Administrative order punishing a delinquent employee - Certain generic principles governing interference with orders of punishment that are passed following inquiry proceedings have evolved over a period of time. Law is well settled that an administrative order punishing a delinquent employee is not ordinarily subject to correction in judicial review because the disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. If there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the high court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, should on consideration of the materials on record, the court be satisfied that there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice, or that the inquiry proceedings have been conducted contrary to statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry, or that the ultimate decision of the disciplinary authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is ex facie arbitrary or capricious, so much so that no reasonable person could have arrived at such conclusion, or there is any other ground very similar to the above, the high court may in the exercise of its discretion interfere to set things right. After all, public servants to whom Article 311 of the Constitution apply do enjoy certain procedural safeguards, enforcement of which by the high court can legitimately be urged by such servants depending upon the extent of breach that is manifestly demonstrated. (Para 33) Bhupinderpal Singh Gill v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 85 : AIR 2025 SC 620 : 2025 INSC 83

For a person to claim employment in an organization, a direct masterservant relationship must be established on paper. (Para 7) Joint Secretary, Central Board of Secondary Education v. Raj Kumar Mishra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 343

Indefinite temporary employment for permanent roles is contrary to labour jurisprudence and principles of fairness. (Para 14 & 15) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Employees' Compensation Act, 1923

Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) - "dependent" - Whether the definition of "dependent" as per Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the Act, specifically whether widowed sisters of the deceased, who were not minors, could be considered dependents entitled to compensation – Held, Section 2(1)(d)(ii)(d) of the 1923 Act defines dependents to include a "minor brother, or an unmarried sister, or a widowed sister if a minor" and noted the incongruity with present-day realities, referring to the context of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which makes the occurrence of a "widowed minor sister" unlikely - Supreme Court declined to interfere with the High Court judgment which treated widowed adult sisters as dependents, allowing compensation - Supreme Court left the question of law about the definition of "dependent" open and recommended the Law Commission of India to consider suitable amendments to the Employees Compensation Act to reflect current social realities. [Paras 2 - 6] New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Kogga, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1039

Sections 2(8), 3 - Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (ESI Act) - Sections 2(8), 51E - Interpretation of “accident arising out of and in the course of employment” - High Court reversed Commissioner's order for compensation citing that accident of deceased-watchmen did not originate from his employment because it happened outside factory premises – Held, the phrase “accident arising out of and in the courts of his employment” as it appears in section 3 of EC Act, includes accidents that occur when an employee is travelling to or from their place of work - Introduction of Section 51E into the ESI Act in 2010, which explicitly states that an accident while commuting to work is “deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of employment”, provided a nexus between the accident and the employment is established - This interpretation is based on the principle that the EC Act and ESI Act are statutes in pari materia and serve the common goal of social security for employees - This amendment to be “clarificatory in character” and therefore, it has a retrospective effect - Both EC Act and ESI Act are beneficial legislations - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Paras 15, 16, 18, 23, 37, 39, 40, 44, 47, 55] Daivshala v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 748 : 2025 INSC 904

Courts are not strictly bound by the schedule under the Act, 1923, when determining compensation for functional disability. Courts may deviate from the statutory schedule to account for the actual loss of earning capacity due to functional disability, adopting a liberal interpretation of the Act as beneficial legislation. Overturning the High Court's reduction of disability from 100% to 34% for an employee who lost four fingers, the Court assessed the functional disability at 50%, considering the severe mutilation of the employee's right hand. It awarded enhanced compensation of ₹1,60,177.5 with 12% interest from the date of the accident and a penalty of ₹80,088.75. (Paras 8-12) Kamal Dev Prasad v. Mahesh Forge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 510 : 2025 INSC 591

Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (PF Act)

