LAND LAWS - SUPREME COURT ANNUAL DIGEST 2024Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1972; Sections 36, 37, and 38 - Acquisition and release of land designated for public purposes - The suit land, originally shown in private ownership in the 1978 and 1981 Layout Plans, was reserved for "public purpose" under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act. However, no acquisition proceedings...
LAND LAWS - SUPREME COURT ANNUAL DIGEST 2024
Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act, 1972; Sections 36, 37, and 38 - Acquisition and release of land designated for public purposes - The suit land, originally shown in private ownership in the 1978 and 1981 Layout Plans, was reserved for "public purpose" under the Tamil Nadu Town and Country Planning Act. However, no acquisition proceedings or agreements were initiated within the statutory 3-year period prescribed by Section 38 of the Act. Consequently, the land was deemed released from reservation, and the original owner retained the right to transfer ownership. The planning authority failed to acquire the land within the stipulated time. Subsequent revisions in the Layout Plan in 2005 designated the land as a "mixed residential area." Thus, the appellants, as transferees, lawfully acquired the suit property without violating any statutory provisions or zoning restrictions. The First Appellate Court was correct in dismissing the suit. The Trial Court's and High Court's findings were set aside. Appeal allowed. Pradhan Babu and Ors. v. Nachimuthu Nagar Kudiyiruppor Nala Sangam, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1057
Applicability of amendments made by the Kerala Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland (Amendment) Act, 2018, to pending applications for converting paddy land to non-agricultural purposes. Whether the amendments, effective from December 30, 2017, would retrospectively affect applications filed before that date. The Court upheld the High Court's decision that the amended provisions would apply only to applications submitted after December 30, 2017. Applications filed before this date would be adjudicated under the unamended statutory framework. The Court clarified that the legal position established in Revenue Divisional Officer v. Jalaja Dileep, (2015) 11 SCC 597 regarding the conversion of paddy land, remained unaffected. The appeals were dismissed with the Court affirming the High Court's interpretation, emphasizing the prospective application of the 2018 Amendment Act. Tehsildar and Another v. Renjith George, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1052
Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 CPC - Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886; Section 97, 100 and 154(1)(e) - The Regulation, 1886, allows revenue authorities to undertake partition only when all co-sharers consent. In cases of dispute, jurisdiction shifts to civil courts. The High Court erroneously interpreted Section 154(1)(e), concluding civil courts lack jurisdiction when revenue authorities entertain a partition application. This view contradicts the statutory framework and judicial precedents emphasizing the civil court's role in resolving title disputes. The High Court erred in holding that the civil court lacked jurisdiction. Disputes involving title or possession must first be resolved by a competent civil court before revenue authorities can proceed with partition. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043
Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 CPC - Partition of Agricultural Lands - Section 54 of CPC mandates that the Collector handles partitions involving agricultural lands assessed to revenue. The Civil Court's role is limited to declaring rights and shares. The execution of partition, including delivery of possession, is solely within the Collector's domain. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043
Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 CPC - Partition - Practical Implications - The division by metes and bounds includes both the physical partition and handing over possession. Where statutory constraints, such as anti-fragmentation laws, apply, the Collector must adhere to them while effecting partition. Civil Courts lack jurisdiction to direct how the Collector should execute the partition but may address grievances if the Collector's actions contravene the decree. This analysis underscores the structured approach to partition suits, balancing judicial determinations with administrative execution, ensuring both equity among parties and adherence to revenue laws. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043
