of time, as it circumvents the established legal process of filing a formal review. Unilateral oral requests for corrections, made without notice to the opposing party, violate principles of natural justice and judicial propriety. Judicial pronouncements are expected to have stability and finality, and should not be subject to arbitrary modifications. In this case, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders, including a corrected order obtained through an improper oral mention, and restored the original writ petition for fresh hearing. The court also imposed costs on the appellant for adopting such an improper procedure. (Para 12 & 13) C.S. Umesh v. T.V. Gangaraju, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2025 INSC 298
Supreme Court Rules - Procedural Lapses by the Supreme Court Registry in accepting a counter affidavit and documents from a non-party (proposed respondent/complainant) without court permission for impleadment in a Special Leave Petition (SLP). The Court criticized the Registry for repeated lapses in accepting documents from non-parties and failing to comply with procedural rules. The Registrar (Judicial) was directed to submit a report on follow-up actions taken to address these issues. The Court emphasized strict adherence to Supreme Court Rules and directed the Registry to rectify procedural lapses. (Para 3, 6) Harmanpreet Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 181
The Supreme Court deprecated the practice of trial court judges directly communicating with its Registry to seek extensions in cases with directions for expeditious trials. The Court held such communication improper and mandated that extension requests be supervised by the High Court Registry, routed through the Registrar General or Registrar (Judicial), and forwarded to the Supreme Court. The Court noted the Madhya Pradesh High Court's Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) prohibiting direct communication and prescribing procedures for extension requests in time-bound trials. To ensure uniformity, the Supreme Court directed all High Courts to formulate similar SOPs and submit compliance reports within one month. (Paras 1–4) Durgawati @ Priya v. CBI, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 656
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988
A preliminary inquiry is not mandatory under the Act for initiating a corruption case against a public servant. The absence of a preliminary inquiry does not justify quashing a case against a public servant solely on that ground. (Para 12 & 16) State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2025 INSC 471
A public servant accused in a corruption case has no inherent right to a hearing prior to the registration of an FIR. (Para 14) State of Karnataka v. Sri Channakeshava H.D., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 412 : 2025 INSC 471
Conviction of Public Servant – Stay of Conviction – Supreme Court dismissed plea seeking a stay on the conviction of a public servant reaffirming that courts should generally refrain from staying convictions in corruption cases involving public servants. The petitioner, convicted under Sections 7, 12, and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act, had their sentence suspended by the High Court, but the conviction was not stayed. Finding no compelling reason to interfere with the High Court's decision, the Supreme Court dismissed the plea as lacking merit. Raghunath Bansropan Pandey v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 690
Section 2(c)(i), 7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) - Held, stamp vendors are "public servants" under Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act, as they perform a public duty by vending stamp papers and are remunerated by the government through discounts on stamp paper purchases, as governed by the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 and related rules. The nature of the duty, not the status of the person, determines their classification as a public servant under the PC Act. Stamp vendors perform a public duty in which the State and public have an interest, and their remuneration via discounts qualifies them as public servants under the PC Act. However, in this case, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's demand and acceptance of illegal gratification (Rs. 2 excess for a Rs. 10 stamp paper). The prosecution's reliance on trap evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the appellant's conviction under Sections 7, 13(1)(d), and 13(2) of the PC Act was set aside. The High Court's judgment affirming the Trial Court's conviction was overturned. (Para 68) Aman Bhatia v. State (GNCT of Delhi), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 520 : 2025 INSC 618 : AIR 2025 SC 3153 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 2801
Section 7 - Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023; Section 61(2) - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Denial of Anticipatory Bail – The petitioner, an audit inspector, was alleged to have demanded illegal gratification for conducting an audit. Co-accused was apprehended red-handed while accepting the bribe, and there was an audio recording corroborating the demand. Held, the High Court rightly denied anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail in corruption cases should be granted only in exceptional circumstances, such as false implication or politically motivated allegations. The Court reiterated that mere demand or solicitation of a bribe constitutes an offense under Section 7 of the Act. The Court emphasized the severity of corruption and the need to uphold public justice, stating that liberty should be denied to accused persons to ensure a corruption-free society. (Para 12, 21 & 24) Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 291 : 2025 INSC 320 : (2025) 4 SCC 493
Section 7 - Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946; Section 6 - Consent of State Government - Bifurcation of States - CBI challenged the judgment of the High Court which quashed criminal proceedings in two cases involving allegations of corruption. The respondents were accused of demanding and accepting illegal gratification while serving as public servants in the Central departments. The High Court held that the CBI lacked jurisdiction to register and investigate the FIRs in Telangana for offences committed in Andhra Pradesh, as the State of Andhra Pradesh had not granted specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The High Court also ruled that the absence of a notification designating a Special Court under the PC Act vitiated the proceedings. Held, the Supreme Court examined the impact of the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act, 2014, and the continuity of laws post-bifurcation. It held that the general consent granted to the CBI prior to bifurcation continued to apply to both Telangana and Andhra Pradesh unless explicitly repealed or amended. The Court emphasized that the CBI's jurisdiction to investigate offences under the PC Act involving Central Government employees did not require State consent, as the PC Act is a Central legislation. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment, restoring the criminal cases to the Special Judge for CBI Cases for trial. The Court clarified that the CBI's jurisdiction and the validity of the proceedings were not vitiated by the absence of State consent or notification, as the offences involved Central Government employees and were governed by Central laws. The appeals were allowed, and the quashed proceedings were reinstated, with directions for the trial court to proceed in accordance with the law. Central Bureau of Investigation v. A. Satish Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 11 : 2025 INSC 11 : AIR 2025 SC 913
Sections 7, 13(2), 19(3) and (4) - Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the Sanction Order and the consequent proceedings when the trial had already commenced and seven witnesses had been examined. Held, the High Court erred in quashing the Sanction Order and the proceedings without examining whether any failure of justice had occurred due to the alleged incompetency in granting the sanction. As per Section 19 (3) and (4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the absence or error in sanction does not invalidate the proceedings unless it resulted in a failure of justice, which was neither pleaded by the respondent nor established by the High Court. The matter of competency of the sanctioning authority is to be determined as an issue of evidence during the trial. The appellate or revisional court should not interfere with an order passed by the Special Judge on the ground of an invalid sanction unless it leads to a failure of justice, as per Section 19(3) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The appeal was allowed, and the trial proceedings were ordered to continue, reaffirming the principle that technical errors in sanction do not vitiate proceedings unless they cause a failure of justice. State of Punjab v. Hari Kesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 62 : 2025 INSC 50 : AIR 2025 SC 729
Sections 7, 13 and 20 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Necessity of Proof – Held, proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant is a sine qua non to establish guilt under Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Mere allegation of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification does not give rise to a presumption under Section 20 of the Act. A prima facie finding of corruption requires allegations containing definite ingredients for which proof can be offered at trial, giving rise to the presumption under Section 20, which is rebuttable. Misuse of authority alone, without proof of demand or acceptance of bribe, does not constitute an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. In this case, where a Minister was accused of corruption for allocating fishing contracts without following tender processes, the Court found no material in the investigation report or statements indicating demand or acceptance of bribe by the Minister, thus warranting discharge. The court clarified that the beneficial distribution of largesse to marginalised communities, even if done outside of the normal tender process, does not automatically equate to corruption. (Para 12, 21 & 22) Dileepbhai Nanubhai Sanghani v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 273 : 2025 INSC 280
Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 156(3) - Preliminary inquiry not mandatory before fir registration against public servant – Issues - 1. Whether a preliminary inquiry is mandatory before registering an FIR against a public servant under the PC Act. 2. Whether a source information report can substitute for a preliminary inquiry in corruption cases. Held, a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory before registering an FIR against a public servant under the PC Act when the source information discloses a cognizable offence. The accused has no vested right to demand a preliminary inquiry. While a preliminary inquiry may be desirable in certain cases to ascertain the commission of a cognizable offence, its necessity depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The scope of such an inquiry is limited to determining whether the information prima facie reveals a cognizable offence, not to verify its truthfulness. A detailed source information report, as in this case, can serve as a substitute for a preliminary inquiry. The High Court's decision to quash the FIR was set aside, and the FIR under Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) of the PC Act was restored. (Para 24) State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2025 INSC 229
Sections 13(1)(b), 12, and 13(2) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Section 156(3) - Reliance on Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. was misplaced, as it does not mandate a preliminary inquiry in corruption cases but allows discretion based on case-specific facts. The source information report, providing a comprehensive breakdown of the respondent's assets and income discrepancies, was sufficient to act as a preliminary inquiry. Preliminary inquiries aim to prevent unnecessary harassment while ensuring genuine allegations are not stifled arbitrarily. The State's appeal was allowed, the High Court's order quashing the FIR was set aside, and the FIR was restored. (Para 19) State of Karnataka v. T.N. Sudhakar Reddy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2025 INSC 229
Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) - Penal Code, 1860; Section 109 - Disproportionate Assets Case - Alleged Abetment by Minister's Wife - Conviction for abetting the accumulation of disproportionate assets challenged. Justice Dhulia upheld the conviction, finding active participation in acquiring properties during her husband's tenure with knowledge of his insufficient lawful income, relying on P. Nallammal v. State, (1999) 6 SCC 559, which establishes abetment by a close relative based on circumstantial evidence. Justice Amanullah set aside the conviction, holding that the prosecution failed to prove mens rea or knowledge of illicit funds, citing K. Ponnuswamy v. State, (2001) 6 SCC 674 and State v. Uttamchand Bohra, (2022) 16 SCC 663, emphasizing that mere property registration in her name does not establish abetment without evidence of conspiracy or intentional aid, and cautioning against reversing the burden of proof or undermining the presumption of innocence. Due to the split verdict, the case was referred to the Chief Justice of India for further directions. (Paras 18, 36, 39) P. Nallammal v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 545 : 2025 INSC 643
Section 13(1)(b) r/w. 13(2) - Disproportionate Assets - Income Tax Returns - Quashing of FIR - Economic Inflation - Long-Term Asset Valuation - The Appellant argued that his wife's income and other declared sources of income were not properly considered in the calculation of assets. The Appellant submitted income tax returns and other supporting documents to justify the declared assets. Held, the income of the Appellant's wife and other declared sources were not adequately considered by the Vigilance Department. It was observed that while calculating disproportionate assets over a long period (1996-2020), inflation and economic changes should be considered. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 the Court noted that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised when allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The Court found that the alleged disproportionate assets were not substantiated when the Appellant's and his wife's declared income was properly accounted for. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 90
Section 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) - LIC Officer - The appellant, a Development Officer of Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), was convicted for offenses under Sections 468, 465, 420 read with Section 120(B) IPC and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. He was found guilty of fraudulently obtaining the settlement of insurance claims by projecting the insured as deceased, despite the insured being alive. The trial court sentenced the appellant to two years of rigorous imprisonment for most offenses under the IPC and three years for offenses under the PC Act. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence. Whether the appellant could be convicted under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Held, an officer of LIC is considered a public servant under the PC Act, making them liable for offenses under the Act if corruption is proven. As a Development Officer of LIC, established under the Life Insurance Corporation of India Act, 1956, the appellant was a public servant under Section 2(c)(iii) of the PC Act. Therefore, his conviction under Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act was justified. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the conviction and sentences imposed by the trial court and upheld by the High Court. Biswajit Das v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 89
Section 13(1)(e) - Can a non-public servant be convicted for abetting offences under the Act, specifically for assisting a public servant in acquiring disproportionate assets? Held, a nonpublic servant can be convicted for abetting a public servant's offence under Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for possessing assets disproportionate to known sources of income. The Court upheld the conviction of the appellant, the wife of a former public servant, for abetting her husband by holding disproportionate assets in her name. A non-public servant who facilitates, collaborates, or holds illicit assets for a public servant is liable for abetment under Section 109 of the IPC read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court confirmed the appellant's role in accumulating assets disproportionate to her husband's known income. The appeal was dismissed, and the conviction under Section 109 IPC read with Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the Act was upheld. [Paras 13 - 15] P. Shanthi Pugazhenthi v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 558 : AIR 2025 SC 3007 : 2025 INSC 674
Sections 13(2) r/w 13(1)(e) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Validity of Sanction – Held, the High Court acted improperly by conducting a mini-trial at the pre-trial stage and quashing the case before the actual case material were brought on record. The issue of conviction prospects and invalid sanction are matters to be determined during the trial. (Para 12 & 14) State v. G. Easwaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 356 : 2025 INSC 397 : AIR 2025 SC 1848
Section 17A and 19 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 156(3) - Whether prior sanction under Section 17A of the 1988 Act is required when a Magistrate orders an investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC? In a case involving former Karnataka Chief Minister, the Supreme Court refrained from deciding the above question, as the issue is already under consideration in a pending reference (Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora). The Court directed the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for tagging with the reference, citing judicial discipline. (Para 20) B.S. Yeddiyurappa v. A Alam Pasha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 450 : 2025 INSC 515
Section 20 - Demand and Acceptance of Bribe - Trap Case - Inconsistencies in Complainant's Testimony - Hostile Independent Witnesses - Reasonable Doubt – Acquittal - Where a trap was laid based on a complaint alleging demand and acceptance of bribe by public servants for processing a license application, and the complainant's testimony regarding the amount demanded was inconsistent and contradictory to the written complaint, and the independent witnesses turned hostile and contradicted the prosecution's version of the trap proceedings, and the evidence raised reasonable doubt as to the actual acceptance of the bribe, the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court were set aside. The prosecution failed to establish the demand and acceptance of bribe beyond reasonable doubt, precluding the presumption under Section 20 of the Act. (Para 16) Madan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 310 : 2025 INSC 340 : AIR 2025 SC 1635 : (2025) 4 SCC 624
Section 20 – Mere recovery of tainted money insufficient for conviction without proof of bribe demand – Recovery of tainted money alone does not trigger the presumption of guilt under Section 20 unless the complete chain of events—demand, acceptance, and recovery—is established. Acquitting a public servant accused of demanding a ₹1,500 bribe, the Court found no proof of demand, despite evidence of acceptance and recovery. The prosecution must establish the entire chain to sustain a conviction; failure to prove demand negates the burden on the accused to disprove guilt. High Court's acquittal upheld, appeal dismissed. (Para 25 - 28) State of Lokayuktha Police, Davanagere v. C.B. Nagaraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 620 : 2025 INSC 736
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002
Accused cannot be kept in custody if order taking cognizance of Enforcement Directorate (ED) complaint has been quashed. (Para 5) Arun Pati Tripathi v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 371
Accused's right to access all relevant materials, relied upon or not, to ensure a fair trial - Procedural denials of document access cannot override the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 21. The prosecution's concern about roving inquiries was dismissed, as courts can assess document relevance and reject frivolous requests. The appeal was allowed, granting the accused access to unrelied upon documents and reinforcing their procedural and constitutional rights under the PMLA framework. (Para 56) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Applicability of Cr.P.C. to PMLA - The Court clarified that Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), which incorporates the requirement of Article 22(2), applies to PMLA proceedings by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA. There is no inconsistency between the PMLA and Cr.P.C. in this regard. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137
Duty of Courts to Uphold Fundamental Rights - The Court reiterated that when a court finds that the fundamental rights of an accused have been violated during or after arrest, it is the court's duty to release the accused on bail. The illegality of the arrest vitiates the detention, and bail cannot be denied based on the twin conditions under Section 45 of the PMLA. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the High Court's order granting bail to the respondent. The Court emphasized the importance of upholding constitutional rights and the rule of law in criminal proceedings. The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent's bail was upheld. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137
Illegal Arrest and Bail - Violation of Fundamental Rights - The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to grant bail to the respondent in a case under PMLA. The High Court had found that the arrest was illegal due to a violation of Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India, which mandates that an arrested person must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. The respondent was detained at Airport pursuant to a Look Out Circular (LOC) issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED). The ED took physical custody of the respondent on March 5, 2022, but he was formally arrested only on March 6, 2022, and produced before a magistrate later that day. The Court found that the respondent was not produced before a magistrate within 24 hours of being taken into custody, rendering the arrest illegal. The Court emphasized that the failure to produce the respondent before a magistrate within 24 hours violated his fundamental rights under Articles 21 (right to life and personal liberty) and 22(2) of the Constitution. Consequently, the arrest was deemed vitiated, and the respondent was entitled to bail. Directorate of Enforcement v. Subhash Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 137
In an effort to combat illegal activities and money laundering, the Central Government through the PMLA and the Rules, 2005, mandated that all financial and banking institutions conduct client identity verification, maintain comprehensive records, and report relevant information to the Financial Intelligence Unit – India. Pursuant to the same, the Reserve Bank of India issued the Master Direction on Know your Customer (KYC), 2016 . The Master Direction on KYC prescribes the framework for Customer Due Diligence (CDD) procedures and outlines the digital KYC process under Chapter VI and Annex I, respectively. Additionally, Clause 18 of the MD on KYC introduced the Video based - Customer Identification Process (V-CIP) enabling remote customer verification through secure, real-time video interaction. As a result, multiple sectors – including banking, telecommunications, insurance, and mutual funds – have adopted digital KYC as a mandatory component of their CDD or Customer Identification Program (CIP) obligations, thereby facilitating identity verification of prospective customers in compliance with regulatory requirements. (Para 12) Pragya Prasun v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 507 : 2025 INSC 599 : (2025) 7 SCC 191
In cases involving serious economic offences under the PMLA, such as illegal diversion and layering of funds leading to revenue losses, judicial intervention at a preliminary stage must be exercised with caution. Proceedings should not be quashed absent compelling legal grounds. Where allegations suggest significant financial misconduct, a trial is imperative to establish the full extent of wrongdoing and ensure accountability. The cascading effect of such offences necessitates a thorough judicial process to protect state revenue and legitimate investment sectors. (Para 31) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 : 2025 INSC 349 : AIR 2025 SC 1940
Offence of money laundering under PMLA is a continuing offence. Act of money laundering does not conclude with a single instance but extends so long as proceeds of crime are concealed, used, or projected as untainted property. Legislative intent of PMLA is to combat money laundering, which involves transactions spanning over time. Continued utilization and concealment of proceeds of crime, even in recent times, extends the offence. Money laundering is an ongoing activity as long as illicit gains are possessed, projected as legitimate, or reintroduced into the economy. Proceedings initiated under PMLA for continuing offences are valid. (Para 24 & 25) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 : 2025 INSC 349 : AIR 2025 SC 1940
Person need not be named as accused in complaint to retain seized property under Section 8(3). (Para 10) Union of India v. J.P. Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 338
Powers of NCLAT to Review Decisions of Statutory Authority under PMLA – The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) lacks jurisdiction to exercise judicial review over decisions of statutory authorities under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), as such matters fall within the realm of public law. In the present case, the NCLAT, in its order dated 17.02.2020 in Company Appeal No. 957 of 2019, erroneously stayed and declared illegal a Provisional Attachment Order (PAO) dated 10.10.2019 issued by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) under Section 5 of PMLA, post the approval of a Resolution Plan by the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) on 05.09.2019 under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC). The NCLAT's reliance on Section 32A of IBC, inserted w.e.f. 28.12.2019, to hold that the ED lacked power to attach assets of a Corporate Debtor post-approval of the Resolution Plan was held to be beyond its jurisdiction. As per the Supreme Court's ruling in Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors. [(2020) 13 SCC 308], neither NCLT under Section 60(5) nor NCLAT under Section 61 of IBC can review decisions under public law, including those under PMLA. Appeals under Section 61 are limited to orders passed by NCLT and, in cases of Resolution Plan approvals under Section 31, only on grounds specified in Section 61(3). Consequently, the NCLAT's findings on the PAO were declared coram non judice, being without legal authority and jurisdiction, especially as the issue was sub judice before the Supreme Court in related appeals. (Para 24 - 31) Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Steel and Power Ltd, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 524 : 2025 INSC 622
Registration of Enforcement Case Information Report (ECIR) - High Court cannot direct Enforcement Directorate (ED) to register ECIR merely on prima facie finding that predicate offence existed. (Para 5) R. Madhavan Pillai v. Rajendran Unnithan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 295
Section 19, 45 - The Supreme Court in Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576 interpreting Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and Section 19 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), held that the requirement to inform an arrested person of the grounds of arrest is a fundamental right and must be meaningfully fulfilled to serve its constitutional and statutory purpose. The Court emphasized two key aspects of Section 19(1): (1) the authorized officer must record in writing the reasons for believing the arrestee is guilty of an offence under the PMLA, and (2) the arrestee must be informed of these grounds as soon as possible. The Court clarified that providing written grounds of arrest to the arrestee is essential to avoid disputes over compliance and to enable the arrestee to seek legal counsel and challenge the arrest under Section 45 of the PMLA for bail. Failure to furnish written grounds could lead to immediate release, as seen in V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51. The Court further noted that oral communication or mere reading of voluminous grounds is insufficient, as it does not allow the arrestee, often in a distressed state, to effectively comprehend or recall the grounds for pursuing legal remedies, thereby rendering the constitutional protection under Article 22(1) and statutory mandate under Section 19(1) ineffective. (Para 10) Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 169 : 2025 INSC 162 : AIR 2025 SC 1388 : (2025) 5 SCC 799
Section 19 - Arrest under Special Acts – Judicial Review – Safeguards and Standards - In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929, held that arrests under the PMLA are subject to stringent safeguards under Section 19, ensuring accountability and preventing arbitrary actions by authorized officers. The officer must have material-based "reasons to believe" the person is guilty of money laundering, and the arrestee must be informed of the grounds of arrest promptly. Courts, when reviewing such arrests under special statutes like PMLA, UAPA, Customs Act, GST Acts, etc., should exercise judicial review sparingly, limiting scrutiny to compliance with statutory and constitutional safeguards, such as the officer's authorization, existence of material supporting the belief, and communication of arrest grounds. The sufficiency or adequacy of material forming the basis of the officer's belief is not subject to judicial review, as such arrests occur at a nascent stage of investigation. The scope of judicial review varies by case context, and parameters applicable to service-related cases do not extend to arrests under special statutes. Arrests under such Acts serve investigative purposes, including securing information, preventing interference, and maintaining law and order, as noted in Adri Dharan Das v. State of W.B., (2005) 4 SCC 303. Special Acts like PMLA aim to protect financial systems and national sovereignty, necessitating cautious judicial interference to avoid frustrating their objectives. Courts should avoid magnifying minor procedural lapses, as frequent interference may embolden offenders and undermine societal and national interests, particularly given the complex nature of modern crimes facilitated by technological advancements. (Para 9 -12) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Section 24 - Entitlement to Unrelied Documents - Whether an accused under the PMLA is entitled to access a list of unrelied upon documents and statements collected by the Directorate of Enforcement (ED) during investigation but not relied upon in the prosecution complaint. Held, an accused under the PMLA is entitled to a list of statements, documents, material objects, and exhibits not relied upon by the ED. This ensures the accused has knowledge of such materials to apply for their production under Section 91 CrPC (Section 94 BNSS) at the defence stage. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in allowing such applications, denying them only in exceptional circumstances due to the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA. (Para 30, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Section 24 - Safeguarding PMLA Burden - Given the reverse burden under Section 24 PMLA, denying access to unrelied upon documents hampers the accused's ability to discharge this burden, necessitating liberal construction of Section 233(3) CrPC to protect the accused's rights. (Para 50, 51, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Section 24 - The burden lies on the accused to prove that the proceeds of crime are not involved in money laundering, as the court presumes involvement unless proven otherwise. (Para 13) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA); Section 44 - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 218 / Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 197 - Bail – Cognizance - Sanction under CrPC s. 197 - Liquor Scam - The appellant was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) under Section 44 of the PMLA, in connection with the alleged liquor scam. The Special Court took cognizance of the offence, however, the High Court quashed the cognizance order, holding that it was taken without obtaining the requisite sanction under Section 197 of the CrPC. The High Court's order remains unchallenged, leaving no valid cognizance order in force. The appellant has been in custody for approximately one year. The appellant sought bail before the Supreme Court, relying on the quashing of the cognizance order and the principles in V. Senthil Balaji v. Deputy Director, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 750. In a parallel matter, co-accused was granted bail by the Supreme Court under similar circumstances, with the Court criticizing the ED for continued detention absent a valid cognizance order. Whether the appellant is entitled to bail in the absence of a valid order taking cognizance under PMLA, following its quashing for want of sanction, and considering prolonged incarceration. Held: - Bail granted, subject to stringent conditions. The Central Government directed to expeditiously designate a Sessions Judge as presiding officer of the Special PMLA Court in Raipur under Section 43(1) PMLA, in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court. The Court applied the twin conditions under Section 45 PMLA but emphasized the V. Senthil Balaji principles, which favor bail where: (i) no cognizance order exists; (ii) the accused has undergone substantial pre-trial detention (here, 1 year); (iii) the trial involves 20 co-accused requiring separate hearings on charges; and (iv) over 30 prosecution witnesses are cited, with a maximum sentence of 7 years. The ED's opposition, citing the appellant's influence and risk of tampering, was countered by the imposition of rigorous bail terms. The Court noted the vacancy in the Special PMLA Court and directed interim bail formalities before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, with liberty to the ED to seek cancellation for non-cooperation. The judgment underscores that detention without a valid cognizance order is impermissible, directing the ED to ensure procedural compliance for future cognizance. Anil Tuteja v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 486
Section 44(1)(b) – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 223(1) – Pre-Cognizance Hearing – Held, under Section 223(1) of the BNSS, a Special Court is required to grant the accused an opportunity to be heard before taking cognizance of a complaint filed by the Enforcement Directorate under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. The proviso to Section 223(1) of the BNSS mandates that a Magistrate shall not take cognizance of an offence without providing the accused such an opportunity. In a complaint filed under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA post-July 1, 2024, the Special Judge's failure to afford this pre-cognizance hearing renders the cognizance order liable to be set aside. The Court set aside the Special Court's cognizance order dated November 20, 2024, for non-compliance with this mandatory requirement, which was not present in the erstwhile Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Court held that the provisions of Chapter 16 (Sections 223 to 226) of the BNSS apply to PMLA complaints, and the absence of a pre-cognizance hearing justified quashing the order. The appeal was partly allowed, directing the appellant to appear before the Special Court for a hearing as per the proviso to Section 223(1). Issues regarding the scope of the pre-cognizance hearing and cognizance in supplementary complaints were left open for the Special Court to decide. Kushal Kumar Agarwal v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 642 : 2025 INSC 760
Section 45 - Bail - Trial Delay and Prolonged Custody - Prolonged detention under stringent laws like PMLA, coupled with delays violating the right to a speedy trial under Article 21, warrants bail. The Court distinguished Assistant Director v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 where bail was canceled due to shorter custody (less than seven months) and no trial delay, clarifying that the twin conditions under Section 45 of PMLA were not universally overriding when trial delays and prolonged detention were evident. The appeal was allowed, and bail was granted. [Paras 4, 5] Udhaw Singh v. Enforcement Directorate, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 229 : 2025 INSC 247
Section 45 - Money Laundering is not an ordinary offence, having a transnational impact on financial systems, sovereignty, and integrity of nations. Casual or cryptic bail orders ignoring Section 45's rigours are unjustifiable. Twin conditions - i) reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty, and (ii) the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—are mandatory, even for bail applications under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. (Para 17, 21) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028
Section 45 - Production at Bail Stage - At the bail stage under Section 45 PMLA, the accused can invoke Section 91 CrPC to seek production of unrelied upon documents. The ED may object if disclosure prejudices ongoing investigations, but courts may deny production only if satisfied that disclosure would harm the investigation. (Para 52, 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Section 50 - Mandatory Document Disclosure - Upon taking cognizance of a prosecution complaint, the Special Judge must provide the accused with: (i) Copies of the complaint and statements recorded by the Special Judge before cognizance. (ii) Documents and statements under Section 50 PMLA produced with the complaint, including those filed subsequently until cognizance. (iii) Copies of supplementary complaints and documents. (iv) A list of unrelied upon documents, statements, and material objects. (Para 55) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
Section 50 - Money laundering is an independent offence, and the accused need not be involved in the predicate offence to be summoned under PMLA. The protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) does not apply to statements recorded under Section 50 of PMLA when a person is summoned as a witness, as no formal accusation exists at that stage. (Para 18, 22) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028
The argument that proceedings under the PMLA are invalid due to the amount involved not meeting the statutory threshold of Rs. 30 lakhs (prior to amendment) is rejected. The determination of the threshold must be based on the entirety of the transaction and the overall financial trail, not isolated instances. The alleged proceeds of crime, including land allotment fraud, hawala transactions, and illegal gratification, significantly exceeded the threshold. The totality of evidence, even on a prima facie assessment, indicated that the proceeds of crime were substantially higher than the statutory limit, rendering the appellant's reliance on the threshold baseless. (Para 26 - 29) Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 311 : 2025 INSC 349 : AIR 2025 SC 1940
The Court set aside the High Court's ruling that the prosecution is not obligated to provide unrelied upon documents at the pre-trial stage, holding that such denial violates the accused's rights under Article 21. (Para 56) Sarla Gupta v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 541 : 2025 INSC 645 : (2025) 7 SCC 626
The PMLA was enacted to implement the international resolutions and declarations made by the General Assembly of United Nations, and prevent money laundering as also to provide for confiscation of properties derived therefrom or involved in money laundering. The subject matter of PMLA therefore is traceable or relatable to the Entry-13 of Union List (List-I) of Seventh Schedule. (Para 35) National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2025 INSC 694 : (2025) 8 SCC 393
The Supreme Court allowed the Enforcement Directorate's appeal, set aside the High Court's order, and remanded the case to the High Court for fresh consideration by a different bench, without expressing an opinion on the merits. The Court stressed that non-compliance with Section 45's mandatory requirements renders bail orders legally unsustainable. Courts must uphold PMLA's objectives by rigorously applying these conditions, given the serious nature of money laundering offences. (Para 17, 21) Union of India v. Kanhaiya Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 201 : 2025 INSC 210 : AIR 2025 SC 1028
Prisoners Act, 1900
