Land Law - Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025 Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2) or...
Land Law - Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025
Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2) or Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act is a complete package and excludes itself from the purview of the 1997 Act thereafter - The rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the contract - Section 12 of the 1997 Act, which speaks of payment of interest from the time of taking possession until compensation is paid or deposited, has no application to a case where an agreement has been entered into between the parties under Section 7 - Once an agreement is finalized, the agreement becomes sacrosanct, and all disputes with respect to the determination of rent and interest would get subsumed within the contract itself - A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes (contract and statutory remedy) after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest - The High Court committed a fundamental error in invoking Section 12 for the payment of interest from the date of the notice under Section 3(2) of the 1997 Act till the date of the impugned judgment, after giving a clear finding that the agreement was a complete package - The contract voluntarily entered into shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions which are sought to be excluded by such contract. [Paras 14-25] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332
Although the land acquisition compensation is to be determined at the market rate prevailing on the date of issuance of the notification regarding the acquisition of land, the compensation can be determined based on a later date in exceptional circumstances when the delay in the disbursal of the compensation has been inordinate. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : (2025) 7 SCC 580
Cancellation of Land Allotment – Validity of Legal Notice - The Supreme Court dismissed the Trust's appeal, affirming that UPSIDC's cancellation of the allotment complied with procedural requirements under Clause 3.04(vii) of the UPSIDC Manual. The appellant argued that only the notice dated 13.11.2006 qualified as a "legal notice," claiming three consecutive notices were required. However, the Court held that prior communications dated 14.12.2004 and 14.12.2005 also met the criteria for valid legal notices, as they clearly outlined the default, breach, intent to take legal action, and consequences, despite not being explicitly labeled as such. A valid legal notice requires clear facts, notice of breach, intent to hold the recipient liable, and compliance with statutory provisions, without suppressing material information. No prejudice was caused to the appellant, and the High Court's decision was upheld. (Paras 22 - 24) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Conservation of Paddy Land and Wetland Act, 2008 (Kerala) – Section 27A – Conversion Fee Exemption – No Exemption for Land Exceeding 25 Cents – Held, the exemption from conversion fee under Section 27A applies only to landholdings up to 25 cents and not to larger landholdings exceeding 25 cents. The Court set aside the High Court's judgment, which had directed that the conversion fee for land exceeding 25 cents be calculated after deducting 25 cents. The notification dated 25th February 2021 intended to exempt small landholdings (up to 25 cents) from the conversion fee to facilitate construction without financial burden. The exemption notifications must be interpreted strictly and literally, and the State was competent to classify landholdings into two categories: those up to 25 cents (exempt) and those exceeding 25 cents (liable for 10% of fair value as fee). A subsequent notification dated 23rd July 2021 and Rule 12, Clause 9 of the Rules, 2008, further clarified that no exemption applies to land exceeding 25 cents. The High Court's interpretation, which fused the two categories, was erroneous. (Para 18, 19, 24) State of Kerala v. Moushmi Ann Jacob, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 235 : 2025 INSC 255
Constitution of India - Articles 142 and 300-A – Compensation – Delay in Determination and Disbursal – Held, the appellants were deprived of their legitimate compensation for over 22 years due to the inaction and lethargy of the State and Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board (KIADB). The delay violated the appellants' constitutional right under Article 300-A, which guarantees the right to property, mandating adequate and timely compensation for deprivation of property. The Court found that despite the statutory framework requiring prompt disbursal, the compensation was determined only in 2019 after contempt proceedings were initiated, using the market value from 2011 as the base. It was held that awarding compensation at the 2003 market value would result in gross injustice and render Article 300-A meaningless. In exercise of its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court directed the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) to determine compensation based on the market value as of April 22, 2019, along with statutory benefits under the 1894 Land Acquisition Act. Additionally, the judgment and orders of the High Court's Division Bench were set aside, and the appellants' writ petition was allowed. The Court clarified that the inter se dispute between the State, KIADB, and Respondents 6 and 7 regarding the delay in compensation payment must be resolved as per the agreements between them, without affecting the appellants' entitlement. Respondents 6 and 7 were granted liberty to pursue remedies in law if aggrieved. Appeals allowed; fresh award to be determined within two months based on the 2019 market value; statutory benefits to be provided. Bernard Francis Joseph Vaz v. Government of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 2 : (2025) 7 SCC 580