Section 4 and 54; Order XX Rule 18 CPC - Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886; Section 154(1)(e) - Civil Court Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction of civil courts to determine title is not ousted by Section 154(1). The Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction of civil courts under Section 154(1)(e) is barred only when a suit for imperfect partition is maintainable under Section 97 of the Assam Land and Revenue Regulation, 1886. For such maintainability, two conditions must be met: (i) The party seeking partition must be in actual possession of the property in question. (ii) Co-sharers must be unwilling to consent to the partition. If these conditions are unmet, the civil court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate partition claims based on title as a co-owner. The Court emphasized that while revenue authorities have exclusive jurisdiction over perfect partition of revenue-paying properties, civil courts retain the authority to: (i) Determine the rights and shares of parties in disputed properties. (ii) Declare entitlement to seek partition before revenue authorities. (iii) Adjudicate on title to immovable property. The Court also reiterated that perfect partition remains the exclusive domain of revenue authorities, but suits for declaration of title, right, or interest in immovable property are within the jurisdiction of civil courts. The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the Civil Judge's order reinstated. Pending applications, if any, were disposed of. Abdul Rejak Laskar v. Mafizur Rahman, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1043
Article 300A - The right to property under Article 300A of the Constitution, coupled with procedural safeguards, necessitates a high threshold of fairness in State acquisition. Procedural irregularities, such as failure to serve notice, premature possession without compensation, and non-compliance with statutory timelines, warrant judicial intervention despite the delay. In this case, the High Court entertained the writ petition filed after 21 years, recognizing significant procedural lapses in land acquisition and the importance of protecting constitutional rights. The Court reiterated that addressing patent illegality and preventing injustice takes precedence over the principle of finality, especially where individual rights to property are at stake. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Validity of Notification for Land Acquisition under Section 52 of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement (RUI) Act, 1959 - Mandatory Requirements under Section 52(2) - Non-Compliance with Procedural Requirements - The State Government is required to serve individual notices to landowners and publish the notice in the Official Gazette, as well as paste it in a conspicuous area in the locality where the land is situated. These procedural safeguards are intended to ensure that landowners and interested parties are adequately notified and given an opportunity to object or make representations regarding the acquisition. The notification for acquisition under Section 52(1) is valid if the notice requirements under Section 52(2) are substantially complied with, ensuring that landowners are informed and heard. Non-compliance causing prejudice to landowners, as in the Moongaska case, renders the acquisition invalid. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Constructive and Implied Notice - For the Nangli Kota lands, the State Government failed to serve individual notices and did not paste notices in conspicuous areas, though the notice was published in the Official Gazette. Despite this, the participation of landowners in the proceedings was deemed sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the notice, rendering the acquisition valid. For the Moongaska lands, there was complete non-compliance with the requirements of individual notices and conspicuous postings. Additionally, some landowners and their legal heirs were not given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings, prejudicing their rights. Consequently, the notification for the acquisition of the Moongaska lands was held invalid. Constructive notice through publication in the Official Gazette and implied notice inferred from the participation of landowners in the proceedings were considered valid forms of notice for the Nangli Kota lands. However, absence of participation by some landowners in the Moongaska case invalidated the acquisition due to lack of actual or constructive notice. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Right to be Heard and Article 300A of the Constitution - The right to property, though no longer a fundamental right, is a constitutional right under Article 300A. Any expropriation of property must strictly adhere to statutory provisions. Failure to comply with procedural requirements, especially the right to be heard, can vitiate the entire acquisition process. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Land Acquisition – Non-payment of Compensation within Statutory Timelines – Invalidity of Acquisition - Improper Service of Notice and Invalidity of Notification - Premature Possession Transfer - Delayed Payment of Compensation - Held, the acquisition of the Nangli Kota lands was invalid as the compensation was not paid within the statutory period prescribed under Section 60A(4) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959, as amended. The improper service of notice under Section 52(2) rendered the notification under Section 52(1) for the Moongaksa land invalid. Possession of the Nangli Kota lands was handed over to the appellant Trust before depositing the compensation amount, in violation of Section 52(7). Compensation was deposited with the reference court in 1997, despite the requirement under Section 60A(4) to make payment within six months from 1 August 1987. The Court found the delay of over 10 years unjustified and in breach of the respondents' rights under Article 300A of the Constitution. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Violation of Right to Property as a Human Right - Fair Procedure in Acquisition - Right to property is a constitutional and human right. Timely and adequate compensation is integral to protecting this right. The Court reiterated that the process of land acquisition must be fair, transparent, and in strict compliance with statutory provisions. Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 1008