Section 29 - The respondent, a life convict, serving a sentence for multiple offenses, was transferred from Hazaribagh Central Jail to Dumka Central Jail by the Inspector General of Prisons, Jharkhand citing security concerns and the risk of a gang war within the prison. The respondent challenged the transfer before the High Court, which quashed the transfer order, relying on a previous order and a character certificate issued by the Jail Superintendent. The State appealed the High Court's decision, arguing that the transfer was necessary for prison security and the safety of the respondent. Held, the transfer of the respondent was lawful under Section 29 of the Prisoners Act, 1900, and Rule 770(b) of the State Jail Manual. The Inspector General of Prisons has the authority to transfer prisoners based on administrative grounds, including security concerns. Such transfers are not arbitrary if based on tangible inputs and are necessary for maintaining prison discipline and safety. The High Court's reliance on a previous order and the character certificate was misplaced, as the respondent was now a convict, not an undertrial prisoner. The transfer was justified to prevent potential gang violence and ensure the safety of the respondent and other inmates. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the transfer order issued by the Inspector General of Prisons. The Court directed the State of Jharkhand to ensure the protection of the respondent's fundamental rights and expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual for effective prison administration. The appeal was allowed, and the transfer of the respondent was deemed lawful and necessary for prison security. The Court emphasized the importance of balancing administrative discretion with prisoners' rights and called for reforms in prison administration. State of Jharkhand v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 78
Model Prison Manual, 2016 - Prison Reforms - The Court underscored the need for prison reforms and the protection of prisoners' rights under Article 21 of the Constitution. It directed the State of Jharkhand to expedite the formulation of a Jail Manual based on the 2016 Model Prison Manual to ensure effective prison administration. State of Jharkhand v. Vikash Tiwary @ Bikash Tiwary @ Bikash Nath, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 78
Probation of Offenders Act, 1958
Section 11 - The appellant along with other accused, was convicted under various sections of IPC including Sections 148, 307/149, 326, 323/149, and 452. The High Court partly allowed the appeal, acquitted charges under Sections 307, 148, and 149 IPC but upheld his conviction under Sections 326, 325, 452, and 323 IPC, modifying his sentence. A related criminal case involving a clash between two family groups on the same day was settled amicably, and the accused in that case were granted the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. The appellant sought similar relief, citing the settlement and prolonged legal proceedings. The Supreme Court, considering the settlement between the parties, the appellant's age (70 years), and the fact that he had already served over four months of his six-month sentence, extended the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act to the appellant. The Court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and Section 11 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, directing the appellant's release on executing a personal bond of Rs. 10,000 with a surety of like amount for six months. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was granted probation under the same terms as the accused in the cross case, with an additional Rs. 100 imposed as prosecution expenses. The Court emphasized the interconnected nature of the cross cases and the need for consistency in judicial outcomes. Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 43
Section 12 - When a Court confirms a conviction but extends the benefit of probation on grounds of good conduct, it cannot deny the consequential benefit which is the removal of disqualification, if any, attached to the conviction. Amit Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 48
Procedural Law
Short-circuiting of procedure cannot be allowed - Procedural law provides the necessary legal infrastructure on which edifice of rule of law is built. Short-circuiting of procedure to reach hasty outcomes is an undesirable propensity of an overburdened judiciary. Such impulses rendering procedural safeguards and substantive rights otiose, subvert certainty and consistency in law and need to be discouraged. (Para 14) K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 515 : 2025 INSC 606
Property Law
Title through Court Auction - Validity of Subsequent Sale –The court auction sale on 04.05.1962, conducted while Somasundaram was alive, and the subsequent sale deed on 25.09.1963 vested absolute title in Padmini. Somasundaram's will (30.05.1962) could not override this, as he no longer held title at his death on 14.06.1962. Since the property was sold via court auction before the will's execution took effect, Defendant No. 1 inherited no rights, making the 1992 sale deeds to Defendant Nos. 3 to 6 void. Padmini's will (30.09.1975) explicitly bequeathed the Plaint Schedule to Vinayagamurthy and his children, not the Trust. Thus, the Trust had no claim to the property. The court justified moulding relief in favor of the executor (H.B.N. Shetty) to execute Padmini's will, citing judicial discretion to shorten litigation and ensure justice. Given the age of the surviving executor and the death of others, requiring a fresh suit would be unjust. The appellants (Defendant Nos. 3 to 6) were not prejudiced, as they fully contested the title issue. Under Article 136, the Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's exercise of discretion, emphasizing that moulding relief was appropriate to implement Padmini's testamentary intent without prolonging litigation. (Para 24) J. Ganapatha v. N. Selvarajalou Chetty Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 353 : 2025 INSC 395
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Physical Presence in DV Act Proceedings - Proceedings under the DV Act are quasi-criminal in nature and do not mandate the personal presence of a party, except in cases of breach of a protection order under Section 31. (Para 18, 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Extradition Order Quashed - The Trial Court's order directing extradition of the appellant (husband) residing in the USA, due to his non-appearance, was held untenable, especially given the illegal impoundment of his passport. (Para 20) Vishal Shah v. Monalisha Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 240
Issuance of bailable warrant - Proceedings under the D.V. Act are quasi-criminal and do not warrant such coercive measures unless there is a violation of a protection order. Alisha Berry v. Neelam Berry, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 33
Public Employment
Equality of opportunity - Public employment has to be preceded by (i) an appropriate advertisement inviting applications from eligible aspirants to offer their candidature or/and by requisitioning names of prima facie eligible candidates from the employment exchanges, (ii) screening the eligible aspirants by keeping aside the ineligible, (iii) conducting of a process of selection meeting the tests of fairness and transparency with a body of selectors constituted in accordance with the relevant law, (iv) making an impartial and bias-free selection upon due assessment of the inter se merits of the aspirants, (v) preparation of a merit list of candidates found suitable as per merit and arranging their names recognising such merit with due regard to rules of reservation, both vertical and horizontal, (vi) preparing a wait-list of candidates, if the governing rules so governing rules so require and (vii) then proceeding to offer appointments from the merit list as well as from the waiting list, if the occasion to operate such a waiting list does arise, giving due regard to merit - and merit alone. Limited exceptions are there for compassionate appointments, appointments on dying-in-harness schemes, protective discrimination schemes etc. (Para 11) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Opportunity for hearing - Contention that the members of the petitioning union were deprived of an opportunity for a hearing before the High Court - Although it is true that such members did not have an audience before the High Court, the Supreme Court has given the fullest opportunity to argue the case of the petitioning union. The petitioner, a trade union not a party to the High Court proceedings, had no enforceable right, and the absence of a prior hearing was remedied by the opportunity granted in the Supreme Court. (Para 41) Bihar Rajya Dafadar Chaukidar Panchayat v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 394
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971
Section 7 - Limitation Act, 1963; Article 52 and Section 18 - Recovery of Arrears – Effect of acknowledgment in writing - Held, the Limitation Act applies to Public Premises Act. The respondents cannot argue that only section 3 of the Limitation Act along with the limitation provided under Article 52 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act will apply and not section 18 of the same Act. Once the Limitation Act applies, all its provisions will be applicable to the proceedings under the PP Act. The High Court erred in deciding limitation without awaiting the outcome of Licensees' intra-court appeals on retrospective tariff revision, as the issues were interlinked. If the appeals are allowed by the Division Bench, there would no question of any retrospective recovery; the demands would be liable to be withdrawn. However, if the respondents fail, they would be liable to pay the demand in accordance with law alongwith admissible interest. (Para 10 - 17) New Mangalore Port Trust v. Clifford D. Souza, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 397 : 2025 INSC 440
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
Section 8 r/w. 15 and 54 – Conscious Possession – Presumption under Section 54 – Burden of Proof - The appellant was convicted under Section 8 read with Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possession of 50 kg of poppy husk. The prosecution's case rested on the recovery of the contraband from the appellant's possession while he was traveling on a train. The appellant argued that he was not in conscious possession of the contraband, claiming the cartons could have belonged to any passenger. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that the prosecution had established conscious possession. The Court emphasized that "possession" under the NDPS Act implies not just physical possession but also awareness of the nature of the substance possessed. Once physical possession is established, the burden shifts to the accused to explain how they came into possession and prove lack of awareness of the contraband's nature. The Court noted that the appellant's explanation for being found with the cartons was unconvincing. The Court further relied on Section 54 of the NDPS Act, stating that when the accused is found in possession of a prohibited article and fails to provide a satisfactory explanation, a presumption arises that the accused has committed an offense under the Act. The Court rejected the appellant's arguments and dismissed the appeal. Rakesh Kumar Raghuvanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 100 : 2025 INSC 96
Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act applies to all substances listed in the NDPS Act's Schedule, irrespective of their omission in the NDPS Rules. The accused must prove that their dealing was for authorized medical or scientific purposes and complied with the NDPS Act, Rules, or orders to avoid liability. (Para 90) Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2025 INSC 498
Section 8(c) - Whether dealing with a psychotropic substance listed in the Schedule to the NDPS Act, but not in Schedule I of the NDPS Rules, constitutes an offence under Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act. Held, dealing in a psychotropic substance like Buprenorphine Hydrochloride, listed in the NDPS Act's Schedule but not in Schedule I of the NDPS Rules, constitutes an offence under Section 8(c) of the NDPS Act unless done for medical or scientific purposes, in accordance with the Act, Rules, or orders, and with proper authorization. The Court overruled the trial court and High Court's reliance on State of Uttaranchal v. Rajesh Kumar Gupta, (2007) 1 SCC 355, affirming Union of India & Anr. v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande, (2014) 13 SCC 1, which held that all substances in the NDPS Act's Schedule are prosecutable. The charges under the NDPS Act against the Respondent were reinstated, and the High Court's decision was set aside. (Para 38, 54, 90, 156) Directorate of Revenue Intelligence v. Raj Kumar Arora, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 434 : 2025 INSC 498
Sections 8(C), 21 and 29 - Respondent was arrested by the Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) in a joint operation where 1280 grams of brown powder (allegedly heroin) was seized. Two samples sent for testing to the Central Revenues Control Laboratory (CRPL) returned negative for narcotic substances. Despite this, the NCB sought re-testing of a second set of samples, which also tested negative. The respondent was released after four months of confinement, and the NCB filed a closure report. The High Court, while adjudicating the bail application that had become infructuous, awarded Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation for wrongful confinement. Held, the High Court overstepped its jurisdiction by awarding compensation in a bail application, especially since the bail application had become infructuous due to the respondent's release from custody. Re-testing of samples, despite the first negative report, was improper, but compensation claims should be pursued under appropriate legal avenues, not in bail proceedings. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting compensation, holding it to be beyond the scope of Section 439 CrPC. Appeal partly allowed; compensation order set aside. (Para 2 & 7) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292
Section 20 – Absence of evidence linking accused to contraband - Acquittal – The appellant, a taxi driver, was convicted under the NDPS Act for the recovery of 20 kilograms of ganja from his vehicle after two passengers fled upon interception by the police. The appellant argued that he was unaware of the contraband as it belonged to the fleeing passengers. No incriminating material was found on his person, and he did not attempt to flee. Held, merely failing to provide details of the passengers, did not establish the appellant's connection to the contraband, especially since no effort was made to trace the passengers. It was unreasonable to expect a taxi driver to know the details of his passengers. The conviction was set aside as the prosecution failed to establish any direct link between the appellant and the contraband. The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was acquitted of all charges under the NDPS Act. Sri Shankar Dongarisaheb Bhosale v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 64
Sections 22 and 29 - Appeal against rejection of anticipatory bail - Allegation of recovery of 550 tablets of Tapentadol Hydrochloride from a vehicle – Tapentadol Hydrochloride is not included in the list of psychotropic substances under the NDPS Act – Accused was entitled to pre-arrest bail - Appeal allowed. (Para 7) Kulwant Singh v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 387
Section 37 - Held, bail or suspension of sentence may be granted to a convict under the NDPS Act, despite Section 37's stringent conditions, if the convict has served a significant period of incarceration and the appeal is unlikely to be heard soon. The Court dismissed the Narcotics Control Bureau's appeal, upholding the High Court's order suspending a 10-year sentence after 4.5 years of imprisonment, emphasizing that prolonged denial of bail could violate Article 21 rights. No rigid rule requires a convict to serve half their sentence for bail or sentence suspension during an appeal's pendency. Appellate courts retain discretion to grant relief based on the case's merits, as a rigid approach in fixed-term sentence cases could result in convicts serving their entire sentence before the appeal is heard, infringing Article 21 rights. [Para 5 - 7] Narcotics Control Bureau v. Lakhwinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 191 : 2025 INSC 190
Section 42 - Search and Seizure – Competency of In-Charge SHO - Held: In the absence of the designated Station House Officer, the In-Charge Station House Officer is competent to exercise powers under Section 42 of the NDPS Act, including conduct of search, seizure and arrest without warrant, provided he belongs to the category of officers empowered by the State Government notification issued under the said provision. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court order quashing the FIR on the ground that the search was conducted by an unauthorised officer (In-Charge SHO). The Court clarified that Section 42 does not require the search to be carried out exclusively by the officer actually posted as SHO; an officer holding temporary charge as SHO, duly authorised under the notification, is equally competent. State of Rajasthan v. Gopal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 552
Section 52A - Principles - Burden of Proof - Chain of Custody - Substantial Compliance - Procedural safeguards for inventorying, photographing, and sampling seized narcotics must be substantially complied with. Non-compliance alone is not fatal unless it casts doubt on the prosecution's case. The accused must first establish non-compliance with Section 52A on a preponderance of probabilities. The prosecution must then prove substantial compliance or show that non-compliance does not affect the case. Proper sealing and handling of samples are critical. Any discrepancy in the chain of custody can lead to an adverse inference against the prosecution. Minor procedural lapses do not automatically vitiate the trial if the prosecution's case is otherwise credible. Rajwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 102
Section 52A - Whether non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act vitiates the trial and conviction, especially when the seized contraband was allegedly mixed before sampling. Held; Section 52A of the NDPS Act is primarily for the safe disposal of seized contraband but also introduces procedural safeguards, including inventorying, photographing, and sampling in the presence of a magistrate. The procedure under Section 52A and related rules requires substantial, not strict, compliance. Non-compliance alone does not vitiate the trial unless it renders the prosecution's case doubtful. Inventory, photographs, and samples certified by a magistrate under Section 52A(4) are treated as primary evidence, even if the bulk contraband is not produced. The initial burden lies on the accused to show non-compliance with Section 52A. Once foundational facts are established, the prosecution must prove substantial compliance or that non-compliance does not affect the case. Procedural lapses under Section 52A do not automatically lead to acquittal. Courts must consider the overall evidence, including discrepancies, and ensure that the prosecution proves its case beyond reasonable doubt. Non-compliance may lead to an adverse inference, but it depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court found no procedural lapse in the sampling process and upheld the conviction, emphasizing that the prosecution had established the recovery and possession of the contraband beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was dismissed. Bharat Aambale v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 84 : 2025 INSC 78 : (2025) 8 SCC 452
Section 52A - The appellant was convicted under Section 15 of the NDPS Act for possessing poppy straw. The Special Court sentenced him to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment and imposed a fine of Rs. 1 lakh. The High Court upheld the conviction. The prosecution's case was based on the recovery of poppy straw from a car driven by the appellant, following a tip-off about his involvement in drug peddling. The co-accused was acquitted by the High Court. Whether the conviction was vitiated due to non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act, which mandates procedural safeguards for the disposal, inventorying, and sampling of seized narcotics. Held, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant failed to establish non-compliance with Section 52A of the NDPS Act. The Court emphasized that the initial burden lies on the accused to show non-compliance on a preponderance of probabilities. In this case, no questions were raised during cross-examination regarding Section 52A, and no evidence was presented to prove procedural lapses. The Court also distinguished the case from Mohammed Khalid vs. State of Telangana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 183 where the conviction was set aside due to multiple loopholes in the prosecution's case, including tampering concerns. Here, the samples were properly sealed, and the chain of custody was intact. The appellant was directed to surrender to serve the remaining sentence. Appeal dismissed. Rajwant Singh v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 102
Section 51 - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - No Specific Bar under NDPS Act - Whether a vehicle seized under the NDPS Act can be released to its owner during the pendency of the trial. The appellant owned a truck purchased on an EMI basis, which was his sole source of income. The truck was stopped at a police checkpoint, and 24.8 grams of heroin were found concealed in the vehicle. The main accused was arrested, but the appellant and his driver were not implicated in the crime. The appellant sought the release of the truck, which had been lying unused at the police station, citing natural wear and tear. The High Court dismissed the appellant's petition, leading to the present appeal before the Supreme Court. Appellant relied on Sections 451 and 457 of Cr.P.C. and precedents to argue for the interim release of the vehicle, emphasizing that the appellant was not involved in the crime and that the vehicle was deteriorating in police custody. The State contended that the NDPS Act is a special law that does not permit interim release of vehicles used in drug trafficking, as they are critical evidence and may be reused for illegal activities. Held, the Court found no explicit prohibition in the NDPS Act against the interim release of seized vehicles. Section 51 of the NDPS Act allows the application of Cr.P.C. provisions, including Sections 451 and 457, for the custody and disposal of property. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241
Section 51 - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - Four Scenarios of Seizure - The Court identified four scenarios where contraband is seized from a vehicle: (i) Owner or agent is the accused. (ii) Vehicle is stolen by the accused. (iii) Contraband is found with a third-party occupant without the owner's knowledge. The Court held that in the third and fourth scenarios, where the owner is not implicated, the vehicle should normally be released on interim custody with appropriate conditions. The Court rejected the State's argument that vehicles should not be released due to the risk of reuse, noting that such a stance would lead to absurd outcomes, such as seizing private planes or ships used unknowingly in drug trafficking. Keeping the vehicle in police custody would serve no purpose and only lead to its deterioration. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241
Section 51 - Interim release of vehicles involved in NDPS cases - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the trial court to release the vehicle to the appellant on interim custody under the following conditions: (i) The vehicle must be videographed and photographed, with the inventory authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner, and accused. (ii) The appellant must furnish an undertaking not to sell or transfer the vehicle until the trial concludes. (iii) The appellant must surrender the vehicle or pay its value if directed by the court after the trial. The Court emphasized that the release of the vehicle would benefit the owner, the financier, and society at large, while ensuring that the vehicle remains available for trial purposes if needed. This judgment clarifies that vehicles seized under the NDPS Act can be released to their owners during the pendency of the trial, provided the owner is not implicated in the crime and appropriate conditions are imposed to safeguard the interests of justice. The decision balances the stringent provisions of the NDPS Act with the practical need to prevent unnecessary hardship to innocent vehicle owners. Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 30 : 2025 INSC 32 : AIR 2025 SC 549 : (2025) 3 SCC 241
Section 69 - Protection of action taken in good faith - The Court refrained from commenting on the protection afforded to NCB officers under Section 69 of the NDPS Act, which shields officers acting in good faith from prosecution. (Para 8) Union of India v. Man Singh Verma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2025 INSC 292
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Section 138 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Sections 2(wa), 372, 378 (4), 378 (6) - Dishonour of Cheque - Special Leave to Appeal - Appeal against order of acquittal – Victim's right to appeal - Whether an appeal would be maintainable under the proviso to section 372 of CrPC against an order of acquittal passed in a case instituted upon a private complaint under section 138 by treating complainant in such a proceeding as a victim under section 2(wa) CrPC – Held, a complainant in a cheque dishonour case for the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is a “victim” within the meaning of section 2(wa) of CrPC. The complainant can proceed as per the proviso to section 372 CrPC. Complainant need not invoke section 378(4) CrPC and could file appeal as 'victim' as per section 372 proviso. (Para 7.11) Celestium Financial v. A Gnanasekaran, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 666 : 2025 INSC 804
Section 141 – Dishonour of Cheque – Liability of Company Directors – Held, a complaint under Section 141(1) does not require specifying the precise administrative role of directors to establish liability for cheque dishonour. General averments that a director was "in charge of and responsible for" the company's business are sufficient at the complaint stage, without needing verbatim statutory language. The complainant must only plead the accused's role generally, as specific administrative details are within the special knowledge of the company or director. The burden lies on the director to prove they were not in charge during the trial. Magistrate's order issuing process upheld; High Court's order quashing proceedings set aside. [Paras 34–38] HDFC Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 624 : 2025 INSC 759 : AIR 2025 SC 2707
Section 138 - Application of Res Judicata in Criminal Proceedings - The principle of res judicata applies to criminal proceedings, barring re-litigation of issues conclusively determined in earlier proceedings. Factual findings by a criminal court are binding on both parties in subsequent proceedings involving the same issue. However, res judicata does not apply to proceedings dismissed as withdrawn or not decided on merits. The Court quashed subsequent cheating case under Section 420 IPC, as prior proceedings under the NI Act established that demand drafts were issued for distinct liabilities, unrelated to the dishonoured cheques, rendering the new prosecution an abuse of process. [Paras 19 & 20] S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 436 : 2025 INSC 493
Section 138 - Complainant has no onus to prove financial capacity at the threshold. Once the drawer admits to signing the cheque, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act cannot be rebutted merely by questioning the complainant's debt-giving capacity, especially when such a defence was not raised in the reply notice by the accused. The High Court wrongly imposed an initial burden on the complainant to prove financial capacity and loan details. (Para 21 & 22) Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2025 INSC 427 : AIR 2025 SC 1931
Section 141 - A signatory of a cheque, if in charge of a firm's affairs, can be prosecuted without impleading the firm. Since the accused was the signatory and a partner in charge, the complaint was maintainable without impleading the firm. (Para 19 & 20) Ashok Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 383 : 2025 INSC 427 : AIR 2025 SC 1931
Section 138 - Reply to the Statutory Notice - This was a case where very material documents in the form of two letters addressed by the appellant were suppressed in the complaint and the statement on oath under Section 200. In the statement on oath, the respondent-complainant vaguely referred to a 'false notice reply', but a copy of the reply was not produced by the respondent along with the complaint. Setting criminal law in motion by suppressing material facts and documents is nothing but an abuse of the process of law. Hence, the High Court ought to have interfered and quashed the complaint. Complaint and cognizance order set aside, leaving civil remedies open. (Para 20 - 23) Rekha Sharad Ushir v. Saptashrungi Mahila Nagari Sahkari Patsansta Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 355 : 2025 INSC 399 : AIR 2025 SC 1857
Section 138 – Return of a dishonoured cheque simpliciter does not create an offence under Section 138 NI Act. The cause of action arises only when a demand notice is served and payment is not made within the stipulated fifteen-day period. (Para 9) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2025 INSC 346 : AIR 2025 SC 1741
Section 138 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 & 17 - Where the cause of action for an offence under Section 138 NI Act arises after the imposition of a moratorium under Section 14 IBC, proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act cannot be initiated against the Director of the Corporate Debtor. Upon the imposition of a moratorium and the appointment of an Interim Resolution Professional (IRP) under Section 17 of the IBC, the management of the Corporate Debtor vests in the IRP, and the powers of the Board of Directors are suspended. Consequently, the Director lacks the capacity to fulfil the demand raised by a notice under Section 138 NI Act. The judgment in P. Mohan Raj v. M/s Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258 is distinguishable, as in that case, the cause of action under Section 138 NI Act arose before the imposition of the moratorium. Proceedings under section 138 of the NI Act are quashed, when the cause of action arises after the imposition of moratorium, and the director of the company has been suspended from his duties, and the IRP has taken over the management of the company. (Para 11 - 13) Vishnoo Mittal v. Shakti Trading Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : 2025 INSC 346 : AIR 2025 SC 1741
Section 138 - Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act can be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction? Held, a complaint under Section 138 of the N.I. Act cannot be transferred under Section 406 Cr.P.C. for lack of territorial jurisdiction. Power to transfer cases under Section 406 Cr.P.C. is discretionary and must be exercised sparingly. Mere inconvenience or hardship to the accused, such as travel or language barriers, does not justify transfer unless there is a reasonable apprehension of injustice. (Para 49 & 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328
Section 138 - Whether the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. encompasses cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction under Section 138 of the N.I. Act? Held, the phrase “expedient for the ends of justice” in Section 406 Cr.P.C. does not include cases where the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328
Section 138 - Transfer of Trial – Principles - Whether the Supreme Court can transfer a case under Section 406 Cr.P.C. if the court where the complaint is filed lacks territorial jurisdiction? Held, lack of territorial jurisdiction alone not sufficient ground. Broad factors to be considered include: (i) Prosecution acting in collusion with the accused. (ii) Likelihood of accused influencing witnesses or causing harm to complainant. (iii) Comparative inconvenience and hardship to parties and witnesses. (iv) Communally surcharged atmosphere affecting fair trial. (v) Hostile persons interfering with the course of justice. These factors are illustrative, not exhaustive. Ensuring a fair trial is the paramount consideration. (Para 49) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328
Section 138 and 142 (2) - Petitioner sought the transfer of a criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act by Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. from the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chandigarh, to the Metropolitan Magistrate, Coimbatore, Tamil Nadu. The petitioner argued that the entire transaction, including the loan processing, EMI deductions, and SARFAESI proceedings, occurred in Coimbatore, and no cause of action arose in Chandigarh. The petitioner also cited inconvenience, language barriers, and harassment as grounds for transfer. The Supreme Court reiterated that under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act, as amended in 2015, the jurisdiction for complaints under Section 138 lies with the court where the cheque is delivered for collection through the payee's bank account. The court in Chandigarh had jurisdiction as the cheque was presented for collection there, even if the transaction occurred in Coimbatore. The petitioner's grievances did not meet the threshold for transfer, as the Chandigarh court had valid jurisdiction under Section 142(2) of the N.I. Act. The Supreme Court dismissed the transfer petition, holding that no case was made out for transferring the proceedings from Chandigarh to Coimbatore. It is always open for the petitioner accused to pray for 2 exemption from personal appearance or request the Court that he may be permitted to join the proceedings online. (Para 65) Shri Sendhuragro and Oil Industries v. Kotak Mahindra Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 292 : 2025 INSC 328
Section 138 - Territorial Jurisdiction - Transfer Petition – Maintainability - The issue of lack of territorial jurisdiction in complaints filed under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is a matter to be raised before the Trial Court. The Magistrate has the power to return the complaint for presentation to the proper court if satisfied that the court lacks territorial jurisdiction. Therefore, the issue of territorial jurisdiction cannot be adjudicated in a transfer petition. (Para 2 & 3) Kamal Enterprises v. A. K. Constructions Co, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 289
Section 138 r/w. 141 – Vicarious Liability of NonExecutive Directors – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Held, Non-executive and independent directors cannot be held vicariously liable under Section 141 of the NI Act for dishonor of cheques unless specific allegations demonstrate their direct involvement in the company's affairs at the relevant time. Mere designation as a director or attendance at board meetings does not create automatic liability. The complaint must contain specific averments establishing a direct nexus between the directors and the financial transactions in question. In the absence of such specific allegations and where records confirm a non-executive role without financial decision-making authority, criminal proceedings under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act against non-signatory, non-executive directors are liable to be quashed. (Para 16 & 18) K.S. Mehta v. Morgan Securities and Credits Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 286 : 2025 INSC 315 : AIR 2025 SC 1607 : (2025) 7 SCC 615
Section 141 - Vicarious Liability of Directors - Twin Requirements for Prosecution – Held, for an offence under Section 141 of the N.I. Act, 1881, involving dishonour of a cheque by a company, the complaint must allege that the accused person was both in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. These are distinct requirements, and both must be explicitly stated in the complaint. Only the signatory of the cheque can be held liable, and in the absence of allegations that the appellant was in charge of the company's business, prosecution under Section 141(1) cannot be sustained. The Court set aside the High Court's order dismissing the appellant's plea to quash the complaint and allowed the appeal, without commenting on the merits of the case against other accused. (Para 5) Hitesh Verma v. Health Care at Home India Pvt. Ltd;, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 176 : (2025) 7 SCC 623
Section 138 – Dishonour of cheque – Liability of Director – Resignation before issuance of cheque – Quashing of complaint – Held, where the appellant had resigned from the post of Director prior to the issuance of post-dated cheques by the company, and the cheques were signed by another competent person, the appellant could not be held liable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It was undisputed that the appellant resigned on 21.06.2019 and the resignation was acknowledged by the Registrar of Companies on 26.06.2019, whereas the cheques were issued on 12.07.2019. Therefore, the appellant was not in charge of or responsible for the affairs of the company at the relevant time. The judgment of Malva Cotton and Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Virsa Singh Sidhu (2008) 17 SCC 147 was distinguished on facts, as in that case, the resignation was submitted after the issuance of the cheques. The appeals were allowed, and the impugned order of the High Court dismissing the petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was set aside. The complaints under Section 138 NI Act against the appellant were quashed. Appeals Allowed. Adhiraj Singh v. Yograj Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 75
Section 142 - Whether the High Court was justified in quashing the complaint under Section 138 NI Act on the ground of lack of specific averments regarding the personal knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the complaint and supporting documents. The High Court relied on the decision in A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790 to hold that the power of attorney holder lacked personal knowledge of the facts giving rise to the proceedings, as there were no specific pleadings to that effect in the Letter of Authority or affidavits. However, a conjoint reading of the Letter of Authority, the verifying affidavit, and the affidavit of evidence under Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. demonstrated that the manager and power of attorney holder of the appellant-firm, had personal knowledge of the transactions and was duly authorized to file the complaint. The complaint satisfied the requirements of Section 142 of the NI Act as it was filed by the payee through its authorized representative. The High Court's reliance on inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the complaint was unwarranted and contrary to the settled principle that such powers should be exercised sparingly and not interfere with a fair trial. The High Court erred in quashing the complaint based on incorrect reasoning and lack of due consideration. The appeal was allowed, and the complaint was restored to the file of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate for adjudication on merits. Appeal allowed. Judgment and order of the High Court quashed and set aside. Complaint restored for fresh adjudication. Naresh Potteries v. Aarti Industries, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1 : 2025 INSC 1 : AIR 2025 SC 886
Preventive Detention
A mere reference to a past narcotics case, not forming the basis of the present detention order, does not vitiate the order, especially when used only to highlight the detenu's propensity to engage in illegal activities. (Para 10) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 - Grounds for Detention - Non-application of Mind - Grant of Bail - Failure to Consider Bail Conditions – Effect - Where a person is detained under the COFEPOSA Act based on allegations that are the same as those in a criminal prosecution where the person has been granted bail with specific conditions, the detaining authority must consider the efficacy of those bail conditions. Failure of the detaining authority to examine whether the bail conditions imposed by the jurisdictional magistrate are sufficient to curb the alleged activities, which form the basis of the preventive detention, amounts to a non-application of mind. While courts cannot scrutinize the reasonableness of the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction, they must ensure that the authority has indeed applied its mind to relevant factors, including existing bail conditions. When there is a grant of bail with conditions, the detaining authority has to consider if those conditions are sufficient to prevent the detenu from indulging in the activities that the preventive detention is trying to prevent. The court allowed the appeal and set aside the detention order, directing the detenu's release, due to the detaining authority's failure to consider the bail conditions. (Para 16 - 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Non-supply of an application for cancellation of bail, which was filed after the detention order was passed and not pursued by the department, does not render the detention order illegal. (Para 12) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Preventive detention should not be used merely to circumvent bail granted by a competent court when the ordinary criminal law is sufficient to address the situation. (Para 21) Joyi Kitty Joseph v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 298