Delay in filing an appeal against a land acquisition compensation award does not justify denying landowners just, fair, and reasonable compensation. The Court allowed the appeal filed after a 4908-day (13.5-year) delay, overturning the High Court's dismissal for refusing to condone the delay. Emphasizing Article 300A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to property and mandates fair compensation for land acquired under eminent domain, the Court reiterated a liberal approach to condoning delays in land acquisition cases, especially considering factors like poverty and illiteracy of land losers. However, no interest on compensation is payable for the delayed period. The case was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration, excluding the issue of delay, with no interest awarded for the condoned delay period. [Paras 11 & 13] Suresh Kumar v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 473 : 2025 INSC 550
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 (Haryana) - Section 15 - Principles of Natural Justice - Opportunity of Hearing - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that directed the closure of civil suits and action against unauthorized construction and commercial use of residential property in Gurugram, on the ground that the directions were issued without joining the affected parties (appellants) and affording them an opportunity of hearing - Observed that while unauthorized construction or commercial use of residential property cannot be protected, the determination of such fact must be made by the authorities affording due opportunity to the owners and occupiers - Held that opportunity of hearing is a sine qua non for fair administration of justice and a Court's observations should not adjudicate the rights of any unheard party - Set aside order of High Court. [Paras 9 - 12] Gaurav Kohli v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1061
Dispute over Government Land - Liberal Approach - Substantial Justice - Although a delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, the case's merit cannot be discarded solely on the technical grounds of limitation. A liberal approach should be taken in condoning delays when the limitation ground undermines the merits of the case and obstructs substantial justice. (Para 14) Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 339 : 2025 INSC 382
East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Validity of Haryana Act No. 9 of 1992 upheld (paras 128-129). Lands reserved for common purposes including utilized and unutilized, vest in Gram Panchayat and are to be used for village needs - Bachat land, which has not been reserved for common use under the scheme, remains the proprietary land of the contributors and must be redistributed among them per their share - Compensation is not payable where acquisition is for common purposes and the beneficiary is not the State but the proprietors themselves via Gram Panchayat management - distinctions between acquisition by the State and modification of rights benefiting proprietors through Panchayat management of common land - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 24-43, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58-62-64] State of Haryana v. Jai Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 917 : 2025 INSC 1122
Forfeiture of Alwara lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli - Supreme Court dismisses allottees' plea against Collector's 1974 order for forfeiture of Alwara lands in Dadra and Nagar Haveli - The rights vested in the appellants fall under the OA specifically governed by emphyteutic principles, not general land revenue laws - The doctrine of lex specialis applies, giving precedence to the OA over the 1917 Portuguese Land Law under which the appellants sought relief, which was raised belatedly and not considered at earlier stages - The High Court rightly interfered with concurrent findings of fact upon showing perversity, misreading and ignoring evidence - Delay or long inaction by the administration does not amount to acquiescence unless there is deliberate waiver of rights; mere delay does not bar rescission - That appellants' pleaded waiver and acquiescence were rejected due to lack of evidence and failure to plead such grounds initially - Held that rescission was in exercise of statutory power by the Collector duly delegated by the Administrator, based on noncultivation contrary to Article 12 of the OA and was not mala fide - The 1971 Land Reforms Regulation repealed prior laws but saved pending proceedings; thus, the rescission proceedings initiated prior to its enforcement were valid - The principle of law on waiver against the Government requires intentional relinquishment of rights which was not made out here - No estoppel against government in exercise of sovereign, legislative or Executive power. [Paras 4, 8-11, 16-23, 33-38, 40-46, 60-62, 54-63, 70-74, 80-85] Divyagnakumari Harisinh Parmar v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 942 : 2025 INSC 1145