General Provident Fund (Central Service) Rules, 1960 – Rule 5 and Rule 33 – Effect of nomination becoming invalid upon subscriber "acquiring a family" – Distribution of GPF proceeds - Nomination vs. Succession - Supreme Court reaffirmed that a nomination does not confer absolute title or beneficial interest upon the nominee - It serves only as an indication of the person authorized to receive the amount, while the actual entitlement is governed by the law of succession – Held, where the original nomination form stipulates that the nomination becomes ineffective/invalid upon the subscriber acquiring a family (marriage), such nomination becomes void by function of that condition - Even if the subscriber fails to formally cancel or update the nomination after marriage, the earlier nomination cannot be held valid - Under Rule 33(i)(b) of the GPF(CS) Rules and Note 2 to Rule 476(V) of the Official Manual, if no valid nomination in favor of a family member subsists at the time of death, the GPF amount must be distributed among all eligible family members in equal shares - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sarbati Devi v. Usha Devi (1984) 1 SCC 424; Shakti Yezdani v. Jayanand Jayant Salgaonkar (2024) 4 SCC 642; Shipra Sengupta v. Mridul Sengupta (2009) 10 SCC 680; Paras 7-10] Bolla Malathi v. B. Suguna, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1177 : 2025 INSC 1391

Order of Payment from Sale Proceeds: From the proceeds of the sale of the assets by the secured creditor - i. The first charge would be for the dues under the EPF&MP Act (including contribution, interest, penalty, and damages); ii. The remaining proceeds are then applied in satisfaction of the secured debt of the appellant-bank; iii. Workmen are granted liberty to approach the appropriate authority under the MRTU & PULP Act to determine their dues, which would only be satisfied if any amount remains after satisfaction of the provident fund dues and the secured creditor's debt. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Paras 17-27] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335

Section 11(2) - Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 26E - Priority of Dues - First Charge Vs. Priority to Secured Creditors – Held, the statutory first charge created under Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act in respect of provident fund dues has precedence over the priority conferred on a secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act - While Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act (introduced later in 2020) provides an overriding non-obstante clause conferring priority to a secured creditor's debts over all other debts and government dues, this priority cannot be equated with a "first charge" - Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act expressly creates a statutory first charge on the establishment's assets for the amount due, and this first charge prevails over the priority given under Section 26E of the SARFAESI. [Paras 22 - 24] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335

Section 11(2) - Supreme Court set aside Karnataka High Court order and restored a writ petition, remanding the matter for a fresh decision after impleading Axis bank as a respondent - High Court is directed to examine the priority of first charge between the EPFO and the secured creditors in light of Section 11(2) of the PF Act and High Court must also consider if the EPFO created a charge on the properties to be auctioned by Axis bank prior to the auction - High Court has to first deal with this issue and determine if Axis Bank has the first charge and priority over the EPFO to satisfy its dues from secured property under the SARFEASI Act, 2002 - Appeal allowed. [Para 8 - 13] Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Ltd. v. Regional Pf Commissioner II and Recovery Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 848 : 2025 INSC 1045

Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948

Section 2(17) - Principal Employer - A person exercising supervisory control over an establishment, irrespective of their official designation, qualifies as a 'principal employer' under Section 2(17) of the ESI Act. The Court upheld the conviction of a company's General Manager for failing to remit ESI contributions to the ESIC, sentencing him to six months' imprisonment and a ₹5,000 fine, emphasizing that liability persists for individuals acting as managing agents or supervising the establishment. Arguments that only the company bears responsibility were dismissed. (Paras 20 & 23) Ajay Raj Shetty v. Director, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 442 : 2025 INSC 500

Employees State Insurance (ESI) Corporation Act 1948- Section 45A- Jurisdiction under Section 45A: Whether the Employees State Insurance (ESI) Corporation can invoke summary determination powers under Section 45A of the ESI Act, 1948, in cases where the employer has produced records and participated in hearings, but the Corporation perceives such records as "inadequate" or "deficient."- held that Section 45A is an "extraordinary procedure" and a "residuary power"- It can only be invoked if two specific pre-conditions are met: (a) No returns, particulars, or records are submitted/maintained under Section 44; or (b) An official is obstructed from exercising duties under Section 45- clarified that "mere inadequacy of the record" does not confer jurisdiction under Section 45A- The statutory threshold is "non-production," not "inadequate production"- Dissatisfaction with the quality of documents does not permit the Corporation to treat production as non-production. [Relied on ESI Corpn. vs. C.C. Santhakumar (2007) 1 SCC 584] Carborandum Universal Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1232 : 2025 INSC 1455