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012
Application in Consensual Adolescent Relationships - The Supreme Court emphasized a nuanced application of the POCSO Act in cases involving consensual romantic relationships between adolescents, prioritizing the best interests of the victim and her dependents. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778
Life Imprisonment - While conviction under both IPC and POCSO Act may be justified, the High Court erred in enhancing the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court to "imprisonment for the remainder of natural life" in an appeal against conviction. Courts have discretion to award life imprisonment under Section 376(2)(f) and 376(2)(i) of the IPC, but it is not mandatory that it extend to the remainder of the convict's natural life. In cases where life imprisonment is deemed appropriate but a fixed term is considered insufficient, courts may impose a modified sentence specifying a fixed period beyond 14 years. In this case the sentence of life imprisonment awarded by the trial court was reinstated, but without the addition that it will enure till the natural life of the appellant, along with a fine of 5,00,000/- to be paid to the victim. (Para 28 & 31) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972
Real-Time Data Collection - The Court supported proposals for a structured mechanism to track POCSO cases, sex education implementation, counseling services, and child marriage monitoring to enhance institutional accountability and transparency. A notice was issued to the Union of India to form a committee to address these suggestions. States and Union Territories were directed to ensure compliance with POCSO and Juvenile Justice Act provisions, with compliance reports to be submitted to the Ministry of Women and Child Development. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778
Section 6 - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Sections 376(3), 376(2)(n) - Victim, now married to the accused and living with him and their child, did not perceive the incident as a crime. The victim's trauma resulted more from the legal process, societal judgment, and family abandonment than the incident itself. A committee report confirmed that the legal and social consequences caused greater harm than the act. The Court criticized deficiencies in the legal system and societal attitudes, acknowledging the victim's emotional attachment to the accused and her desire to protect her family. Previously, the Court had set aside controversial High Court remarks on adolescent sexuality, restored the conviction, and issued guidelines on judgment writing and compliance with the POCSO Act and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. The Court directed the government to provide educational and financial support to the victim and her child, with assistance from the State Legal Services Authority. Invoking Article 142, the Court refrained from sentencing the accused due to the unique circumstances, as the victim opposed punishment to preserve her family. (Paras 23, 24) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778
Section 7 - Sexual Harassment of Students - Quashing of FIR - High Court's Insensitive Approach - Restoration of Criminal Proceedings - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order quashing an FIR against a computer teacher accused of sexually harassing students, predominantly female, in a government-aided school. The Court criticized the High Court for conducting a "mini-trial" and erroneously concluding that the accused's actions lacked sexual intent under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. The allegations, including inappropriate physical contact, invasive questions, and sending vulgar images, prima facie constituted offenses under the POCSO Act, necessitating a trial. The Court noted the High Court's insensitive approach, particularly as many victims belonged to minority communities, and directed the trial court to proceed expeditiously, treating victims as protected witnesses. The accused was ordered to remain suspended during the trial and prohibited from contacting victims or witnesses. The High Court's interpretation that Section 7 requires physical contact with sexual intent was incorrect, as the teacher's actions, given their position of authority, provided sufficient grounds to infer sexual intent. The Court expressed concern over the accused's influence, including a purported settlement with one victim and the police's initial failure to record all victims' statements. The school was directed to maintain the accused's suspension and permitted to conduct an independent domestic inquiry. (Paras 2, 3, 4) X v. Rajesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 498 : 2025 INSC 579
Section 8 - Penal Code, Section 363, 376(2), 302 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 3 - Rape and Murder of a Three-Year-Old Girl - The prosecution's case, relying on an alleged extra-judicial confession and last seen evidence, was found deficient. The extra-judicial confession, based on the accused's statement of being “tensed up,” lacked corroboration and was omitted from the witness's Section 164 Cr.P.C. statement, rendering it unreliable. Witness testimonies on last seen circumstances were inconsistent, delayed, and tainted by ulterior motives and trial-stage improvements. Gross negligence by Investigating Officers, including delayed recording of witness statements despite early identification in the spot panchnama and withholding of critical FSL reports comparing samples from other suspects, warranted an adverse inference. The prosecution's evidence, based on conjectures, failed to meet the burden of proof. Emphasizing the weak nature of extra-judicial confessions and the need for robust investigations in heinous crimes, the Court set aside the conviction, acquitting the accused after nearly 12 years of incarceration, including 6 years under a death sentence. (Paras 59, 60, 75 & 76) Ramkirat Munilal Goud v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : AIR 2025 SC 3186 : 2025 Cri.L.J. 3027 : 2025 INSC 702
Section 42 - Sentencing - Overlapping Offences - Where acts constitute offences under both the POCSO Act and the IPC, the law providing for the greater degree of punishment applies. (Para 19 & 21) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972
Section 42A - No plea for a lesser punishment under the POCSO Act can be entertained if the IPC prescribes a higher punishment for certain offences by arguing that Section 42A, as a special law, overrides the IPC, which is considered a general law. (Para 22) Sentencing – Enhancement of - High Court erred in enhancing sentence in absence of appeal for enhancement by state The High Court had clarified that the life imprisonment awarded by the trial court would mean imprisonment for the remainder of the appellant's natural life. While the trial court had the discretion to award life imprisonment, the High Court could not enhance the sentence in an appeal filed by the accused, especially without an appeal for enhancement by the State. (Para 27) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972
Section 42A - Overriding effect - Section 42A of the POCSO Act, which gives overriding effect to the POCSO Act in cases of inconsistency with other laws, pertains to procedural aspects and does not override the substantive provision of Section 42 regarding punishment. (Para 22) Gyanendra Singh @ Raja Singh v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 299 : 2025 INSC 335 : AIR 2025 SC 1972
Sex Education Reforms - The Court endorsed amici curiae suggestions for comprehensive sexuality education to address adolescent health, misinformation, and stigma, referencing UNESCO's 2021 Global Status Report on the need for systematic policy reforms and inclusive curricula. The Union Ministry of Women and Child Development was directed to constitute an expert committee to evaluate these suggestions, with a report due by 25 July 2025. (Paras 15, 31) In Re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 617 : 2025 INSC 778
The Supreme Court directed the Union and State Governments to prioritize establishing Special POCSO Courts and ensure compliance with statutory timelines for investigation and trial. The Court emphasized sensitizing officials involved in POCSO cases and mandated timely filing of chargesheets and completion of trials as per the Act. While acknowledging compliance by several States with Central Government funding, the Court noted deficiencies in Tamil Nadu, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Odisha, and Maharashtra, where high case pendency necessitates additional POCSO Courts. Previous orders from July 2019 mandated exclusive POCSO Courts in districts with over 100 pending cases, appointment of Special Public Prosecutors, and adherence to investigation and trial timelines. The Court also proposed exploring a National Scheme for victim compensation under the POCSO Act. (Para 6) In Re Alarming Rise in the Number of Reported Child Rape Incidents, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2025 INSC 695
Public Prosecutor
Regularisation of Contractual Appointment – No statutory or constitutional right to regularisation when appointment adheres to structured procedure under CrPC, 1973 and State Rules –The petitioner, an Additional Public Prosecutor appointed on a contractual basis, sought regularisation through a writ petition, which the High Court dismissed. The petitioner had previously requested continuation in contractual capacity for livelihood. The Supreme Court found no error in the High Court's decision, as the petitioner failed to establish any legal right to regularisation. SLP dismissed, upholding High Court's rejection of writ petition. (Para 3) Anupam Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 692
Railways Act, 1989
Disputes On Consignment Excess Weight - Advancement of Technology - Whether an opportunity of hearing ought to be given before imposing penalty on account of excess weight being detected in a consignment – Held, it was not possible for the railways to issue show-cause notice before imposing a penalty for excess weightage - It would be practically difficult for appellant-Railways to issue a show cause notice to the consignor or consignee and to hold a mini-trial to determine the question of excess weightage and compensatory charges - Relied on Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills Vs. Chief Commercial Superintendent, N.R. and others (1998) 5 SCC 126 - that a demand for penal freight without prior notice was not violative of Article 14 of the Constitution - Court directed appellant-Railways to upgrade and update themselves with the advancement of technology - Suggested appellant-Railways to use mechanisms like automatic videography of loaded weight along with weight measurement at the time of off-loading, to avoid litigation. In case, any consignor or consignee disputes the liability towards charges for excess weightage, such electronically collected proof can be supplied to redress the grievances - Court made observations to sensitize the appellant-Railways and set aside order passed by High Court wherein it was held that an opportunity of hearing ought to be given before imposing penalty on account of excess weight, citing it as 'obsolete and redundant'. [Paras 8, 10-13] Union of India v. Megha Technical and Engineers Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 670
Section 66 - Railways empowered to impose penalties for misdeclared goods even after delivery of consignments. No specific timing for imposing charges under Section 66; legislative intent permits levy at any stage. High Court's ruling set aside, which held penal charges cannot be levied postdelivery. Distinguished Jagjit Cotton Textile Mills v. Chief Commercial Superintendent N.R., (1998) 5 SCC 126, as dealing with Section 54(1), not Section 66. Appeal allowed, Railways can recover misdeclaration penalties post-delivery. (Para 14) Union of India v. Kamakhya Transport Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 683 : 2025 INSC 805
Section 143 - Scope of - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Whether the creation of multiple/fake user IDs by an individual (authorized or unauthorized) to procure and supply railway e-tickets through the IRCTC portal constitutes an offence under Section 143 of the Railways Act, 1989. Whether the criminal proceedings in the two sets of appeals were rightly quashed by the High Courts. The Managing Director of a finance company was accused of creating fraudulent user IDs to procure and sell railway e-tickets without authorization. The Kerala High Court quashed the criminal proceedings, holding that Section 143 did not apply to online ticket sales as the provision predated the internet era. Connected Appeals, an authorized railway ticket agent, was accused of creating multiple user IDs to procure and sell e-tickets for illegal gain. The Madras High Court refused to quash the proceedings, holding that such actions violated Section 143. Held: Section 143 prohibits unauthorized persons (not being railway servants or authorized agents) from carrying on the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets, irrespective of the mode (physical or online). The provision is broad enough to cover technological advancements like e-ticketing, even if such developments were not contemplated when the Act was enacted. The Kerala High Court erred in holding that Section 143 was inapplicable to online ticket sales. The criminal proceedings were wrongly quashed by the Kerala High Court. Being an unauthorized agent, prima facie committed an offence under Section 143 by creating fake user IDs to sell tickets. The Supreme Court restored the proceedings against him. J. In connected appeals as an authorized agent, the accused could not be prosecuted under Section 143 for creating multiple user IDs, as the provision does not criminalize such actions by authorized agents. The Madras High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings was overturned, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. The lead appeal was allowed, and the criminal proceedings were restored. The connected appeals were allowed, and the criminal proceedings were quashed. Section 143 is a penal provision aimed at preventing unauthorized procurement and supply of railway tickets, regardless of the mode of sale. Authorized agents cannot be prosecuted under Section 143 for breaches of contract terms; such disputes must be resolved through civil remedies. The Kerala High Court's interpretation of Section 143 as inapplicable to online ticket sales was erroneous. Inspector, Railway Protection Force v. Mathew K. Cherian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 42
Recruitment
Caste Certificates in the specific format - The appellants, belonging to the Other Backward Classes (OBC), applied for recruitment to posts advertised by the Uttar Pradesh Police Recruitment and Promotion Board (UPPRPB). The recruitment advertisement required submission of OBC caste certificates in the specific format prescribed by the State Government; certificates in the central government format would result in treatment as unreserved candidates. The appellants submitted certificates in the central format, leading to rejection of their reservation claims and placement in the unreserved category. Their writ petitions before the High Court were dismissed, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court. Whether a candidate can claim reservation benefits under a recruitment advertisement without submitting a caste certificate in the exact format prescribed therein, merely by virtue of belonging to the reserved category. Held, No. Strict compliance with the format prescribed in the recruitment advertisement is mandatory for claiming reservation. Non-compliance justifies rejection of the candidate's reserved status claim, treating them as unreserved, and courts will not interfere post-commencement of the selection process absent exceptional circumstances. Affirming the High Court's decision and relying on Registrar General, Calcutta High Court v. Srinivasan Prasad Shah, (2013) 12 SCC 364, the Court held that certificates must be issued by the competent authority in the prescribed format; deviation triggers adverse consequences on candidature. The recruiting authority is the best judge of the process, and candidates bear the responsibility to fully comprehend and adhere to notification terms. Failure to seek clarification or obtain the correct format constitutes a "calculated chance" that cannot later be challenged as a mere technicality. The Court dismissed the appeals, refusing relief to the appellants. Mohit Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2025 INSC 704
Eligibility - Higher Qualification - Though over-qualification by itself is not a disqualification, there is no general rule that candidates with qualifications higher than the basic qualification required for a post must be preferred. There is no straight-jacket rule that candidates with higher qualifications must be selected over those with possessing the basic qualification. Each case will depend on its facts, the rules governing the selection process, the nature of duty to be performed etc. It has to be remembered that, at times, the employer's need to have the right people at the right place, and not always the higher qualified, has to be conceded. (Para 27 & 36) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425
Eligibility - Higher Qualification - Allowing Master degree holders to apply for peon posts may result in injustice. There are decisions holding that overqualification is not a disqualification. However, it cannot be given a universal application. Allowing highly qualified persons to apply for jobs requiring lesser qualifications may lead to injustice in some situations. (Para 36) Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381 : 2025 INSC 425
Educational Qualification - A candidate possessing a higher degree of qualification cannot be rejected solely because a lower degree of qualification is required for a particular post. (Para 32) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2025 INSC 372
In 2010, the Jharkhand government issued an advertisement for Class-IV employee posts, which omitted the number of vacancies, failed to specify applicable reservations, and later introduced an interview component not mentioned in the original notice. Appointments were made pursuant to this process. The Jharkhand High Court terminated several appointees without affording them a hearing, prompting appeals to the Supreme Court. Whether a recruitment process marred by constitutional infirmities can be declared null and void ab initio, justifying the quashing of all appointments—including those where candidates had joined service—without compliance with principles of natural justice (i.e., audi alteram partem). Held, The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's order, declaring the entire 2010 recruitment process illegal and unconstitutional under Articles 14 (equality) and 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment) of the Constitution. The process was quashed in toto, with directions to the State to issue fresh advertisements within six months. No hearing was required for appointees, as their selections were a nullity in law. An advertisement and recruitment process that contravenes constitutional mandates (e.g., arbitrariness in vacancy details, reservations, or procedural changes mid-process) renders the entire exercise void ab initio. Every subsequent action, including appointments, is illegal and liable to be set aside wholly, irrespective of third-party rights created (e.g., service entry or years of employment). Beneficiaries of an unconstitutional "back-door" process cannot claim equitable protection or hearing rights when the illegality is exposed; their tenure is contingent on the advertisement's validity. Courts retain plenary jurisdiction to annul such appointments without prior notice to affected parties. Public recruitment is a state obligation under Articles 14 and 16, demanding unwavering fairness, transparency, and impartiality. Arbitrariness strikes at equality's root; while no absolute right to appointment exists, the State cannot act capriciously. Violations invite judicial intervention to safeguard fundamental rights, with the process held to constitutional bounds. Reinforces judicial power to nullify flawed public employment processes ex post facto, prioritizing constitutional compliance over administrative convenience or individual equities. Directs systemic reforms to prevent arbitrary state actions in hiring. [Relied on: Union of India v. Raghuwar Pal Singh, (2018) 15 SCC 463] Amrit Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 180 : 2025 INSC 176
Recruitment Process - Reservation – Punjab Civil Services (Reservation of Posts for Women) Rules, 2020 – Advertisement for Recruitment – Scheduled Caste Sports Category – Horizontal Reservation – Roster System – Change in Recruitment Rules Midway – Held, reservation notified in advertisement cannot be cancelled by subsequent roster change. The recruitment process, governed by the 2020 Rules mandating 33% horizontal reservation for women, was valid. The roster system introduced on 29.01.2021, after the application deadline, could not retrospectively alter the terms of the advertisement. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the High Court Division Bench's order remanding the matter for fresh adjudication. The Court upheld the Single Judge's order dismissing the private respondent's writ petition, which sought to quash the reservation of a Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) post for 'Scheduled Caste Sports (Women)' under Advertisement No. 14 dated 11.12.2020. The appellant, being the only qualified female candidate in the 'SC Sports (Women)' category, was entitled to the DSP post. The private respondent, who participated without protest and applied under a different category, could not claim the reserved post. [Relied on: K. Manjusree v. State of A.P., (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864; Para 21 - 24] Prabhjot Kaur v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 425 : 2025 INSC 479
Registration Act, 1908
Section 11 (5) - Maharashtra Ownership Flats (Regulation of the Promotion of Construction, Sale, Management and Transfer Act) 1963 (“MOFA”); Section 11(4) - Deemed Conveyance - Writ Court Interference - Scope of powers of the registration officer - Held, the competent authority under the MOFA has the power to grant deemed conveyance to flat purchasers when developers fail to execute formal conveyance. The MOFA, as welfare legislation, protects flat buyers from developer malpractices. High Courts, exercising writ jurisdiction, should refrain from interfering with deemed conveyance orders under Section 11(4) unless manifestly illegal, as such orders do not preclude aggrieved parties from pursuing civil suits. The competent authority's proceedings are summary in nature, requiring reasoned orders, and the registering officer's role is limited, with no appellate power over such orders. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision upholding deemed conveyance to a co-operative housing society. (Para 35 & 37) Arunkumar H Shah Huf v. Avon Arcade Premises Co-Operative Society, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 447 : 2025 INSC 524
Sections 23, 34 – Unregistered Sale Agreement – Validity of Title – Subsequent Registration – Held, an unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title, even if a subsequent instrument based on it is registered. Nonregistration of the 1982 sale agreement, as required under the Registration Act, cannot be cured by validation in 2006 without a fresh transaction. Section 23 mandates presentation of a document for registration within four months from its execution, with Section 34 allowing condonation of delay for an additional four months upon payment of a fine. The unregistered 1982 agreement is incapable of conferring title, and the High Court erred in granting protection from dispossession based on it. Appeal allowed; High Court's decision set aside. (Para 22) Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646
Unregistered Sale Agreement – Title and Possession – An unregistered sale agreement does not confer valid title or entitle the claimant to protection from dispossession. The Supreme Court, in an appeal against a High Court Division Bench order, set aside the restraint on dispossession by Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (TSIIC). The respondents' claim, based on an unregistered 1982 sale agreement executed by a General Power of Attorney holder, was invalid. Unregistered agreements are not recognized as valid instruments for transferring immovable property. The respondents failed to establish valid title or rightful possession. The Single Judge's decision denying protection from dispossession was restored. [Relied on: Suraj Lamp & Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656. (Paras 17 & 25)] Mahnoor Fatima Imran v. Visweswara Infrastructure, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 679 : 2025 INSC 646
Section 49 - Admissibility of an unregistered agreement to sell as evidence in a suit for specific performance – Held, an unregistered agreement to sell is admissible as evidence to prove the existence of a contract in a specific performance suit under the proviso to Section 49 of the Registration Act, 1908. The proviso allows such documents to be used as evidence of a contract or collateral transaction, despite being unregistered. (Para 9, 10, 11) Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652
Section 49 - The appellant relied on an unregistered agreement to sell (dated 01.01.2000) in a suit for specific performance, claiming part payment and possession of the property by the respondent, who failed to execute the sale deed. The trial court and High Court dismissed the suit, citing inadmissibility under the Stamp Act and Registration Act, as registration of such agreements is mandatory in Tamil Nadu due to a State amendment. Held, an unregistered document can be used to prove an oral agreement of sale in a specific performance suit, not as evidence of a completed transfer. The document was admissible under Section 49 to establish contract formation, not title. The Supreme Court set aside the lower courts' findings, allowed the appeal, and permitted the appellant to introduce the unregistered agreement as evidence of the oral agreement of sale. [Para 10] Muruganandam v. Muniyandi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 549 : 2025 INSC 652
Section 69 – Registration of transfer document cannot be refused on ground that vendor's title deeds aren't produced or established. It is not the function of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority to ascertain whether the vendor has title to the property. The Act does not authorize the Registering Authority to deny registration of a transfer document on the ground that the vendor's title documents are not produced or that their title is unproven. Even if a person executing a sale deed or lease does not have title to the property, the registering authority cannot refuse to register the document, provided all procedural requirements are met and applicable stamp duty and registration fees are paid. (Para 11 & 15) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462
Section 69 – Registration Rules (Tamil Nadu); Rule 55A(i) - As per Rule 55A(i), the person seekig registration of a document was mandated to produce the previous original deed as per which he acquired title and encumbrance certificate. Unless this Rule is complied with, the document will not be registered. It was not within the mandate of the Sub-Registrar or Registering Authority under the 1908 Act to verify whether the vendor has valid title. Therefore, the Court struck down as unconstitutional Rule 55A(i) of the Tamil Nadu Registration Rules as inconsistent with the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908. Impugned High Court judgments relying on Rule 55A(i) quashed. Sale deed to be registered upon procedural compliance within one month. Appeal allowed. (Para 16 - 19) K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 402 : 2025 INSC 462
Religion
Freedom of Religion Act, 2018 (Uttarakhand) - Sections 3/5 - Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 - Sections 318(4) and 319 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Bail application - Supreme Court granted bail to appellant who was arrested by the police under anti-conversion law following his marriage to a woman belonging to another religion – Marriage was consensual with the approval of their respective families - State cannot object to appellant and his wife living together in consensual case - Pending criminal proceeding cannot come in the way of appellant and his wife residing together on their own volition - Granted bail to appellant - Set aside order of High Court and Appeal allowed. Aman Siddiqui @ Aman Chaudhary @ Raja v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 678
Mere performance of another religion's rituals does not ipso facto amount to professing that religion or renouncing one's original faith. A. Raja v. D. Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 537 : 2025 INSC 629
Rent Control & Eviction
Landlord-Tenant Dispute - Mesne Profits - Determination of rate and interest - Held and affirmed the High Court's conclusion regarding mesne profits in a longstanding landlord-tenant dispute but modified the interest rate from 8% to 6 % per annum. The dispute concerned the 'per square foot rate' for mesne profit calculation for Respondent's occupation as a tenant. (Para 12) Mohit Suresh Harchandrai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 663
Delay in Adjudication - Judicial Concern and Directions - Court expressed deep concern over the dispute lasting over two and a half decades. It highlighted that landlords were deprived of monetary fruits from their property for a quarter-century. Held, that such delays cause suffering to both landlords (deprivation of property/dues) and tenants (large sums payable at once). The application for mesne profits, as the order of the Small Causes Court itself reflects, took 11 years and more to decide. The Court requested the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court to obtain a report on the pendency of landlord-tenant disputes in concerned courts and to take appropriate steps for their expeditious disposal if many such instances are found. (Para 13, 14) Mohit Suresh Harchandrai v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 663
Landlord-Tenant Disputes - Stay of Trial - Expeditious Disposal - Directive to High Court – The Supreme Court directed the Allahabad High Court to prioritise and expedite the disposal of appeals, revisions, and original petitions where trial proceedings have been stayed, particularly in landlord-tenant disputes. The Court emphasized out-of-turn hearings to avoid delays in concluding such matters. The order was issued in a case where a landlord sought expeditious hearing due to a stay on eviction proceedings. The Supreme Court noted the pendency of numerous petitions but stressed the need for prompt resolution in cases where trials are stayed, to prevent prolonged delays. A copy of the order was directed to be placed before the Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court for compliance. Rajat Gaera vs Tarun Rawat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 490
Tenancy Laws - Eviction - Landlord and Tenant - Bona Fide Requirement - Family Needs - Tenant's Failure to Seek Alternative Accommodation - No Large-Scale Business by Tenant - The landlord sought eviction of the tenant, who occupied the property for 73 years, including 63 years post-lease expiry, citing the property's need for his disabled, unemployed son. The tenant claimed hardship but failed to demonstrate efforts to secure alternative accommodation. The landlord's family owned no other property, and their business was not substantial enough to negate the bona fide need. Held, a landlord's bona fide requirement under tenancy laws includes the needs of family members, not solely the landlord. The tenant's hardship claim was dismissed due to lack of evidence of attempts to find alternative accommodation during prolonged litigation. The tenant's objection, based on alleged business operations, was rejected as no significant business was proven to counter the landlord's claim. The Court allowed the landlord's appeal, upholding the eviction as the need was genuine and the tenant's objections unsustainable. [Referred: Mohd. Ayub v. Mukesh Chand, (2012) 2 SCC 155; Paras 25 & 28] Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Uttar Pradesh), Section 21(1)(a) and 21(7) - Bona fide need - Comparative hardship - Landlord-tenant dispute - Legal representatives - Held, under Section 21(7), legal representatives of a deceased landlord can prosecute an eviction application based on their own need, substituting the original landlord's need. The objection to the maintainability of the appeal by the legal representatives was rejected. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564
Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (Uttar Pradesh), Proviso to Section 21(1)(a) - Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972; Rule 16(2) - Comparative Hardship - Despite the tenant's long possession (73 years, including 63 years post-lease expiry), the tenant's multiple business ventures, inherited properties, and lack of effort to seek alternative accommodation tilted the balance in favor of the landlord. The tenant's claims of business losses and pending partition suits were insufficient to outweigh the landlord's pressing need. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564
Appellate Authority's Error - The Appellate Authority's reversal of the Prescribed Authority's findings was unsustainable, as it failed to provide convincing reasons to dislodge the evidence-based conclusion of bona fide need. The assumption that the landlord had substantial business interests was not supported by documentary evidence, and the Prescribed Authority's findings on the landlord's limited income were consistent with the record. Murlidhar Aggarwal v. Mahendra Pratap Kakan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 476 : 2025 INSC 564
Landlord-Tenant - Eviction - Bona Fide Need - Landlord's discretion in selecting premises - Appeal against the dismissal of an eviction suit – Held, a landlord is the best judge to determine which tenanted premises best suits their bona fide need, and a tenant cannot dictate that the landlord seek vacation from alternative properties merely for the tenant's convenience. The Court allowed the landlord's appeal, setting aside concurrent findings of the trial court and High Court, where the eviction was sought to establish an ultrasound machine business for the landlord's two unemployed sons. The suit premises was deemed most suitable due to its adjacency to a medical clinic and pathology center, with the landlord proving financial capacity and genuine need to augment family income. The tenant's objection based on the landlord's ownership of other properties was rejected, emphasizing that bona fide need must be real, not a mere whim, but once established, the landlord's choice of premises is unassailable. (Para 10 - 12) Kanahaiya Lal Arya v. Md. Ehshan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2025 INSC 271
Rent Control Act, 1999 (Maharashtra) - Landlord-tenant relationship terminates only upon the passing of the eviction decree. Accordingly, mesne profits are to be calculated from the date of the decree. Amritpal Jagmohan Sethi v. Haribhau Pundlik Ingole, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 400
Res Judicata
Quasi-judicial bodies are also bound by the principles of res-judicata to prevent re-litigation on the same issue. Once a Competent Authority (quasijudicial in nature) settles an issue, that determination attains finality unless it is set aside in accordance with law. Any quasi-judicial Authority would not ordinarily have the power to unilaterally take a contrary view taken by a coordinate or predecessor authority at an early point in time. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order which had upheld the second order passed by the quasi-judicial body despite the first order passed by the quasi-judicial body was not followed and remained unchallenged. (Para 10 - 13) Faime Makers Pvt. Ltd. v. District Deputy Registrar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 379 : 2025 INSC 423 : (2025) 5 SCC 772
Section 11 CPC - Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 – Principle of Res Judicata – Constructive Res Judicata - Finality in judicial and administrative proceedings - Disgorgement and Restitution - Misleading advertisements and fraudulent share transactions - Whether the principle of res judicata applies to proceedings under the SEBI Act, 1992, particularly in cases where SEBI seeks to issue multiple orders on the same cause of action? The Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, affirming that the principle of res judicata, including constructive res judicata under Explanation IV to Section 11, CPC, applies to SEBI's quasi-judicial proceedings. SEBI, having foregone disgorgement in 2014, could not revisit the same cause of action in 2018, rendering the later order unsustainable. [Referred: Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, (1999) 5 SCC 590; Amalgamated Coalfields Ltd. v. Janapada Sabha, AIR 1964 SC 1013; Para 28 - 31] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Ram Kishori Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 401
Right to Information Act, 2005
A request to disclose the marks obtained by other candidates in a public examination under the Right to Information Act, 2005, in the public interest, cannot be declined. Public Information Officer and Registrar v. Onkar Dattatray Kalmankar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 210
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
Jurisdiction of Civil Courts vs. Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) - Whether the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the validity of a sale deed and mortgage deed, or whether such matters fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the DRT under the SARFAESI Act. Held, Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale deed and mortgage deed, as these matters do not fall within the scope of the DRT's powers under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT is only empowered to examine whether the measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act are in accordance with the law, and it cannot adjudicate on title disputes or the validity of documents executed prior to the invocation of the SARFAESI Act. The DRT's powers are limited to restoring possession to the borrower or someone claiming through the borrower. It cannot hand over possession to a third party who was never in possession. The DRT also lacks jurisdiction to decide on the validity of sale deeds or mortgage deeds, which are matters for the civil court. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96
Section 2 (f), 11 - Exclusion of Lender-Borrower Disputes - Section 11 does not apply to disputes where one bank or financial institution is a borrower, as defined under Section 2(f) of the SARFAESI Act, which includes entities receiving financial assistance by creating a security interest. (Para 124 (iv)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 - Statutory Arbitration - Whether the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT) has jurisdiction to adjudicate inter-creditor disputes under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, or whether such disputes must be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the Act read with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Held, Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act mandates arbitration for disputes between banks, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies, or qualified buyers concerning securitization, reconstruction, or non-payment of dues, including interest. No explicit written arbitration agreement is required, as the provision creates a legal fiction of deemed consent for arbitration. (Para 124 (v)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act creates a legal fiction by using the word 'as if,' which presumes the existence of an arbitration agreement among the designated parties. This provision negates the requirement for a formal written arbitration agreement. Appeal dismissed; dispute to be resolved through arbitration under Section 11 of the SARFAESI Act read with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. (Para 106) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 - Twin Conditions for Arbitration: For Section 11 to apply, (i) the dispute must involve banks, financial institutions, asset reconstruction companies, or qualified buyers, and (ii) it must relate to securitization, reconstruction, or non-payment of dues. If these conditions are prima facie satisfied, DRT lacks jurisdiction, and arbitration is the sole recourse. (Para 124 (ii)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 - Scope of Non-Payment - The phrase “non-payment of any amount due, including interest” in Section 11 is broad, encompassing disputes arising from borrower defaults, including conflicts over priority of charges over secured assets. (Para 124 (iii)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 - Mandatory Nature - The use of “shall” in Section 11 makes arbitration mandatory, and parties cannot bypass this by seeking recourse elsewhere. (Para 124 (vi)) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 - Overruling Prior Precedent - The Court clarified that earlier decisions requiring express consent for arbitration (e.g., Federal Bank Ltd. 2 v. LIC Housing Finance Ltd., 2010 SCC OnLine DRAT 138) are overridden by the statutory fiction under Section 11. (Para 107) Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 11 - Bank of India (BOI) and Punjab National Bank (PNB) claimed rights over the same hypothecated stock of M/s Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., which defaulted in 2015. BOI approached the DRT, which ruled in its favor in 2017. The DRAT overturned this in 2019, citing lack of DRT jurisdiction and directing arbitration. The Delhi High Court upheld DRAT's view in 2020. The Supreme Court dismissed BOI's appeal, affirming arbitration as the appropriate recourse. Bank of India v. Sri Nangli Rice Mills Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2025 INSC 765 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1911