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 18 and 28A - Claim for re-determination of enhanced compensation cannot be denied merely because it was based on the High Court's decision to enhance compensation instead of the Reference Court's decision under Section 18 of the Act. To claim re-determination of compensation under Section 28A, it is not necessary to rely solely on the Reference Court's decision. A party can also seek re-determination based on a High Court decision that increases the compensation. Banwari v. HSIIDC, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 995
Land Acquisition and Integrated Development Plan – Yamuna Expressway Project – Legality of Urgency Clause – Compensation Enhancement Issues Considered - The Court addressed the following key issues: (i) Whether the land acquisition is part of the integrated development plan for the Yamuna Expressway under Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority (YEIDA) (ii) Whether the invocation of urgency provisions under Sections 17(1) and 17(4) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was justified, thereby dispensing with the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act. (iii) Whether the judgment in Kamal Sharma correctly interpreted the law, or if the judgment in Shyoraj Singh was valid in relying on Radhy Shyam to quash the acquisition proceedings. Held, the land acquisition was an integral part of the Yamuna Expressway project, involving the development of adjoining areas for industrial, residential, and recreational purposes, forming a unified development scheme. The invocation of Sections 17(1) and 17(4) was deemed lawful and justified in light of the project's scale and public purpose. The Court affirmed the view in Kamal Sharma, which upheld the acquisition and urgency clause application, and declared Shyoraj Singh per incuriam for failing to consider prior precedents. The Court upheld the Allahabad High Court's grant of a 64.7% enhanced compensation as a "No Litigation Bonus" under a Government Order dated November 4, 2015. It directed that this enhancement apply uniformly to all affected landowners, with no further increase warranted. The question of the final award's non-issuance remains open for separate adjudication. The integrated development plan and the urgency clause invocation are valid, the acquisition proceedings stand upheld, and enhanced compensation at 64.7% is confirmed. Appeals by landowners dismissed; YEIDA's appeals allowed. Kali Charan v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 922
Allotment of government land to Medinova Regal Co-operative Housing Society (MRCHS) - Allegations of nepotism and procedural violations - Application of Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Land) Rules, 1971 and Government Regulations dated 09.07.1999 (“GR 1999”) - The Supreme Court addressed an appeal by Proposed Vaibhav Cooperative Housing Society Limited challenging the High Court's dismissal of their writ petition against the State allotment of land to MRCHS. The Court scrutinized the procedural irregularities and favoritism in the allotment process, noting that MRCHS, which initially applied for a different plot, was ultimately allotted another plot under discretionary powers without proper compliance with the applicable rules and regulations. The Court highlighted the lack of transparency and due process, including the failure to disclose reasons for the discretionary allotment, as required under Clause 12(8) of GR 1999. It was found that MRCHS changed its membership multiple times to meet eligibility criteria, undermining the initial objective of providing housing for doctors at Tata Memorial Hospital. The Court underscored the necessity of adherence to procedural safeguards in government land allotment to ensure fairness and prevent arbitrary decisions. The appeal was allowed, and the allotment to MRCHS was set aside. Proposed Vaibhav Cooperative Housing Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 984
The appellant's land was acquired under the National Highways Act, 1956. The appellant filed an appeal before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, which was later dismissed as barred by limitation under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The appellant sought condonation of the period from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012 under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Whether the period from 20.10.2011 to 20.01.2012 should be excluded under Section 14 of the Limitation Act while calculating the limitation period for filing objections under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Held, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, which provides for the exclusion of the time spent in bona fide legal proceedings, applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Court emphasized a liberal interpretation of limitation provisions to secure the limited remedies available under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration Act. The Court allowed the exclusion of the period from 20.10.2011 to 23.02.2012, thereby restoring the Section 34 petition for reconsideration. The appeals were allowed, and the judgment of the High Court and the order of the District Judge were set aside. The Section 34 petition was restored to its original number for fresh adjudication. Kirpal Singh v. Government of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 970
