Supreme Court Criminal Digest: October 2025

Advocate - Procedure for Summoning an Advocate (in exceptional cases) - Status of in-house counsel - Supreme Court laid down procedure for summoning advocates in exceptional cases - i. An Investigating Officer (I.O.) can only summon an Advocate if the I.O. has knowledge of an issue that falls under the exceptions to Section 132 of the BSA (e.g., communication made in furtherance of an illegal purpose)- In such a case, the summons must specifically mention the exception under which the Advocate is being summoned; ii. Any summons issued against an Advocate by an I.O. must be with the prior approval and satisfaction of the hierarchical Superior, not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police (SP), and a reasoned order must be recorded; iii. In-house counsel are not entitled to the professional privilege under Section 132 of the BSA since they are not Advocates practicing in Courts as spoken of in the BSA- they would be entitled to the protection under Section 134 insofar as any communication made to the legal advisor of their employer- The protection under Section 134 cannot be claimed for the communications between the employer and the In-house counsel themselves. [Relied on Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, (2005) 6 SCC 1; Paras 48-50, 59-67] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Advocate - Treatment of Advocate's Digital Devices and Confidentiality- Supreme Court held that - i. While examining any digital device of an Advocate, care shall be taken by the Court not to impair the confidentiality with respect to the other clients of the Advocate; ii. The discovery shall be strictly confined to the information sought by the Investigating Officer, provided it is found to be permissible and admissible. [Paras 54 - 58] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

Army Act, 1950 - Sections 63, 69, 70, 162 - Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 - Section 15(6) - Arms Act, 1959 - Sections 3, 25(1-B) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 222 - Substitution of Conviction - Act Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline - Possession of Ammunition - Scope of AFT's Power to Substitute Finding – Held, Section 15(6)(a) of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, vests the Tribunal with the power to substitute a finding of guilty for any other offence for which the offender could have been lawfully found guilty by the court martial and pass a sentence afresh - This power is in pari materia with Section 162 of the 1950 Act and akin to Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, which permits conviction for a lesser or cognate offence on the same set of facts - Noted that the legislative intent is that the appellate forum is not denuded of power to render a lawful finding where the evidence sustains a different, though related, offence - The twin conditions for exercising this power are fulfilled: (i) the accused could have been lawfully found guilty of the substituted offence by the original court-martial based on the evidence presented; and (ii) the Tribunal may pass a new sentence - The concurrent findings of fact regarding the recovery of ammunition from the appellant's possession were not assailed as perverse - Since the recovery of old, aged ammunition was established, this factual foundation clearly disclosed an act or omission prejudicial to good order and military discipline under Section 63 of the 1950 Act, reflecting the appellant's failure to follow mandatory procedure for disposal and accounting of old ammunition - The appellant could lawfully have been convicted under Section 63 of the 1950 Act based on the proved facts - The scope of interference by the Supreme Court in an appeal under Section 30 of the 2007 Act is limited - It would interfere only if the order is shown to be arbitrary, unreasonable, or capricious - This exercise of discretion was found to be just and proportionate, balancing disciplinary needs with fairness, and thus did not call for any interference - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Union of India & Ors. v. R. Karthik, (2020) 2 SCC 782; Paras 17-27] S.K. Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 994 : 2025 INSC 1215

Arrest - Grounds of Arrest v. Reasons for Arrest – Held that there is a significant difference between the phrase "reasons for arrest" and "grounds of arrest" - Reasons for arrest are purely formal parameters and are general in nature (e.g., to prevent further offense, proper investigation, prevent tampering with evidence) - Grounds of arrest must be personal to the accused and required to contain all basic facts in the hand of the investigating officer which necessitated the arrest, to provide the accused an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Bharatiya Nagarika Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 528 - Inherent Power of High Court - Review/Recall of Own Order - Held that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 528 BNSS [Section 482 CrPC] cannot be invoked to review or recall its own judgment or order on merits, as the power of review is specifically barred under Section 403 BNSS [Section 362 CrPC], except for the purpose of correcting clerical or arithmetical errors - The inherent power cannot be exercised for doing that which is specifically prohibited by the Code - Held that High Court grievously erred in recalling/reviewing its reasoned order dated January 16, 2025, on the ground of an "inadvertent clerical mistake" when the subsequent application was, in effect, a prayer for review of the earlier order by acceding to the initial prayer for transfer of investigation, which the earlier order had consciously declined - The Supreme Court quashed the High Court's orders dated January 24, 2025 (recalling the earlier order) and February 4, 2025 (transferring investigation to CBI), as they were based on an erroneous premise of a clerical mistake and amounted to an impermissible review of a reasoned order passed under the inherent jurisdiction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and Another (1990) 2 SCC 437; Para 18, 20, 26-31] State of Rajasthan v. Parmeshwar Ramlal Joshi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 984 : 2025 INSC 1205

Bhartiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA); Section 132 – Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS); Section 179 – Constitution of India; Articles 14, 21 – Advocate-Client Privilege - Advocate-Client Privilege – Summoning of Advocates by Investigating Agencies – Held, Investigating Agency/Prosecuting Agency/Police cannot directly summon a lawyer who is appearing in a case to elicit details of the case, as this would violate the statutory privilege conferred by Section 132 of the BSA and infringe upon the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution (Articles 14 and 21) - The privilege is a fundamental feature of a fair and free legal system, which requires an atmosphere of uninhibited communication between a client and their legal representative. [Paras 24-28] In Re : Summoning Advocates, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051 : 2025 INSC 1275