Section 18 - Pre-Deposit - Appeals against procedural orders of the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the SARFAESI Act, 2002, do not mandate a pre-deposit as required under Section 18 for appeals to the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). The Court set aside High Court order affirming a DRAT directive requiring a Rs. 125 crore pre-deposit for an appeal against a DRT's procedural order rejecting an application by auction purchasers to be impleaded in a securitization application. Emphasizing that the phrase "any order" in Section 18 should be interpreted meaningfully, the Court clarified that pre-deposit obligations typically apply to final orders determining liability, not procedural orders like the one in question. The matter was remanded to the High Court for reconsideration. (Para 14 - 16) Sunshine Builders and Developers v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 459
Section 34 - The respondent filed a civil suit seeking a declaration that a sale deed and mortgage deed were null and void, and for possession of the suit property. The property was allegedly sold by her brother-in-law without her consent, and the buyer mortgaged it to the Central Bank of India. The Bank filed an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, arguing that the civil court had no jurisdiction due to Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act, which bars civil courts from entertaining matters that the DRT is empowered to decide. The trial court rejected the plaint, but the High Court reversed this decision, holding that the civil court had jurisdiction to decide the validity of the sale and mortgage deeds, as these matters were outside the scope of the DRT's powers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that the civil court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The Court emphasized that the DRT's powers are limited and do not extend to adjudicating on title disputes or the validity of documents. The civil suits were allowed to proceed, and the interim orders were vacated. Central Bank of India v. Smt Prabha Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96
Service Law
Disciplinary Action – Fake Transfer Order – Non-Supply of Preliminary Inquiry Report – Natural Justice – Prejudice Requirement – Clarity of Chargesheet – Whether disciplinary action can be challenged for non-supply of a preliminary inquiry report on grounds of violating natural justice without proving grave prejudice. The appellant, a Hindi-trained graduate teacher at Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, was dismissed for securing a transfer from Bangalore to Mumbai using a fake transfer order dated 01.10.1991. Her challenges before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bombay High Court, and Supreme Court were dismissed, upholding the disciplinary action. Held, Disciplinary proceedings cannot be set aside for non-supply of documents, such as a preliminary inquiry report, unless the delinquent employee demonstrates grave prejudice. Mere technical violations do not breach natural justice principles. The chargesheet clearly alleged the appellant's use of a fake transfer order, enabling effective defense. The Court reaffirmed three natural justice principles: (i) Audi Alteram Partem (right to a fair hearing), (ii) Nemo Judex in Causa Sua (no bias), and (iii) reasoned decisions (speaking orders). Non-supply of documents violates these principles only if it causes grave prejudice. The appellant, who participated in a regular departmental inquiry with evidence from both sides, failed to show prejudice from non-supply of the preliminary inquiry report or other documents. The 9-year inquiry duration, spanning multiple locations, was justified, with no evidence of prejudice or tampering, and the appellant received subsistence allowances. The transfer order was proven fake, with the appellant as the sole beneficiary. The disciplinary authority followed due process, sharing reasons for disagreeing with the inquiry officer and seeking the appellant's response. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the dismissal order, as no violation of natural justice was established. [Referred: Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727, Paras 18–26] S. Janaki Iyer v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 655 : 2025 INSC 742
The Supreme Court directed the State of Uttarakhand to pay Rs. 89 lakhs, in addition to Rs. 11 lakhs already disbursed, to the family of a deceased doctor killed by assailants in a hospital while on duty. The Court noted that a proposal by the Chief Secretary to pay Rs. 50 lakhs as ex-gratia, approved by the Chief Minister, was not honored, with only Rs. 1 lakh initially paid citing rules. Despite subsequent payments and benefits like family pension, gratuity, and compassionate appointment to the deceased's son, the Court found the High Court's compensation calculation using the multiplier method unjustified. Emphasizing the gravity of the incident and nine years of litigation, the Court quantified the total compensation at Rs. 1 crore, including interest, to be paid within six weeks. (Para 5) State of Uttarakhand v. Sarita Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 348
Annual Increment for Retirees – Held, government employees are entitled to an annual increment earned the day before retirement, as per Director (Admn and HR) KPTCL v. CP Mundinamani (11.04.2023). This entitlement applies prospectively to third parties from 01.05.2023, with enhanced pension including one increment payable from that date. No enhanced pension is payable for the period before 30.04.2023. For employees who succeeded in prior writ petitions, the judgment operates as res judicata, entitling them to enhanced pension with one increment as per the judgment, unless the judgment is under appeal and not final. Retired employees who filed applications for intervention, impleadment, writ petitions, or original applications before the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), High Courts, or Supreme Court are entitled to enhanced pension with one increment for the three years prior to the month of filing, as per modified direction issued on 20.02.2025. Applications filed after Union of India & Anr. v. M. Siddaraj (19.05.2023) are governed by the prospective application rule and not the modified direction. Excess payments or arrears already made will not be recovered. Aggrieved parties may approach relevant authorities for non-compliance and, if necessary, the CAT or High Court as per law. Union of India v.. M. Siddaraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 258
Out of 51 sanctioned lecturer posts at Motilal Nehru Government Polytechnic College, Puducherry, 45 were filled on an ad hoc basis, despite the introduction of recruitment rules in 2006 - Respondent Nos.1-3 were appointed ad hoc in 2005 and sought regularization with back benefits. The Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Madras Bench, and Madras High Court granted relief, citing parity with 15 similarly situated lecturers who had obtained prior CAT orders (upheld by the High Court and Supreme Court in 2007) for regularization - The Union of India (UoI) and Directorate of Technical Education, Puducherry, appealed, citing UPSC's refusal to regularize "illegal" appointees. No recruitment process was initiated post-2006 rules, despite the lecturers' unblemished service and qualifications - In 2007, the Supreme Court had directed a scheme for regularizing casual lecturers, but compliance lapsed, with UPSC obstructing the 15 prior cases despite past regularizations in other Puducherry institutions. Issues 1. Whether ad hoc lecturers, appointed pre-2006 rules and serving without blemish, are entitled to regularization despite UPSC's objection to "illegal" appointments. 2. Validity of prolonged ad hoc engagements without legitimate recruitment, in defiance of court orders and statutory rules. 3. Accountability for systemic non-compliance and illegal appointments in public employment. Held, Regularization Ordered: Invoking extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to secure "complete justice," the Court directed the Government of Puducherry to regularize the services of all 18 lecturers (15 prior + 3 respondents) forthwith, without UPSC involvement. This overrides exploitative delays, as the lecturers possessed requisite qualifications and had served since 2005. Critique of Authorities: Described the situation as a "very sorry state of affairs." Lamented UPSC's "audacious" stance against a subsisting 2007 Supreme Court order and non-compliance by Puducherry authorities. Noted failure to initiate recruitment post-2006 rules, enabling prolonged ad hoc exploitation. Precedential Clarification: Reaffirmed State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3), (2006) 4 SCC 1] does not shield employers from regularization where no recruitment process was undertaken despite opportunities, per Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, (2023) 9 SCC 172]. Public employment mandates selecting the "best available talent" via open advertisement; ad hoc arrangements post-rules are impermissible. Future Safeguards: Prohibited ad hoc appointments for the 6 vacant posts or future vacancies; all must follow 2006 Puducherry Recruitment Rules. Investigation Directed: Ordered a Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) probe into illegal appointments, fixing responsibility on culpable officials (serving or retired). CVC report due by 14 May 2025. Union of India v. K. Velajagan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 170
Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Section 20 - Time-Barred Claims - A time-barred service dispute cannot be brought within the limitation period by filing a belated representation. When a government servant is aggrieved by a denial of a benefit, which is not based on a formal order, then a representation must be filed within a reasonable time. The cause of action to approach the Administrative Tribunal arises when an order is passed on such representation or no order is passed after the lapse of six months from the submission of the representation. There may be situations such as denial of promotion or increment, which are not based on formal orders. In such cases, filing of a representation may be necessary, even if the service rules do not provide specifically for such a remedy. (Paras 34 - 36) Chief Executive Officer v. S. Lalitha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 479 : 2025 INSC 565
Armed Forces Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 2008; Rule 18 - Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982; Rules 5, 9 and 14 - Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 - Disability Pension - Invalided Soldier - Presumption of Disability Due to Military Service - Burden on Army to Prove Otherwise - Soldier invalided out of service due to disability presumed to have incurred disability from military service unless proven otherwise by the Army - No requirement for soldier to prove disease was contracted or aggravated by military service - Disability leading to invalidation presumed to be above 20%, entitling soldier to 50% disability pension - Beneficial provision to be interpreted liberally - Army directed to grant 50% disability pension with 6% interest on arrears from 01.01.1996 for life, payable within three months. (Paras 44 - 46) Bijender Singh v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 477 : 2025 INSC 549 : AIR 2025 SC 2130
Banking Service - UCO Bank Pension Regulations, 1995 - Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 2(p) and 18(1) - Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957; Rule 58 - Bipartite Settlement, 1966 - An employee dismissed for misconduct after completing over ten years of service is entitled to pensionary benefits under the Bipartite Settlement. Regulation 22 which denies pension to removed employees, does not override Clause 6(b) of the Bipartite Settlement, which has statutory force under the Industrial Disputes Act. An employee meeting the minimum qualifying service requirement cannot be denied pension, regardless of misconduct, harmonizing the provisions to uphold the employee's superannuation benefits. Appeal dismissed. (Para 14, 17 & 22) Uco Bank v. Vijay Kumar Handa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 390 : 2025 INSC 442 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1484
Banking Service - Union Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976; Regulation 19 - Disciplinary Proceedings - Central Vigilance Commission (CVC) - Procedural Fairness - Mala Fides - Retirement Benefits - Whether the initiation of disciplinary proceedings and issuance of a charge sheet by Union Bank of India against a former employee, without obtaining the Central Vigilance Commission's (CVC) first-stage advice in a vigilance-related case, violated procedural fairness and the Bank's regulations. Held, the Bank's actions, initiated just before the appellant's retirement after 34 years of unblemished service, breached procedural fairness, particularly as the Bank had assured the High Court that the charge sheet would be issued only after receiving CVC advice. The Supreme Court quashed the disciplinary proceedings, finding the Bank's failure to obtain and consider CVC's first-stage advice before issuing the charge sheet arbitrary, mala fide, and in violation of Regulation 19 and CVC circulars. The appeal was allowed, the charge sheet and disciplinary proceedings were set aside, and the Bank was directed to release the appellant's full retirement benefits, excluding back wages. (Para 21) A.M. Kulshrestha v. Union Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 640 : 2025 INSC 744 : AIR 2025 SC 2520
Caste Certificate - Plea to submit caste certificates beyond cut-off date - OBCNCL/MBC-NCL certificates valid for one year, extendable to three with affidavit – appellants lacked valid certificates at application deadline – No relaxation permissible – As per relevant law, rules and instructions, a certificate of a claim, as put forth by the appellants, was valid for 1 year from the date of issuance, and subsequently, extendable up to 3 years, provided an affidavit to the said effect was also produced along with the originally issued certificate. A claim made by a candidate, while filling their application as per the concerned advertisement, was to hold good as on the date of his or her application or as per the last date of submission of applications prescribed by the concerned advertisement. Thereupon, considering the date of issuance of the category certificates in the appellants' case, none of them had a valid certificate and/or accompanied by the affidavit as per the proforma at the relevant time as per requirement. (Para 33, 36 - 38) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232
Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Appeals by Group-A officers of CRPF, BSF, SSB, ITBP, and CISF seeking OGAS status and relief from promotional stagnation due to IPS deputation - Directions - Complete cadre review for all CAPFs within six months. Review and amend service and recruitment rules within six months with cadre officers' inputs. DoPT to decide on action taken reports within three months. Progressively reduce deputation posts up to SAG level within two years. (Para 45) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779
Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) - Whether CAPFs qualify as Organised Group-A Services (OGAS) for cadre-related matters, including cadre review and service benefits, and whether deputation of Indian Police Service (IPS) officers to CAPFs causes promotional stagnation for CAPF officers, necessitating reduction. Held, CAPFs are recognised as OGAS for all purposes, including cadre management and service benefits, as per DoPT OM dated 12 July 2019. All OGAS benefits must extend to CAPFs. Central Government directed to complete cadre reviews for all CAPFs and amend recruitment rules within six months to align with OGAS status. To address promotional stagnation, deputation posts up to Senior Administrative Grade (SAG) level to be progressively reduced within two years to enhance promotion prospects for CAPF officers. Ministry of Home Affairs to review service and recruitment rules with inputs from CAPF cadre officers within six months; DoPT to act on reports within three months. Deputation policies remain Central Government's prerogative, but CAPF officers' grievances regarding stagnation and recognition must be addressed to uphold morale. (Paras 43 & 44) Sanjay Prakash v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 625 : 2025 INSC 779
Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (Karnataka); Rule 16(a)(iii) – Government Servants (Seniority) Rules, 1957 (Karnataka); Rule 6 – Cadre Change at Employee's Request – Effect on Seniority - the Tribunal as well as the High Court committed an error in directing the appellant to grant seniority to the respondent in the cadre of First Division Assistant with effect from the date in which the said respondent has entered service in the cadre of Staff Nurse from 05.01.1979, instead of 19.04.1989, when she was appointed in the new cadre of First Division Assistant. (Para 24) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389
Compassionate Appointment - Applicable Scheme - Date of Death vs. Date of Consideration - Conflicting Precedents - Terminal Benefits - Retrospective Application - Canara Bank Scheme 1993/2005 - Merits of Claim - No severe financial hardship was demonstrated post-death to warrant compassionate appointment. The widow and respondent (son) were the only dependents; married daughters were settled. The High Court's direction under the 1993 Scheme was set aside, and the appeal allowed by dismissing the respondent's claim. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – Conflicting Judicial Precedents on Applicable Scheme - The Court flagged ongoing uncertainty, noting divergent views across decisions - Date of Death View (Binding Precedent): Abhishek Kumar v. State of Haryana (2006) 12 SCC 44; Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (2015) 7 SCC 412; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Amit Shrivas (2020) 10 SCC 496; Indian Bank v. Promila (2020) 2 SCC 729; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ashish Awasthi (2023) [Implied Reference]. These hold that claims must be decided under the scheme existing at the date of death, absent retrospective application of a subsequent scheme. No vested right accrues on death to demand consideration under a prior scheme if superseded. – Date of Consideration View: SBI v. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661; MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh (2014) 13 SCC 583; N.C. Santhosh v. State of Karnataka (2020) 7 SCC 617. These apply norms prevailing at the time of application consideration, as no vested right exists post-death. The Court observed that three-judge Bench decisions in N.C. Santhosh (supra) and Amit Shrivas (supra) are at variance, and the reference to a larger Bench in State Bank of India v. Sheo Shankar Tewari (2019) 5 SCC 600 remains undecided. It debated retrospective application of executive schemes but deferred resolution, noting an existing reference. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – Deceased bank employee left behind widow, unmarried son (respondent, now overage for entry-level post), and three married daughters (not dependents). Family received family pension of Rs. 4,637.92 (deemed sufficient for two dependents) and terminal benefits of Rs. 3.09 lakh. High Court directed appointment and Rs. 5 lakh compensation, upheld on appeal with costs. Impugned High Court orders set aside; compassionate appointment denied for absence of indigence. However, invoking inherent powers and prior coordinate bench observations, employer directed to pay respondent lump sum ex-gratia of Rs. 2.5 lakh within two months as final settlement, considering generated expectations from litigation success. (Para 32, 44, 49) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – Delay in Claim – A lapse of over two decades in pursuing the claim (father's death in 2001; claim assessed in 2025) does not automatically bar consideration where the dependent has diligently litigated against the employer and courts. Respondent's current age is irrelevant if merits are otherwise assessable. (Para 27, 28) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – Disagreement with Canara Bank (2015): Overruling aspects of Canara Bank v. M. Mahesh Kumar (supra), the Court held that Clause 3.2 (keeping offers open for minors till majority) is a benevolent provision for human dignity, not linked to terminal benefits. Grant of family pension/terminal benefits does not bar compassionate claims, as they serve distinct purposes. However, judicial propriety precluded referral to a larger Bench, given the pending Sheo Shankar Tewari reference and the claim's two-decade pendency. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – Principles - 1. Exception to Equality: Compassionate appointment, offered on humanitarian grounds, is an exception to the constitutional principle of equality in public employment. 2. Rule-Based: It cannot be granted without specific rules or instructions. 3. Purpose: Aimed at addressing sudden financial crises due to the death or medical incapacitation of the family's breadwinner. 4. Immediacy: Appointments must be made promptly to alleviate distress, and delayed applications may be rejected. 5. Strict Interpretation: As a side-door entry, rules must be strictly interpreted. 6. Not a Right: Compassionate appointment is a concession, not a vested right, and depends on fulfilling eligibility criteria, including financial indigence. 7. No Inheritance: It cannot be claimed as an inherited right or based solely on descent. 8. Financial Need: The family's financial distress is a primary condition; terminal benefits and other income sources are considered to assess penury. 9. No Reservation: Vacancies cannot be reserved for minors until they attain majority unless specified by rules. 10. Judicial Restraint: Courts cannot grant compassionate appointments outside statutory regulations or based solely on sympathy. The Court underscored that compassionate appointments are not meant to provide endless support or bypass constitutional safeguards under Articles 14 and 16, ensuring fairness and objectivity in the process. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – Scope and Criteria – Held, compassionate appointments under schemes for dependents of deceased employees dying in harness are to be granted only in "hand-to-mouth" cases where the family is below the poverty line and struggling with basic expenses like food, rent, and utilities due to lack of steady sustenance. Such relief is not warranted merely for a fall in standard of life following the breadwinner's death. There is no straitjacket formula; each case must be assessed on its peculiar financial condition, with indigence of dependents being the fundamental precondition. Failure to prove such indigence renders the claim untenable, as it would otherwise create an impermissible reservation conflicting with Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. (Para 29) Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Compassionate Appointment – The respondent's father, an employee of Canara Bank, died in 2001 prior to retirement. The respondent sought compassionate appointment under the Canara Bank Compassionate Appointment Scheme, 1993. During pendency of High Court proceedings, the Bank introduced the 2005 Scheme, replacing appointments with lump-sum ex-gratia payments, and discontinued the 1993 Scheme via circular. The High Court directed appointment under the 1993 Scheme, leading to the Bank's appeal. Whether, for compassionate appointment claims, the applicable scheme is that prevalent on the date of the employee's death or on the date of consideration of the application. Effect of family pension and terminal benefits on eligibility for compassionate appointment under the 1993 Scheme. Interpretation of Clause 3.2 of the 1993 Scheme regarding minors and terminal benefits - Discussed. Canara Bank v. Ajithkumar G.K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 187 : 2025 INSC 184
Constitution of India; Article 245 - Principle of Functus Officio – Applicability to Executive Rule-Making Authority - the principle of functus officio does not apply to executive rule-making authority under Article 245 of the Constitution of India and is limited to judicial or quasi-judicial forums. Applying functus officio to the State's rule-making power would cripple executive functions and paralyze governance. The State is not required to provide a prior hearing to affected individuals during the exercise of its rule-making authority, as such a requirement would impose undue procedural constraints and undermine efficient policy implementation. The High Court's decision quashing a revised memorandum on the grounds of functus officio and lack of prior hearing was held to be untenable and ultra vires the Constitution. The impugned judgment was set aside, and the appeal was allowed. (Para 42, 45, 47) P. Rammohan Rao v. K. Srinivas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 208 : 2025 INSC 212 : AIR 2025 SC 1335 : (2025) 4 SCC 127
Constitution of India - Article 226 - Acquittal in a criminal case based on the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not bar departmental disciplinary proceedings against a public servant, which are governed by the "preponderance of probabilities" standard. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's Division Bench decision setting aside the dismissal of an Assistant Engineer (Civil) at the Airports Authority of India (AAI), who was acquitted in a corruption case but dismissed following a departmental inquiry. The Disciplinary Authority is not obligated to address every ground raised by the delinquent officer or provide exhaustive reasons in disciplinary orders, provided the findings are supported by a reasoned conclusion and evidence establishing guilt on the preponderance of probabilities. In an intra-court writ appeal, the Appellate Court must exercise restraint, and interference with the Single Judge's judgment is permissible only if it is perverse or suffers from an apparent error of law. The Supreme Court upheld the Disciplinary and Appellate Authorities' decisions, reinstating the respondent's dismissal, and found the Single Judge's dismissal of the respondent's writ petition to be well-reasoned. Appeal allowed; respondent's dismissal from service reinstated. (Paras 33, 34, 37 & 38) Airports Authority of India v. Pradip Kumar Banerjee, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 162 : 2025 INSC 149 : AIR 2025 SC 1052 : (2025) 4 SCC 111
Constitution of India - Article 311 doesn't mean only appointing authority can initiate disciplinary action against government servant. The appointing authority is not required to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a state employee. While the appointing authority's approval is necessary for dismissal, it is not required for initiating disciplinary action. The High Court's decision, which quashed the state employee's dismissal solely due to the lack of prior separate approval from the Chief Minister for the charge sheet, is erroneous. (Para 33, 34 & 39) State of Jharkhand v. Rukma Kesh Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 368 : 2025 INSC 412 : AIR 2025 SC 1656
Consumer Forum - Qualification for appointment - A bunch of appeals and review petitions arose from Bombay High Court orders invalidating aspects of the Consumer Protection (Qualification for appointment, method of recruitment, procedure of appointment, term of office, resignation and removal of the President and members of the State Commission and District Commission) Rules, 2020 (“2020 Rules”), concerning appointments to consumer fora under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and the Consumer Protection Act, 2019, particularly in Maharashtra. In Impugned Order I, the Bombay High Court struck down Rule 6(1) of the 2020 Rules for executive dominance in the selection process (violating judicial independence per Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Limited, (2020) 6 SCC 1, Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369 (“MBA – III”), and Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2022) 12 SCC 455 (“MBA – IV”)) and partially invalidated Rule 10(2) on tenure extensions; absent clear reappointment rules, it applied Rule 8(18) of the Consumer Protection (Appointment, Salary, Allowances, and Conditions of Service of President and Members of State Commission and District Forum) Rules, 2019, temporarily. Impugned Order II clarified that directions in Secretary, Ministry of Consumer Affairs v. Dr. Mahindra Bhaskar Limaye, [2023 SCC OnLine SC 231] (“Limaye – I”) on written examinations apply only to non-judicial members of State Commissions and District Commission members. Impugned Order III (Telangana High Court) set aside District Commission appointments predating Limaye – I. The Supreme Court examined consumerism's constitutional foundations under Articles 38, 39, and 47, its evolution, and the adequacy of tenure-based grievance redressal mechanisms. Issues: (i) Feasibility of a permanent adjudicatory forum (e.g., Consumer Tribunal or Consumer Court) for consumer disputes, replacing or supplementing tenure-based appointments with permanent judicial/non-judicial members, staff, and Presiding Officers (potentially headed by sitting judges), alongside enhanced strength and infrastructure; (ii) Notification of revised recruitment rules ensuring judicial independence (majority judicial selection committees), efficiency (five-year tenures per precedents), and differentiated processes (no examinations for judicial posts; mandatory for non-judicial); (iii) Validity of 2020 Rules' provisions on selection committees, examinations, and reappointments; (iv) Scope of Limaye – I directions; (v) Status of existing/pending appointments, terminations, and recruitments amid transitions. Held: Upholding consumerism as a constitutionally embedded right integral to participatory democracy, economic activity, and environmental justice, the Court held that impermanent, tenure-based offices undermine security of tenure, motivation, judicial quality, efficiency, and consumer trust—necessitating a shift to permanency for qualitative, timely decisions. Exercising Article 142 powers, it advocated revamping consumer fora toward permanency at district, state, and national levels, aligning with precedents on judicial independence (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, “MBA – IV”). Struck down unsustainable aspects of 2020 Rules; clarified Limaye – I requires no written examinations/viva voce for Presidents/Judicial Members of State Commissions or District Commission Presidents, but mandates them (in consultation with State Service Commissions) for Non-Judicial Members; restricted District Commission President qualifications to serving/retired District Judges; set aside Impugned Order I (qua 2019 Rules' applicability for reappointments), upheld Impugned Order II, set aside Impugned Order III; allowed review petitions exempting judicial posts from examinations; mandated four-year tenures for continuing appointments (five-year for future ones); applied judgment prospectively except as directed. Directions: (i) Union of India to file affidavit within 3 months assessing constitutional viability of permanent Consumer Tribunal/Court with permanent staff/members/Presiding Officers, enhanced strength, infrastructure, and independence; (ii) Union to notify new Rules within 4 months incorporating five-year tenures, majority judicial selection committees, differentiated examination requirements, and restricted qualifications per precedents (Rojer Mathew, MBA – III, MBA – IV); (iii) States to complete fresh recruitments within 4 months of notification. Granted interim protections (under Article 142) to seven categories of Presidents/Members, with continuing appointments limited to four-year tenures: (1) Maharashtra appointees (05-10-2023, post-examination) to complete tenures or continue until new process completion; (2) Maharashtra terminated members (06-10-2023) eligible for reappointment consideration under new Rules (judicial posts exempt from examination; non-judicial required); (3) Pre-Limaye – I (pre-2023) serving Presidents/Members to complete tenures or continue until new process; (4) Other States' serving/appointed Presidents/Judicial Members (with/without examinations) to complete tenures; stay-delayed selectees to be appointed for full terms; (5) Pre-Limaye – I non-judicial selectees (without examinations): serving to complete tenures; post-Limaye – I to continue until new process (no appointment if only selected); (6) Post-examination non-judicial selectees: serving to complete tenures; stay-delayed to be appointed for full terms; (7) Other States' terminated members eligible for reappointment under new Rules (judicial exempt from examination; non-judicial required). Ganeshkumar Rajeshwarrao Selukar v. Mahendra Bhaskar Limaye, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2025 INSC 752 : (2025) 8 SCC 634
Deputation and Pension – Right to Absorption – Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules - West Bengal Services (Death-cum-Retirement Benefit) Rules – No right to absorption in borrowed department – Service rendered by a state government employee on a deputation basis in a central government's department would not entitle him to pension as per Central Civil Service (Pension) Rules, 1972 - Appeal Allowed. Union of India v. Phani Bhusan Kundu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 65
Disability Pension – Burden of Proof – Schizophrenia – Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961 – Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) – Medical Board Opinion - Whether the Army bears the burden to prove that a disability arising during service is not service-related, and whether denial of disability pension without reasoned medical opinion is permissible. Held, under the Pension Regulations for the Army, 1961, disability pension provisions must be interpreted liberally in favor of the personnel. The burden of proof lies with the Army to demonstrate that a disability arising during service is neither attributable to nor aggravated by military service. The Medical Board's opinion, lacking reasons to classify schizophrenia as a constitutional (hereditary) disorder, was deemed arbitrary and insufficient. Since the appellant was medically fit at enrolment in 1988 and the onset of schizophrenia occurred during service, the authorities failed to discharge the burden of proving the illness was not service-related. Denial of disability pension based on an unreasoned Medical Board opinion is impermissible, as reasons are statutorily required to justify discharge and denial of pension benefits. Where the authority initiates discharge due to a medical condition (not at the personnel's request), the onus to substantiate the grounds for denying disability pension lies heavily on the authority. Appeal allowed; disability pension granted to the appellant. (Para 32 - 36) Rajumon T.M. v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 546 : 2025 INSC 644 : AIR 2025 SC 2804
Disciplinary Action - Moral Turpitude - Dismissal from Service - Proportionality of Punishment - Doctrine of Proportionality - This doctrine forbids the competent authority to act arbitrarily, vengefully or so harshly that the punishment awarded to a delinquent employee pricks the conscience of the court. Held, Respondent-Constable was a member of a disciplined Para Military Force and was posted in sensitive border area. He was obligated to perform his duties and guard the cash boxes with utmost dedication, honesty, commitment and discipline. Contrary to the faith and trust reposed in him by his superiors, he broke open the cash box. On being found guilty of gross misconduct involving moral turpitude, relying on confessional statement and evidences, it is duty of Disciplinary authority to impose a punishment on Respondent. This duty increases especially in Para military forces. All the members of the force must note that there is zero tolerance for such brazen misconduct, where the guardian of the cash box became its looter. The genuineness of the respondent's confession has not been doubted by the High Court. High Court ought not to have exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to compel the authorities to impose a punishment less than dismissal from service. Misconduct proved against respondent is so grave and alarming that any punishment less than dismissal from service would prove inadequate and insufficient. High Court ought not to have applied doctrine of proportionality herein. Appeal allowed. (Paras 10, 11) Union of India v. No. 900224364 Const/G.D. Jageshwar Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 668
Disciplinary Proceedings - Acquittal in Criminal Case - Disciplinary action cannot be sustained when an employee is acquitted in a criminal case involving substantially similar charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances, as upholding such findings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. The Court awarded Rs. 30 lakhs compensation and Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant, a constable wrongfully dismissed from Bihar Police Service, due to procedural illegalities, including withheld departmental records, vague charges, and denial of cross-examination rights, rendering the dismissal violative of fairness and natural justice. (Paras 37, 40, 44, 47, 50 & 52) Maharana Pratap Singh v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 474 : 2025 INSC 554
Disciplinary Proceedings - Extension of Time - Due Process and Natural Justice - Disciplinary proceedings extending beyond a court or tribunal's stipulated time limit without a genuine attempt to seek an extension are unlawful. If a time limit is conditioned with lapse of proceedings upon default, the disciplinary authority loses jurisdiction. Extensions may be sought in exceptional circumstances, but continuing proceedings without an extension, particularly despite objections, risks bias and violates due process. Non-compliance with judicial orders undermines the rule of law. In a case involving an Assistant Engineer accused of embezzling Rs. 2.5 crore, the Court identified multiple breaches of natural justice, including failure to provide enquiry documents and non-adherence to the U.P. Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. The enquiry was declared wholly vitiated, and the Court dismissed the appeal, awarding the respondent full retiral benefits, adjusted for provisional pension arrears. (Paras 10, 38, 60, 62, 63, 70) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 463 : 2025 INSC 555
Disciplinary Proceedings - The appellant, a Senior Medical Officer with 34 years of unblemished service, was served a charge-sheet 11 days before his retirement on March 31, 2017, alleging misconduct, including non-compliance with Election Commission directives, unauthorized leave, and failure to participate in the pulse polio program. Disciplinary proceedings were initiated, and the appellant was denied an extension of service. An inquiry officer was appointed a year later, and the appellant was found guilty of most charges, leading to a 2% permanent pension cut. The High Court modified the penalty to a 2% pension cut for 5 years, but the appellant challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Whether the disciplinary proceedings and the penalty imposed were justified. Whether the High Court's modification of the penalty was adequate. Whether the appellant's procedural rights were violated during the inquiry. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and the disciplinary authority's penalty, holding that the charges were not substantiated by legal evidence. The Court found that the inquiry officer's findings were based on perceived moral duties rather than the actual charges, and the disciplinary authority failed to provide a fair hearing. The appellant was exonerated of all charges, and the Court directed the restoration of his full pension, along with repayment of deducted amounts with 6% interest. The Court also awarded costs of ₹50,000 to the appellant, citing mala fide intent by the respondents in initiating disciplinary proceedings as retaliation for the appellant's prior litigation against high-ranking officials. The Court emphasized that disciplinary actions must be based on legal evidence and procedural fairness, and penalties must be proportionate to the misconduct. The Court deprecated the misuse of disciplinary proceedings to target employees, especially those nearing retirement, for personal vendettas. The Election Commission's policy exempting employees nearing retirement from election duty was highlighted, and the Court found the disciplinary action contrary to this policy. The appellant's full pension was restored, and deducted amounts were ordered to be repaid with interest. Costs of ₹50,000 were awarded to the appellant, with liberty for the State to recover the amount from responsible officials. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing all penalties and restoring the appellant's pension, while condemning the misuse of disciplinary proceedings for personal vendettas. Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83