Industrial Land Allotment – Systemic Flaws in UPSIDC Process - The Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of a 125-acre industrial land allotment to Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust by the Uttar Pradesh State Industrial Development Corporation (UPSIDC) due to payment defaults, as confirmed by the Allahabad High Court in 2017. The Court criticized UPSIDC for systemic flaws in allotting the land in 2003 within two months without competitive bidding, violating the Public Trust Doctrine. This doctrine mandates transparent, fair, and publicly beneficial allocation of state resources, requiring consideration of economic benefits, environmental sustainability, and regional development. The Court noted that UPSIDC's non-transparent process deprived the public exchequer of revenue and undermined the State's fiduciary duty to citizens. It directed Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC to ensure future allotments are transparent, non-discriminatory, and aligned with public interest, industrial development, and environmental goals, with the subject land to be re-allotted strictly per these principles. (Paras 29 - 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Issue of non-payment of compensation to land owners whose land was acquired for the construction of a water tank. The Court expressed strong disapproval of the conduct of the State authorities, who had failed to pay the compensation despite a final award in favor of the land owners. The Court directed to ensure the release of the compensation amount, along with interest and punitive costs. The Court also mandated an explanation from the Collector and warned of contempt proceedings if the payment was not made by the stipulated date. The Special Leave Petition was disposed of with these directions, and the Court clarified that its observations were not against any individual officer. Kondiram Manikrao Nimbalkar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 54
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Section 23(1A) & (2)) and Section 28 - National Highways Act, 1956; Section 3J - In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2019) 9 SCC 304 the Supreme Court declared Section 3J of the National Highways Act, 1956 unconstitutional to the extent it denied solatium (under Section 23(1A) & (2)) and interest (under Section 28 proviso) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to landowners whose properties were acquired by the National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) between 1997 and 2015. Post-judgment, NHAI sought clarification that the ruling apply prospectively, precluding recalculation of compensation in cases where acquisition proceedings had attained finality, citing financial burden (approx. Rs. 100 crores) and risk of reopening settled matters. Whether the Tarsem Singh ruling, striking down the exclusion of solatium and interest for NH Act acquisitions, operates prospectively or requires retrospective application to rectify pre-2015 disparities without disturbing final judgments. Held, the Court dismissed NHAI's plea, holding that the 2019 ruling applies to all eligible acquisitions between 1997 and 2015, mandating computation and payment of solatium and interest by competent authorities. Prospective application would nullify the intended relief and perpetuate unconstitutional discrimination under Article 14. Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 161 : 2025 INSC 146
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Compensation vs. Job in Lieu of Acquired Land - Held, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on land being acquired, the family is entitled only to the compensation which has already been paid - There is no provision under the Act for the grant of a job in lieu of the acquired land - A policy decision for giving a job in lieu of acquired land cannot prevail over the statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court found no error or illegality in the authorities and the High Court dismissing the claim for a job, which was filed more than 18 years after the framing of the policy - Petition dismissed. [Para 3] Sanjeev Kumar v State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1079
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Highest bona fide sale exemplar must be considered when determining land acquisition compensation to ensure a fair market value for the acquired land. While determining the compensation, crucial factors such as the close proximity of the acquired land to the developed zone and non-agricultural utility should also be kept into consideration. (Relied: Mehrawal Khewaji Trust v. State of Punjab, (2012) 5 SCC 432, Para 19 & 31) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1961 – Compensation - Determination of market value - Use of sale exemplars - Reference Court disregarded the highest value sale deed without providing reasons - High Court affirmed this decision with contradictory findings – Held, when there are several exemplars with reference to similar lands, the highest of the exemplars, if it is a bone fide transaction, should be considered when determining compensation for compulsorily acquired land - Averaging of sale prices is only permissible when prices is only permissible when prices have a narrow bandwidth or have a “marginal bandwidth” or a “marginal variation” and not when the values are “markedly different” - The reference Court's approach of overlooking the highest exemplar and averaging the remaining was impermissible - Supreme Court enhanced the compensation by applying a 20% deduction to the highest sale exemplar's value, considering the larger area of acquired land compared to the exemplar plot and granted appellant's all benefit of solatium and interest on enhanced compensation - Set aside order of High Court citing as erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Paras 22, 31, 33, 46-48] Manohar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 746 : 2025 INSC 900