The Supreme Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition filed by the State challenging the High Court's refusal to condone an inordinate delay of 5 years, 10 months, and 16 days in filing a second appeal regarding valuable government land disputes. The Court emphasized that the expression "sufficient cause" under limitation law requires a party to provide an adequate and plausible explanation for the delay, especially within the prescribed limitation period. Negligence, inaction, or lack of bona fides cannot justify condonation of delay, irrespective of whether the litigant is a private party or the State. The Court criticized the State's lackadaisical approach and attributed the delay to systemic inefficiencies, including delayed communication and decision-making by officials. The Court directed the State to streamline its legal machinery, hold erring officials accountable, and take measures to prevent such lapses in the future. Costs of ₹1,00,000/- were imposed on the State for filing the appeal without substantial grounds and for misusing the Court's time. The Special Leave Petition was dismissed with costs, and the Court cautioned against filing appeals without proper justification, emphasizing judicial efficiency and accountability in government litigation. State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Kumar Choudhary, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 953
Land Allotment - Government's policy of preferential land allotment to housing societies comprising MPs, MLAs, judges, civil servants, defence personnel, and journalists - The Court deemed this policy arbitrary, unreasonable, and in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality. The Court annulled the 2005 Government Orders (GOs) that categorized these groups as a distinct class eligible for land allotment at basic rates. The Court also nullified subsequent GOs from 2008 that facilitated such allotments, concurring with a 2010 High Court judgment. The Court criticized the policy for perpetuating inequality by favoring privileged groups, thereby undermining the principles of fairness and equality enshrined in the Constitution. It emphasized that state resources should be allocated in a manner that benefits all citizens, particularly the marginalized and socio-economically disadvantaged, rather than a select elite. This ruling underscores the judiciary's commitment to upholding constitutional principles and ensuring that government policies do not arbitrarily favor certain sections of society at the expense of others. State of Andhra Pradesh v. Dr Rao VBJ Chelikani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 918
Legality of the demolition of the petitioner's ancestral house without due process. Procedural safeguards required for actions against alleged encroachments. State accountability for high-handed and unauthorized actions. The petitioner alleged that his ancestral home in Maharajganj, Uttar Pradesh, was unlawfully demolished during a road widening project for National Highway 730. The demolition was carried out without written notice, based solely on public announcements. The NHRC and Commissioner's reports revealed procedural lapses, including lack of demarcation, absence of land acquisition, and demolition beyond the alleged encroachment. No evidence was presented by the State to establish the width of the highway or the extent of encroachment. The demolition exceeded the purported encroachment of 3.70 meters, going up to 8 meters in some areas. No compensation was provided, and the State failed to follow due process as mandated by law. The demolition was declared illegal, high-handed, and violative of procedural safeguards under Article 300A of the Constitution, which protects the right to property. The Court emphasized the requirement of due process, written notice, and proper demarcation before taking actions against alleged encroachments. State authorities were ordered to adopt procedural safeguards, including written notice, demarcation, and compensation, before initiating demolitions. Disciplinary and criminal proceedings were recommended against officials involved in unauthorized actions. The principle of “justice through bulldozers” was condemned as incompatible with the rule of law and constitutional guarantees. The Court held that any demolition of private property must strictly adhere to legal procedures to uphold constitutional protections and ensure public accountability. Arbitrary actions by the State undermine the rule of law and cannot be justified in a civilized society. In Re Manoj Tibrewal Akash, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 878