Disciplinary Proceedings - The respondent, a former branch manager of Syndicate Bank, was accused of financial irregularities, including fictitious debits, fraudulent withdrawals, and misappropriation of funds during his tenure at the Mudigubba branch (2007-2008). A disciplinary inquiry found the charges proven, leading to his dismissal in 2012. The respondent was acquitted in criminal proceedings but failed to overturn the dismissal in subsequent appeals. The High Court set aside the dismissal, citing lack of evidence and procedural unfairness, and ordered reinstatement with full benefits. Whether the disciplinary inquiry was conducted fairly and based on sufficient evidence. Whether the High Court erred in interfering with the disciplinary authority's decision. Whether the penalty of dismissal was proportionate to the misconduct. Held, the disciplinary inquiry was fair, principles of natural justice were followed, and the findings were based on substantial evidence, including the respondent's admissions and documentary proof. The Court reiterated that acquittal in criminal proceedings does not exonerate an employee in disciplinary proceedings, as the standards of proof differ. However, considering the respondent's long unblemished service (21 years), the pressure of work, and the reimbursement of the financial loss, the penalty of dismissal was deemed disproportionate. The Court modified the penalty to a reduction in the time scale of pay for one year, without cumulative effect or adverse impact on pension. The appeal was partly allowed. The findings of misconduct were upheld, but the penalty was reduced to a minor penalty under Regulation 4(e) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976. The respondent was entitled to retiral benefits, to be paid within four months. The judgment reaffirms the high standards of integrity expected from bank officers and the limited scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters. It underscores the principle of proportionality in imposing penalties, especially in cases involving long-standing employees with otherwise clean records. Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 92 : 2025 INSC 89 : (2025) 3 SCC 601
Education - Role of Teachers - The Court highlighted the pivotal role of teachers in shaping the future of the nation, especially in primary and upper primary education. Teachers are instrumental in moulding young minds, instilling values, and preparing students to be responsible citizens. The Court emphasized the need for teachers to adapt to modern challenges, including the use of technology and artificial intelligence, while guiding students to discern right from wrong. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134
Education – Technical Education – AICTE Notifications – Qualifications for Teachers – PhD Requirement - Entitlement to Revised Pay Scales and Redesignation under 6th Pay Commission – Held, Assistant Professors in Engineering institutes (appointed after March 15, 2000), who did not have PhD qualification at the time of appointment or failed to acquire PhD within seven years of their appointment, cannot claim re-designation as Associate Professors in terms of the 2010 notification issued by the All-India Council for Technical Education (AICTE). At the same time, teachers who were appointed in various Engineering institutes prior to March 15, 2000, when PhD was not an essential requirement for the post of Assistant Professor, will receive the benefit and redesignation to the post of Associate Professor as per 6th Pay Commission. (Para 17 & 27) Secretary All India Shri Shivaji Memorial Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 373 : 2025 INSC 422 : (2025) 6 SCC 605
Education - West Bengal Primary School Teachers Recruitment Rules, 2016 - Eligibility cut-off for D.El.Ed candidates of the 2020-22 batch applying for Assistant Teacher posts in West Bengal is the date of the recruitment notification (21.10.2022), not the earlier announcement (29.09.2022), as no cut-off was specified in the Rules, 2016. Eligibility is determined by the date in the advertisement inviting applications when rules lack a cut-off. The Court upheld the 21.10.2022 notification, allowing candidates who received certificates on 29.11.2022 to participate, and directed the recruitment process to proceed expeditiously under Article 142. [Paras 24, 30 - 33] Soumen Paul v. Shrabani Nayek, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 444 : 2025 INSC 451
Equivalence of Qualifications - Judicial Interference - Where the appointing authority, after obtaining necessary clarification, accepts the equivalence of a candidate's qualification (Diploma in Electrical and Electronics Engineering) with the prescribed qualification (Diploma in Electrical Engineering) for recruitment to the post of Junior Engineer, and no glaring disparity exists between the two, Courts should refrain from interfering by setting aside the appointment on grounds of mere difference in nomenclature. The burden lies on the challenger to demonstrate arbitrariness or illegality in such acceptance, failing which judicial review is unwarranted, as equivalence is primarily a matter for the recruiting authority to determine. [Para 17 - 23] Sajid Khan v. L. Rahmathullah, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 237 : 2025 INSC 251 : AIR 2025 SC 1300
Forest Service - Performance Appraisal Reports (PARs) - Authority to Act as Reporting, Reviewing, or Accepting Authorities for Indian Forest Service (IFS) Officers up to Additional Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (APCCF): Held, reporting, reviewing, and accepting authorities for IFS officers up to APCCF must be their immediate superiors within the Forest Department, as mandated by Supreme Court rulings in State of Haryana v. P.C. Wadhwa (1987) and Santosh Bharti v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2007). For the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (PCCF), the reporting authority may be from another department, provided they are higher in rank and familiar with the PCCF's work. The Supreme Court quashed the Government Order (G.O.) dated June 29, 2024, permitting Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, such as District Collectors and Divisional Commissioners, to comment on PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF, as it violated prior Court directions in Santosh Bharti (September 22, 2000) and TN Godavarman Thirumalpad (April 19, 2004). Noting Madhya Pradesh as the only state adopting this practice, the Court deemed it contemptuous but refrained from further action. The Ministry of Environment and Forests had directed that PARs of IFS officers up to APCCF be evaluated by superior Forest Department officers. IAS officers may provide comments on IFS officers' developmental work on a separate sheet, subject to review by a superior IFS officer. The State of Madhya Pradesh was directed to amend its rules to comply with prior Court orders. The ruling upholds the autonomy of the IFS in performance appraisals up to APCCF, restricting evaluations to Forest Department officers, except for the PCCF. (Para 37) In Re Performance Appraisal Reports of the Officers of the Indian Forest Service, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2025 INSC 748
Frivolous Litigation - The petitioner, a former employee of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL), was dismissed in 2000 for habitual absenteeism and misconduct. Despite multiple judicial and administrative forums upholding his dismissal, the petitioner engaged in persistent and frivolous litigation, including filing multiple review petitions, appeals, and complaints alleging corruption against judges. The Court condemned the petitioner's abuse of the judicial process, emphasizing that such conduct wastes valuable judicial time and resources. The Court imposed a cost of ₹1,00,000 on the petitioner, to be deposited with the State Legal Services Authority, as a deterrent against unscrupulous litigants. The SLP and the application for condonation of delay were dismissed, and the Court underscored the need to curb frivolous litigation to ensure timely justice for genuine cases. Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 57 : 2024 INSC 1051
Government Service - Sikkim Government Services (Leave) Rules, 1982; Rule 36 r/w. 32 - A government servant re-employed after retirement is not entitled to additional leave encashment under Rule 36 of the Rules if they already availed the maximum 300 days of leave encashment upon initial retirement. Rule 36 applies only to employees retiring at the age of superannuation (58 years) and does not extend to re-employed individuals. Rule 32, which governs re-employed servants, operates independently and does not entitle them to fresh leave encashment. Leave encashment, rooted in principles of equity and deferred compensation, must balance employee welfare with the financial stability of the employer, particularly when public funds are involved. Allowing multiple encashments for the same leave accrual risks unjust enrichment and burdens the public exchequer. The Court set aside the High Court's decision, upheld the State's clarificatory Office Memorandum, and rejected claims of procedural unfairness, finding no violation of natural justice. (Paras 14, 16, 21- 33) State of Sikkim v. Dr. Mool Raj Kotwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 472 : 2025 INSC 559 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1770
IAS (Pay) Rules, 2016; Rule 2 - Contention that no benchmark score was fixed under Rule 2 is inconsequential. Clause 7.2 of the Guidelines clearly states that no benchmark is required. Moreover, the absence of a fixed benchmark does not constitute arbitrariness or discrimination, as the appellant was considered a 'special case' despite 90% of his ACRs being unavailable. (Para 23) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563
IAS Officer - Individual excellence may foster a superiority complex, potentially undermining discipline, decorum, and collegiality. Given the critical need for collective leadership at the highest levels of civil service, the Committee was justified in prioritizing adherence to discipline and collegiality. (Para 22) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563
IAS Officer - Promotion to Chief Secretary Grade - Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Eligibility Criteria - Screening Committee - Dismissal of Plea - Officer failed to meet the mandatory requirement of having 90% of Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) completed, a key criterion for promotion eligibility. (Para 25) Raju Narayana Swamy v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 462 : 2025 INSC 563
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947; Section 17B - In cases of wrongful dismissal, lump sum compensation may be more appropriate than reinstatement with back wages in specific circumstances, provided courts balance the interests of the employee and employer with reasoned justification. Back wages are not automatic and depend on whether the dismissed employee was gainfully employed post-termination. The quantum of back wages is at the court's discretion if the employee admits to or is proven to have had gainful employment, with the employer bearing the burden of proof under Section 17B. In this case, the employer was found guilty of suggestio falsi (false representation) and suppresio veri (suppression of truth) before the Labour Court and Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, violating natural justice principles. The employee, a driver dismissed after a vehicular accident, was awarded 75% back wages from termination to superannuation, along with full terminal benefits, modifying the High Court's order for 100% back wages. (Para 25, 30, 34, 44, 45) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : AIR 2025 SC 1172 : (2025) 4 SCC 321
Judicial Officers' Pay - Directions - Increase of posts of District Judges - Constitution of Committees - Payment of Arrears - Regular Meetings - Clarification on Allowances - The Supreme Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to frame rules regarding the increase of posts of District Judges in the Selection Grade and Super Time Scale categories. All High Courts were directed to constitute Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary within four weeks, with a Nodal Officer appointed to address day-to-day grievances of judicial officers. States were directed to pay arrears to judicial officers, including Special Judicial Magistrates, within three months. The Committees were directed to meet at regular intervals (not exceeding three months) to ensure timely resolution of grievances. The Court clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every ACP stage, irrespective of promotions or ACP benefits. The Court emphasized the importance of timely implementation of its orders and the need for institutional mechanisms to address the service conditions of judicial officers. The directions were issued under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, binding all State Governments and High Courts to comply. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Implementation of Second National Judicial Pay Commission (SNJPC) Recommendations - The Court addressed the non-implementation of the SNJPC recommendations, particularly regarding the payment of super-time scale and selection grade scales for judicial officers, which were approved by the Court in its order dated 19.05.2023. The Court emphasized the need for timely payment of arrears and directed the constitution of Committees for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary (CSCDJ) in each High Court to oversee the implementation of these recommendations. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Individual Grievances - Miscellaneous Applications - The Court disposed of several intervention applications and clarified that individual grievances should be addressed by the respective High Courts through the newly constituted Committees. The Court directed the Committee for Service Conditions of the District Judiciary in the High Court of Telangana to address the grievance of a petitioner regarding inadequate pension, in line with the Court's earlier orders. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Remuneration for Special Judicial Magistrates - The Court clarified that Special Judicial Magistrates are entitled to a minimum remuneration of Rs. 45,000/- per month, along with a conveyance allowance of Rs. 5,000/- per month, effective from 01.04.2019. The Court directed the State of Andhra Pradesh to pay arrears to these magistrates within three months. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Officers' Pay - Risk Allowance and Higher Qualification Allowance - The Court addressed issues related to the admissibility of risk allowance for judicial officers and clarified that judicial officers are entitled to higher qualification allowances at every Assured Career Progression (ACP) stage, rejecting the argument that such allowances would lead to unjust enrichment. All India Judicial Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 130
Judicial Review—Violation of Statutory Eligibility - A single judge's finding of ineligibility based on objective assessment of documents and organizational hierarchy binds unless demonstrably erroneous. A division bench's reversal, premised on restricted interference in service matters without probing statutory violations, constitutes error. Where selection files reveal absence of supporting evidence for claimed experience and affirmative proof of shortfall (e.g., only ~4 years in qualifying roles), the appointment is quashed ab initio. Appointee directed to vacate office forthwith (within one week, sans policy/financial decisions); benefits accrued till date preserved, but future entitlements limited to verified tenure. Fresh selection process mandated expeditiously. Dr. Amaragouda L v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 197 : 2025 INSC 201
Judicial Service – Civil Judge Appointments – Candidates denied appointment for submitting category certificates beyond the cut-off date - Advertisement silent on certificate issuance date – Held, the Advertisement appears to be silent on the aspect of last date of issuance of valid category certificate, however, clause (i) and (iii) of paragraph 6 explicitly provide that the candidates from concerned categories therein were to furnish certificate issued by the competent authority as per rules. Clauses 1 and 2 of paragraph 18 clarified that candidates should only apply under a said category if they meet all the eligibility conditions as per the Advertisement. The Subsequent Notice, which was issued by the High Court on 04.08.2022, cannot be said to be arbitrary or without any basis. It specified that the certificate belonging to the concerned reserved category should have been issued prior or upto 31.08.2021 i.e. the last date of receipt of the application in pursuance to the Advertisement. This was because the Advertisement required a candidate to possess eligibility upto the cut-off date. Thus, the Subsequent Notice issued was in consonance with law and as per the Advertisement, applicable Rules, instructions and circulars issued by the competent authority. The plea of the appellants is unsustainable and deserves to be rejected. No relaxation can be granted in the given facts and circumstances of the case nor can it be claimed as a matter of right in the absence of any such discretionary clause in the Advertisement/Rules/Instructions. Appeal dismissed. (Para 26 & 36) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232
Judicial Service - Constitution of India; Article 311 - Termination of Judicial Officers - Adverse Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) - Punitive Action - Natural Justice - Misconduct Allegations - Termination of judicial officers based on adverse ACRs without timely communication, opportunity to explain, or expungement of adverse remarks is arbitrary and illegal. "Poor performance" claims must be substantiated by clear and consistent evidence; contradictory or unsubstantiated claims in ACRs are insufficient grounds for termination. "Other material" used as a basis for termination, such as pending or concluded complaints, necessitates a fair opportunity to be heard, especially when such complaints form the foundation of termination, in adherence to Article 311 of the Constitution and relevant Conduct Rules. Termination based on misconduct allegations and "inefficiency," even if complaints were closed or resulted in advisories, is punitive and stigmatic, rendering it illegal if done without due process. Termination orders based on such flawed procedures are liable to be set aside, as they violate established principles of law and natural justice. (Para 16) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289
Judicial Service - In a landmark ruling affirming judicial independence and equality under Article 14, the Supreme Court held that all retired High Court judges are entitled to full and equal pensionary benefits under the "One Rank One Pension" principle, irrespective of their date of appointment, source of entry (district judiciary or Bar), length of service, or status as permanent or additional judges. Discrimination in terminal benefits post-retirement violates constitutional equality, as judges in service receive uniform treatment. The Court issued comprehensive directions: 1. Retired Chief Justices of High Courts shall receive a full pension of ₹15 lakhs per annum. 2. Other retired High Court judges (including additional judges) shall receive ₹13.5 lakhs per annum. 3. Full pension applies regardless of service breaks between district judiciary retirement and High Court elevation. 4. Judges elevated from district judiciary post-introduction of the New Pension Scheme (NPS) are entitled to full pension; States must refund judges' NPS contributions (with accrued dividends) but retain State contributions. 5. Family pension and gratuity extend to widows/widowers or family members of judges dying in harness, without minimum service qualifiers, by aggregating career service periods. 6. All allowances, including leave encashment, pension commutation, and provident fund, shall comply with the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954. The judgment, pronounced by CJI Gavai, emphasizes that post-retirement benefits are essential for judicial dignity, rejecting distinctions based on entry mode or pension schemes. Certain writ petitions by former judges were also considered. In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2025 INSC 726
Judicial Service - Increase in LDCE Quota - Reduction in Qualifying Service - Accelerated Promotion for Civil Judge (Junior Division) - Restoration of Advocate Practice Requirement - Vacancy Filling and Calculation - Suitability Criteria for Promotion - Directions - The Supreme Court directed all High Courts and State Governments to amend service rules to increase the Limited Departmental Competitive Examination (LDCE) quota for promotion from Civil Judge (Senior Division) to District Judge (Higher Judicial Service) from 10% to 25%. The minimum qualifying service for Civil Judge (Senior Division) to appear in LDCE for promotion to Higher Judicial Service reduced to 3 years, with a total minimum service of 7 years (including Civil Judge (Junior Division) service). 10% of posts in Civil Judge (Senior Division) reserved for accelerated promotion of Civil Judge (Junior Division) through LDCE, with a minimum qualifying service of 3 years. Civil Judge (Junior Division) aspirants must have a minimum of 3 years of practice as an advocate. Unfilled LDCE posts to be filled through regular promotion based on 'merit-cum-seniority' in the same year. Vacancies for LDCE to be calculated based on cadre strength where not already implemented. High Courts and State Governments to frame or amend rules to assess suitability for promotion to Higher Judicial Service based on: Updated knowledge of law, Quality of judgments ACRs of the preceding 5 years, Disposal rate in the preceding 5 years, Performance in viva voce, General perceptions, awareness, and communication skills. All High Courts and State Governments to amend relevant service rules to implement the above changes. Ensure rules are framed or amended to assess candidate suitability for promotion to Higher Judicial Service. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - Persons with Disabilities - Reasonable Accommodation - Equal Opportunity - No person can be denied consideration for recruitment in the judicial service solely on account of their physical disabilities. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Judicial Service - Practical experience is critical for judicial officers handling issues of life, liberty, property, and reputation. Most High Courts, except Rajasthan and Sikkim, and States, except Chhattisgarh, Haryana, Nagaland, and Tripura, supported reintroducing the practice requirement. Concerns raised about superficial practice by aspirants signing vakalaths without effective experience. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - Recruitment for Civil Judge (Junior Division) – Practice Requirement - The Supreme Court restored the 3-year practice requirement for candidates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts, clarifying that experience gained as law clerks with judges or judicial officers will count towards fulfilling this requirement. The Court emphasized that allowing fresh law graduates without practical experience into judicial service has proven problematic, as they lack firsthand exposure to court proceedings and the administration of justice, which is essential for judicial roles. The 3-year practice condition will not apply to recruitment processes notified before the judgment but will be mandatory for future recruitments. The Court underscored the necessity of practical experience to equip candidates with the skills to handle issues of life, liberty, property, and reputation of litigants effectively. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - Recruitment of Fresh Law Graduates as Judicial Officers – Minimum 3-Year Practice Requirement Restored – Held, Appointment of fresh law graduates without prior Bar experience problematic; bookish knowledge and pre-service training insufficient for judicial role; practical exposure to courtroom dynamics essential; 3-year practice mandate applies to future recruitments; law clerk experience counts towards practice period. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - Representation of Women in Judiciary - Importance of Diversity - Held, the Supreme Court emphasized that increased female representation in the judiciary enhances judicial responsiveness to diverse social contexts, challenges gender stereotypes, and promotes equality in decision-making. The dismissal of the appellant, a female judicial officer from the Scheduled Tribe category, for non-disclosure of prior employment was deemed unwarranted, and her reinstatement was ordered. The Court highlighted three key aspects: (i) entry of women into the judiciary, (ii) retention and professional growth of women, and (iii) advancement to senior judicial roles. Greater representation of women shifts gender stereotypes, enhances visibility, and encourages access to justice. The Court recognized the appellant's perseverance and potential to contribute to a competent, diverse, and inclusive judiciary. (Para 29, 31) Pinky Meena v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2025 INSC 756 : AIR 2025 SC 3013
Judicial Service - Termination of Judicial Officer - Alleged Concealment of Prior Employment and Academic Impropriety - Violation of Natural Justice - Constitutional Rights under Articles 14 and 16 - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal of a former Civil Judge and judicial magistrate, setting aside the High Court's Full Court decision to terminate her service in 2020. The termination, based on non-disclosure of prior government employment and simultaneous pursuit of academic degrees, was held to be a disproportionate penalty for a minor omission. The appellant's explanation—that she resigned from her teaching position before joining the judiciary and discontinued her B.Ed. upon learning of university regulations—was found reasonable. The dismissal process violated natural justice principles due to the lack of an opportunity to be heard. While probationers lack an absolute right to a post, arbitrary or discriminatory termination without adherence to natural justice violates Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court ordered reinstatement with notional pay fixation, treating the appellant as a confirmed employee who completed probation, but without backwages. (Para 23, 26, 32) Pinky Meena v. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2025 INSC 756 : AIR 2025 SC 3013
Judicial Service - The Court examined the pension entitlements of retired High Court judges, addressing disparities arising from date of appointment, source of entry (judicial service vs. Bar), and status as permanent or additional judges. Relying on the High Court Judges (Salaries and Conditions of Service) Act, 1954 (HCJ Act), and precedents including M.L. Jain v. Union of India (1985) 2 SCC 355, P. Ramakrishnam Raju v. Union of India (2014) 12 SCC 1, and Jagdish Chandra Gupta v. Union of India 2024 INSC 862, the Court declared a uniform "one rank one pension" norm for this constitutional office. Issues: 1. Whether pension calculations must reckon full judicial service, using last pay as a High Court judge. 2. Validity of pension ceilings under the HCJ Act and Article 14 discrimination. 3. Parity in post-retiral benefits between permanent/additional judges and those elevated from judicial service/Bar. 4. Impact of service breaks or New Pension Scheme (NPS) on entitlements. Holdings and Principles Laid Down: The Court summarized the following binding principles: (i) Entire service as a judge is reckoned for pension, based on last pay drawn as a High Court judge (not hypothetical District Judge pay). [M.L. Jain (1985) 2 SCC 355]. (ii) Pension ceiling under clause (b), Paragraph 2, Part III, First Schedule to HCJ Act violates Article 14; effaced since 1 January 1996 per M.L. Jain (II) (1991) 1 SCC 644. Pension follows proviso ceiling therein. (iii) No discrimination in pension fixation for constitutional office holders; uniform pay, allowances, and perks extend to pensions regardless of elevation source. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (2014) 12 SCC 1]. (iv) Judicial officers' and Bar members' pre-elevation experience counts equally toward pension. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra); Jagdish Chandra Gupta 2024 INSC 862]. (v) Classification by elevation source (Bar vs. service) lacks rational nexus and is unreasonable. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (vi) "One rank one pension" is the norm for constitutional offices. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (vii) No discrimination in family pension payments. [P. Ramakrishnam Raju (supra)]. (viii) Service breaks (e.g., between District Judge retirement and High Court elevation) do not deny pension based on High Court salary. [Union of India v. Justice (Retd.) Raj Rahul Garg (Raj Rani Jain)]. (ix) High Court judges elevated post-NPS are entitled to GPF benefits under HCJ Act. [Justice Shailendra Singh v. Union of India]. Significance: This judgment ensures parity and non-discrimination in judicial pensions, reinforcing constitutional uniformity for High Court judges' post-retiral benefits. In Re Refixation of Pension Considering Service Period in District Judiciary and High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2025 INSC 726
Judicial Service - The Supreme Court reinstated a minimum three-year practice requirement for advocates applying for Civil Judge (Junior Division) posts, reversing the earlier relaxation from the 2002 All India Judges Association case. The decision revealed a lack of consensus among High Courts and States, with most supporting the three-year practice condition alongside a law degree, while Haryana, Chhattisgarh, Nagaland, and Tripura opposed any such requirement. The High Courts of Rajasthan and Sikkim also resisted the mandate, and conflicting stances emerged between certain High Courts and their respective State Governments, such as Chhattisgarh and Punjab & Haryana. The Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts endorsed prior practice but did not specify a minimum duration. The Court clarified that the practice period is calculated from provisional enrollment and does not apply to ongoing recruitment processes. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - The Supreme Court restored the 3-year minimum practice condition for entry into judicial service but clarified that this requirement will not apply to recruitment processes already notified by High Courts or States prior to the judgment. The condition will apply only to future recruitment processes. Recruitment processes previously held in abeyance due to this case may now proceed. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - The Supreme Court restored the requirement of a minimum of three years of practice as an advocate for eligibility to apply for entry-level judicial service posts (Civil Judge, Junior Division). The period of practice may be reckoned from provisional enrollment and includes experience as law clerks. The condition does not apply to recruitment processes initiated by High Courts before May 20, 2025, but applies to future recruitments. All High Courts and State Governments are directed to amend service rules accordingly. Candidates must provide a certificate from the Principal Judicial Officer or an advocate with a minimum 10-year standing, endorsed by the designated officer, to verify practice. The Court observed that allowing fresh law graduates without practical experience into judicial service has been counterproductive, as firsthand court experience is essential for effective judicial functioning. The decision overrules the 2002 judgment in All India Judges Association case, which had removed the minimum practice requirement. All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2025 INSC 735
Judicial Service - Visually impaired candidates are eligible for judicial service, and Rule 6A of the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 1994, was struck down to the extent it excluded them. Rule 7 prescribing additional requirements for PwDs (such as three years of practice or securing 70% marks in the first attempt), was partially struck down as violative of equality and reasonable accommodation. Separate cut-offs must be maintained for visually impaired candidates, in line with the Indra Sawhney judgment. (Para 68) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Judicial Service - Women in Judiciary - Gender Equality - Judicial Decision-Making - Maternity Rights - Indirect Discrimination - Reinstatement of Terminated Judicial Officers - Increased representation of women in the judiciary is essential for enhancing judicial decision-making, particularly in cases affecting women, and for promoting broader gender equality by challenging stereotypes and encouraging women's participation in other decision-making roles. International covenants, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and CEDAW, mandate protection of maternity rights and equal employment opportunities for women, including freedom from discrimination during pregnancy and maternity. Miscarriage has profound physical and psychological consequences for women, requiring sensitive consideration in the workplace. Courts must address and rectify indirect discrimination, which often masks underlying patriarchal systems, to ensure equal opportunity and gender equality in public employment. A holistic approach to evaluating judicial officers, especially women, necessitates considering their medical and emotional circumstances, including the impact of pregnancy and miscarriage, and not solely relying on performance metrics like pendency and disposal. Termination orders of judicial officers were set aside, and they were reinstated with consequential benefits, emphasizing the need for a sensitive work environment and guidance for women in the judiciary. (Para 17 & 18) Sarita Choudhary v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2025 INSC 289
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 - Maternity leave is an integral component of maternity benefits, forming part of reproductive rights recognized under international human rights law, encompassing the rights to health, privacy, equality, non-discrimination, and dignity. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court Division Bench's order denying maternity leave to a government teacher for her third child, citing the State's two-child norm policy. The appellant, who had two children from a prior marriage (not in her custody) and sought leave for her first child born during employment, was entitled to maternity benefits under the Act. The Act prevails over conflicting State service rules by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution. The Act's provisions on maternity leave duration (26 weeks for women with fewer than two surviving children, 12 weeks for those with two or more) do not limit benefits based on the total number of children, and “surviving children” refers to those in the custody of the woman employee. The State's two-child norm must be harmonized with the objectives of maternity benefits through purposive interpretation. The impugned order was set aside, restoring the Single Judge's direction to grant maternity leave from 11 October 2021 to 10 October 2022. (Paras 28, 32, 34, 35) K. Umadevi v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 614 : 2025 INSC 781 : AIR 2025 SC 2719 : (2025) 8 SCC 263
Military Service - Ex-Servicemen Quota – Eligibility of Indian Military Nursing Service (IMNS) Personnel - Whether personnel of the Indian Military Nursing Service (IMNS) qualify as "ex-servicemen" under the Punjab Recruitment of Ex-Servicemen Rules, 1982 for reservation in Punjab Civil Services. Held, IMNS personnel are eligible for "ex-serviceman" status under the 1982 Rules, as IMNS forms part of the Indian Military and the armed forces of the Union. The 1982 Rules aim to facilitate the resettlement of veterans, and excluding IMNS personnel would defeat this purpose, particularly given Punjab's significant contribution to the armed forces (7.7% of Army personnel). IMNS personnel satisfy the criteria for "ex-serviceman" status under Rule 2(c) of the 1982 Rules. Effective resettlement of ex-servicemen is vital for maintaining armed forces morale and encouraging youth enlistment. The Court dismissed the appeal challenging the High Court's ruling, affirming that Respondent No. 4, a released IMNS officer who served as a short-service commission officer and received gratuity upon release, qualifies as an "ex-serviceman" under Rule 2(c). Respondent No. 4 is eligible for appointment under the ex-servicemen quota without affecting the appellant's appointment (an ex-Army Captain). Respondent No. 4 is entitled to notional service benefits but not backwages. The ruling clarifies the inclusive scope of the "ex-serviceman" definition under the 1982 Rules, ensuring equitable employment opportunities for IMNS personnel in Punjab Civil Services. (Paras 14, 15, 18, 22) Irwan Kour v. Punjab Public Service Commission, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 530 : 2025 INSC 494 : AIR 2025 SC 2161
Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Held, under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1972, gratuity can be forfeited, wholly or partially, if an employee is terminated for misconduct constituting an offence involving moral turpitude, without requiring a criminal conviction. The observation in Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529, suggesting conviction as a prerequisite for forfeiture, was obiter dicta and not binding. The term "offence" under the Act, as per the General Clauses Act, refers to any act or omission punishable by law, judged on the standard of preponderance of probabilities in disciplinary proceedings, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal proceedings. The Disciplinary or Appointing Authority must determine if the misconduct constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and decide the extent of forfeiture based on the misconduct's gravity. In the present case, the Court upheld forfeiture for suppression of the actual date of birth and misappropriation of fares by MSRTC conductors, as these acts constituted offences involving moral turpitude, despite no criminal proceedings. Appeal allowed. (Para 10, 13) Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 216 : 2025 INSC 233
Pay Scale - Employees appointed on a temporary basis against sanctioned posts are entitled to a regular pay scale after completing three years of service, as per the relevant government circular. The designation of employees as "part-time" does not negate their entitlement to a regular pay scale if they are appointed against sanctioned posts and fulfill the conditions of the applicable rules. The absence of a Screening Committee for scrutinizing eligibility does not justify denying benefits to employees who are otherwise similarly situated to those who have received such benefits. The appellants were granted the benefit of a regular pay scale, and the State was directed to pay arrears accordingly. Rakesh Kumar Charmakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2025 INSC 136 : (2025) 3 SCC 326
Pensionary Benefits – Regularization of Absence as Extraordinary Leave – Break in Service - Whether a retired government employee can be denied pensionary benefits on the ground of 'break in service' when their unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Held, pensionary benefits cannot be denied to a retired government employee whose unauthorized absence was regularized as extraordinary leave. Once the absence is treated as extraordinary leave, it cannot be considered a 'break in service' for denying pension. Denial of pensionary benefits must be supported by a departmental inquiry proving unauthorized absence, and the burden cannot shift to the employee to prove they were prevented from working. In the absence of such an inquiry, the regularization of service prevails, entitling the employee to pensionary benefits. The appeal was allowed, setting aside the decisions of the State Administrative Tribunal and High Court. The respondents were directed to finalize the appellant's pension within three months. (Para 11, 12) Jaya Bhattacharya v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2025 INSC 270 : AIR 2025 SC 1575
Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – A batch of job contract employees in Odisha, initially engaged under job contract establishments and later regularised in pensionable posts, claimed pensionary benefits counting their entire pre-regularisation service. The Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Single Judge of the Orissa High Court upheld the claim, treating job contract service akin to work-charged service. The State's writ appeals before the Division Bench were dismissed as time-barred due to inordinate delay. The State approached the Supreme Court via special leave petitions, many filed belatedly. Appeals allowed; costs imposed. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259
Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Distinction between work-charged employees and job contract employees – Entitlement to pension for pre-regularisation service – Job contract employees not entitled to count entire pre-regularisation service towards pension; only qualifying period to make eligible for pensionary benefits – Unlike work-charged employees, whose full service of 5 years or more counts if uninterrupted and followed by regular appointment – 2001 amendment to Rule 18(6) limits job contract service to minimum qualifying period post-regularisation – State's delay in appeals condoned due to fiscal implications on exchequer and large number of affected employees, but costs of ₹1.5 lakhs per employee imposed on State for lethargic litigation approach – Orissa Administrative Tribunal and Orissa High Court orders set aside insofar as they allowed full pre-regularisation service for job contract employees. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259
Pensions – Odisha Pension Rules, 1992 – Rule 18(3), (6) – Whether job contract employees, upon regularisation, are entitled under the Odisha Pension Rules, 1992, to pension benefits counting their full pre-regularisation service period, or only a limited qualifying portion thereof, as distinct from work-charged employees. Held: The Supreme Court, departing from the norm against condoning excessive delays, examined the merits given the matter's impact on numerous employees and the State exchequer. It clarified the statutory distinction under Rule 18: sub-Rule (3) qualifies the full uninterrupted service of work-charged employees (5+ years) for pension upon regularisation, whereas sub-Rule (6) limits job contract employees to only that service portion necessary to achieve pension eligibility post-regularisation. The 2001 amendment reinforced this intent to curb undue fiscal burden. The Tribunal and High Court misinterpreted the rules by equating the two categories. Full pre-regularisation service for job contractors impermissibly expands eligibility beyond legislative scheme. Directions issued for State to deposit ₹1.5 lakhs per affected employee within 4 weeks, non-effective until compliance; dismissed delay-based petitions revived per merits. (Para 3. 15, 20) State of Odisha v. Sudhansu Sekhar Jena, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 239 : 2025 INSC 259
Police Service - Constitution of India; Articles 14, 16, and 21 - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Constitutional Validity of Retrospective Amendment – Whether the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) of the Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955, granting seniority to in-service candidates over direct recruits based on prior service instead of competitive examination marks, violates Articles 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution. Held, seniority in direct recruitment must be determined solely based on merit, i.e., marks obtained in the competitive examination, and not prior in-service experience. The retrospective application of the 2017 amendment, which favored less meritorious in-service candidates, was arbitrary and unconstitutional, violating Articles 14 (equality before law), 16 (equality of opportunity in public employment), and 21 (due process). The Supreme Court struck down the 2017 amendment to Rule 25(a) and directed the State to: (i) recast seniority lists for direct recruits from 1995 based exclusively on examination ranks within 60 days; (ii) ensure no reversion of existing promotions but halt further promotions until revised lists are issued; and (iii) grant notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages) to eligible direct recruits based on revised lists. (Para 22–27) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Police Service - Tamil Nadu Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1955; Rule 25(a) - Seniority in Direct Recruitment – Directions – (i) Recast seniority lists for direct recruits (80% open market, 20% in-service) based solely on competitive examination marks within 60 days. (ii) No reversion of officers promoted under prior seniority lists, but no further promotions until revised lists are finalized. (iii) Grant promotions to eligible departmental candidates based on revised seniority lists within two months. (iv) Direct recruits found eligible in revised lists entitled to notional promotions and consequential benefits (excluding back wages). (v) Conduct a common competitive examination for 100% direct recruitment, with seniority determined strictly by examination marks/ranks. (Para 28) R. Ranjith Singh v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 528 : 2025 INSC 612
Prolonged suspension - Reinstatement - Subsistence Allowance - The applicant, an Assistant Superintendent (Jail), sought revocation of his suspension which was extended periodically. The suspension followed allegations of providing undue facilities to ex-promoters/directors of Unitech Ltd. who were under trial for financial misappropriation involving home buyers' funds. The Supreme Court directed the suspension of 32 Tihar Jail officials, including the applicant, pending further proceedings. The applicant argued for reinstatement, citing the prolonged suspension and lack of progress in the criminal case. The Court recalled the suspension order, leaving it to the Competent Authority to decide on reinstatement based on whether it would impede the ongoing departmental proceedings. The Court noted that suspended officials are entitled to 75% of their pay as subsistence allowance after six months of suspension, unless denied for valid reasons. Bhupinder Singh v. Unitech Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 147
Promotion - Direct Recruitment - Procedure - Whether an employee is entitled to claim promotion to a post that is required to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment, and not through promotion from a feeder cadre? Whether a vacancy meant for direct recruitment can be filled merely by issuing an internal circular, without a public advertisement inviting applications from eligible candidates? The importance of adhering to statutory rules and proper documentation in judicial proceedings to avoid miscarriage of justice. The petitioner, employed as a peon since 1978, sought promotion to the post of Tracer, claiming eligibility based on a 3-month training course. The Administrative Tribunal initially directed the State to consider her case for promotion. However, the High Court set aside the Tribunal's order, holding that the post of Tracer was to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment as per the Orissa Subordinate Architectural Service Rules, 1979. The petitioner challenged this decision before the Supreme Court. Held, the post of Tracer, as per the 1979 Rules, is to be filled exclusively by direct recruitment and not through promotion. Rule 5(1)(e) of the 1979 Rules explicitly states that all posts of Tracers in Categories I, II, and III shall be filled by direct recruitment. The petitioner, being a peon, was not eligible for promotion to the post of Tracer, as it is not a promotional post under the Rules. The Court reiterated that direct recruitment to public posts must follow a transparent process, including public advertisements and competitive examinations, as mandated by Rule 7 of the 1979 Rules. The State's failure to issue a public advertisement and follow the prescribed procedure rendered the appointments invalid. Jyostnamayee Mishra v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 91 : 2025 INSC 87 : AIR 2025 SC 676
Promotion - Eligibility criteria - Medical Education Service - Post of Associate Professor - Distinction Between Administrative and Teaching Cadres - Whether the High Court of Kerala was justified in interfering with the promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Department of Neurosurgery on the ground of lacking five years of physical teaching experience as an Assistant Professor after acquiring the M.Ch. degree. Whether Government Order (G.O.) dated April 7, 2008, or G.O. dated December 14, 2009, governed the eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Associate Professor in the Medical Education Service. Whether the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules (KS & SSR), particularly Rule 10(ab), applied to the promotional appointment in question. Held, G.O. dated April 7, 2008, which governed the recruitment and promotion in the Medical Education Service, did not explicitly require five years of teaching experience after acquiring the M.Ch. degree for promotion to the post of Associate Professor. The absence of such a requirement in the Teaching Cadre (Branch-II) was deliberate, as it was explicitly mentioned in the Administrative Cadre (Branch-I). The Court applied the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one thing excludes the other) to conclude that the omission of the phrase “after acquiring postgraduate degree” in the Teaching Cadre was intentional. Rule 10(ab) of the KS & SSR, which generally requires experience to be gained after acquiring the basic qualification, was held inapplicable to the promotional appointment in question. The Court reasoned that G.O. dated April 7, 2008, being a special rule, superseded the general rules under the KS & SSR. The phrase “unless otherwise specified” in Rule 10(ab) allowed for exceptions, and the specific requirements of G.O. dated April 7, 2008, constituted such an exception. The High Court's reliance on Rule 28(b)(1A) of the KS & SSR was also deemed erroneous, as it applied only when no qualified candidate was available for promotion, which was not the case here. The requirement of post-qualification experience was more relevant for administrative posts (Branch-I) than for teaching posts (Branch-II), where the emphasis was on overall teaching experience. Dr. Sharmad v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 51 : 2025 INSC 70
Promotion to the post of District Judge – Merit-cum-Seniority – Suitability Test – Seniority - Held, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal challenging the denial of promotion to the appellants, who were judicial officers in Jharkhand, despite qualifying the suitability test for promotion to the post of District Judge in the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service. The appellants were denied promotion on the basis of a merit list, although they had secured more than the requisite minimum marks for suitability. The Court relied on the judgment in Ravikumar Dhansukhlal Maheta v. High Court of Gujarat, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 387, holding that under the 65% quota for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, once a candidate qualifies the suitability test, promotions cannot be denied solely on the basis of a comparative merit list. The suitability of each candidate should be assessed individually, and a comparative assessment is not warranted unless explicitly provided by the applicable rules. Under the Jharkhand Superior Judicial Services (Recruitment, Appointment, and Condition of Service) Rules, 2001, promotions under the 65% merit-cum-seniority quota should be based on suitability, not comparative merit. Once candidates qualify the suitability test, they are entitled to promotion without a comparative merit list ranking. The appellants were granted notional promotion from the date on which other officers from the same selection list were promoted (i.e., as per the notification dated 30.05.2019). They were also entitled to all consequential service benefits, including seniority, increments, and notional pay fixation, but without any back wages. Appeal Allowed. Dharmendra Kumar Singh v. Honble High Court of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 71 : 2025 INSC 72 : AIR 2025 SC 465 : (2025) 6 SCC 460
Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Courts should scrutinize whether the decision to cancel a selection process is wholly disproportionate to the risk and overly severe. When systemic fraud or irregularities vitiate a recruitment process, the entire process becomes illegitimate. If 2 wrongdoers can be segregated, innocent candidates should not be penalized by the cancellation of the entire process. In cases involving larger public interest, additional grounds can be considered to examine the validity of an order. The court can review the original reasons that caused the cancellation of the select list. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705
Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Judicial Review - Each case regarding the cancellation of a select list must be decided on its own facts. The court must determine if the recruiting authority's decision to cancel the entire process, rather than save a part of it, is disproportionate and irrational. If the selection process borders on fraud, such as through violations of reservation policies, the decision to cancel the entire process can be justified. (Para 50 & 51) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705
Public Employment - Cancellation of Select List - Rights of Empanelled Candidates - Empanelment does not grant an indefeasible right to appointment, but empanelled candidates have a right to challenge adverse decisions. The appointing authority cannot ignore the select panel arbitrarily; there must be cogent reasons for not making appointments. Policy decisions not to carry forward the selection process must be bona fide, justifiable, and free from arbitrariness. (Para 53) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705
Public Employment - Interview-Based Selection - Presumption of Favouritism - Arbitrariness and Judicial Review - When a government itself acknowledges that a selection process based solely on interviews carries an inherent risk of arbitrariness and potential for misuse, this perception is a significant factor in judicial review. An assessment of candidates based solely on interview marks can reasonably lead to a presumption of favouritism. In such circumstances, courts should exercise significant restraint in substituting their judgment for the government's decision, especially when the government has acted to rectify a selection process perceived as flawed. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705
Public Employment - Recruitment Process - Cancellation of Select List by Successor Government - Judicial Review - Proportionality Test - Scope of Interference - Where a successor government cancels a select list prepared by a previous government due to detected illegalities and irregularities, the judicial review court must apply the proportionality test to assess whether the cancellation was justified. The court should consider whether the government's decision was so disproportionate and incommensurate with the detected illegalities/irregularities as to warrant interference. The court should not substitute its own view for that of the government, especially when the government's decision is not unreasonable or implausible. The government's decision to ensure diversity, inclusivity, and fairness in public service, even if it entails canceling a tainted selection process, should be given due deference. (Para 52) Public Employment - Absence of Challenge by Unsuccessful Candidates - The absence of a challenge from unsuccessful candidates does not preclude the government from addressing perceived arbitrariness or potential for favouritism in a selection process. (Para 40) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705
Recruitment Process - Constable positions in the Assam Forest Protection Force (AFPF) - Political Change and Cancellation- The appellants are granted liberty to take forward the process of filling up 104 Constables in the AFPF, in accordance with law, by publishing fresh advertisement. The respondents, if they choose to apply in pursuance of such advertisement, shall be considered for appointment waiving their age bar as well as waiving insignificant minor deficiencies in physical measurement as well as insignificant requirements of the PET. It would be desirable if rules are framed for the purpose of recruitment and such rules are uniformly applied to all and sundry, so as to preempt any allegation of bias or arbitrariness. (Para 63 & 64) State of Assam v. Arabinda Rabha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 307 : 2025 INSC 334 : AIR 2025 SC 1318 : (2025) 7 SCC 705
Recruitment - Qualification - Teacher Eligibility Test - Whether the High Court erred in permitting candidates with Central Teacher Eligibility Test (CTET) or State Teacher Eligibility Test (STET) qualifications to participate in the recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand, despite the Jharkhand Teacher Eligibility Test (JTET) being the prescribed eligibility criterion under the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023? Whether the State of Jharkhand acted arbitrarily by altering the eligibility criteria mid-way through the recruitment process, in violation of the principles laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak v. Rajasthan High Court, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 864 ? Whether the State Government has the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) and the National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) Guidelines, 2011 ? Held, the Jharkhand High Court erred in permitting CTET and STET qualified candidates to participate in the ongoing recruitment process for Assistant Teachers in Jharkhand. The Court emphasized that the eligibility criteria, as per the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, required candidates to pass the JTET, and this criterion could not be altered mid-way through the recruitment process. The Court reiterated the principle laid down in Tej Prakash Pathak that the eligibility criteria for recruitment cannot be changed after the recruitment process has commenced, as it would violate the guarantee of equal opportunity under Article 16 of the Constitution. The State's decision to relax the eligibility criteria based on the Advocate General's concession was deemed arbitrary and unfair. The State Government does not have the authority to relax the minimum qualifications for teacher recruitment under the RTE Act and NCTE Guidelines unless the Central Government issues a notification under Section 23(2) of the RTE Act. The State's actions in this case were not in compliance with the statutory framework. The impugned judgment of the High Court permitting CTET and STET holders to participate in the recruitment process was set aside. Only JTET holders who possessed the requisite qualifications under the 2022 Recruitment Rules prior to the 2024 amendment were declared eligible for appointment. CTET and STET holders who applied after the High Court's judgment or the amendment in the rules were deemed ineligible for recruitment under Advertisement No. 13/2023. The appeals were allowed, and the recruitment process was directed to proceed strictly in accordance with the 2022 Recruitment Rules and Advertisement No. 13/2023, without any mid-way alterations to the eligibility criteria. Parimal Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 142 : 2025 INSC 134
Reservation – Validity of OBC-NCL/MBC-NCL Certificates – Cut-off Date for Eligibility - Split Verdict - The appeals arose from a split verdict by a Division Bench of the Supreme Court on May 18, 2023, concerning the appointment of Civil Judges under the Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010. The Supreme Court heard the appeals before a 3-Judge Bench due to the Division Bench's split verdict and held that in the absence of a specified cut-off date in recruitment advertisements, the last date for application submission is the default date for assessing eligibility, including the validity of reserved category certificates. OBC-NCL and MBC-NCL 2 certificates are valid for one year, extendable to three years with an affidavit, as per State circulars. Certificates issued beyond this period are invalid for claiming reservation benefits. Subsequent notice clarifying cut-off date, aligning with existing rules and judicial precedents, is not arbitrary. Appellants' certificates issued between 2012-2018 and after cut-off date were invalid, and no relaxation permissible absent discretionary clause in rules. Appeals dismissed, upholding High Court's exclusion of appellants from interviews for Civil Judge posts. (Para 36 - 39) Sakshi Arha v. Rajasthan High Court, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 405 : 2025 INSC 463 : AIR 2025 SC 2232
Retired Employees – Recovery of Excess Payment – Principles of Equity - Excess payment made to an employee cannot be recovered if such payment was not on account of any fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employee. Also, excess payment to the employee due to any wrong application of the rule or incorrect calculation on the part of the employer is not recoverable. (Para 9 & 11) Jogeswar Sahoo v. District Judge Cuttack, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 396 : 2025 INSC 449 : AIR 2025 SC 2291
Retirement Age - Prescribing different retirement ages for employees based on the type of disability is arbitrary and violates Article 14. The Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board retired a locomotor-disabled electrician at 58, while visually impaired employees could serve until 60 under a 2013 state policy (OM 29.03.2013). Such distinctions discriminatory, mandating uniform retirement benefits for all benchmark disabilities under the Persons with Disabilities Act, 1995, and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016. The impugned decision was set aside, affirming equal treatment across disability categories and the appellant's legitimate expectation of an extended retirement age until the policy's withdrawal in 2019. Appeal allowed. (Para 14) Kashmiri Lal Sharma v. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 646 : 2025 INSC 472
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - No distinction can be made between Persons with Disabilities (PwD) and Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) for employment rights. (Para 67) In Re Recruitment of Visually Impaired In Judicial Services v. Registrar General the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 274 : 2025 INSC 300
Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 - The court reaffirmed that all benefits granted to Persons with Benchmark Disabilities (PwBD) must also be extended to Persons with Disabilities (PwD) in examination settings, including facilities such as scribes and compensatory time, without discrimination. The court reviewed the Office Memorandum (OM) dated 10.08.2022, issued in compliance with its earlier judgment in Vikash Kumar, which provided guidelines for PwD candidates with less than 40% disability and writing difficulties. However, the petitioner highlighted several deficiencies in the OM, including its failure to incorporate reasonable accommodation, its restrictive focus on "difficulty in writing," and the absence of alternative examination modes (e.g., Braille, computers). The court also noted the lack of a grievance redressal mechanism and inconsistencies in implementation across examination bodies. The court directed the respondent authorities to revise the OM within two months, ensuring uniform compliance, extending benefits to all PwD candidates, and incorporating measures such as a grievance redressal portal, periodic sensitization drives, and flexibility in examination modes. The court emphasized the need for strict adherence to the RPwD Act, 2016 and the principles of reasonable accommodation, as outlined in Vikash Kumar and Avni Prakash. The matter was posted for compliance reporting after two months. (Para 19) Gulshan Kumar v. Institute of Banking Personnel Selection, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 151 : 2025 INSC 142 : AIR 2025 SC 1063 : (2025) 4 SCC 90
Rule Against Bias - Audi Alteram Partem - Cure at Revisional Stage - Whether the selection of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in Janpad Panchayat, Gaurihar in the year 1998 was vitiated due to violation of the rule against bias (nemo judex in causa sua) ? Whether the cancellation of appointments without affording the appellants an opportunity of hearing (audi alteram partem) violated the principles of natural justice, and whether demonstrating prejudice is necessary to establish such a violation ? Whether the breach of natural justice at the initial stage (Collector's order) can be cured at the revisional stage (Commissioner's order) ? The appellants, relatives of members of the selection committee, were selected for the post of Shiksha Karmi Grade III teachers in 1998. Their selection was challenged by an unsuccessful candidate alleging nepotism and bias. The Collector quashed the selection, citing bias and nepotism, without issuing notice to the appellants. The Commissioner and High Court upheld the decision, despite the appellants' contention that they were denied a fair hearing. Held, the selection was not vitiated by bias. The recusal of committee members with relatives among the candidates, as per the Panchayat's resolution, eliminated any reasonable likelihood of bias. The statutory definition of "relative" was not fully considered by the lower authorities, and the absence of a hearing prevented the appellants from demonstrating the fairness of the selection process. The Court found a gross violation of the principle of audi alteram partem, as the appellants were not given notice or an opportunity to be heard at the initial stage. The breach of natural justice was fundamental, and the prejudice exception did not apply. The Court emphasized that procedural fairness is inherent and cannot be dispensed with, even if no prejudice is demonstrated. The denial of natural justice at the initial stage could not be cured at the revisional stage. The appellate process cannot rectify a fundamentally flawed initial decision, especially when the revisional authority did not conduct a fresh hearing or address the procedural defects. The selection process was not vitiated by bias, but the cancellation of appointments without a fair hearing violated the principles of natural justice. Given the 25-year tenure of the appellants under interim orders, the Court declined to remand the matter for fresh inquiry, deeming it impractical and unjust. The judgment reaffirms the importance of procedural fairness in administrative decisions, emphasizing that the principles of natural justice, particularly the right to a fair hearing, are fundamental and cannot be overlooked. The Court also clarified that the rule against bias must be assessed contextually, and the doctrine of necessity may apply in cases where recusal is impractical due to small jurisdictions or statutory mandates. Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2025 INSC 126 : AIR 2025 SC (CIVIL) 1043 : (2025) 7 SCC 545
Seniority – If a government employee holding a particular post is transferred on public interest, he carries with him his existing status including seniority to the transferred post. However, if an officer is transferred at his own request, such a transferred employee will have to be accommodated in the transferred post, subject to the claims and status of the other employees at the transferred place, as their interests cannot be varied without there being any public interest in the transfer. Subject to specific provision of the Rules governing the services, such transferees are generally placed at the bottom, below the junior-most employee in the category in the new cadre or department. (Para 19) Secretary to Government Department v. K.C. Devaki, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 350 : 2025 INSC 389
Subordinate Service - Kerala Public Health Engineering Subordinate Service Rules, 1966 (Subordinate Service Rules) and Kerala Public Health Engineering Service Special Rules, 1960 (Special Rules) govern completely separate cadres. Rule 4(b) of the Special Rules applies only after appointment as Assistant Engineer, and cannot be applied for lower promotions. (Para 24) Sajithabhai v. Kerala Water Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 358 : 2025 INSC 354
Subordinate Service - Re-evaluation of answer sheets - The Supreme Court directed the Uttar Pradesh Subordinate Services Selection Commission (UPSSSC) to re-evaluate answer sheets for the 2021–2022 Revenue Lekhpal examination due to ambiguities in three questions from Booklet Series “B.” For Question 58 (Salt Satyagraha Location), the Court held both (A) Dandi and (C) Sabarmati as correct, noting the march started at Sabarmati but the act of defiance occurred at Dandi, and awarded marks for either choice. For Question 63 (Longest National Highway in UP), options (C) NH2 and (D) None of these were accepted due to outdated designations. For Question 90 (Solar Photovoltaic Irrigation Pump Scheme grant), both (B) 30% and (C) 45% were deemed valid due to policy changes. Criticizing UPSSSC for framing ambiguous questions, the Court ordered re-evaluation for affected candidates without disturbing selected candidates. (Para 10 - 12) Reetesh Kumar Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 523
Transfer - Distinction between transfers on request and transfers by absorption in public interest - Determination of seniority of employees absorbed from the Directorate of Health Services (DHS) into the Directorate of Medical Education (DME) following the abolition of the dual control system in medical colleges in Kerala - Held, the transfer of employees from DHS to DME was a result of a policy decision by the Kerala government to abolish the dual control system, and the absorption was not based on the employees' request but on their option to join DME. The proviso to Rule 27(a) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules (KS&SS Rules), which applies to transfers on request, does not apply to transfers by absorption made in public interest or administrative exigency. The seniority of the absorbed employees should be maintained as per Rule 27(a) and 27(c) of the KS&SS Rules, meaning their seniority would include their past service in DHS. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside, and the State of Kerala was directed to prepare the seniority list of DME employees, including both original and absorbed employees, in accordance with the Court's ruling. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the absorbed employees, holding that their seniority should include their past service in DHS, as the transfer was a result of a policy decision and not a request-based transfer. Geetha V.M. v. Rethnasenan K., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 39 : 2025 INSC 33 : AIR 2025 SC 824
University - Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - Appeal against High Court order dismissing writ petition seeking inclusion in University's General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Appellant, appointed as Junior Scientist cum Assistant Professor in 1987, did not opt for Contributory Provident Fund (CPF) despite opportunities. University statutes provided for two retiral benefit schemes: CPF (opt-in) and General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity (default). University issued Office Order dated 21.02.2008, reiterating this, stating non-exercise of CPF option would result in inclusion in the default scheme. Appellant's name was omitted from the list of those included in the default scheme. Whether the appellant, who did not opt for CPF, is entitled to be included in the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme. Held, Yes. University statutes and Office Order clearly stipulate that non-exercise of CPF option automatically entitles employees to the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cumgratuity scheme. High Court erred in dismissing the writ petition based on nonexercise of option, as non-exercise led to inclusion in the default scheme. Similar relief granted to similarly placed persons by the High Court. High Court order set aside. University directed to provide retiral benefits under the General Provident Fund-cum-pension-cum-gratuity scheme within four months, subject to adjustments of CPF benefits, if any, availed by the appellant. Appeal allowed. (Para 12) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312
University - Rajendra Agricultural University Statutes, 1976 - the default retiral scheme applicable to the University's employees is General Provident Fund-cumpension-cum-gratuity, unless the employee has specifically opted for the Contributory Provident Fund scheme. (Para 9) Mukesh Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Agricultural University, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 316 : 2025 INSC 312
Slum Areas
Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 Once a slum area is declared as 'censused slum' i.e., the slums located on land belonging to government or municipal undertaking, then such slums are automatically eligible for redevelopment under the Slum Act without the need for a separate notification. (Para 16) Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali v. Tahsildar-I, Special Cell, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 308 : 2025 INSC 276
Society
Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra); Section 48(e) – Alienation of Charged Property – Not Void Ab Initio – Voidable at Society's Instance – Held, Alienation of property charged in favor of a Co-operative Society under Section 48(e) of the Act, 1960, is not void ab initio but voidable only if the Society seeks nullification. A third party cannot challenge the transaction as void if the Society does not enforce the charge. Section 48(e) is directory, and the transaction remains valid unless the Society, as the aggrieved party, contests it. The plaintiff, having alienated the charged property, cannot seek to nullify his own actions to gain relief, as courts will not reward a party for their own wrong. (Paras 20-25, 32) Machhindranath v. Ramchandra Gangadhar Dhamne, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 667 : 2025 INSC 795
Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - ISKCON Mumbai, founded in 1966 by Srila Prabhupada with its registered office in Juhu, Mumbai, claimed ISKCON Bangalore (registered July 1978) operated solely as its subordinate branch, with all properties vesting in Mumbai. - ISKCON Bangalore acquired the disputed Hare Krishna Hills property (Schedule 'A') via allotment to it specifically, constructing the temple using devotee funds; it sought declarations of independent ownership, administrative autonomy, and injunctions against Mumbai's interference in a suit filed in 2001 (Suit No. 7934/2001, City Civil Court, Bengaluru). Trial court decreed in favor of ISKCON Bangalore on April 17, 2009, rejecting Mumbai's counterclaim for injunction. Karnataka High Court, on May 23, 2011, reversed this, holding ISKCON Bangalore as a branch and vesting title in Mumbai, prompting ISKCON Bangalore's appeal to the Supreme Court. An oversight committee under former Justice R.V. Raveendran supervised temple affairs for 14 years per interim Supreme Court orders. Issues 1. Whether ISKCON Bangalore constitutes an independent juristic entity or merely a branch of ISKCON Mumbai, affecting property vesting and administrative control. 2. Ownership and title to the Hare Krishna Hill temple property, allotted explicitly to ISKCON Bangalore—does it vest in the allottee society or the alleged "parent" trust (ISKCON Mumbai)? 3. Validity of the July 1, 1984, General Body meeting electing Madhu Pandit Dasa and others as ISKCON Bangalore's governing body, challenged by Mumbai faction. Held, Allowed the appeal filed by ISKCON Bangalore; set aside the Karnataka High Court's May 23, 2011, judgment and restored the trial court's April 17, 2009, decree in full. Declared ISKCON Bangalore the absolute owner and possessor of the Hare Krishna Hills property; ISKCON Mumbai has no title, control, or authority to interfere in its administration or remove office-bearers. Upheld the 1984 General Body election as valid, dismissing challenges by the Mumbai faction (represented by earlier members like Amiya Vilas Swami). Directed dissolution of the R.V. Raveendran oversight committee within one month of the judgment. No costs awarded; urged both parties to resolve future disputes amicably, noting the Hare Krishna movement's spiritual ethos should preclude such litigation. International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2025 INSC 717
Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - In a 24-year dispute over the ownership and control of the iconic Hare Krishna Hill temple complex in Bengaluru (approximately 6 acres of land allotted by the Bangalore Development Authority in 1988), the Supreme Court upheld the independent legal status of the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Bangalore ("ISKCON Bangalore"), registered under the Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960. The Court set aside the Karnataka High Court's 2011 judgment favoring the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Mumbai ("ISKCON Mumbai"), a public trust registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, and the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950, restoring the trial court's 2009 decree declaring ISKCON Bangalore as the absolute owner and restraining ISKCON Mumbai from interference. The ruling emphasizes the primacy of statutory registration and title over affiliative claims, dissolving a long-standing oversight committee and closing the chapter on intra-organizational litigation. International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2025 INSC 717
Societies Registration Act, 1860 - Karnataka Societies Registration Act, 1960 - Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 - Property Title - Juristic Personality - Religious Institutions - Branch vs. Independent Entity - Injunction Against Interference - Primacy of Statutory Title - Independence of Registered Entities - Evidentiary Burden - Equity in Religious Disputes - Property allotted by a public authority (e.g., Bangalore Development Authority) to a specifically named registered society vests exclusively in that society as a separate juristic person. Historical affiliation or proof of a "branch" existence does not confer automatic title to a "parent" organization absent explicit transfer or vesting provisions. Mere use of a common name (e.g., "ISKCON") does not imply subordination if registrations are distinct under applicable laws. Societies registered under state-specific acts (like Karnataka's) enjoy autonomy; claims of overarching control by a national-level trust must be substantiated by bylaws, agreements, or conduct, not presumed from origins. Concurrent trial and appellate findings on entity independence are not to be lightly disturbed. High Court erred in inferring branch status and property vesting from isolated documents (e.g., early correspondence); comprehensive records, including allotment letters and society bylaws, confirm ISKCON Bangalore's standalone status and title. Courts must balance legal rights with organizational harmony but cannot rewrite statutory titles; prolonged litigation (over 20 years) warrants finality to prevent further schisms in spiritual movements like ISKCON, founded on devotional principles. International Society For Krishna Consciousness, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2025 INSC 717
Societies Registration Act, 1975 (Tamil Nadu) - Whether prior approval from the District Registrar is required before passing a Special Resolution for the amalgamation of societies under Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975. Whether societies with divergent objectives can amalgamate under the Act. Held, Section 30 of the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act, 1975, requires approval from the District Registrar for amalgamation but does not mandate such approval before passing the Special Resolution by the societies. There is no statutory requirement that societies seeking amalgamation must have identical objectives. The Inspector General of Registration and the High Court erred in interpreting the statutory provisions and imposing additional conditions not prescribed by the law. The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Single Judge, Division Bench of the High Court, and the Inspector General of Registration, restoring the District Registrar's approval of the amalgamation. Appeal allowed. Manurkula Devanga Vasaga Salai v. Inspector General of Registration, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 70
Special Investigation Team
The petitioners sought anticipatory bail involving allegations of corruption and fraudulent compensation payments by NOIDA officials. The Court noted that the interim protection granted to the petitioners had been confirmed as they had joined the investigation. The Court expressed dissatisfaction with the earlier Fact-Finding Committee's investigation, which had deviated from its mandate by questioning judicial orders on compensation. Consequently, the Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) comprising senior IPS officers from outside Uttar Pradesh to ensure transparency and fairness. The SIT was tasked with investigating: (1) whether compensation payments exceeded legal entitlements, (2) identifying responsible officials, (3) examining collusion between beneficiaries and NOIDA officials, and (4) assessing NOIDA's overall transparency and public interest commitment. The SIT was directed to submit its report within two months, and no coercive action was to be taken against landowners/farmers without the Court's prior permission. Virendra Singh Nagar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 141
Specific Relief Act, 1963