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Principle of de-escalation - the Supreme Court allowed the landowner's plea seeking enhancement of compensation fixed by the High Court and enhanced the compensation from ₹55.71 lakh to ₹1.18 crore per acre for lands acquired in Dharuhera village (Haryana) in 2008 under the Act, 1894 by applying the principle of de-escalation. The Court set aside the High Court's decision to selectively rely on lower-value exemplars while ignoring comparable higher-value transactions. The High Court committed an error by ignoring evidence of proximity and potential for non-agricultural use since the acquired land was in a controlled urban area surrounded by various Multinational Companies and had a big residential colony opposite to it with multiple schools and townships within 1KM range. (Relied: BESCO Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2023), (Para 34 - 38) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Section 5-A, Section 6, Section 11 - Singur Land Acquisition - Restoration of Acquired Land – Held, the remedial framework in Kedar Nath Yadav (supra) was anchored in the recognition that the acquisition disproportionately affected vulnerable communities ("poor agricultural workers") lacking financial resources and institutional access to challenge governmental action - Relief conceived to prevent impoverishment among the disadvantaged farmers cannot be extended to commercial enterprises with financial capacity and institutional sophistication, as this would defeat the remedy's foundational intent - The entity is precluded by its conduct and the principle of estoppel from claiming restoration after a delay of an entire decade - Held that land acquisition can/t be challenged after accepting compensation. [Relied on Kedar Nath Yadav v. State of West Bengal, AIR 2016 SC 4156] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222
Land Acquisition - Determination of Market Value - The determination of the prevalent market value of the acquired land is not an algebraic formula and that cannot be determined in a precise or an accurate manner. Some amount of guess work is always permissible. Therefore, a judge has to sit in an arm chair and without much taxing his mind has to determine the market value in a prudent manner. (Para 13) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Enhancement of Compensation - Supreme Court enhanced compensation for acquired agricultural land from Rs. 30 per sq. mt. to Rs. 95 per sq. mt., based on GIDC's allotment of nearby commercial plot at Rs. 180 per sq. mt. in 1988 - Adjusted for 5% price rise over one year to Rs. 190 per sq. mt., followed by 50% deduction (40% for development costs, 10% for larger area). (Para 14) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Income from Fruit-Bearing Trees – Compensation for trees requires documentary proof of income, not mere presence. (Para 15) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition – Large areas do not attract the same price as is offered for the small plots of lands. Therefore, some amount of deduction is also normally permissible on account of largeness in area. Thus, deduction of at least 10% has to be applied to determine the rate of compensation. (Para 12) Manilal Shamalbhai Patel v. Officer On Special Duty, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 354 : 2025 INSC 393
Land Acquisition - Natural Justice - Whether the High Court's reliance on the respondent's affidavit without granting the petitioner an opportunity to respond violates principles of natural justice. Held: The Supreme Court quashed the acquisition proceedings initiated by the development authority, holding that the High Court's Division Bench violated principles of natural justice by relying solely on the authority's affidavit and closing the matter on the same day without allowing the appellant to respond. The Court set aside the Division Bench's order, remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh consideration, and permitted the High Court to conduct a spot inspection if necessary. (Para 14, 15) D.M. Jagadish v. Bangalore Development Authority, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 172 : 2025 INSC 157 : (2025) 4 SCC 347
Land Acquisition - Principles of Escalation and De-Escalation - The principle of escalation signifies adjusting the base value of land upwards to account for appreciation in market value over time. The principle is used when the reference sale deed or award is from an earlier period than the acquisition date. Whereas, the principle of de-escalation signifies adjusting the base value downward to account for time gaps when the reference point is from a later period, but the land was acquired earlier. (Para 25 - 28) Ram Kishan v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 388 : 2025 INSC 441