CBI Investigation - Extraordinary Powers of Constitutional Courts - Reiterated that the extraordinary power under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI investigation must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations - Such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police - Held that it must be necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing fundamental rights. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 12-41] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Circumstantial Evidence - Last Seen Theory - Absence of Test Identification Parade (TIP) - Value of Scientific Evidence – Principles - The Supreme Court reiterated the 'five golden principles' for sustaining a conviction on circumstantial evidence - the circumstances must be fully established, consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt, of a conclusive nature, must exclude every possible hypothesis except that of guilt, and must form a complete chain of evidence leaving no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with innocence - Held dock identification without Test Identification parade unreliable when witness had no familiarity with accused - noted that It is well settled that dock identification without a prior TIP has little evidentiary value where the witness had no prior familiarity with the accused - Both witnesses identified the Appellants for the first time in court, which, in the absence of a TIP, renders their dock identification less credible - Their testimonies, therefore, cannot constitute reliable evidence of identification - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra 1984 4 SCC 116; P. Saikumar v. State; Paras 27-28] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Bhartiya Nayaya Sanhita, 2023 - Karur Stampede Incident - Transfer of Investigation to CBI - Formation of Supervisory Committee - Supreme Court takes cognizance of the Karur stampede incident that resulted in the death of 41 persons and injuries to over 100 people during a political rally organized by Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam (TVK) - Noted that top police officials publicly defended the actions of subordinate officers, creating doubt about the investigation's impartiality in the minds of the general public - Observed a contradiction between the Madras High Court, Madurai Bench, which denied CBI investigation holding local police investigation was not flawed, and a Single Judge of the Main Seat, who suo moto directed the formation of a Special Investigation Team (SIT) - Held that Due to the political undertone, the gravity of the incident with wide ramifications, the need to restore public faith in the criminal justice system, and to ensure an impartial and fair investigation - Court directed the transfer of investigation to the CBI - The direction for the appointment of the SIT and the one-man enquiry commission set up by the Chief Minister were suspended - A three-member Supervisory Committee, headed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Rastogi (Retd.), was constituted to monitor the CBI investigation. [Relied on State of W.B. V. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights 2010 3 SCC 517; Paras 33-35] Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam v. P.H. Dinesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 999 : 2025 INSC 1224

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 378 - Appeal against acquittal - When an order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court can be interfered with by the Appellate Court – Held, the order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court was not open to interference by the First Appellate Court until and unless the findings recorded by the Trial Court were per se perverse or erroneous - It is safer and more appropriate to rely upon the findings of the Trial Court which has seen the demeanour of the witnesses rather than to rely upon the findings of the First Appellate Court - The High Court erred in reversing the finding of the Trial Court without coming to the conclusion that the findings of the Trial Court were perverse. [Para 35] Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2025 INSC 1193

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Criminal Complaint - Caste Certificate – Held, the High Court committed a grave error by conducting a 'mini-trial' at the stage of considering a petition for quashing a criminal complaint under Section 482 C.r.P.C. - The question of whether the offences under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC (Forgery related offences) or Section 420 IPC (Cheating) are made out will depend on the evidence adduced at the trial - At the stage of quashing, it cannot be said that the prosecution should be nipped in the bud - High Court's findings about "legal illiteracy" were conjectural and patently erroneous - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Kumari Madhuri Patil and Another vs Addl. Commissioner, Tribal Development and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 241; Paras 13, 23, 26, 27, 28] Komal Prasad Shakya v. Rajendra Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1004

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) – Section 482 – Constitution of India – Article 226 & 32 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Second FIR - Held that the Court has a self-imposed discipline to ordinarily direct petitioners to the High Court, Article 32, being a fundamental right, cannot be rendered nugatory. The Supreme Court can entertain a petition under Article 32 to quash an FIR in glaring cases of deprivation of liberty - The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is not restricted to the stage of the FIR; the High Court/Supreme Court can exercise jurisdiction even when a charge-sheet has been filed, to prevent abuse of process or miscarriage of justice - A second FIR in respect of the same cognizable offence or an occurrence that constitutes a single, composite transaction is not maintainable. Subsequent complaints that are merely counter-versions, modifications, or supplemental in nature to the first one must be treated as a part of the first FIR and investigated accordingly. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) 335; Para 84, 95, 100-105, 145] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 313 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Section 302 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 8 (Conduct) and Section 27 (Discovery) - Circumstantial Evidence - Five Golden Principles - i. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be fully established ("must" or "should" be proved, not "may be" proved); ii. The established facts should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, excluding every other hypothesis; iii. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; iv. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; v. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused - Supreme Court observed that the prosecution had failed to establish a cogent link in the cabin of circumstances and did not satisfy the principles laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sardas case - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 25, 39, 56-58] Nilesh Baburao Gitte v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 985 : 2025 INSC 1191