Section 12 - Specific Performance of Part of Contract - Legal Principle - Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 allows specific performance of part of a contract only if: The plaintiff is ready and willing to perform their obligations. The contract terms are severable, and the plaintiff relinquishes all claims to the performance of the remaining part and to any compensation. Inability to perform may arise due to various factors, including legal prohibitions or deficiencies in quantity or quality of the subject matter. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59
Section 12 (3) – Specific Performance of Part of Contract – Readiness and Willingness to Perform - The petitioner filed suit for specific performance of an agreement and delivery of possession of the suit property. In the alternative, he claimed damages of Rs. 60,00,000/- with interest. The Trial Court dismissed the prayer for specific performance, finding the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, but directed a refund of Rs. 20,00,000/- with 12% interest. The High Court affirmed this decision, holding that Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act was not applicable as the petitioner had not relinquished all claims and was seeking damages. Whether the petitioner was entitled to specific performance of part of the contract under Section 12(3) of the Specific Relief Act despite not relinquishing all claims to performance of the remaining part of the contract or compensation. Held, Section 12(3) is a discretionary relief and cannot be invoked where the terms of the contract are not severable or when the plaintiff has not relinquished all claims to performance and compensation. Section 12(3) could not be invoked as the petitioner sought damages in addition to specific performance, indicating non-relinquishment of claims. The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition, upholding the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and High Court that the petitioner was not ready and willing to perform his contractual obligations. Vijay Prabhu v. S.T. Lajapathie, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 59
Section 16(c) and 34 - Cancellation of Agreement to Sell - Maintainability of Suit - A suit for the specific performance of an agreement to sell, filed after its cancellation, is not maintainable unless it includes a prayer for declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Act challenging the validity of the cancellation. Declaratory relief challenging the validity of the cancellation was essential when seeking specific performance of the agreement to sell, as the suit could not be sustained without a valid and subsisting agreement. (Para 24, 26 & 27) Sangita Sinha v. Bhawana Bhardwaj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 378 : 2025 INSC 450
Section 22 - Refund of Advance Payment - Necessity of Specific Prayer in Plaint - Held, a refund of advance payment or earnest money as part of sale consideration cannot be granted unless specifically prayed for in the plaint or sought through an amendment under Section 22(2). The Court cannot suo moto grant such relief, as the inclusion of a specific prayer is a sine qua non. However, no express prayer is required for ancillary reliefs, such as delivery of possession, which naturally flow from a decree of specific performance, as clarified in Manickam @ Thandapani v. Vasantha, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 395. The forfeiture of earnest money is not penal under Section 74 of the Contract Act in the ordinary sense. In the present case, the appellant's failure to pay the balance sale consideration or fulfill the agreement terms necessitated a specific prayer for refund, which was absent, leading to dismissal of the claim. (Paras 34, 36, 37, 40 & 510) K.R. Suresh v. R. Poornima, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 522 : 2025 INSC 617
Section 28 - Doctrine of Merger - Whether the trial court's decree merges with the appellate court's decree, and whether the time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, as stipulated in the trial court's decree, revives after the appellate court's decision. The plaintiffs filed suits for specific performance of agreements to sell, which were decreed by the trial court in 1994, directing the plaintiffs to deposit the balance sale consideration within 20 days. The defendants appealed, and the first appellate court reversed the trial court's decision. The plaintiffs then filed second appeals, which were allowed by the High Court in 2018, restoring the trial court's decree. The plaintiffs deposited the balance sale consideration in 2018, and the defendants filed applications under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, seeking rescission of the contract, which were rejected by the executing court. The High Court upheld the executing court's decision, leading to the present appeals. Held, the doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court affirms, modifies, or reverses the trial court's decree. The doctrine of merger ensures that only one operative decree exists at any given time, and the appellate court's decree supersedes the trial court's decree. The trial court's decree merged with the High Court's decree in the second appeals. Since the High Court did not specify a time limit for depositing the balance sale consideration, the 20-day period stipulated by the trial court did not revive. The executing court has the discretion to extend the time for depositing the amount, and there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the plaintiffs. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82
Section 28 - Rescission of Contract - Whether the defendants (judgment debtors) were entitled to rescind the contract on the grounds that the plaintiffs (decree holders) failed to deposit the balance sale consideration within the stipulated time. Held, under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the executing court retains jurisdiction to extend the time for depositing the balance sale consideration, even after the decree for specific performance has been passed. The court's power to extend time is discretionary and must be exercised based on the conduct of the parties and the facts of the case. The defendants were not entitled to rescind the contract under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, as the plaintiffs had deposited the balance sale consideration promptly after the High Court's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, holding that the High Court committed no error in rejecting the defendants' applications for rescission of the contract. The Court reaffirmed the principles of the doctrine of merger and the discretionary powers of the executing court under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Balbir Singh v. Baldev Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 82
Section 31 and 34 - Plaintiff seeking declaration of title over a property is not required to seek cancellation of a sale deed executed by another party with whom the plaintiff has no privity of contract. Declaration of title is sufficient and equivalent to seeking cancellation of such a sale deed, as the proviso to Section 34 does not mandate seeking all possible reliefs, only those directly flowing from the declaration. A non-executant of a deed need only seek a declaration that the deed is invalid, void, or non-binding, not its cancellation under Section 31. The Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the suit for not seeking cancellation of the sale deed, restoring the trial court's ruling upholding the plaintiff's title via a Gift Deed and declaring the defendant's sale deed void ab initio. (Referred: Suhrid Singh @ Sardool Singh v. Randhir Singh, (2010) 12 SCC 112; Paras 28 - 30 & 36) Hussain Ahmed Choudhury v. Habibur Rahman, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 466 : 2025 INSC 553
Stamp
Stamp Act, 1899; Section 47-A – Tamil Nadu Stamp (Prevention of Undervaluation of Instruments) Rules, 1968; Rules 3, 4, 6, 7 – Forms I & II – Undervaluation of property in sale deeds – Reference to Collector for determination of market value – Validity of proceedings – Held, in case of undervaluation of property sale's price, the Registering Authority under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 cannot mechanically make reference to the Collector (stamps) for determination of the correct market value of the property. Instead, an opportunity is to be provided to the party, and reasons have to be furnished by the Registering Authority for arriving at a conclusion that the property is undervalued. The Registering Officer must record reasons for believing undervaluation before referring the instrument to the Collector. A roving inquiry is impermissible. Form I notice must contain reasons for considering the document undervalued. Absence of reasons vitiates the inquiry. Collector (Stamps) must pass a provisional order under Rule 4(4) indicating the basis of valuation before issuing Form II. Issuing a final order directly without a provisional order and opportunity for representation violates Rules 4 and 6. "Reason to believe" under Section 47-A is not subjective satisfaction but must be based on material having a rational connection to the belief of undervaluation. The Registering Officer cannot refuse registration merely because the document is undervalued. Their power is limited, and they cannot conduct a detailed inquiry, which is the Collector's prerogative. The Collector's power to determine market value is quasi-judicial, requiring adherence to procedural rules and principles of natural justice. The High Court's view that Form I must contain reasons for undervaluation and the Collector must follow the prescribed procedure is upheld. Appeals dismissed. Chief Revenue Controlling Officer Cum Inspector General of Registration v. P. Babu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 40
Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Cancellation Deed - Applicability of Limitation Period - The Appellants entered into an Agreement to Sell on August 30, 2014, for the purchase of a residential flat in Mumbai, paying ₹27,34,500 as stamp duty. Due to delays in possession, the Appellants canceled the agreement, and a Cancellation Deed was executed on March 17, 2015, but registered on April 28, 2015. The Appellants applied for a refund of the stamp duty on August 6, 2016, contending that their case fell under the pre-amendment regime, which allowed a two-year window for refund claims. The CCRA initially granted the refund on January 8, 2018, but later recalled the order on March 3, 2018, citing the amended six-month limitation period. The High Court dismissed the Appellants' writ petition, holding that the amended limitation period applied, and the CCRA's recall of the refund order was valid. Whether the amended six-month limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, introduced on April 24, 2015, applies to the Appellants' claim for stamp duty refund, given that the Cancellation Deed was executed before the amendment but registered thereafter. Held, technicalities of limitation should not defeat legitimate claims, especially when the claimant is not at fault. The Appellants' right to claim a refund accrued on the date of execution of the Cancellation Deed (March 17, 2015), which was before the amendment. Therefore, the unamended two-year limitation period under Section 48(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958, applied. The Court emphasized that amendments reducing limitation periods cannot extinguish vested rights retrospectively. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110
Stamp Act, 1958 (Maharashtra); Section 48(1) - Refund of stamp duty - Whether the Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (CCRA) had the statutory power to review and recall its earlier order granting a refund of stamp duty. Held, the CCRA lacked statutory authority to review or recall its earlier order granting the refund. The subsequent orders recalling the refund were vitiated in law, as the CCRA had no express power of review under the Act. The statutory authorities cannot exercise powers not conferred upon them, such as reviewing their own orders without express statutory mandate. Harshit Harish Jain v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 110
Succession Act, 1925
Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Validity of a Will - Partition of Property – The Trial Court rejected the Will, holding it was not proved in accordance with the law, and granted the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in the properties. The High Court reversed this decision, upholding the validity of the Will and restricting the plaintiffs' share to Schedule A property alone. Held, a propounder who substantially benefits from a Will and participates in its execution raises suspicion, which must be dispelled with clear evidence. The propounder is expected to testify about the proper execution, the presence of attesting witnesses, and other key details. Under Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, presenting one attesting witness is insufficient to prove execution unless they confirm the presence and actions of the other attesting witnesses. The Will was not proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. The evidence of the attesting witnesses was insufficient, and the propounder of the Will failed to establish its due execution. The Court noted suspicious circumstances surrounding the execution of the Will, including the lack of proper attestation and the involvement of the propounder in its preparation. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decision, granting the plaintiffs a 1/6th share in both Schedule A and Schedule B properties. The judgment reiterates the strict requirements for proving a Will under the Indian Succession Act and the Evidence Act, emphasizing the need for proper attestation and the removal of suspicious circumstances by the propounder. It also highlights the Court's role in ensuring that testamentary documents are executed freely and voluntarily by the testator. Chinu Rani Ghosh v. Subhash Ghosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 56
Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." - Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness regarding the testator's direction. Facts: Sanjhi Ram, the testator, executed a Will on November 7, 2005, bequeathing his property to his nephew, Gopal Krishan (Appellant No. 1). He passed away the next day. The Respondents (legal heirs of Sanjhi Ram) challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of testimony from the attesting witness that the testator directed the signing of the Will. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the validity of the Will, ruling that the testator's mental faculties were sound, and the Will complied with legal requirements. Supreme Court's Decision: Interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925: The Court clarified that Section 63(c) provides alternative conditions for attestation: (a) The attesting witness must have seen the testator sign or affix their mark to the Will; or (b) The witness must have seen another person sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the testator. The use of the word "or" is disjunctive, meaning compliance with either condition suffices. The High Court erred in interpreting "or" as "and," thereby imposing an unnecessary requirement that the attesting witness explicitly state the testator's direction. Validity of the Will: The testimony of the attesting witness (DW-1) confirmed that he had seen the testator affix his mark to the Will. This alone satisfied Section 63(c). The requirement of the testator's direction applies only when another person signs the Will on the testator's behalf, which was not the case here. The High Court's finding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of testimony regarding the testator's direction was incorrect. Restoration of Lower Appellate Court's Judgment: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, holding the Will valid. Consequently, the subsequent sale deeds executed by Gopal Krishan were also upheld. Conclusion: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, ruling that the Will executed by Sanjhi Ram was valid and complied with the requirements of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The High Court's interpretation of the attestation requirements was erroneous, and the Lower Appellate Court's judgment was reinstated. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 26
Section 63(c) - Requirement of attestation "by the direction of the testator." Whether the High Court erred in holding that the Will was not proved due to the absence of explicit testimony from the attesting witness that the Testator directed the signing of the Will. The testator executed a Will bequeathing his property to his nephew. He passed away the next day. The Respondents challenged the Will, alleging it was forged and the subsequent mutation of property was illegal. The Trial Court and the High Court held the Will invalid, citing suspicious circumstances, including the absence of a death certificate and irregularities in the Will's execution. The Lower Appellate Court, however, upheld the Will, finding no evidence that the testator was of unsound mind or that the Will was fabricated. Held, the High Court erred in interpreting Section 63(c). The phrase "by the direction of the testator" applies only when an attesting witness sees someone other than the testator sign the Will. In this case, the attesting witness had seen the testator affix his mark, which was sufficient to comply with Section 63(c). The Court emphasized that the word "or" in Section 63(c) is disjunctive, and the requirement of "direction" is not applicable when the witness has seen the testator sign the Will. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Lower Appellate Court's decision, declaring the Will valid and the subsequent sale deeds executed lawful. The appeal was allowed, and the Will was upheld as valid. The Supreme Court clarified the interpretation of Section 63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, emphasizing that the requirement of "direction" is not necessary when the attesting witness has seen the testator sign the Will. Gopal Krishan v. Daulat Ram, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 21
Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - A finding of valid execution does not automatically imply genuineness. Suspicious circumstances must be addressed before concluding the genuineness of a Will. Mere registration of a Will does not validate it; it must be proved in accordance with legal mandates. Lilian Coelho v. Myra Philomena Coalho, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 15
Section 63 - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 68 - Requirements of - Validity of the Will – Mere proof of execution of a Will does not make it genuine if it is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The defendants failed to prove that the testator executed the Will with a sound disposing mind and understood its contents. The stamp papers for the Will were purchased in the name of the first defendant and she played an active role in its execution, which cast doubt on its authenticity. The defendants' claim under the Will was rejected due to the suspicious circumstances surrounding its execution. Leela v. Muruganantham, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 8
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
Section 3(2)(v) - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 114A - Significance of - Presumption of absence of consent in rape cases - Need for evidence establishing that caste identity was one of the grounds for the offense - Conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act cannot be sustained as there is no evidence to prove that the offence was committed on the ground that the victim belonged to a Scheduled Caste. The Supreme Court upholds the conviction under Sections 366, 376(2)(g), and 342 IPC, modifies the sentence for 376(2)(g) IPC from life imprisonment to 10 years rigorous imprisonment, and sets aside the conviction under Section 3(2)(v) of the 1989 Act. (Paras 25 - 44) Raju @ Umakant v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 518 : 2025 INSC 615
Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) - Essential ingredients of - "within public view" - The Appellant was accused of abusing a Revenue Inspector by using his caste name in a government office, leading to charges under Sections 294(b) and 353 IPC and Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act. The High Court dismissed the Appellant's petition under Section 482 CrPC seeking to quash the criminal proceedings. Whether the incident occurred in a place "within public view" as required under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, and whether the High Court erred in not quashing the proceedings. Held, For an offence under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, the act of insult or abuse must occur in a place "within public view." A place "within public view" refers to a location where members of the public can witness or hear the incident, even if it is a private place. The incident occurred within the confines of the Revenue Inspector's office, and not in a place "within public view." Therefore, the essential ingredients of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act were not satisfied. The Court quashed the criminal proceedings, ruling that the High Court failed to consider this crucial aspect. The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of proving that an offence under the SC-ST Act occurred in a place "within public view." Since the incident took place in a private office without public witnesses, the charges under the SC-ST Act were not sustainable, and the proceedings were quashed. Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2025 INSC 132 : AIR 2025 SC 705
Supreme Court Rules, 2013
Appearances of only Senior Advocates or Advocateon-Record or Advcoate, who are physically present and arguing in the Court at the time of hearing of the matter and one Advocate/Advocate-on-Record each for assistance in Court to such arguing Sr Advocate, Advocate-on-Record or Advocate, as the case may be, will be recorded in the record of proceedings. The Appearance Slip as per Form 30 prescribed by the SC Rules only allowed the recording of these appearances. (Para 20) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364
A strange practice was being followed in the Supreme Court regarding the marking of the presence of the number of advocates for the party, without anybody certifying whether they all are authorised to appear for the party. In most of the matters, simple or complicated, a number of appearances of advocates would be shown in the proceedings, running into pages and pages, without any verification as to whether such advocates were in fact present in the Court or were in fact authorised to appear for a particular party. Every vakalatnama or Memorandum of Appearance filed in the case carries a lot of responsibility and accountability. (Para 5 & 17) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364
No advocate, other than the Advocate-on-Record for a party, can appear, plead and address the Court in a matter unless he is instructed by the AOR or permitted by the Court. A Senior Advocate shall not appear without an AOR in the Supreme Court. Though an advocate is entitled to appear before the Supreme Court, his appearance would be subject to the 2013 Supreme Court Rules. As per Rule 1(b) of Order IV, no advocate other than AOR can appear for the party. On a conjoint reading of this Rule along with Rule 20, no AOR can authorise any person except another AOR to act for him in any case. Similarly, Rule 1(b) has to be read with Rule 2(b), which says that no Senior Advocate can appear without an AOR. (Para 13) Supreme Court Bar Association v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 320 : 2025 INSC 364
Order IV Rule 18 - Advocates on Record (AoRs) who are designated as Senior Advocates must inform their clients about their designation and submit a report to the Registry confirming that alternate arrangements have been made for their clients' representation. Failure to comply with this obligation would bar such Senior Advocates from appearing before the Court. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dileep, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 146
Order VI Rule 3 - Appeals seeking restoration of death sentence commuted by High Court - In criminal appeals arising from the 2002 Godhra train burning case, where the trial court awarded death sentence to 11 accused (later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court) and life imprisonment to 20 others, the Supreme Court rejected the convicts' preliminary objection that the State's appeal for restoration of capital punishment must be heard by a three-Judge Bench in light of Mohd. Arif v. Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737 and Order VI Rule III of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013. The Court held that the cited judgment and Rule apply only where the High Court has confirmed or awarded the death sentence; here, the High Court had commuted it. Accordingly, a two-Judge Bench was competent to hear the State's appeal for restoration of the death sentence along with the convicts' appeals against conviction. (Para 3 & 4) Abdul Raheman Dhantiya @ Kankatto @Jamburo v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 575
Tax
Constitution of India – Article 14, Entry 97, List I (Union List), Entry 62, List II (State List) – Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006 – Constitutional Validity – Cable TV Services – Legislative Competence – Aspect Theory – Held, cable TV services qualify as a “luxury” under Entry 62, List II, enabling State taxation. No conflict exists between State's luxury tax on entertainment and Central service tax on broadcasting under Entry 97, List I. Initial arbitrary exemptions under the Act violated Article 14, but the revised framework rectified these issues. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Kerala's luxury tax on cable TV services under the Kerala Tax on Luxuries Act, 2006, affirming the State's legislative competence under Entry 62, List II. Applying the aspect theory, the Court distinguished the State's luxury tax on entertainment (cable TV services) from the Central tax on broadcasting services under the Finance Act, finding no constitutional overlap. The aspect theory, in India, focuses on the taxable event's nature, not legislative competence, unlike its Canadian application. The High Court's ruling striking down exemptions for smaller cable operators (under 7,500 connections) as violative of Article 14 was upheld, but the revised framework was deemed constitutionally valid. The tax was not discriminatory against cable TV operators compared to DTH providers. The appeal was allowed, reversing the High Court's decision to strike down the tax. (Para 17) State of Kerala v. Asianet Satellite Communications Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2025 INSC 757
Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 80-IA(9) - Scope of - Deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB and 80-HHC – Deductions under Sections 80-IA/80-IB (industrial undertaking profits) and Section 80-HHC (export profits) can be computed independently. Resolving the split verdict in Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Micro Labs Limited, (2015) 17 SCC 96, the Court held that Section 80-IA(9) does not mandate reducing the gross total income by the Section 80-IA/80-IB deduction before computing deductions under Section 80-HHC. Instead, it restricts the aggregate deductions under heading 'C' of Chapter VI-A to the extent of eligible business profits, preventing double benefits on the same profits. Approving the High Court's reasoning in Associated Capsules (P) Ltd. v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, (2011) SCC OnLine Bom 27, the Court clarified that Section 80-IA(9) limits the allowability, not the computability, of deductions. For example, if business profits are Rs. 100 and Rs. 30 is allowed under Section 80-IA, a computed deduction of Rs. 80 under Section 80-HHC would be restricted to Rs. 70 to ensure the total deduction does not exceed the profits. The reference was answered accordingly, permitting independent computation of deductions while capping their aggregate to the eligible profits. (Para 20, 21 & 23) Shital Fibers v. Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2025 INSC 743
Constitutional Law – Taxation - Sales Tax - Purchase Tax - Validity of Provisions Imposing Purchase Tax on Exempted Transactions - In a reference to resolve conflicting views on the interpretation of "levy" in sales tax exemptions, the Supreme Court (3 Bench) upheld the constitutional validity of Section 5A, Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (KGST Act), and the pari materia Section 7A, Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (TNGST Act). The provisions impose purchase tax on purchasers who acquire goods from sellers exempted from sales tax under notifications issued pursuant to Section 10, KGST Act (or equivalent), and subsequently dispatch such goods outside the state via stock transfer (not constituting inter-state sale). Facts: The appellants, registered dealers, purchased voltage stabilizers from small-scale industrial (SSI) units and charitable institutions within Kerala, which were exempt from sales tax liability under Section 10 notifications. The goods were then dispatched outside Kerala by way of branch/stock transfer. The revenue authorities levied purchase tax under Section 5A, KGST Act, treating the purchases as "liable to tax." The appellants contended that the exemption under Section 10 rendered the transactions non-liable to tax altogether, excluding the operation of Section 5A. A 2009 Division Bench of Supreme Court, in a lead case, distinguished between "leviability" (imposition of tax liability) and "payability" (actual payment), holding the goods liable but exempt from payment. Due to a contrary view in Peekay Re-rolling Mills (P) Ltd. v. Assistant Commissioner, (2007) 4 SCC 30 (interpreting "levy" to include collection/payment), the matter was referred to a larger Bench. Issues Referred: 1. Whether purchases from tax-exempt dealers under the KGST/TNGST Acts constitute purchases "liable to tax" within the meaning of Section 5A/7A. 2. Whether such purchasers are liable to pay purchase tax under Section 5A/7A despite the exemption. 3. Whether the purchase tax under Section 5A/7A is ultra vires the Constitution, being in the nature of a manufacture tax, consignment tax, or inter-state levy beyond state legislative competence. Held, Issues (i) and (ii) answered in the affirmative; issue (iii) in the negative. Appeals dismissed; judgments of Kerala and Madras High Courts affirmed. Held, Sections 5A/7A are independent charging provisions levying purchase tax solely where no sales tax is payable on the underlying sale, ensuring the transaction is not taxed twice. Such tax is triggered in three scenarios: (a) goods used in manufacture without sales tax payment; (b) goods dispatched outside the state (other than inter-state trade/commerce); or (c) goods disposed of otherwise than by intra-state sale. The charge remains a tax on purchase, with satisfaction of these conditions merely delineating its applicability. "Levy" denotes the imposition or exigibility of tax liability (authorization to tax), distinct from assessment (quantification) and collection/payment. An exemption under Section 10 affects only payability, not the underlying leviability; goods remain "liable to tax" in principle, though payment is deferred or waived. The provisions do not encroach on Union powers under Entries 52/54, List I (inter-state sales) or Entry 52A, List II (declared goods), as they target intra-state purchases followed by non-sales dispositions or out-of-state dispatches that do not qualify as inter-state sales. Inter-state movement of goods (sans sale) falls within state legislative domain under Entry 54, List II. States retain prerogative to levy such taxes for revenue generation, warranting interpretive leeway absent clear constitutional overreach. Peekay Re-rolling Mills, (2007) 4 SCC 30 distinguished as pertaining to declared goods under Entry 52A, List II, where exemption impacts the charge itself; the ratio in Kandaswami, (1975) 4 SCC 745; Hotel Balaji, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 536 and Devi Dass, (1994) Supp 2 SCC 59 (upholding similar provisions) prevails, overruling Goodyear, (1990) 2 SCC 71 to the extent of conflict. (Para 30 - 33) C.T. Kochouseph v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 554 : 2025 INSC 661
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – Section 132 – Bail should be normally granted for offences u/s. 132 CGST Act unless extraordinary circumstances exists. Vineet Jain vs Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 513
Income Tax Act, 1961; Section 263 - Power of Commissioner to revise assessment - Distinction between failure to investigate and wrong decision by Assessing Officer - Where Assessing Officer conducts investigation but makes no addition, it implies acceptance of assessee's plea - Commissioner can revise under Section 263 by deciding on merits and making additions, not by remanding for lack of investigation - Remand justified only if superficial or random investigation established with recorded error and prejudice to Revenue - High Court and Tribunal orders upheld - Special Leave Petition dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 v. V-Con Integrated Solutions, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 435
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956; Section 13 – Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957; Rule 17(20) – State Rules Cannot Override Central Rules under CST Act – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision striking down Rule 17(20) of the Central Sales Tax (Rajasthan) Rules, 1957, as ultra vires the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. The Court held that the State Government, under its delegated powers, cannot frame rules inconsistent with the Central Sales Tax (Registration and Turnover) Rules, 1957. Rule 17(20) permitted the cancellation of Form C in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, or legal contravention, a provision absent in the Central Rules, which prescribe Form C but do not provide for its cancellation. The Court clarified that only the Central Government has the authority to prescribe the form of declaration and its particulars, and State rules cannot derogate from Central Rules. The State's appeal, challenging the High Court's declaration of Rule 17(20) as ultra vires due to inconsistency with Central law, was dismissed. (Para 16) State of Rajasthan v. Combined Traders, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 432 : 2025 INSC 496
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 269ST, 271DA - Prohibition of Cash Transactions Exceeding ₹2,00,000 - Mandatory Reporting by Courts and Sub-Registrars - Disciplinary Action for Non-Compliance - Role of Income Tax Authorities - Circulation of Judgment - Section 269ST of the Income Tax Act, 1961 prohibits cash transactions of ₹2,00,000 or more in a single transaction, aggregate per day, or for a single event, except through account payee cheque, bank draft, or electronic clearing systems. Violations attract penalties under Section 271DA to promote digital transactions and curb black money. Courts are obligated to report to the jurisdictional Income Tax Department any suit involving cash transactions of ₹2,00,000 or more to verify compliance with Section 269ST. Sub-Registrars must report documents (e.g., sale agreements) presented for registration indicating cash payments of ₹2,00,000 or above. Failure to report by officials will lead to disciplinary action initiated by the Chief Secretary of the State/Union Territory. The jurisdictional Income Tax Authority shall investigate reported transactions for potential violations. The Registrar (Judicial) was directed to circulate this judgment to all High Court Registrar Generals, Chief Secretaries of States/Union Territories, and the Principal Chief Commissioner of Income Tax for strict compliance. The case involved a property dispute where a charitable trust, in possession since 1929, challenged a 2018 sale agreement claiming ₹75,00,000 in cash, violating Section 269ST. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's dismissal of the trust's revision petition, dismissed the respondents' suit as defective and speculative, and emphasized mandatory reporting of high-value cash transactions by courts and Sub-Registrars to ensure compliance with tax laws. Appeal allowed. (Para 18) Correspondence RBANMS Educational Institution v. B. Gunashekar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 429 : 2025 INSC 490
Value Added Tax Act, 2008 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 7 (c) and 13 (7) - A dealer cannot claim Input Tax Credit (ITC) on purchases linked to tax-exempt sales under Section 7(c), as per Section 13(7). Emphasizing strict construction of tax statutes, the Court rejected the appellant's claim for ITC of ₹6.42 lakh on exempt sales of ₹1.89 crore to a manufacturer-exporter, prioritizing statutory language over policy intent to boost exports. The appeal was dismissed, upholding the disallowance of ITC. (Para 10) Neha Enterprises v. Commissioner, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 423 : 2025 INSC 476
Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; Section 39 (9) - Denial of Input Tax Credit (ITC) due to clerical or arithmetical errors - Examination of timelines for correction of bona fide mistakes in tax filings - Judicial observations on software limitations in tax compliance. Held, timelines for rectifying bona fide errors in tax filings should be realistic, as denial of ITC due to inadvertent mistakes unfairly burdens taxpayers. Denying correction rights in cases of genuine errors contradicts the fundamental right to conduct business. Software limitations cannot justify denying taxpayers the right to correct mistakes, as compliance mechanisms should facilitate, not hinder, rectifications. Special Leave Petition dismissed declining to interfere with the High Court's judgment, as there was no loss of revenue. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 361
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 246A - Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act); Sections 69 and 70 - Constitutionality of - Power to Arrest and Summon - Legislative Competence under Article 246A - Incidental Powers for Tax Evasion. The constitutional validity of Sections 69 (power to arrest) and 70 (power to summon) of the CGST Act, and analogous provisions in State GST Acts, was challenged. Petitioners contended that Article 246A, which empowers Parliament and State Legislatures to levy and collect GST, does not authorize criminalization of violations, such as through arrest and summons. They argued these powers fall outside legislative competence, being neither ancillary to GST levy nor covered by Entry 93 of List I (offences against laws of the Union) in the Seventh Schedule. Whether Sections 69 and 70 of the CGST Act are constitutionally valid and within Parliament's legislative competence under Article 246A. Held, Provisions upheld as constitutionally valid. Challenge to vires rejected; provisions do not violate constitutional limits. (Para 75) Radhika Agarwal v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2025 INSC 272 : (2025) 6 SCC 545
Value Added Tax Act, 2005 (Punjab) - Held, Rule 21(8) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Rules, 2005, notified on January 25, 2014, cannot be applied to transactions prior to April 1, 2014, as the enabling amendment to Section 13(1) of the Punjab Value Added Tax Act, 2005, came into effect only on that date. The benefit of Input Tax Credit (ITC) cannot be reduced without statutory sanction. Rule 21(8), which limits ITC to the reduced tax rate for goods in stock following a tax rate reduction, lacked statutory backing before April 1, 2014. Applying it retroactively would cause financial loss to taxable persons who purchased goods at a higher tax rate, as ITC is a statutory right accrued at the time of purchase. The Court dismissed the State's appeals, upholding the High Court's decision that Rule 21(8) applies only to transactions on or after April 1, 2014. (Para 41.1) State of Punjab v. Trishala Alloys Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 221 : 2025 INSC 231
Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 10, 11 and 12-AA - Charitable Trust - Income Tax Exemption - Proposed Activities – Held, since Section 12AA pertains to the registration of the Trust and not to assess of what a trust has actually done, the term 'activities' in the provision includes 'proposed activities'. Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 214
Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 10, 11 and 12-AA - Whether registration of a charitable trust under Section 12-AA of the Act, 1961, for income tax exemptions under Sections 10 and 11 should be based on the trust's proposed activities or actual activities. Held: The Supreme Court reiterated that registration under Section 12-AA of the Act, 1961, must be decided based on the trust's proposed activities rather than its actual activities, affirming the precedent set in Ananda Social, (2020) 17 SCC 254. The Commissioner must satisfy themselves of the genuineness of the trust's objects and proposed activities. However, mere registration does not guarantee exemptions under Sections 10 and 11, and the assessing officer may deny exemptions if the trust's materials are not convincing or genuine. The Supreme Court rejected the Revenue's contention that actual activities should be considered and declined to refer the Ananda Social decision to a larger bench. The High Court's order upholding the Appellate Tribunal's direction to grant registration was affirmed. Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 214