Land Acquisition – Rehabilitation - Right to livelihood - Whether Respondents are entitled to rehabilitation or alternative plots in addition to monetary compensation as per Scheme of 1992 or revised scheme of 2016 – Held, it is not necessary that in all cases over and above compensation in terms of money, rehabilitation of the property owners is a must - Any beneficial measures taken by the government should be guided only by humanitarian considerations of fairness and equity towards the landowners - Rehabilitation should only be meant for those persons who have been rendered destitute because of loss of residence or livelihood as a consequence of land acquisition - In cases of land acquisition the plea of deprivation of right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution is unsustainable - Respondents are not entitled to claim as a matter of legal right that they should be allotted plots as oustees only at the price as determined in Policy. [Relied on Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, Para 78, 84] Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Nirmala Devi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 700 : 2025 INSC 843
Land Allotment - Public Trust Doctrine - This issue ought to be examined through the prism of administrative law principles vis-à-vis the contractual powers of the State. While it is well-settled that land allotment authorities such as UPSIDC possess the inherent right to cancel allotments upon violation of stipulated conditions, this Court has consistently emphasized that judicial intervention in matters concerning land revocation should be circumscribed to ensure adherence to procedural safeguards. This paradigm underscores the administrative autonomy vested in such authorities while safeguarding allottees' rights through procedural fairness. We, therefore, consider it necessary to examine whether UPSIDC's procedure for industrial land allotment meets standards of administrative propriety, particularly in light of the Public Trust Doctrine (Doctrine) mandating that public resources be managed with due diligence, fairness, and in conformity with public interest. Considering the broader implications for the transparent allocation of public resources and the need to strengthen administrative accountability in industrial land distribution, we deem it appropriate to issue the following direction: The State Government of Uttar Pradesh and UPSIDC are directed to ensure that any such allotment in the future be made in a transparent, non-discriminatory and fair manner by ensuring that such allotment process fetches maximum revenue and also achieves the larger public interest like industrial development priorities, environmental sustainability, and regional economic objectives (Para 20, 29, 38) Kamla Nehru Memorial Trust v. U.P. State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 652 : 2025 INSC 791 : AIR 2025 SC (Civil) 2248
Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, 1982 (Andhra Pradesh) – "Land Grabbing" - Definition of – Unauthorized Possession – Peaceful Occupation - mens rea - Whether peaceful, non-violent unauthorized possession of land constitutes "land grabbing" under the Andhra Pradesh Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act. Held, violence or criminality is not a prerequisite for an act to qualify as "land grabbing" under the Act. Peaceful, unauthorized occupation of land without legal right falls within the ambit of "land grabbing" as per the Act. Mens rea required is the intention to illegally possess land through unlawful or arbitrary means, including for unauthorized use, construction, or creation of third-party rights. The appellant, who occupied land (Survey No. 9) without legal title despite believing he purchased an adjacent plot (Survey No. 10), was declared a "land grabber" under the Act. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision. [Para 7] V.S.R. Mohan Rao v. K.S.R. Murthy, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 619 : 2025 INSC 708
Land Revenue Act, 1956 (Rajasthan) – Section 16 – Circular dated 20.08.2009 – Creation of Revenue Villages – The Supreme Court set aside a Rajasthan High Court Division Bench judgment that had allowed the naming of new revenue villages after individuals - held that Clause 4 of the State's own Circular dated 20.08.2009 explicitly mandates that the name of a Revenue Village shall not be based on any person, religion, caste, or sub-caste to maintain communal harmony. Bhika Ram v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1247 : 2025 INSC 1482
Land Revenue Code, 1959 (M.P.) – Sections 109 and 110 – Mutation based on Will – Held: There is no proscription in the 1959 Code against the acquisition of rights in land through a Will - Revenue authorities cannot reject a mutation application at the threshold simply because it is based on a Will - While a Tehsildar cannot adjudicate complex disputes regarding the authenticity or validity of a Will (which must be decided by a Civil Court), mutation should not be denied where no serious dispute is raised by the natural legal heirs of the deceased - Mutation entries are for fiscal purposes and do not confer title. Tarachandra v. Bhawarlal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1246 : 2025 INSC 1485