Land Acquisition - Compensation Assessment – Reliance on Highest Sale Exemplar – Developmental Deduction Range – Judicial Precedents Considered – Appeals Allowed - Held, there is no bar to take into account the sale of smaller pieces of land as an exemplar for determining the fair and just land acquisition compensation. In determining compensation for acquired land, the court identified significant disparity among sale exemplars ranging from ₹16,94,000 to ₹1,81,33,867 per acre. Despite objections, the court chose to rely on the highest exemplar (Ex. P5) due to its proximity and similarity to the acquired agricultural land. Deductions for development were assessed between 46% and 50% to account for the disparity in land size and strategic location advantages. Even applying the highest deduction, the compensation exceeded the Land Acquisition Collector's (LAC) determination, affirming its fairness. The High Court's reduction of valuation was found erroneous, and the Reference Court's award was restored. The court ordered payment of the compensation with statutory benefits within eight weeks. Appeals allowed. High Court judgment set aside. Compensation by the Reference Court restored. Horrmal v. State of Haryana, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 818
The Supreme Court set aside a judgment of the Karnataka High Court which directed HMT Ltd. and Union of India to either return land in Bangalore's Jarakabande Kaval village to heirs of a previous owner from whom it was requisitioned in 1941 or to compensate them by paying the present market value. The Court noted that the writ petition filed in the Karnataka High Court in 2006 was barred by delay and laches. The Court also noted that the petitioner had suppressed several crucial facts. HMT Ltd. v. Rukmini, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 743 : AIR 2024 SC 4677
State must ensure timely payment of land acquisition compensation even if a private company is ultimately liable - Delay violates Article 300A. Ultra Tech Cement LTd v.Mast Ram, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 724
Compensation for surrendering land for public purpose once determined is payable without formal request, failure violates Article 300-A. Kukreja Construction Company v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 701
The Supreme Court sets aside the grant of land acquisition compensation share to persons who purchased sites from party having no title. Lakshmesh M. v. P. Rajalakshmi, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 699 : AIR 2024 SC 4281
The Supreme Court set aside the interim order passed by the High Court, which had directed the maintenance of status quo regarding the land acquisition and rehabilitation process for the proposed expansion of an Airport. The High Court's order had imposed a blanket stay, halting the acquisition of land and demolition of structures, pending the disposal of a writ petition filed by families affected by the expansion project. The Court vacated the interim order, taking into account the potential delays and cost overruns caused by such blanket stays on infrastructural projects. Principal Secretary v. Gaggal Airport Expansion Affected Social Welfare Committee, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 684
Is interest on solatium payable from date of land acquisition or date of 'sunder' judgment? The supreme court refers to a 3-judge bench. Executive Engineer, Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. V. Saraswathiammal, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 523
Land was donated to the State in 1958 for the construction of a veterinary hospital. The Court criticized the plaintiff for filing a vague plaint, lacking essential details, and attempting to circumvent the law of limitation through clever drafting. The suit was barred by limitation under Article 65, as it was filed more than 40 years after the hospital's construction and well beyond the 12-year period from when the plaintiff had knowledge of the hospital's existence. The burden of proof in a possession suit lies on the plaintiff, and mere entries in revenue records do not confer title. The lethargy of the State in not updating revenue records did not diminish its rights under the gift deed. The appeal by the State was allowed. (Para 18 - 32) State of Punjab v. Bhagwantpal Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 479
Zamindari Abolition Act; Section 154B - Prohibition of the sale or transfer of agricultural lands to a person who is not an agriculturalist – Section 154-B permits the sale of agricultural land to a non-agriculturalist with the permission of the State Government for the purposes specified in clause (i) to (v) of clause (h). Held, an 'agreement for sale' does not transfer the property subject matter of the agreement to the purchaser and does not create any interest in the property subject matter of the agreement. Therefore, the embargo created by sub-section (1) of Section 154-B will apply only to the execution of the sale deed and not to the execution of the agreement for sale. Further held, a decree enjoining the defendants to obtain permission to sell the suit property can be passed and a decree for the specific performance can be passed contingent upon the grant of the permission. (Para 17 & 18) Maharaj Singh v. Karan Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : AIR 2024 SC 3328 : (2024) 8 SCC 83