Limitation and Statutory Architecture: Whether the Corporation can bypass the five-year limitation period prescribed under the proviso to Section 77(1A)(b) by incorrectly resorting to Section 45A when the legal pre-conditions for such an invocation are not met- When records are produced and cooperation is forthcoming, the Corporation must carry out the assessment under Section 75(2)(a). If the Corporation believes the employer's computation is incorrect, the proper course is to raise a dispute under Section 75 within the limitation period prescribed by Section 77(1A)(b)- While there is no limitation period for proceedings properly initiated under Section 45A, the Corporation cannot use Section 45A as an alternative mechanism to bypass the five-year limitation bar under Section 77(1A)(b) for stale claims when the employer has been cooperative - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court and ESI Court orders, ruling that since the appellant had produced ledgers, cash books, and returns, and attended numerous hearings, the invocation of Section 45A was "misconceived" and "wholly untenable"- Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-20, 24-30] Carborandum Universal Ltd. v. ESI Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1232 : 2025 INSC 1455

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

Industrial Dispute - Reliance on Umadevi, (2006) 4 SCC 1 to deny regularization to daily-wage employees is misplaced where the employment is irregular, not illegal, and the employer has engaged in exploitative practices for years. (Para 14) Industrial Dispute - Regularization - A general ban on fresh recruitment cannot justify indefinite daily-wage status or unfair labour practices, especially where the work is perennial and essential. (Para 14) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Dispute - The employer's engagement of workmen in perennial municipal functions, while denying them statutory benefits and equal pay for equal work, constitutes an unfair labour practice. (Para 13) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Dispute - The principle of “equal pay for equal work” cannot be casually disregarded when workers have served for extended periods in roles resembling those of permanent employees. (Para 13) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (U.P.) - Whether an individual is classified as regular or temporary is irrelevant as retrenchment obligations under the Act must be met in all cases attracting Section 6N. Any termination thus effected without statutory safeguards cannot be undertaken lightly. (Para 10) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Termination without adhering to Sections 6E and 6N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for employees engaged in essential duties, is illegal. Bureaucratic limitations cannot override the rights of workmen serving in de facto regular roles for extended periods. (Para 17) Shripal v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 153 : 2025 INSC 144

Section 2(oo)(bb) - The 73-year-old petitioner, a former employee, filed a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution challenging a labour dispute denial of reinstatement. Appearing in person due to financial constraints, he struggled with English submissions. The Court appointed Advocate Sanchar Anand as Amicus Curiae, who rendered pro bono assistance over 14 hearings spanning two years, facilitating a negotiated settlement. The respondents (employer) agreed to a lump-sum payment in lieu of reinstatement under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, initially offering Rs.10 lakhs, revised to Rs.15 lakhs, and finally settled at Rs.20 lakhs. Issue(s): 1. Whether a lump-sum compensation of Rs.20 lakhs in lieu of reinstatement is just and equitable for an aged workman who waives claims on merits, per Section 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 2. The ethical duty of advocates, particularly young members of the Bar, to provide voluntary legal aid to indigent litigants to ensure access to justice, and to dispel the misconception that the Supreme Court is accessible only to the wealthy. Held, the Court directed the respondent-employer to pay Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) via Demand Draft within three weeks as full and final settlement of all claims, extinguishing the petitioner's rights to reinstatement or further relief. This was deemed just, equitable, and proportionate given the petitioner's advanced age (73 years), long pendency, waiver of merits-based claims, mutual consent, and the employer's voluntary enhancement of the offer. No costs were awarded. As appreciation for the Amicus Curiae's selfless service, the Court directed an additional Rs.1,00,000/- to be paid to him by the respondents (Paras 9-11, 15) Shankar Lal Sharma v. Rajesh Koolwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 199 : 2025 INSC 200

Section 2(s) — Master and Servant Relationship — Canteen Employees — Non-Statutory Canteen Run by a Co-operative Society — Test to Determine Employer-Employee Relationship – Held, the employees working in a non-statutory canteen, run by a Co-operative Society on the Bank's premises with the Bank providing significant financial subsidy (75% of wages) and infrastructure, cannot be deemed to be the employees of the Bank (principal employer) - The mere act of a Bank playing a pivotal role in setting up the canteen, or providing necessary infrastructure, finance, subsidies, and controlling the working hours/days, is an "obligation to provide facilities to run canteen," which is distinct from a statutory or implicit "obligation to provide a canteen." - This does not make the canteen a part of the establishment - Appellant-Bank lacked the right to supervise and control the work done by the canteen employees, or to take any disciplinary action against them, the relationship of master and servant did not exist - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Parimal Chandra Raha v. LIC of India, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 611; Balwant Rai Saluja v. Air India Ltd. (2014) 9 SCC 407; Paras 36-40, 46-48] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175