Lease and Allotment - Difference Between - Explained - Lease is a temporary grant whereas allotment though is a temporary right of use and occupation of evacuee but does not include a grant by way of a lease. Dalip Ram v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 13
Orders in personam vs. in rem - Held that orders quashing acquisition on grounds personal to individual objectors (like vitiated consideration of specific Section 5-A objections) operate in personam and benefit only those who contested the matter - Benefits of quashing do not accrue to non-parties unless the entire acquisition is struck down on fundamental grounds applicable to all - Filing objections under Section 5-A, which are subsequently rejected, does not exhaust the remedies; failure to pursue judicial challenge renders the notification conclusive proof of waiver. [Paras 19, 20] State of West Bengal v. Santi Ceramics Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1000 : 2025 INSC 1222
Resumption of land for public purpose (DIET building) without due process or compensation violated Article 300A – “No compensation” clauses in assignments unconstitutional per Mekala Pandu, 2004 SCC OnLine AP 217 – Appellants entitled to market value compensation. (Para 121 - 125) Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344 : 2025 INSC 383
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 11 - Under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, the market value of acquired land must be determined based on the date of the Section 11 notification, as mandated by the proviso to Section 26(1). Overturning the High Court's decision to fix the valuation date as January 1, 2014 (the Act's enforcement date), the Court emphasized that the legislative intent is to ensure fair compensation reflecting the current market value at the time of acquisition. The use of "shall" in the proviso makes the Section 11 notification date mandatory for valuation, and courts lack discretion to select an alternative date. (Paras 9 - 11) Sumitraben Singabhai Gamit v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 448 : 2025 INSC 521
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; Section 26 - Determination of Market Value - Theory of Deduction - Circle Rates - Held, theory of deduction applied under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to adjust market value for development costs, is not mandatory under the Acquisition Act, 2013. Section 26(1) mandates compensation based on the highest of: (a) market value under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899; (b) average sale price of similar land; or (c) consented amount. Explanation 4 allows the Collector discretion to adjust this value if it does not reflect actual market value, potentially applying deduction, but requires recorded reasons. Absent such adjustment, circle rates fixed under the Stamp Act govern. Public authorities must adhere to State-fixed circle rates, which citizens pay as stamp duty. Appeals dismissed emphasizing scientific fixation of circle rates for equitable compensation and governance. (Para 37 - 43) Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation v. Vincent Daniel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 364 : 2025 INSC 408 : (2025) 7 SCC 798
Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Sections 26, 28 – Land Acquisition – Determination of Market Value – Rental Compensation/Mesne Profits for Illegal Occupation – Held, the Reference Court's enhancement of compensation under Section 26 of the 2013 Act was justified as it correctly adopted the "average sale price" method by considering one-half of the highest-priced sale instances, along with a 10% annual increase for the time gap, as mandated by Section 26(1)(b) read with Explanations 1 and 2 - The Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) erred in relying solely on the ready reckoner rates while ignoring genuine and undisputed sale instances of similar land in the vicinity - High Court was wrong to interfere with the Reference Court's finding on market value - Noted that the 'rental compensation' in land acquisition proceedings is granted only when the owner is completely deprived of its property's use - that rental compensation requires complete deprivation of property; denies Rs. 238 Crore claim against respondent - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R.L. Jain v. DDA 2004 4 SCC 79; Shankarrao Bhagwantrao Patil and Others v. State of Maharashtra (2022) 15 SCC 657; Paras 24-35] Pradyumna Mukund Kokil v. Nashik Municipal Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1007 : 2025 INSC 1236
Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance, and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra) Once a slum area is declared as 'censused slum' i.e., the slums located on land belonging to government or municipal undertaking, then such slums are automatically eligible for redevelopment under the Slum Act without the need for a separate notification. (Para 16) Mansoor Ali Farida Irshad Ali v. Tahsildar-I, Special Cell, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 308 : 2025 INSC 276
Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra); Section 14 - Land Acquisition - Preferential Right of Owner - Primacy of owner's right over SRA's power - Validity of acquisition of land in a Slum Rehabilitation Area (SR Area) when the landowner is willing to redevelop it – Held, owner of a plot of land within a SR Area has a preferential right to redevelop the land - Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA) can only undertake development if the landholders or occupants do not come forward with a proposal within reasonable time - Publication of the Section 3C(1) Declaration in Official Gazette is not sufficient to fulfil the requirement of inviting a landowner to redevelop the land - Without special notice-cum-invitation from SRA to the landowner, the owner may be unable to prepare an SR Scheme due to the inaccessibility of technical information and surveys - A specific notice-cum-invitation to the owner is a necessary procedural requirement to ensure the owner's preferential right is not frustrated - State Government's power to acquire land under Section 14 is subject to the landowner's preferential right to redevelop - Acquisition process must be held in abeyance until the owner's preferential right is extinguished - Acquisition cannot proceed as long as the owner is willing to undertake development - There appears no cogent reason as to why, instead of enacting a self-contained code within Section I-A, the drafters of this legislation chose to incorporate an entirely distinct slum rehabilitation mechanism by amending the existing legislation through Section 3D - Court granted landowner a period of 120 days to submit a fresh SR Scheme for redevelopment - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Paras 45- 48, 50-53, 64- 65, 68, 74, 84] Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 832 : 2025 INSC 1015
Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance And Redevelopment) Act, 1971 (Maharashtra) - Section 14 - Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRA) - Acquisition of Land - Preferential Right of Owner - Recreational Ground (RG) – Held, the power of the State Government to acquire land under Section 14 read with Section 3D(c)(i) of the Slum Act for the purpose of a Slum Rehabilitation Scheme is subject to the preferential right, if any, of the owner to redevelop the Slum Rehabilitation Area - Supreme Court declined to grant the appellant's prayer for a writ of mandamus directing the State Government to acquire the subject property under Section 14 of the Slum Act, holding that the owner's preferential right had not been extinguished - The subject property, which is reserved for Recreational Ground (RG), cannot be constructed upon - The subsequent developer (Respondent No. 4) is directed not to put up any type of construction on the subject property, and the same shall be utilized only as a Recreational Ground (RG) - The appellant (Jyoti Builders) was held to have been fully compensated by the grant of adequate area/FSI for sale, and is entitled to the Occupation Certificate for the Final Sale Building upon handing over its own plot reserved for RG - It is well settled that the power of the State Government to acquire land under Section 14 read with Section 3D(c)(i) of the Slum Act is subject to preferential right, if any, of the owner. [Relied on Tarabai Nagar Co-Op. Hog. Society (Proposed) v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw SC 832; Paras 63, 71-77] Jyoti Builders v. Chief Executive Officer, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1158 : 2025 INSC 1372
Wetlands (Conservation and Management) Rules, 2017 – Rule 2(1)(g) - Definition, Applicability and Public Trust Doctrine – Held, the Futala Tank, Nagpur, being a man-made lake constructed in 1799 for irrigation and drinking water purposes, does not fall within the statutory definition of 'wetland' under Rule 2(1)(g) 2017 Rules, as the definition expressly excludes human-made waterbodies specifically constructed for recreation, aquaculture, salt production, and irrigation purposes - affirmed the High Court's observation that although Futala Lake is not a statutory wetland, the restrictions under Rule 4(2)(vi) concerning prohibition on permanent construction may still apply in spirit to preserve the ecological integrity of such waterbodies, consistent with the Office Memorandum dated 08.03.2022 of the MoEFCC - It reiterated the Public Trust Doctrine, affirming that the State is a trustee of natural and environmental resources, which are meant for public use and cannot be converted for private or commercial purposes - This doctrine extends not only to natural but also man-made environmental assets that promote ecological balance and sustainable development - Recreational and beautification projects such as the Viewer's Gallery, Musical Fountain, and Artificial Banyan Tree were found to be within permitted construction norms and adequately sanctioned by competent authorities, without any proven ecological detriment - The Banyan Tree structure was held temporary and removable, not amounting to a permanent construction- upholding the High Court's balanced directives for maintaining Futala Lake in an ecologically sustainable manner while allowing limited public utility and recreational use - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M.K. Balakrishnan v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 230 of 2001; M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath, (1997) 1 SCC 388; Paras 5-11] Swacch Association v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 978 : 2025 INSC 1199