Income Tax Act, 1961; Sections 10, 11 and 12-AA - The respondent, a charitable trust engaged in education and medical aid, sought registration under Section 12-AA for tax exemptions. The Commissioner denied registration, citing insufficient evidence of actual charitable activities. The Appellate Tribunal reversed this, directing registration, which the High Court upheld. The Commissioner challenged this via a Special Leave Petition. Held, Section 12-AA requires the Commissioner to verify the genuineness of a trust's objects and activities for registration to claim benefits under Sections 11 and 12. The Court relied on Ananda Social, (2020) 17 SCC 254, which clarified that “activities” under Section 12-AA include “proposed activities,” and the Commissioner must assess the trust's objects and their alignment with proposed activities. Appeal dismissed; High Court's decision upheld. (Para 9, 13, 15) Commissioner of Income Tax Exemptions v. International Health Care Education and Research Institute, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 214
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 132 and 271AAA - Penalty for undisclosed income - Search and seizure - Levy of penalty u/s. 271AAA(1) - Discretion of Assessing Officer – Mere surrender of undisclosed income during search insufficient to attract penalty; Assessing Officer must prove that income was "found in the course of search" as defined in Explanation to s. 271AAA(1) - Discretion to levy penalty not arbitrary but must be exercised judiciously, guided by law. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 132 and 271AAA - Penalty for undisclosed income - Held, Penalty leviable only where conditions satisfied; expression "found in the course of search" not confined to documents seized from assessee's premises but extends to materials obtained in continuation thereof, e.g., sale deeds procured from third party (society) triggered by initial search. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 271AAA - Exemption from penalty u/s. 271AAA(2) – Conditions - Assessee admits undisclosed income in statement u/s. 132(4) during search; substantiates manner of derivation; pays tax together with interest - No specific time-limit prescribed for payment - Delayed payment does not disentitle assessee from exemption. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 271AAA - Exemption from penalty u/s. 271AAA(2) –Held, If conditions (i)-(iii) of s. 271AAA(2) fulfilled, 10% penalty normally not leviable, even with delay in tax payment. K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 132 and 271AAA - During search u/s. 132 at assessee's premises, assessee admitted undisclosed income of Rs. 2,27,65,580 for AY 2011-12 in statement u/s. 132(4) and later substantiated source, paying tax with interest (albeit delayed). Penalty imposed u/s. 271AAA on this amount and additional sum detected via sale deeds obtained from housing society post-search. Tribunals/High Court upheld penalty; assessee appealed to Supreme Court. Held, Appeal partly allowed - No penalty on admitted income of Rs. 2,27,65,580 as Section 271AAA(2) conditions complied with; 10% penalty payable only on additional undisclosed income from sale deeds, held to be "found in the course of search". Matter remitted for recomputation of penalty on latter amount. (Para 29, 31, 33, 35, 40, 41) K. Krishnamurthy v. Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax. 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 202 : 2025 INSC 208
Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 - Section 8 - The amendment to Section 8(5) of the Act, 1956, introduced by the Finance Act, 2002—making state-granted exemptions from inter-state sales tax subject to production of declarations in Forms 'C' or 'D' under Section 8(4)—operates prospectively and does not retrospectively nullify or revoke absolute exemptions already accrued and granted under pre-amendment incentive schemes, such as the Maharashtra Package Scheme of Incentives, 1993. The respondent assessee, eligible under the 1993 Scheme and issued an Eligibility Certificate for full/partial sales tax exemption without Form 'C'/'D' requirements, faced trade circulars from the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Mumbai, demanding refund of exempted tax post-2002 amendment and revising assessments for non-submission of declarations. The High Court set aside the circulars, holding the amendment prospective. Whether the 2002 amendment to Section 8(5) applies retrospectively to deprive assessees of vested exemption rights under unamended provisions empowering states to grant absolute exemptions in public interest, dispensing with Section 8(4) formalities. Held, every statute is prima facie prospective unless expressly or by necessary implication retrospective; absent clear legislative intent to affect existing rights, prior exemptions persist. Premature deprivation of accrued exemption benefits is arbitrary; states cannot unilaterally revoke vested substantive rights without notice or hearing. Unrevoked Eligibility Certificates preserve accrued rights; post-amendment Form 'C'/'D' requirements apply only from May 11, 2002, onward. Appeal dismissed; impugned High Court order upheld. [Para 17, 23, 28] State of Maharashtra v. Prism Cement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 198 : 2025 INSC 199
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Sections 276CC, 279(2) - Compounding of offences - "First offence" under Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014 - Interpretation - Assessee filed delayed returns for AY 2011-12 (due 30.09.2011, filed 04.03.2013) and AY 2013-14 (due 31.10.2013, filed 29.11.2014), leading to prosecution proposals under Section 276CC - Compounding application for AY 2011-12 accepted on 11.11.2014 post show-cause notice dated 27.10.2014 - For AY 2013-14, show-cause notice issued 12.03.2015; compounding rejected on ground it was not "first offence" due to prior compounding – High Court upheld rejection – Held, Offence u/s 276CC committed on day immediately following due date for filing return (01.10.2011 for AY 2011-12; 01.11.2013 for AY 2013-14), relying on Prakash Nath Khanna v. CIT, (2004) 9 SCC 686 - Subsequent belated filing does not erase commission of offence - "First offence" u/para 8.1 of 2014 Guidelines (superseding 2008 Guidelines) means offence committed prior to issuance of show-cause notice or intimation of prosecution, whichever earlier - Both offences here preceded respective show-cause notices - Prior compounding for AY 2011-12 immaterial as each offence assessed independently against "first offence" criteria - Rejection of compounding for AY 2013-14 set aside; assessee directed to file fresh application within 2 weeks - If accepted, trial proceedings abate - Appeal allowed. (Para 35, 41, 44, 69, 70) Vinubhai Mohanlal Dobaria v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 173 : 2025 INSC 155
Motor Vehicles Taxation and Certain Other Law (Amendment) Act, 2003 (Karnataka) repealed the Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976 (Karnataka), which had nationalized private contract carriages, and delegated the power to issue non-stage carriage permits (including contract carriages, special, tourist, and temporary vehicles) from the State Transport Authority (STA) to its Secretary under Section 68(5) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (MV Act) read with Rule 56(1)(d) of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 (KMV Rules). The High Court struck down the delegation provision as unconstitutional, holding it required fresh presidential assent akin to the 1976 Act and that quasi-judicial permit-granting powers could not be delegated to a single officer. Aggrieved private operators appealed to the Supreme Court – Issues - 1. Whether Section 3 of the 2003 Act, repealing the 1976 Act (previously upheld by the Supreme Court), is constitutionally valid absent fresh presidential assent. 2. Whether the STA's delegation of routine non-stage carriage permit-granting authority to its Secretary violates administrative law principles, given the quasi-judicial nature of such functions. Held (Appeal Allowed): The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 2003 Act and the delegation, dismissing the challenge by the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (KSRTC). On Issue 1: The State Legislature possesses plenary power to repeal its enactments, including those previously assented to by the President, as a repeal merely extinguishes operative provisions without recreating a new framework or overriding judicial precedents. The 2003 repeal was a valid policy shift to liberalize the transport sector, address public transport shortages, and enhance private participation; no fresh presidential assent was required, as it fell squarely within legislative competence under Article 245 of the Constitution. On Issue 2: Delegation of quasi-judicial functions is permissible under administrative law if expressly authorized by the enabling statute, distinguishing between complex adjudicatory tasks (e.g., stage carriage permits, reserved for the full STA) and routine administrative functions (e.g., non-stage carriage permits). Section 68(5) of the MV Act and Rule 56(1)(d) of the KMV Rules explicitly permit such delegation to the STA Secretary—a senior expert officer—ensuring efficiency, timely service delivery, and oversight without arbitrary discretion. Prohibiting delegation would overburden the STA, causing delays and inefficiencies contrary to legislative intent. The Secretary is empowered to grant such permits subject to prescribed conditions. S.R.S. Travels v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Workers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 166 : 2025 INSC 152
Disproportionate Assets - Income Tax Returns - Quashing of FIR - Economic Inflation - Long-Term Asset Valuation - The Appellant argued that his wife's income and other declared sources of income were not properly considered in the calculation of assets. The Appellant submitted income tax returns and other supporting documents to justify the declared assets. Held, the income of the Appellant's wife and other declared sources were not adequately considered by the Vigilance Department. It was observed that while calculating disproportionate assets over a long period (1996-2020), inflation and economic changes should be considered. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 the Court noted that powers under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised when allegations in the FIR do not constitute any offence. The Court found that the alleged disproportionate assets were not substantiated when the Appellant's and his wife's declared income was properly accounted for. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered against the Appellant. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. Nirankar Nath Pandey v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 90
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 2(47) - Whether the reduction in share capital of a subsidiary company, resulting in a proportionate reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee, constitutes a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, thereby allowing the assessee to claim a capital loss. The respondent-assessee, M/s. Jupiter Capital Pvt. Ltd., held 99.88% shares in Asianet News Network Pvt. Ltd. (ANNPL). Due to financial losses, ANNPL filed for a reduction in share capital, which was approved by the High Court. The share capital was reduced from 15,35,05,750 shares to 10,000 shares, and the assessee's shareholding was proportionately reduced from 15,33,40,900 shares to 9,988 shares. The face value of the shares remained unchanged at Rs. 10. The assessee claimed a long-term capital loss of Rs. 164,48,55,840/- due to the reduction in share capital. The Assessing Officer disallowed the claim, stating that the reduction did not amount to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, as there was no extinguishment of rights or sale of shares. The CIT(A) upheld the Assessing Officer's decision, but the ITAT allowed the assessee's claim, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47). The High Court affirmed the ITAT's decision. The Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue's appeal, holding that the reduction in share capital amounted to a "transfer" under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Court relied on its earlier decision in Kartikeya v. Sarabhai v. CIT (1997) 7 SCC 524, which held that the extinguishment of rights in a capital asset, even without a sale, constitutes a transfer. The Court emphasized that the reduction in the number of shares held by the assessee resulted in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset, and the assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss. The Court also noted that the face value of the shares remaining unchanged did not negate the fact that the assessee's rights in the shares had been extinguished. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2025 INSC 38
Income Tax Act, 1961 - Section 2(47) - "transfer" - Reduction of Share Capital - Capital Loss - Legal Principles - The definition of "transfer" includes the extinguishment of any rights in a capital asset, even if there is no sale or exchange. A reduction in share capital, resulting in the extinguishment of a shareholder's rights, constitutes a transfer under Section 2(47). The assessee is entitled to claim a capital loss when there is a reduction in share capital that results in the extinguishment of rights in the capital asset. The Supreme Court held that the reduction in share capital of the subsidiary company and the consequent reduction in the assessee's shareholding amounted to a transfer under Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The assessee was entitled to claim a capital loss, and the petition filed by the Revenue was dismissed. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-4 v. Jupiter Capital, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 41 : 2025 INSC 38
Temple
Modifying the Allahabad High Court's order dated November 8, 2023, which had barred the use of temple funds for land acquisition, the Supreme Court permitted the State of Uttar Pradesh to utilize fixed deposits held in the name of Shri Banke Bihari Ji Temple (Vrindavan) to purchase approximately 5 acres of land for developing a ₹500 crore corridor around the temple. The Court mandated that the acquired land be registered solely in the name of the deity or the temple trust, ensuring the funds' proceeds remain dedicated to the temple's perpetual benefit. The ruling was prompted by the urgent need for infrastructure overhaul in Mathura and Vrindavan—key pilgrimage sites attracting millions annually—following incidents like the 2022 stampede at the temple, which highlighted maladministration and safety risks. Citing the Uttar Pradesh Braj Planning and Development Board Act, 2015, the Court underscored the State's statutory duty to prioritize heritage conservation, devotee amenities (e.g., parking, roads, dharamshalas, hospitals, toilets, and security posts), and beautification of sites like Yamuna River ghats and Kusum Sarovar. Development was deemed a collective responsibility involving government, temple trusts, and communities to facilitate safe, spiritually enriching pilgrimages without discomfort. Ishwar Chanda Sharma v. Devendra Kumar Sharma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2025 INSC 700
Tender
Arbitrariness in Pre-Qualification—Judicial Review - The appellant, an Indian elevator manufacturer, challenged its exclusion from a Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) issued by the Gwalior Municipal Corporation (GMC) for the supply, installation, testing, commissioning, and maintenance of lifts under the Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana. The GMC had arbitrarily pre-selected only 10 multinational corporations based outside India as eligible bidders, presuming them to be the "most reputed firms" to ensure quality, thereby excluding domestic entities. The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the appellant's writ petition, relying on Global Energy Ltd. v. Adani Exports Ltd., (2005) 4 SCC 435, holding that courts should not interfere with tender conditions absent arbitrariness, discrimination, or malice. On appeal, the Supreme Court held the GMC's process conjectural and presumptive, implying an untenable belief that Indian manufacturers are inherently incapable of competing with or providing services comparable to international firms. Such practices were disapproved in strong terms as wholly untenable and violative of principles of fair competition. Relying on Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437, the Court affirmed that while judicial restraint is warranted in tender matters, powers of review may be exercised to invalidate processes tainted by arbitrariness or favouritism. However, as the contract had been fully executed by the successful bidder, the appeal was disposed of as infructuous, without further relief. Tender conditions restricting participation to foreign multinationals on presumptive grounds of superior repute are arbitrary and impermissible; domestic firms cannot be excluded on the sole basis of nationality. Appeal disposed of as infructuous with costs. Omega Elevators v. State of M.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 230
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987
Section 15 - Rule 15 of TADA Rules - Confession to Police Officer - Admissibility - Procedural Safeguards - Kartar Singh Guidelines - Issue Estoppel - Confessional statements were unreliable and failed to meet the procedural safeguards under the Act, as the recording officer failed to ensure the voluntariness of the accused while taking confessions. The statements of the accused did not contain the time of recording of the confession or indicate from where they were produced. No time was given to the accused for reflection before the recording of the confessional statements, which vitiated the said statements. There was nothing on record to suggest that the witness who recorded the statement was authorized to do so. The procedure laid down in the Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (e.g., voluntariness, free atmosphere, reflection time) regarding the recording of confessional statements in coercive environments (BSF camp, Joint Interrogation Centres) under the TADA was violated. Accused confession further barred by issue estoppel from prior acquittal in 2002. Eyewitnesses failed to identify accused, and unrecovered murder weapon weakened prosecution case. Special Court's acquittal upheld as no evidence established guilt beyond reasonable doubt; no error or perversity found. (Para 22 - 27) State (CBI) v. Mohd. Salim Zargar @ Fayaz, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 337 : 2025 INSC 376
Town Planning
Constitution of India; Article 21 - U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973; Section 27 and 43 - Right to Shelter - Illegal Demolition of Residential Structures – Compensation – Held, demolition of appellants' residential structures by Prayagraj Development Authority (PDA) was illegal and arbitrary due to non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Sections 27 and 43 of the 1973 Act. Show-cause notice and demolition order affixed without multiple attempts at personal service, violating requirement to ensure person “cannot be found”. Demolition within 24 hours of serving subsequent communication denied appellants opportunity to appeal under Section 27(2). Action breached principles of natural justice, right to shelter under Article 21, and rule of law. PDA ordered to pay Rs. 10 lakh compensation to each of six individuals for illegal demolition of their homes. The Court directed the PDA to scrupulously follow the directions in the case of In Re: Directions in the Matter of Demolition of Structures, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 884 which laid down guidelines for serving notices and carrying out demolitions, in the future. Zulfiquar Haider v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 421 : 2025 INSC 480
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 - Section 49 and 127 - Reservation of land under development plan - Lapse due to failure to acquire within timelines – Held, Reservation for public purpose lapses if land not acquired within 10 years of plan finalisation or 12 months of purchase notice; timelines sacrosanct and mandatory; indefinite restraint on owner's use impermissible; lapse operates for all intents, freeing land for permissible development even for bona fide purchasers. In 1993, portion of appellants' 2.47-hectare plot reserved for private school in sanctioned development plan; no acquisition till 2006. Original owners served purchase notice u/s 49 MRTP Act, confirmed 02-01-2007; no proceedings initiated within one year. Land sold to appellants in 2015. Writ petition seeking lapse declaration dismissed by High Court with liberty to pursue remedies; appeal to Supreme Court. The Supreme Court allows appeal, declares reservation lapsed on 02-01-2008 u/s 49(7). Even absent statutory aid, 33-year delay warrants lapse u/Art. 142 for complete justice. [Relied on: Chabildas v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 500; Kolhapur Municipal Corpn. v. Vasant Mahadev Patil, (2022) 5 SCC 758; Para 38, 50, 52] Nirmiti Developers v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2025 INSC 265
Transfer of Property Act, 1881
Section 3 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order 7 Rule 11 - Suit filed after 45 Yrs - Limitation - Registered Sale Deeds - Constructive Notice - Property was partitioned orally in 1968 and subsequent registered sale deeds executed in 1978. Predecessors never challenged the partition or sale deeds during their lifetime. Held, party interested in property deemed to know about sale deed from registration date. Registered documents provide constructive notice, and a suit filed decades later without evidence of recent knowledge is barred by limitation. Plaintiffs' failure to address prior knowledge of the sale deeds and the long delay rendered the suit vexatious and meritless. The Trial Court correctly dismissed the suit, and the High Court erred in remanding it, as no triable issues existed. (Para 13 & 17) Uma Devi v. Anand Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 382 : 2025 INSC 434 : (2025) 5 SCC 198
Section 10 - Applicability to Government Land Allotments - Restrictive Conditions - Resumption of Land - Held, Section 10 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which prohibits absolute restraints on alienation, does not apply to government land allotments, as these are not inter vivos or commercial transactions but are governed by public interest. The Telangana government validly imposed conditions on land allotted for charitable purposes in 2001. The Respondent-Trust's subdivision and sale of the land breached these conditions, justifying the State's 2012 resumption order. The High Court's 2022 decision, which invalidated the resumption order as violating Section 10, was set aside, as government allotments are regulated by specific statutory frameworks (Rules 1975 and Board of Revenue Standing Orders), not the Transfer of Property Act. The appeal was allowed, affirming the State's authority to enforce conditions and resume land for public welfare. (Para 23) State of Telangana v. Dr. Pasupuleti Nirmala Hanumantha Rao Charitable Trust, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 564 : 2025 INSC 679 : AIR 2025 SC 2874
Section 41 and 122 - When a property transfer involves considerations such as love and affection while the donor retains a life interest, it qualifies as a settlement deed in the form of a gift. Once the donee accepts the gift through the settlement deed, the donor cannot unilaterally revoke it. Mere reservation of life interest of the donor and the postponement of the delivery of the possession to the donee would not make the document a Will. Delivery of possession is not sine qua non to validate a gift or settlement. Upon the retention of the life interest, the donor will continue only as an ostensible owner of the property. Delivery of possession is only one of the methods to prove acceptance and not the sole method. The receipt of the original document by the plaintiff and registration of the same, would amount to acceptance of the gift and the transaction satisfies the requirement of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502
Section 52 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order I Rule 10 or Order XXII Rule 10 - Rights of transferees pendente lite - A transferee pendente lite is bound by the outcome of the litigation and may seek leave to appeal if their interests are affected. While a transferee pendente lite is not automatically entitled to be impleaded as a party, they may seek leave to appeal if their interests are prejudicially affected by the decree. However, such leave is discretionary and must be granted judiciously. In the present case, the Court found that the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who purchased the suit property during the pendency of litigation and while an injunction was in force, failed to establish a valid case for leave to appeal. The Court set aside the High Court's order granting leave, holding that the Respondents could pursue separate legal remedies if they believed they were defrauded by the original owner. H. Anjanappa v. A Prabhakar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 123
Section 53A - Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 - The appellant, already in possession of the suit property as a tenant, entered into an agreement to sell with the respondent-landlord. The agreement stipulated that physical possession remained with the appellant as tenant, with ownership-based possession to transfer only upon execution of the sale deed. The appellant filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement, while the respondent sought eviction. The trial court and High Court levied stamp duty on the agreement under the Bombay Stamp Act, treating it as a 'conveyance' due to the grant of possessory rights under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Whether an agreement to sell, executed when the purchaser is already in physical possession as a tenant and contemplating future ownership transfer, constitutes a 'conveyance' exigible to stamp duty under Explanation I to Article 25, Schedule I of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958. Held, An agreement to sell granting or recognizing possession (including pre-existing tenancy possession intended for ownership conversion) is stampable as a conveyance under the Bombay Stamp Act, irrespective of deferred title transfer. The Supreme Court upheld the levy of stamp duty, observing stamp duty is levied on the *instrument* (agreement), not the underlying transaction. Where an agreement to sell includes delivery or prior grant of possession (even as tenant), it qualifies as a 'conveyance' under the Act, as it confers protected possessory rights under Section 53A of the TPA. The timing of possession transfer (before, during, or after the agreement) is immaterial; the instrument's effect—securing possession pending sale deed execution—triggers the duty. Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Veena Hasmukh Jain v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 5 SCC 725; Shyamsundar Radheshyam Agrawal v. Pushpabai Nilkanth Patil, (2024) 10 SCC 324] Ramesh Mishrimal Jain v. Avinash Vishwanath Patne, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 206 : 2025 INSC 213
Section 53A - Lis Pendens - Protection under Section 53A for a person possessing a property under part performance of a contract, is not available to a party who knowingly entered into the agreement despite being aware of pending litigation. (Para 9) Raju Naidu v. Chenmouga Sundra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 331 : 2025 INSC 368
Section 54 - Registration Act, 1908; Section 17, 49- In a dispute concerning an agreement to sell dated 24.05.2014, the appellant argued that the agreement was a security for a loan, akin to a mortgage, and sought to repay the loan to redeem the property. However, the agreement to sell, along with an unregistered power of attorney and related documents, was held incapable of conferring title, interest, or ownership rights in the immovable property, as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. These documents were revoked by the appellant on 24.05.2022 and 27.05.2022, prior to the execution of the impugned sale deeds. The absence of a suit for specific performance by Respondent No. 1 further weakened their claim, as an agreement to sell, without registration, does not convey title or create any interest in the property. This position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (2012) 1 SCC 656, which clarified that unregistered agreements to sell, even with possession, do not transfer title or interest, except to the limited extent provided under Section 53-A of the TP Act. The Court further held that a power of attorney does not transfer title and is revocable unless coupled with interest, and a will is not a transfer inter vivos, taking effect only post the testator's death. Transactions like SA/GPA/WILL do not constitute valid transfers of immovable property and cannot be relied upon for claiming ownership or effecting mutations in records. This legal position was reiterated in Cosmos Co. Operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 352 and Shakeel Ahmed v. Syed Akhlaq Hussain, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1526, emphasizing that only a registered deed of conveyance can legally transfer title in immovable property, and unregistered documents cannot confer enforceable rights under the Registration Act, 1908, and the TP Act. (Para 9.2,9.3) Vinod Infra Developers Ltd. v. Mahaveer Lunia, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630 : 2025 INSC 772 : AIR 2025 SC 2933
Sections 54, 58(e), and 78 - A mortgage created by deposit of title deeds constitutes a legal mortgage and prevails over an equitable mortgage created by deposit of an unregistered agreement to sell, as the latter does not create any interest or charge on the property. An equitable mortgage operates in personam and does not bind third parties, unlike a legal mortgage, which creates a charge enforceable in rem. The equitable mortgage of the Central Bank of India (Respondent No. 1), based on an unregistered agreement to sell, was subservient to the legal mortgage of Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Appellant), created by deposit of a share certificate equivalent to title deeds. Under Section 78 of the TP Act, the respondent's equitable charge was postponed due to lack of public notice and failure to deposit title deeds, prioritizing the appellant's legal mortgage. Appeal allowed. (Para 42, 43, 47, 52) Cosmos Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 226 : 2025 INSC 243
Section 54 - An agreement for sale of immovable property does not transfer title under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Title can only be transferred by a registered sale deed as per the Indian Registration Act, 1908. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77
Section 54 - The appellant, Indian Overseas Bank, challenged the findings of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT) regarding the ownership of a property allegedly agreed to be sold to a company in exchange for shares. The NCLAT held that the company was in possession of the property by way of part performance of the contract and that the sale deed executed by legal representatives was not binding on the company. Whether the NCLAT was correct in holding that the sale deed was not binding on the company based on the company's possession under part performance of an unregistered agreement. Held, the NCLAT exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the sale deed as not binding, as no registered sale deed was executed. The Court reiterated that under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement for sale does not transfer ownership rights. Consequently, the legal owner remained the same until a registered sale deed was executed. The Supreme Court partly allowed the appeals, setting aside the NCLAT's declaration regarding the non-binding nature of the sale deed. However, the Court clarified that no adjudication was made on the ownership rights claimed by the parties, and all remedies for seeking declarations or enforcing rights were kept open. This judgment reinforces the principle that title to immovable property can only be transferred through a duly registered sale deed and not merely by possession under an agreement for sale. Indian Overseas Bank v. M.A.S Subramanian, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 77
Section 55 - Specific Relief Act 1963; Sections 22 and 28(3) - Specific Performance - Possession of Suit Property - In a suit for specific performance, where exclusive possession of the suit property is with the defendant at the time of the decree, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree directing the execution of a sale deed in favor of the plaintiff. A separate claim for possession is not mandatory in such cases, as per the combined reading of Sections 22 and 28(3) of the Specific Relief Act and Section 55 of the Transfer of Property Act. (Para 64, 65) Sulthan Said Ibrahim v. Prakasan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622 : 2025 INSC 764 : AIR 2025 SC 2979
Section 122 - Once the document is declared as “gift”, Defendant No.1 had no right to cancel the same unilaterally and the Sub Registrar had no right to register the cancellation deed. Once the document is categorized as a gift, in the absence of any clause or reservation to cancel, the executant has no right to cancel the same. The reasons for cancellation or revocation of gift have to be proved in a court of law. Therefore, the unilateral cancellation of the document is void and as a natural corollary, the sale deed dated 19.10.1993 executed by Defendant No.1 / father also, is invalid. (Para 18) N.P. Saseendran v. N.P. Ponnamma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 345 : 2025 INSC 388 : AIR 2025 SC 1987 : (2025) 7 SCC 502
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967
Section 44 - National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, Section 17 - Blanket orders prohibiting disclosure of witness statements under the UAPA are impermissible without an individualized threat assessment for each witness. Restrictions on the accused's access to witness statements recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC require a reasoned judicial order establishing a specific threat to the life or safety of identified witnesses. Such orders must evaluate tailored protective measures and ensure the accused's right to a fair trial, including effective cross-examination, is not compromised. The Court set aside a Special Court's blanket order, affirmed by the High Court, withholding statements of 15 prosecution witnesses in a UAPA case investigated by the NIA, directing a fresh application within 8 weeks for individualized judicial scrutiny. (Para 10, 11) Mohammed Asarudeen v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 636 : 2025 INSC 746
University
Appointment of Chancellor—Mandatory Approval by Visitor - Under Section 14(1) of the Chandra Mohan Jha University Act, 2009, the appointment of the Chancellor by the Sponsor is "subject to" the approval of the Visitor (Governor of Meghalaya), which is mandatory and conditional. The phrase "subject to" means "conditional upon" such approval, rendering the appointment invalid and void ab initio in its absence. No doctrine of deemed approval applies absent a statutory legal fiction, as judicially creating one would encroach on legislative domain. Held, the self-appointment of Chander Mohan Jha as Chancellor without Visitor's approval was illegal, vitiating subsequent actions of the University. [Relied on: K.R.C.S. Balakrishna Chetty & Sons & Co. v. State of Madras (1960 SCC OnLine SC 179); Sant Lal Gupta & Ors. v. Modern Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd. and Ors. (2010 SCC OnLine SC 1169)] CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211
Dissolution of University—Procedural Compliance under Section 48 - The State Government's power to dissolve a private university for "mismanagement, maladministration, indiscipline, fraudulent intent and failure in the accomplishment of the objectives" under Section 48 of the 2009 Act must follow natural justice principles, including show-cause notices, opportunity to respond, and a reasoned order evaluating evidence. Compliance with this Court's prior directions in SLP(C) No. 19617 of 2013 (requiring notice and hearing) is also essential. Held: The dissolution order dated March 31, 2014, adhered strictly to procedure—two show-cause notices issued, appellants' replies examined, and irregularities (e.g., illegal admissions, non-submission of reports, fraudulent degrees) exhaustively reasoned in the order. The Visitor's pivotal role under the Act was not nominal, justifying invocation of dissolution powers. CMJ Foundation v. State of Meghalaya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 204 : 2025 INSC 211
University Grants Commission (UGC) Act, 1956 - The term 'degree' is defined under Section 22(3) the UGC Act, which states that the 'degree' means the 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and the 'Doctorate Degree'. Thus, wherever the word 'degree' is used, unless a specific exclusion is provided, the same would include within its scope and ambit all three, 'Bachelor's Degree', 'Master's Degree' and a 'Doctorate Degree'. (Para 29) Chandra Shekhar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 336 : 2025 INSC 372
Unauthorized Construction
Demolition - Unauthorized constructions must be demolished without exception, and judicial regularization is impermissible. Courts must adopt a strict approach to uphold the rule of law, as leniency would undermine the deterrent effect of laws and foster a culture of impunity. State laws permitting regularization through impact fees were criticized, as they weaken legal deterrence. The High Court's decision refusing regularization and ordering demolition was upheld. Appeal dismissed; demolition of unauthorized construction upheld. [Referred: Rajendra Kumar Barjatya and Another v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1009 (Paras 6, 7)] Kaniz Ahmed v. Sabuddin, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 514 : 2025 INSC 610
Vicarious Liability
Whether the complaint under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) discloses any prima facie offence against the appellants. Whether the directors and officers of a company can be held vicariously liable in the absence of specific allegations. Held, vicarious liability does not automatically attach to directors or officers of a company unless there are specific allegations of personal involvement in the alleged offence. In the present case, there were no direct accusations against the appellants regarding their role in the alleged illegal uprooting of trees using JCBs. The complainant failed to array the company as an accused despite it being the entity responsible for obtaining necessary permissions for land development. The Court reaffirmed that mere designation as a director or officer does not suffice to establish liability unless there is material evidence of direct involvement in the offence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the complaint against the appellants, reiterating that liability for environmental violations under the PLPA, 1900, cannot be imputed without clear allegations of direct participation in the offence. Sanjay Dutt v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 32
Vexatious Litigation
If the parties misuse the process and attempt to obtain an order by "trick and strategem", the Courts would be justified in imposing the costs for igniting such vexatious litigation. (Para 9) Leelawati v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 321
Writ Jurisdiction
Money Claim - Availability of Alternative Remedy – Long Pendency – Held, merely because an alternative remedy was available, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petitions after a delay of over a decade, particularly when the parties had already exchanged affidavits. Non-payment of admitted dues could be seen as arbitrary action, justifying the exercise of writ jurisdiction. The Supreme Court restored the writ petitions to their original numbers for fresh adjudication by the High Court, emphasizing that writ jurisdiction could be exercised even in money claims under certain circumstances. Utkal Highways Engineers and Contractors v. Chief General Manager, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 63
Z+ Security
The determination of threat perception for Z+ security cover is made by the Government of India and State authorities based on agency inputs and falls outside the judiciary's purview. The Supreme Court dismissed the Application seeking to revoke the Z+ security cover provided to the Ambani family, reiterating that the applicant lacked locus standi to challenge the security arrangement. The Court upheld its prior orders dated July 22, 2022, and February 2023, directing that Z+ security cover for the family continue in India and abroad, with costs borne by the Ambanis. The Court cautioned the applicant against filing further frivolous applications, warning of exemplary costs for future violations. The Court rejected arguments that security personnel were required for national security purposes, finding no material change in threat perception to justify altering the security cover. (Para 3, 4) Union of India v. Bikash Saha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 689