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 389 - Suspension of Sentence and Bail - Supreme Court expressed dismay at an order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court which suspended the sentences of two murder convicts on the condition to plant 10 saplings each as a matter of social cause - Held that Order did not disclose any reason whatsoever as to the basis on which the bail had been granted - Noted that the High Court imposed a condition that the accused persons, convicted under Section 302 IPC, must "carry out plantation of saplings on the premise that it would serve social cause" - The Supreme Court expressed dismay and surprise, noting that the High Court seemed "to have got swayed to grant the prayer for suspension of sentence and grant of bail on the basis they (accused persons) would purge in their misdeeds" - Held that granting bail based on this condition, without considering the merits of the suspension of sentence, could not stand the test of law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 5, 6] Surajpal Singh Jadon v. Prashant Sikarwar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1049

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Quashing of FIR - Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 - Supreme Court Quashes FIR For Possession of Reindeer Horn - Notes reindeer not a protected species - Invokes Article 142 - The Supreme Court noted it was not in dispute that the reindeer is not a species covered under the category of a protected or prohibited animal as per the schedule of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 – Held, recovered article did not violate any statute and the petitioner's 14 day incarceration, Supreme Court found that allowing further prosecution would amount to gross abuse of the process of the Court - There is an imminent need to require jurisdictional agencies at international airports to sensitize their officers in the prevailing laws before taking drastic steps like detention and arrest of international travellers - Such steps should not be taken in haste and must be preceded by appropriate legal opinion and pragmatic approach - Supreme Court referred the current case and a recent incident at Jaipur International Airport involving the arbitrary seizure of a lawfully owned Rolex watch - Such ill-advised actions tend to bring disrepute to the country and breach human rights guarantees. [Paras 15-19] Rocky Abraham v Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1020

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482 – Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 - Section 3 - Quashing – Held, the appellants had already availed of the statutory appellate remedy before the Appellate Tribunal under Section 26 of PMLA, which remains pending - The PMLA provides a complete and self-contained adjudicatory framework under Sections 5, 8, and 26 - Judicial interference at this stage would prejudge issues within the Tribunal's domain - The ECIR did not name JSW-appellant as accused, and the CBI charge sheet also dropped it from prosecution, indicating absence of a live predicate offence - However, the ED's action was confined to recovery of INR 33.80 crore allegedly arising from the attached bank accounts - When an efficacious statutory remedy under PMLA is being pursued before the Appellate Tribunal, the Supreme Court ordinarily refrains from exercising extraordinary jurisdiction to interfere with ongoing proceedings - Alleged possession or use of attached property constitutes a matter for adjudication under PMLA's internal mechanism, not for pre-emptive quashing - The Court declined to quash proceedings, observing that the dispute regarding the characterization of attached funds as “proceeds of crime” must first be adjudicated by the Appellate Tribunal - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Paras 21, 24, 33-40] JSW Steel Limited v. Deputy Director, Directorate of Enforcement, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 977 : 2025 INSC 1194

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Special Leave Petition (Criminal) - Delay - Legal Aid - National Legal Services Authority (NALSA) Scheme - Misuse of Process - Supreme Court noted that SLP was filed with a delay of 2298 days by a convict and held that the petition was filed merely under a legal aid programme without the convict's consent, and that such a practice amounts to misuse of process - Held that since the petitioner never expressed any desire to file the Special Leave Petition, its filing only in view of the NALSA programme is a misuse of the process - Noted that that the delay in filing the same does not stand explained at all - Petition dismissed. [Paras 4, 5] Kamaljit Kaur v State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1035

Constitution of India - Article 22(1) - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 50A – Held that requirement of communicating the grounds of arrest in writing is not merely a formality but is essential for actualising the fundamental right to liberty and life as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution - The purpose of communicating the grounds of arrest to the detenue and their relatives is to enable them to take prompt actions to secure the release of the arrested person, which includes engaging lawyers and seeking bail at the earliest. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India & Ors. (2024) 7 SCC 576]; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254] Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Constitution of India - Article 226 – CBI investigation - Power of the High Court to direct a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry - Judicial restraint in ordering CBI investigation - Held, the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct a CBI inquiry must be exercised sparingly, cautiously, and in exceptional situations - It should not be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party levels allegations against the local police - There must be sufficient material to come to a prima facie conclusion that there is a need for such an inquiry, and a commission of a criminal offence is prima facie disclosed - The direction is justified only when the integrity of the process is compromised to a degree that shakes the conscience of the Courts or public faith, often involving high-ranking officials or systemic failure - In matters relating to recruitment, it would not be appropriate to direct CBI investigation in the routine course unless the facts are so abnormal that they shake the conscience of the Court - The High Court's direction for a CBI inquiry was based on mere 'doubt,' 'assumption,' and 'inexplicable details' concerning the external agency's master data, which did not satisfy the prima facie threshold required for such an investigation - Supreme Court set aside order of High Court and directed a CBI enquiry into alleged irregularities in the recruitment process for the U.P. Legislative council and Assembly Secretaries - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of W.B. v. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights; Paras 11, 14- 23] Legislative Council U.P. Lucknow v. Sushil Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1012 : 2025 INSC 1241