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 23(1) – Land acquisition – Quantum of compensation granted to the landowners is challenged to be inadequate – Held, there exists no direct piece of evidence to determine fair and just compensation in the instant cases hence, courts must resort to the settled principle of guesstimation. While the Court can use the principle of guesstimation in reasonably estimating the value of land in the absence of direct evidence, the Court must embrace a holistic view and consider all 'relevant factors' and existing evidence, even if not directly comparable, to arrive at a fair determination of compensation. Such relevant factors can be divided into three categories: (i). Characteristics of the land, (ii). Future potentiality of the land, (iii). Factors denoting market sentiment. Further held, compensation could be determined applying the principle of guesstimation, based on the circle rate after granting a marginal increase over the same. It would be appropriate to apply a 15% escalation for one year to the price fixed at INR 350 per sq. yd., bringing the total guesstimate to INR 403 per sq. yd.. It stands conclusively surmised that the landowners are entitled to an enhancement in the compensation awarded. (Para 32, 33, 34, 42 & 43) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456
Principle of guesstimation – It is a heuristic device that enables the court, in the absence of direct evidence and relevant sale exemplars, to make a reasonable and informed guess or estimation of the market value of the land under acquisition, and concomitantly the compensation payable by the appropriate Government. This principle accentuates the fundamental understanding that determining compensation for land is not a matter of exact science but involves a significant element of estimation. Indeed, this holds true for valuation of land in general, which is affected by a multitude of factors such as its location, surrounding market conditions, feasible uses etc. Accordingly, while evidence and calculations can aid in estimating the land value, they ultimately serve as tools for approximation rather than precision. (Para 31 & 32) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456
Seeking parity with Bir Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh where compensation was enhanced to INR 449 per sq. yd – Held, enhanced compensation was awarded relying on the sale deed which noted the value of land as INR 400 per sq. yd which was founded on a bona fide factual error. The figure of 400 actually denoted the area and size of the plot and not its sale value. Further held, the decision was not revisited by this Court likely on account of the practical difficulties in recovering the excess compensation amount already paid to the expropriated land owners and given the larger interest of justice. Hence, the judgement would not be binding and market value of land in question is to be determined independently. (Para 21) New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Harnand Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 456
Article 300A – The Duty to acquire only for public purpose – The acquisition must be for a public purpose is inherent and an important fetter on the discretion of the authorities to acquire. Further, the decision of compulsory acquisition of land is subject to judicial review and the Court will examine and determine whether the acquisition is related to public purpose. If the court arrives at a conclusion that that there is no public purpose involved in the acquisition, the entire process can be set-aside. (Para 30.4) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Article 300A – The Right of conclusion – The culmination of an acquisition process is not in the payment of compensation, but also in taking over the actual physical possession of the land. If possession is not taken, acquisition is not complete. With the taking over of actual possession after the normal procedures of acquisition, the private holding is divested and the right, title and interest in the property, along-with possession is vested in the State. The obligation to conclude and complete the process of acquisition is also part of Article 300A. (Para 30.7) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – Section 352 – Procedure of acquisition is mandatory to be followed – Section 352 is bereft of any procedure whatsoever before compulsorily acquiring private property. Held, compulsory acquisition will be unconstitutional if proper procedure is not established or followed before depriving a person of their right to property. The constitutional right to property comprises of seven sub-rights or procedures such as the right to notice, hearing, reasons for the decision, to acquire only for public purpose, fair compensation, efficient conduct of the procedure within timelines and finally the conclusion. Held, as Section 352 does not provide for these sub-rights or procedures, it can never be a valid power of acquisition. Hence, acquisition of land under Section 352 is rejected. (Para 2 & 24) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 – Section 352 & 537 – Power of acquisition – Section 352 empowers the Municipal Commissioner to identify the land required for the purpose of opening of public street, square, park, etc. and under Section 537, the Municipal Commissioner has to apply to the Government to compulsorily acquire the land. Upon such an application, the Government may, in its own discretion, order proceedings to be taken for acquiring the land. Held, section 352 is, not the power of acquisition. Hence, the submission that Section 352 enables the Municipal Commissioner to acquire land is rejected. The appellant-Corporation acquiring land under Section 352 acted in blatant violation of statutory provisions. (Para 22) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 382