Whether the complaint under Section 4 read with Section 19 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) discloses any prima facie offence against the appellants. Whether the directors and officers of a company can be held vicariously liable in the absence of specific allegations. Held, vicarious liability does not automatically attach to directors or officers of a company unless there are specific allegations of personal involvement in the alleged offence. In the present case, there were no direct accusations against the appellants regarding their role in the alleged illegal uprooting of trees using JCBs. The complainant failed to array the company as an accused despite it being the entity responsible for obtaining necessary permissions for land development. The Court reaffirmed that mere designation as a director or officer does not suffice to establish liability unless there is material evidence of direct involvement in the offence. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and quashed the complaint against the appellants, reiterating that liability for environmental violations under the PLPA, 1900, cannot be imputed without clear allegations of direct participation in the offence. Sanjay Dutt v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 32
Whether the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, could interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the lower authorities regarding the classification of disputed land as "Johad (Pond)" in revenue records. Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge which prohibited the respondent from interfering with the villagers' use of the disputed land as a water reservoir. The appellant contended that the land was a water reservoir used by villagers, while the respondent claimed ownership based on a 1981-82 patta, asserting the land was "Oosar" (barren). The Additional District Magistrate and Additional Commissioner found the patta to be fictitious and upheld the land's classification as a pond. The High Court, however, reversed these findings, holding that the land was mistakenly recorded as a pond and should be treated as "Oosar." Held, the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 by reappreciating evidence and overturning the concurrent factual findings of the lower authorities, which had determined the land was a pond. The High Court erred in disregarding the permanent injunction granted by the Civil Judge, which was based on independent consideration and not solely reliant on the Collector's order. The findings of the lower authorities, declaring the land as "Johad (Pond)," were restored, and the High Court's interference was deemed unjustified in the absence of perversity or illegality in the lower authorities' decisions. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court, in writ jurisdiction, cannot re-examine factual findings unless there is a clear perversity or jurisdictional error. The concurrent findings of the lower authorities were reinstated, and the land was declared to be a pond, upholding the villagers' rights to its use as a water reservoir. Ajay Singh v. Khacheru, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 29 : 2025 INSC 9 : AIR 2025 SC 1083 : (2025) 3 SCC 266
Whether the State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth from private lands leased by brick kiln owners, even if the ownership of the land is not vested in the State. Whether the declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral under the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, empowers the State to levy royalty irrespective of land ownership. The respondents, brick kiln owners, leased private lands and excavated brick earth for brick manufacturing. They challenged the State's imposition of royalty, contending that brick earth did not vest in the State under the Wajib-ul-arz (village land records) and that no provision in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887, or the Punjab Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1964, authorized such levies. The Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissed the suits, holding that brick earth, declared a minor mineral, vested in the State under Section 42 of the Land Revenue Act. The High Court, however, ruled in favor of the respondents, holding that mere declaration of brick earth as a minor mineral did not confer ownership or royalty rights on the State. Held, the State's right to levy royalty on brick earth is independent of land ownership. Once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act, the State is empowered to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The ownership of the land is irrelevant for royalty purposes, as the Mineral Rules require a certificate of approval (Form “B”) for mining operations, and royalty is payable on the production and disposal of minor minerals. The High Court erred in focusing on land ownership rather than the State's statutory right to levy royalty under the Mineral Rules. The appeals were allowed, and the Trial Court's dismissal of the suits was restored. The Court clarified that it made no adjudication on the ownership of the lands in question. The State Government is entitled to levy royalty on the excavation of brick earth, irrespective of land ownership, once brick earth is declared a minor mineral under the 1957 Act. The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the Trial Court's decision was reinstated. State of Punjab v. Om Prakash Brick Kiln Owner, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 93