Criminal Appeal — Sections 302, 307, 148, 149 of IPC — Liability of members of unlawful assembly under Section 149 IPC — Common object — Proof by eyewitnesses — Role of injured witnesses — Appreciation of evidence — Distinction between innocent bystander and member of unlawful assembly — Principle of constructive liability —Standard for conviction — Supreme Court examined the principles related to the common object of an unlawful assembly and the scope of constructive liability under Section 149 IPC- Held that- i. Section 149 IPC makes every member of an unlawful assembly guilty of an offence committed by any member thereof in furtherance of the common object of the assembly if such offence was likely to be committed. The assembly must have five or more persons, and the common object must be proved from conduct and circumstances; (ii) Mere presence at the scene does not render a person a member of such assembly. The prosecution must show that the accused shared the common object. The test for distinguishing an innocent bystander from a member focuses on time, place, conduct, collective behaviour, motive, and manner of occurrence; (iii) Eyewitnesses' oral testimony, particularly of injured witnesses who suffer from injuries inflicted by the accused, holds great evidentiary value and deserves careful appreciation, unless compelling reasons exist to discard it; (iv) Evidence involving large assemblies requires careful scrutiny; the Court should separate the guilty from innocent spectators by relying on consistent identification from at least two witnesses and material evidence to avoid wrongful conviction; (v) Delay in forwarding the FIR or registration does not per se vitiate it if there is no material contradiction affecting the case; (vi) Convictions under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC were sustained against those positively identified as having shared the common object and who committed overt acts in furtherance thereof; others acquitted on benefit of doubt as passive onlookers. [Relied on: Musa Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 1 SCC 733; Ranvir Singh Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 14 SCC 41; Paras 34-37, 45, 46, 48, 49, 53, 54, 57-66, 44, 73-75] Zainul v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 979 : 2025 INSC 1192

Criminal Law – Bail - Juvenile Justice - Sexual Offences - Sex Education - Supreme Court reiterated its direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh to file an additional affidavit informing the Court on how sex education is provided as a part of the curriculum in higher secondary schools (Classes IX to XII) so that young adolescents are made aware of the hormonal changes that come with puberty and the consequences that may flow therefrom — Pursuant to the direction, an additional affidavit was filed detailing the curriculum provided by the Secondary Education Department, Uttar Pradesh, for classes IX to XII, which was stated to be in keeping with the directives of the National Council of Educational Research & Training (NCERT)— Need for earlier implementation — Supreme Court opined that sex education should be provided to the children from a younger age and not class IX onwards — It is for the authorities concerned to apply their mind and take corrective measures, so that children are informed of the changes that happen after puberty and the care and cautions to be taken in relation thereto — That aspect was left open for the authorities concerned to take necessary steps. [Para 7-10] Juvenile X v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989

Criminal Law - Kidnapping, Rape, POCSO, SC/ST Act - Concurrent Convictions - Evidence - Reliability of Victim's Testimony - Proof of Age - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 154 - Hostile Witness - Judicial Discretion - Supreme Court expressed concern over the indiscriminate granting of permission to declare a witness hostile - Held that before a witness can be declared hostile and cross-examined by the party calling him, there must be some material to show that the witness is not speaking the truth or has exhibited an element of hostility - The contingency of cross-examining one's own witness is an extraordinary phenomenon, and permission should be given only in special cases after the Court scans and weighs the circumstances properly - Small or insignificant omissions cannot be the basis for treating a witness hostile - The permission to cross-examine one's own witness should only be granted when- i. the witness exhibits 'an element of hostility'; ii. The witness has resiled from a “material statement” made earlier; iii. The court is satisfied the witness is “not speaking the truth” - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Sri Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa 1976 4 SCC 233; Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakker v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1964 SC 1563 Paras 10-15, 19] Shivkumar @ Baleshwar Yadav v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1006

Dying Declaration – Multiple dying declarations – Evidentiary value – Corroboration by independent evidence - Supreme Court dismissed the appeal against the High Court's order, affirming the conviction – Held, in a case of multiple dying declarations, each must be considered independently - The first dying declaration given to the independent witness, which stated the appellant poured kerosene and set the deceased ablaze, and disclosed the motive, was found to be duly proved and trustworthy - Minor discrepancies in subsequent statements do not weaken first dying declaration if found reliable and consistent - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Nallam Veera Stayanandam & Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., (2004) 10 SCC 769; Paras 10-14] Jemaben v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1042 : 2025 INSC 1268

Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 25, 26, and 27 - Confession to Police Officer and Discovery of Fact - Admissibility - Held that – i. Section 27 is an exception to the substantive provisions of Sections 25 and 26; ii. Sections 25 and 26 provide that no confession made to a police officer or to any person while in custody of the police, shall be admissible against a person accused of any offence; iii. Section 27 provides an exception, stating that so much of the information received from an accused person in custody of the police, whether in the nature of confession or otherwise, as related distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be admissible; iv. Only the part of the statement which leads the police to the recovery of the weapons is admissible, and not the part which alleges that the weapons recovered were actually the weapons of crime; v. The statement of the appellants that the weapons recovered were the weapons of crime cannot be read against them in view of Sections 25 and 26 read with Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - The recovery of the weapons of crime, allegedly on the pointing out of the appellants, was not sufficient to connect the appellants with the crime as no effort was made to match the blood on said weapons with that of the deceased - No report of the forensic laboratory was produced to establish that the weapons so recovered were smeared with the blood of the deceased to prove that they were actually used in the murder. [Relied Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. vs. The King Emperor 1947 MWN CR 45; Manjunath and Ors. vs. State of Karnataka 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 28, 29, 31, 33] Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttaranchal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 980 : 2025 INSC 1193