Valuation of land by the state – Held, it is not clear on what basis the valuation has been arrived at; at what point of time this amount came to be assessed; and the basis for the assessment of such amount. The High Court proceeded on the footing that the valuation has been assessed and it is now for the appellant to file an application to get the amount disbursed. Further held, the High Court should also have asked the State the basis of the determination of the amount towards compensation and the approach of the High Court while disposing of the appeal is disappointing. The impugned order of High Court is set aside. (Para 13 & 15) Dharnidhar Mishra v. State of Bihar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 380 : (2024) 10 SCC 605
Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (Gujarat); Section 52 – Allotment of land in question – The plaintiffs, being well aware of the fact that Final Plot allotted to them under the second varied Town Planning Scheme was of lesser area, accepted the same without any protest and without agitating a right to a larger area in the light of the initial allotment – Held, having accepted the plot allotted to them upon variation of the scheme without demur or protest, the plaintiffs cannot now seek to reopen the negligence and delay, if any, on the part of the Corporation prior to such variation. (Para 34 & 39) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : AIR 2024 SC 3026
Town Planning and Urban Development Act, 1976 (Gujarat); Section 52 – Compensation paid for land is challenged to be inadequate – Held, the conduct of the plaintiffs in depositing the compensation amount thereafter, imply receipt of the compensation amount for the shortfall area in allotted land. This further, foreclosed their right, to either challenge the allotment of a plot of lesser area or to seek more compensation. Further held, the voluntary act of depositing the compensation amount to the trial court precludes them from contending, that the said compensation was never paid to them. (Para 36 & 39) Mrugendra Indravadan Mehta v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 369 : AIR 2024 SC 3026
U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953; Section 49 – The power to declare the ownership in an immovable property can be exercised only by a Civil Court save and except when such jurisdiction is barred expressly or by implication under a law. Section 49 cannot be construed as a bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to determine the ownership rights. It contemplates bar to the jurisdiction of the Civil or Revenue Court for the grant of declaration or adjudication of rights of tenure holders in respect of land lying in an area for which consolidation proceedings have commenced. Hence, the power under Section 49 cannot be exercised to take away the vested title of a tenure holder. Kalyan Singh had acquired ancestral rights as a tenure holder and was co-owner in the suit land much before the consolidation proceedings commenced. Held, the Consolidation Officer could not take away the ownership rights of Kalyan Singh which he had already inherited much before the commencement of the consolidation proceedings. Order passed by the Consolidation Officer has rightly been held to be null and void and without any jurisdiction. (Para 9, 12 & 13) Prashant Singh v. Meena, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 355
Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 – Review Jurisdiction – To declare reserved forest land as private land – Review of earlier order where it had given a clear finding that the title over the reserved forest land wasn't proved by the private person. Held, the High Court showed utmost interest and benevolence in allowing the review by setting aside the well merited judgment in the appeal by replacing its views in all material aspects. The High Court which is expected to act within the statutory limitation went beyond and graciously gifted the forest land to a private person who could not prove his title. The High Court could not interfere by placing reliance upon evidence produced after the decree which states that the land is forest land which has become part of reserved forest. (Para 54 & 56) State of Telangana v. Mohd. Abdul Qasim, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 314 : AIR 2024 SC 2466 : (2024) 6 SCC 461
'Easement' – A right which the owner or occupier of a land possesses for the beneficial enjoyment of his land on the other land which is not owned by him, to do and continue to do something or to prevent and continue to prevent something being done on the said land. The land which is to be enjoyed by the beneficiary is called 'Dominant Heritage' and the land on which the easement is claimed is called 'Servient Heritage'. The easementary right, therefore, is essentially a right claimed by the owner of a land upon another land owned by someone else so that he may enjoy his property in the most beneficial manner. (Para 19) Manisha Mahendra Gala v. Shalini Bhagwan Avatramani, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 301 : AIR 2024 SC 1947 : (2024) 6 SCC 130