Section 17B - In cases of wrongful dismissal, lump sum compensation may be more appropriate than reinstatement with back wages in specific circumstances, provided courts balance the interests of the employee and employer with reasoned justification. Back wages are not automatic and depend on whether the dismissed employee was gainfully employed post-termination. The quantum of back wages is at the court's discretion if the employee admits to or is proven to have had gainful employment, with the employer bearing the burden of proof under Section 17B. In this case, the employer was found guilty of suggestio falsi (false representation) and suppresio veri (suppression of truth) before the Labour Court and Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, violating natural justice principles. The employee, a driver dismissed after a vehicular accident, was awarded 75% back wages from termination to superannuation, along with full terminal benefits, modifying the High Court's order for 100% back wages. (Para 25, 30, 34, 44, 45) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Mahadeo Krishna Naik, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 212 : 2025 INSC 218 : [2025] 3 SCR 100 : AIR 2025 SC 1172 : (2025) 4 SCC 321

Section 25O - 'deemed closure' - If appropriate government does not communicate and order within 60 days of date of application - there shall be deemed closure - Upheld closure application and enhanced compensation offered to workers by an additional amount of Rs. 5 crores. Appeal allowed. [Relied on: Pimpri Chinchwad New Township Development Authority v. Vishnudev Coop. Housing Society (2018) 8 SCC 215, Paras 15, 16, 22] Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286

Section 25O - Procedure for closing down an undertaking - “appropriate Government” - Who is an appropriate government - Powers under Section 25O rests with Minister, the State Government being the appropriate government has delegated its power specifically to the Ministry for Labour - Deputy Secretary is not duly authorized to conduct communication or to accept or reject applications for closure made by Industrial units - No notification for delegation of power - Internal noting in Official files of the Government cannot be considered as an application of mind by appropriate authorities - Administrative Authorities are also required to give reasons for a decision made under Section 25O. Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 673 : 2025 INSC 801 : (2025) 10 SCC 286

Supreme Court laid down tests to determine employer employee relationship to be kept in mind while deciding matters arising from legislations like industrial disputes act, 1947, the factories act, 1948 etc - Factors to be considered include - (1) Control Test- (a) who appoints workers; (b) who pays the salaries/remuneration; (2) who has the authority to dismiss; (3) Organisation Test- who can take disciplinary action; (4) whether there is continuity of service; and (5) extent of control and supervision, i.e., whether there exists complete control and supervision. [Relied on Shivanandan Sharma v. Punjab National Bank Ltd. (AIR 1955 SC 404; Silver Jubilee Tailoring House v. Chief Inspector of Shops and Establishments (1974) 3 SCC 498; Workmen of Nilgiri Coop. Marketing Society Ltd. v. State of T.N. (2004) 5 SCC 514; Paras 37, 74-76] General Manager, U.P. Cooperative Bank Ltd v. Achchey Lal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1024 : 2025 INSC 1175

Payment of Bonus Act, 1965

Sections 1(3)(a), 10, 11, 32(v)(a) and (c) – Workers cannot be denied bonus saying factories are run by charitable trust. (Para 16 & 19) Management of Worth Trust v. Secretary, Worth Trust Workers Union, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 386 : 2025 INSC 432 : (2025) 5 SCC 427

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972

Section 4(6)(b)(ii) - Held, under Section 4(6)(b)(ii) of the Act, 1972, gratuity can be forfeited, wholly or partially, if an employee is terminated for misconduct constituting an offence involving moral turpitude, without requiring a criminal conviction. The observation in Union Bank of India v. C.G. Ajay Babu, (2018) 9 SCC 529, suggesting conviction as a prerequisite for forfeiture, was obiter dicta and not binding. The term "offence" under the Act, as per the General Clauses Act, refers to any act or omission punishable by law, judged on the standard of preponderance of probabilities in disciplinary proceedings, not proof beyond reasonable doubt as in criminal proceedings. The Disciplinary or Appointing Authority must determine if the misconduct constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude and decide the extent of forfeiture based on the misconduct's gravity. In the present case, the Court upheld forfeiture for suppression of the actual date of birth and misappropriation of fares by MSRTC conductors, as these acts constituted offences involving moral turpitude, despite no criminal proceedings. Appeal allowed. (Para 10, 13) Western Coal Fields Ltd. v. Manohar Govinda Fulzele, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 216 : 2025 INSC 233