Evidence Act, 1872 - Evidence of Eye-witnesses – Reliability – Held, when the genesis and manner of the incident itself are doubtful, conviction cannot be sustained - When the prosecution has suppressed the origin and genesis of the occurrence, the proper course is to grant the accused the benefit of doubt - The conflicting versions given by the eye-witnesses, coupled with the suppression of the genesis of the occurrence and the shifting of the place of the incident, demolish the very substratum of the prosecution case - It is unsafe to uphold a conviction based on testimony full of contradictions and inherent improbabilities - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pankaj v. State of Rajasthan, (2016) 16 SCC 192; Bhagwan Sahai and Another v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2016 SC 2714; Paras 57-60] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Evidence Act, 1872 – Quality vs. Quantity of Evidence – Classification of Witnesses - Supreme Court reiterated the guiding principles for assessing the credibility of witnesses, classifying them into: (1) Wholly reliable; (2) Wholly unreliable; and (3) Neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable - For the third category, corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony is required - Held that the Court is concerned with the quality and not with the quantity of the evidence. [Relied on Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras AIR 1957 SC 614; Para 28] Kannaiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1016 : 2025 INSC 1246

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of Proof - Circumstantial Evidence – Murder - Acquittal Reversal – Held, a conviction for murder can solely rest on circumstantial evidence if the chain of circumstances is complete and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused - When an accused offers a false explanation regarding the cause of death that took place within the confines of his house, such falsity becomes an additional link in the chain of circumstances pointing to the guilt of the accused - While the general burden of proof is on the prosecution, Section 106 applies to exceptional cases where it would be impossible or disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused - Supreme Court reverses acquittal of man for daughter-in-law's murder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681; Shambu Nath Mehra v. State of Ajmer (1956) 1 SCC 337; State of West Bengal v. Mir Mohammad Omar & Others (2000) 8 SCC 382; Paras 12-21] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Janved Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1003 : 2025 INSC 1229

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27 - Disclosure Statement - Circumstantial Evidence, DNA Report - The theory of a confessional/disclosure statement under Section 27 leading to the discovery of incriminating articles and the body was held to be a "creation of the Investigating Officer - This was because the officer had already shared the minute details of the crime and the body's location with the complainant before the appellant's purported confession was recorded - The DNA report was rendered redundant as the prosecution miserably failed to prove the chain of custody of the forensic samples (seized articles and blood samples) from the time of seizure till they reached the FSL, thereby breaching the sanctity of the procedure - Held that prosecution had failed to prove the 'last seen' circumstance, the credibility of the CCTV footage, the validity of confessional statements, and the integrity of forensic/DNA evidence, rendering the chain of circumstantial evidence incomplete. Appeals allowed. [Relied on Prakash Nishad @ Kewat Zinak Nishad v. State of Maharashtra 2023 SCC OnLine SC 666; Para 54, 60, 71, 74, 76] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Evidence Law - Extra-Judicial Confession - Held that an extra-judicial confession is considered a weak piece of evidence and must be accepted with great care and caution - Standard of Proof: The prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt that the confession was genuinely made, voluntary, and its contents were true - The standard is even higher when the entire case rests on the EJC – Corroboration - Held that the court will generally look for independent, reliable corroboration before relying on an EJC, especially if suspicious circumstances surround it - Held that the circumstances, taken together, do not conclusively establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as required for a conviction, even in the case of a heinous crime - Supreme Court held that evidence not clear, there can't be moral conviction - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra: (1984) 4 SCC 116 Para 35; Pritinder Singh alias Lovely v. State of Punjab: (2023) 7 SCC 727; Paras 15, 16, 19, 20, 24, 25] Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Evidence Law - Principles for Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence - Supreme Court reiterated the established principles governing cases of circumstantial evidence, noting that the chain of events must be so established that the Court has no option but to come to one and only one conclusion: the guilt of the accused person. If any doubt creeps in at any stage, the benefit must flow to the accused. The chain of circumstances must be so complete as to lead to only one conclusion, the guilt of the accused, and mere suspicion, however strong, cannot be a substitute for proof. If two views are possible on the evidence, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favorable to the accused must be adopted - Supreme Court pointed out several deficiencies in prosecution's case - i. Non-examination of material witness; ii. Doubtful arrest and recovery; iii. Lack of forensic; iv. Last seen theory weakness - Set aside order of High Court - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Karakkattu Muhammed Basheer v. State of Kerala, (2024) 10 SCC 813; Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 13-18, 20-30] Mohamed Sameer Khan v. State Represented By Inspector Of Police, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1045 : 2025 INSC 1269

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (JJ Act) – Section 7-A - Children's Act, 1960 – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Illegal Detention/Breach of Article 21 - Murder Convict – Claim of Juvenility - Supreme Court ordered release of the murder convict under the JJ Act, after finding he was a juvenile at the time of commission of offence in 1981 – Held, JJ Act is retrospective in operation, and applies to offences pre-dated the enforcement of the JJ Act - The plea of juvenility, which can be raised at any stage, is governed by Section 7-A of the JJ Act, 2000 - This section mandates that courts are under an obligation to consider the plea and grant appropriate relief if the convict was a juvenile on the date of the offence - The maximum period of detention for a juvenile under the JJ Act, 2000, is 3 years as per Section 15(1)(g) - Since the petitioner was a child at the time of the offence and had been behind bars for more than 3 years, his liberty was curtailed "not in accordance with procedure established by law." Breach of the right guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution is "writ large," thereby extending the benefit of release from detention - The Court considered the respondent's contentions regarding the heinous nature of the offence (murder) and the petitioner's act of absconding and evading arrest from 2009 to 2022. However, the Court granted relief, noting that the petitioner had "suffered incarceration for more than the period permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand 2005 3 SCC 551; Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi) 2010 5 SCC 344; Para 4, 5, 12-14] Hansraj v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 993 : 2025 INSC 1211