The tenant holding possession of the Watan property under the Maharashtra Hereditary Offices Act, 1874, on the 'Tiller's Day', which is not subjected to payment of land revenue to the State Government, would be entitled to exercise their right of statutory purchase for purchasing the tenanted Watan property under the Maharashtra Revenue Patels (Abolition of Offices) Act, 1962. Baban Balaji More v. Babaji Hari Shelar, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 234
Land Revenue Code; Section 36A and Registration Act, 2008; Section 17 – Restriction in conveyance of land by tribal in favour of non-tribal – Under Section 36A, restriction is only in case of transfer by way of sale, gift, exchange, mortgage, lease or otherwise and there is no bar for a tribal to enter into an agreement to sell and seeking advance sale consideration. Previous sanction is to be taken before conveyance could be made and conveyance by way of sale would take place only at the time of registration of a sale deed in accordance with Section 17 of the Registration Act, 2008. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : (2024) 4 SCC 310
Land Revenue Code; Section 36A – Specific performance of agreement to sell –The stage of taking previous sanction under Section 36A of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1959 had not arisen in the present case, for the reason that the defendant did not come forward to execute the sale deed. Courts could not have declined to grant the decree for specific performance on the basis of non-compliance of Section 36A inasmuch as the considerations under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 only had to be made for the purpose of adjudicating the suit between the parties. As the plaintiff has performed his part of the agreement as required under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief specific performance of the agreement to sell. On grant of the decree of specific performance, the appellant-plaintiff shall proceed under Section 36A of Act of 1959 before seeking conveyance of the subject land in his favour in case the defendant is a tribal. Babasaheb Dhondiba Kute v. Radhu Vithoba Barde, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 225 : (2024) 4 SCC 310
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 - Though, the Right to Property is no more a Fundamental Right, still it is recognized as a Constitutional Right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Depriving a citizen of his Constitutional Right to use the land for 20 years and then showing graciousness by paying the compensation and beating drums that the State has been gracious is unacceptable. The state is not doing charity by paying compensation to the citizens for acquisition of land. (Para 25 & 26) Sudha Bhalla @ Sudha Punchi v. Rakesh Kumar Singh, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 167
Control of National Highways (Land and Traffic) Act, 2002 – Effective Implementation – Machinery for Oversight and Grievance Redressal – Survey of Highways – Removal of unauthorized encroachments on highway land – Compliance with Amendments – Directions Issued. Gyan Prakash v. Union of India, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 164
Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 (Rajasthan); Rule 266 – Only in certain specified situation, the land could be transferred by way of sale on private negotiation, namely, where any person has a plausible claim of title to the land and auction may not fetch reasonable price or it may not be the convenient mode for disposal of land or where such a course is regarded by the Panchayat necessary for advancement of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes or other Backward Classes. Another situation envisaged is where the person is in possession of land for more than 20 years but less than 42 years. Nothing was produced on record to show that the due process required for leasing out/sale of the land in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs by private negotiation was followed. Gram Panchayat from whom the land was taken was not impleaded as party to admit or deny the allegations made by the respondents/plaintiffs in the plaint. The alleged lease deed/sale deed has been issued in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs is clearly violative of Rule 266. (Para 29) Tehsildar, Urban Improvement Trust v. Ganga Bai Menariya, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 153
Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab); Section 16, 8(2) and 3(3) - 'Land' and 'Immovable property' are two different terms. As per Section 3(3), immovable property is more than the land on which certain construction has been made. Notification dated 08.10.1985 limits its application for taking away the right of pre-emption only with reference to sale of 'land' falling in the areas of any municipality. In the present case, it is sale of immovable property, which is more than the land as a rolling mill had already been set up on the land. Held, notification is not applicable to property in dispute. (Para 17) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588
Pre-emption Act, 1913 (Punjab); Section 8(2) - Notification issued in exercise of powers under Section 8(2) enables the State Government to exclude any transaction of sale of any land or property for exercise of right of pre-emption. Notification exempts right of pre-emption in respect of sale of land falling in the area of municipalities in Haryana. (Para 8) Jagmohan v. Badri Nath, 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 95 : AIR 2024 SC 900 : (2024) 3 SCC 588