Section 14 - Assam Financial Corporation (Amendment) Staff Regulations, 2007 - Regulation 107 - Gratuity Ceiling - Employee's right to higher gratuity ceiling – Held, when a statutory corporation's service regulation (Assam Financial Corporation's 2007 Staff Regulation, Regulation 107) itself provides for the payment of gratuity at a maximum limit, which is either an amount fixed by the Corporation or "as notified by the Govt. of Assam from time to time," the Regulation must be interpreted to be in favor of the employees - The right of the employees to the higher ceiling flows from the beneficial interpretation of the Regulation itself - Once the State's regulation specifies a higher limit for the grant of gratuity, then there can't be discrimination regarding the disbursal of the amount of gratuity and every employee shall be given equal treatment - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 16 - 21] Assam Financial Corporation Ltd. v. Bhabendra Nath Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1057 : 2025 INSC 1264

Rules of 1982 - Comparison between - Beneficial Legislation - Under the Act of 1972, gratuity is payable at the rate of 15 days wages based on last wages drawn for every completed year of service or part in excess of 6 months and there should be a continuous service for not less than 5 years - in Rules of 1982 - gratuity is payable equal to 1/4th of last pay drawn of each completed 6 monthly period, subject to a maximum of 16.5 years and the minimum limit of 5 years is not applicable to the Rules of 1982 - Gratuity payable under the Rules of 1982 is far more than that applicable under the Act of 1972 - Employees are also entitled to pension under Rules of 1982. [Para 8, 9] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824

Maharashtra Civil Services (Pension Rules), 1982 - Death cum Retirement Gratuity (DCRG) - Appellant's mother was a teacher in Maharashtra Government's aided school and upon her death, appellant claimed gratuity under the 1972 Act - High Court rejected the claim. Whether legal heirs of a deceased teacher in aided school would be entitled to gratuity under the Act of 1972 or under the Rules of 1982 – Held, Aided School Teacher's post akin to post under State Govt. and gratuity governed by State Rules - Payment of gratuity would not be governed by the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - Court directed to grant benefits under Rules of 1982 - Appellant's mother served in a government aided school and was not a state government employee, her post is equivalent to a post under the State Government - as service conditions and monetary benefits of pay and allowances were governed by State framed rules under Article 309 of Constitution of India. Court permitted appellant to approach respondent with an application for payment as per Rules of 1982. Appeal allowed. [Para 7, 12] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. Headmistress Girls High School and Junior College, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 696 : 2025 INSC 824

Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923

Section 19 – Liability of Insurer – Compensation Claim – Scope of Commissioner's power – Whether an insurer can be made jointly and severally liable with the employer despite the absence of a provision like Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Held, the issue is no longer res integra and stands settled by the decision in Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju - The Commissioner has the power to determine the liability of a person who is required to indemnify the employer - The 1923 Act is a social welfare legislation, and its object is to provide a speedy and efficacious remedy to the workman - While Section 3 fixes liability on the employer, excluding the insurer from being jointly and severally liable, where the liability is covered by insurance, would have a deleterious effect and render the remedy illusory - If the insurer is only liable to reimburse the employer, the workman would be left without compensation if the employer fails to pay due to financial incapacity - By virtue of the power to determine liability under Section 19, the Commissioner has the power to make the insurer jointly and severally liable with the employer to pay compensation if it falls within the scope of the contract of insurance - The High Court's modification, substituting the direction to the insurer to pay with a direction to the employer to pay and seek reimbursement, was held to be unjustified - The appropriate course was to make the employer and the insurer jointly and severally liable - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Gottumukkala Appala Narasimha Raju and others v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2007) 13 SCC 446; Mahendra Rai vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No.6697 of 2014; Paras 10-20] Alok Kumar Ghosh v. New India Assurance Company Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1022 : 2025 INSC 1239