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Seizure, Storage, Sampling and Disposal) Rules, 2022 – Held, NDPS Act does not divest the Special Courts under the NDPS Act of their jurisdiction to entertain an application for interim custody or release of a seized conveyance under Section 451 & 457 CrPC - The Rules of 2022, being subordinate legislation, are only supplemental to the scheme of disposal contemplated under the NDPS Act and cannot supersede the provisions of the parent legislation - The Rules are notably silent on the rights of persons whose property (like a conveyance) is affected by the disposal process - A conjoint and holistic reading of Sections 60(3) and 63 of the NDPS Act makes it abundantly clear that the power to determine whether a seized conveyance is liable to confiscation vests in the Special Court, not in any administrative or executive authority such as the DDC- i. Section 60(3) provides a defence to the owner to prove that the conveyance was used without their knowledge or connivance and that they had taken all reasonable precautions; ii. Section 63 mandates that no final order of confiscation can be passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the person claiming ownership - Mere fact that a vehicle may be liable to confiscation under Section 60 cannot, by itself, operate to deny interim custody to a bona fide owner in the absence of an express bar under the NDPS Act - Confiscation is a measure resulting in deprivation of property and must be preceded by a prior hearing to ensure an innocent owner is not subjected to undue hardship - When the owner of a vehicle establishes that it was used for transporting narcotics substances without his knowledge or connivance, he cannot be denied interim custody of the vehicle pending trial- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Bishwajit Dey v. State of Assam 2025 INSC 32; (Criminal Appeal No. 1305 of 2025) Paras 13-19, 24- 34] Denash v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1032 : 2025 INSC 1258

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Sections 138, 141 - Criminal Liability - Maintainability of Complaint without arraying Trust as Accused - Indian Trusts Act, 1882 - Sections 3, 13 - Issue - Whether a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is maintainable against the Chairman/a Trustee of a Trust, who signed the dishonoured cheque on behalf of the Trust, without arraying the Trust itself as an accused – Held, cheque dishonour complaint maintainable against trustee without arraying trust as accused- Trust is not a Legal Entity/Juristic Person - A 'Trust' under the Indian Trusts Act, 1882, is defined as an obligation annexed to the ownership of property, and not a legal entity with a separate existence capable of suing or being sued - It is the Trustee(s) who are legally bound to maintain and defend all suits for the preservation of the trust property- Therefore, a Trust is not like a corporation or 'body corporate' - Liability of Cheque Signatory - Held that the signatory of a cheque that is dishonoured is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub-section (2) of Section 141 (by analogy to a company officer) - For such a person, there is no need to make a specific averment that he was in charge of and responsible to the entity for the conduct of its business - Appeal allowed. [Relied on SMS Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, (2005) 8 SCC 89; K K Ahuja v. V K Vora, (2009) 10 SCC 48; Paras 18, 22, 23, 25- 27] Sankar Padam Thapa v. Vijaykumar Dineshchandra Agarwal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 991 : 2025 INSC 1210

Omission of Names in FIR – Held, failure to name two of the three Appellants in the First Information Report (FIR), despite the complainant's familiarity with them, cast a serious shadow on the subsequent attempt to implicate them - Such a significant omission in the earliest version of events raises a legitimate inference of false implication and undermines the prosecution narrative - Omissions of important facts affecting the probabilities of the case are relevant under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in judging the veracity of the prosecution case. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of Madhya Pradesh (1975) 3 SCC 815, Para 29] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC); Section 195A – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Sections 154, 156, 195(1)(b)(i), 195A, 340 - Threatening a person to give false evidence –Procedure for taking cognizance – Cognizable or Non-Cognizable Offence – Held, offense of threatening a witness under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offense, empowering the police to directly register an FIR and investigate, without waiting for a formal complaint from a court - Offence under Section 195A IPC is a cognizable offence - The procedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC is not applicable to the offence under Section 195A IPC - Section 195A IPC was conceptualized as distinct and different from the offences under Sections 193 to 196 IPC - The threat to a witness under Section 195A IPC may be given long before they come to Court, and making it cognizable allows for immediate steps to be taken - Requiring the victim to go before the Court concerned and necessitate a complaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC along with an inquiry under Section 340 CrPC would cripple and hamper the process - Section 195A CrPC provides an additional remedy - The use of the word 'may' in Section 195A CrPC means it is not compulsory for the threatened person to only approach the Magistrate - Since the offence is cognizable, the police have the power to take action under Sections 154 CrPC and 156 CrPC - Argument that Section 195A IPC should be split into two categories (one requiring a Court complaint if committed in relation to a proceeding, and the other allowing a private complaint otherwise) was rejected as it would require rewriting the provision - Applied the rule of harmonious construction to synchronize the provisions and give full effect to the legislation - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Abdul Razzak v. State of M.P. and another, 2023 SCC OnLine MP 7152; Paras 22-29] State of Kerala v. Suni @ Sunil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1034 : 2025 INSC 1260

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Section 306, 107 - Quashing of FIR / Criminal Proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. - Core Ingredients – Refusal to Marry -Held, to constitute the offence of abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, two basic ingredients must be present: suicidal death and abetment thereof - Abetment, as defined under Section 107 IPC, requires either instigation, conspiracy, or intentionally aiding the doing of a thing - Conviction under Section 306 IPC requires a clear mens rea and an active or direct act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid the commission of suicide, which must have led the deceased to commit suicide leaving no option - Mere refusal to marry, even if true, by itself, would not amount to 'instigation' as explained under Section 107 of the IPC - His refusal to marry, or even his statement that he "does not care in case she dies" made when the deceased threatened suicide, could not be said to have been made with the intention to push the deceased into a situation where she was left with no option but to commit suicide - The ingredients necessary to constitute the offence of abetment punishable under Section 306 IPC were not borne out - Putting the accused to trial would be a travesty of justice and an empty formality - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Nipun Aneja and Others Versus State of Uttar Pradesh SCC OnLine SC 4091; Geo Varghese v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 19 SCC 144; Paras 15, 17-21] Yadwinder Singh @ Sunny v. State of Punjab, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1058

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 304 Part II, 307 - Unlawful Assembly - Murder and Attempt to Murder - Interference with Concurrent Findings (Article 136 of the Constitution of India) - The Supreme Court reiterated that it generally exercises caution in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless there is a manifest illegality or grave and serious miscarriage of justice on account of misreading or ignoring material evidence, or where the conclusions are manifestly perverse and unsupportable from the evidence on record - Noted that present case did not meet this threshold - Supreme Court noted that there was - i. delay in FIR and non-recovery of weapon not fatal, where there is consistent medical evidence and ocular evidence; ii. Testimonies of injured eye witness holds presumption of truth; iii. Intention to cause death can be gathered from various factors like attacking with lathis, spades, phawadas etc - Held that appellants, in furtherance of their common intention, formed an unlawful assembly, and some were armed with sharp-edged deadly weapons, committing the murder of the deceased and attempting to murder the injured witness - The conviction and sentence were upheld - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Ekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Shahaja alias Shahajan Ismail Mohd. Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra 2023 12 SCC 558; State of H.P. Vs. Gian Chand 2001 6 SCC 71; Jarnail Singh & Ors. v State of Punjab 2009 9 SCC 719; Paras 24, 25, 33-39, 42, 43, 46-48, 49, 50]. Om Pal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1037 : 2025 INSC 1262

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) – Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307 – Unlawful Assembly – Vicarious Liability – Reversal of Acquittal by High Court – Scope of Appellate Interference – Held, interference with an acquittal order must be exercised with caution, but it is justified if the Trial Court's findings are manifestly perverse, unreasonable, or contrary to the evidence on record – The Trial Court's acquittal suffered from a fundamental misappreciation of evidence, specifically by overlooking the consistent testimony of injured eyewitnesses and failing to appreciate the legal effect of the appellants' active participation in an unlawful assembly. The High Court's reversal was based on a proper appraisal of the record and was well-reasoned - The nature of the weapons used, the ferocity and precision of the attack, and the joint execution unmistakably demonstrated that the common object extended to the commission of murder - Upheld order of High Court - Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415; Masalti v. State of U.P., AIR 1965 SC 202; Paras 29-30, 41-44] Haribhau @ Bhausaheb Dinkar Kharuse v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1043 : 2025 INSC 1266

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 302, 376(2)(G) and 201- Circumstantial Evidence — Extra-Judicial Confession — Last Seen Theory- Case based on Circumstantial Evidence- Held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must establish that the circumstances point conclusively toward the guilt of the accused alone, excluding any other hypothesis, including the possibility of innocence or third-party involvement - The chain of evidence must be so complete as to leave no reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the accused's innocence - Explained Principle of Two Views - Held where a perusal of the evidence in a circumstantial case allows for two views, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. Suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Sanjay v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1033 : 2025 INSC 317

Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 302 - Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act) - Section 6 r/w 5(m), 8 r/w 7 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) - Section 207, 366 - Indian Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 27- Constitutional Right to Fair Trial & Legal Aid - Violation of Articles 21 & 22(1) - CrPC Section 207 – Held that the trial was vitiated due to a denial of effective opportunity for defence - The mandatory requirement of providing copies of relied-upon documents under Section 207 CrPC was not complied with before charges were framed - The legal aid counsel was appointed only four days before the commencement of the prosecution evidence, giving insufficient time to prepare the matter and conduct effective cross-examination. [Relied on Anokhilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1637; Para 35, 38] Dashwanth v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 983 : 2025 INSC 1203

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Proof of demand and acceptance of bribe – Held, for an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand of illegal gratification is a sine qua non to prove the guilt - Mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute an offence unless it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe - The proof of acceptance can follow only if there is proof of demand - Sole testimony of the complainant, who is an interested witness, cannot be relied upon without corroboration with independent evidence - Statutory presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is not automatic and arises only once the foundational facts of demand and acceptance are proved - Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rajesh Gupta vs. State through Central Bureau of Investigation, 2022 INSC 359; Panna Damodar Rathi vs. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 4 SCC 526; Ayyasami vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (1992) 1 SCC 304; Paras 18, 19, 33] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7, 13(1)(d), 13(2), and 20 – Demand and acceptance of illegal gratification – Statutory presumption – Failure of prosecution to prove foundational facts – Held, an appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate, and reconsider the evidence - However, due to the reinforced or 'double' presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited - If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in manifest miscarriage of justice - The Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. [Relied on Chandrappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 (Para 11); Mallappa & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka, 2024 INSC 104; Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund & Anr. vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 INSC 258; Paras 11-14] P. Somaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1040 : 2025 INSC 1263

Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act, 2021 (Uttar Pradesh Conversion Act) – Section 4 (Unamended) – Locus Standi to lodge FIR - Locus Standi is Restricted – Held that the right to initiate criminal proceedings under the U.P. Conversion Act is strictly circumscribed and can only be set in motion at the behest of the aggrieved converted individual, or their immediate family members or blood relatives - This restriction is rooted in the recognition that the freedom to profess, practice, or propagate religion (and the liberty to convert) is a facet of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 25 of the Constitution of India - This liberty lies in the innermost domain of human conscience and decisional autonomy - To permit the initiation of criminal proceedings at the instance of strangers or unrelated third parties would amount to an impermissible intrusion into this protected sphere of individual freedom and would open the door to frivolous or motivated litigations - Held that criminal law cannot be allowed to be made a tool of harassment of innocent persons, allowing prosecuting agencies to initiate prosecution at their whims and fancy, on the basis of completely incredulous material. [Paras 110-111, 139] Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1021 : 2025 INSC 1249

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Quashing of Conviction and Sentence - Article 142 of the Constitution of India – Held, quashing of conviction under Section 366 IPC and Section 6 of POCSO Act using Article 142 power of "complete justice" where the appellant and victim married and have a child - Supreme Court invoked its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to quash the criminal proceedings, including the conviction and sentence, against the appellant for offences under Section 366 of the Indian Penal Code, 1872 and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 - Supreme Court acknowledged that while the law provides that proceedings for a heinous offense cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise, ignoring the wife's cry for compassion and empathy would not serve the ends of justice - This is a case where the law must yield to the cause of justice - The appellant was subjected to the specific condition of not deserting his wife and child and to maintain them for the rest of their life with dignity - Appeal allowed. [Paras 8 - 13] K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1048 : 2025 INSC 1272

Quashing of Proceedings – FIR and Chargesheet – CBI Investigation – Consent under Section 6 - Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946 - Requirement of State Government's Consent - Held, Lack of consent from the State Government under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, 1946, for a CBI investigation ought to be raised soon after the registration of the FIR - Once the investigation is complete, a chargesheet has been filed, and the court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance of the chargesheet, the plea regarding the lack of consent cannot be raised to vitiate the validity of the order taking cognizance - This general rule is subject to exceptions: (i) when raising the plea causes severe miscarriage of justice; or (ii) where proceedings for quashing the FIR were initiated, and the chargesheet was filed during the pendency of the quashing proceedings - Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-12] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Narayan Niryat India Pvt. Ltd,, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1001

Scientific Evidence – Inconclusive FSL Report – Motive – Held, the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) reported that no complete DNA profile could be generated from the exhibits (rope, axe, and clothes), making the only scientific evidence neutral, as it neither connected the Appellants to the crime nor corroborated the oral testimony - Noted that an inconclusive or exculpatory scientific report cannot be dismissed as inconsequential in a circumstantial evidence case, and to convict on doubtful testimony while ignoring scientific tests is to substitute suspicion for proof - The alleged motive of revenge for an insult was vague and unproven - Noted that the absence of motive in a circumstantial case assumes significance and tilts the balance in favor of the accused. [Relied on Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808; Paras 52- 56] Nazim v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1019 : 2025 INSC 1184

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (UAPA) - Section 43B - Arrest - Furnishing of Grounds of Arrest - Constitutional Mandate – Held that the explanation given by the jurisdictional Court at the time of remand, followed by the remand order which indicates that the grounds of arrest were explained, is not sufficient compliance with the mandatory requirement of furnishing the grounds of arrest at the time of securing the accused. Ahmed Mansoor v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1026

Voice Sample Test - Power of Magistrate to Direct a Witness to Give Voice Sample - Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) – Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 – Constitution of India, Article 20(3) - Rule against Self-Incrimination – Held, the Magistrate has the power to order any person (not just an accused) to give a voice sample for the purpose of investigation - Reiterated that compelling a person to give a specimen handwriting, signature, finger impression, or a voice sample does not amount to 'testimonial compulsion' and thus does not violate the protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3) - These samples are considered "material evidence" for comparison, not oral or documentary testimony which would, by itself, have the tendency to incriminate the accused - Held that CrPC lacked an explicit provision, whereas precedents conceded the power to the Judicial Magistrate to order a voice sample by adopting the identical principle from Kathi Kalu Case, which dealt with handwriting, signature and finger impressions - This power was conceded to the Magistrate until explicit provisions were incorporated - With the advent of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, Section 349 now specifically incorporates the provision empowering the Magistrate to direct a person to provide a voice sample - Held that whether the CrPC or BNSS is applicable, the Magistrate was empowered to pass the order. [Relied on Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 8 SCC 1; State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad (AIR 1961 SC 1808); Paras 4-11] Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1002 : 2025 INSC 1223