Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 - Supreme Court Annual Digest 2025

Interpretation of Statutes – Use of the word 'Where' in Section 11(1) – Held, the expression "where the respondent is an employee" in Section 11(1) of the POSH Act is a procedural trigger and not a jurisdictional constraint - The word 'where' functions as a 'conditional conjunction' (meaning 'in case' or 'if') to denote different scenarios (employee vs. domestic worker) and the corresponding procedure to be followed. [Relied on Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. and Davies (Inspector of taxes) 1968 AC 1097; Paras 37-44, 47-50, 60-67] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Section 2(n), 3(2), 9 - Complaint of sexual harassment filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under Section 9 - Whether the subsequent administrative actions against the appellant would constitute sexual harassment under the Act to extend the limitation period – Held, a complaint of sexual harassment must be filed within 3 months of the last incident, or within an extended period of 3 months, for a total of 6 months - the definition of sexual harassment includes unwelcome acts of a sexual nature as well as circumstances such as implied or explicit threats of detrimental treatment in employment or creating a hostile work environment - For subsequent actions to be considered part of the sexual harassment, there must be a direct link between the new action and a prior overt act of sexual harassment - A distinction exists between a 'continuing wrong' where the injury persists, and a 'recurring wrong', where a fresh cause of action arises each time - Administrative actions taken against the appellant, such as her removal as Director, were collective decisions of the Executive Council based on an independent complaint - These actions were administrative in nature and did not create a gender-based hostile environment - they were not directly linked to the prior sexual harassment and did not constitute a continuing wrong - the last incident of sexual harassment was in April 2023 and the complaint filed in December 2023 was time-barred - Directed VC-respondent no. 1 to mention judgment in his resume - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 14 - 32] Vaneeta Patnaik v. Nirmal Kanti Chakrabarti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 902 : 2025 INSC 1106

Section 11(1), Section 2(o), and Section 9 – Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) – Inter-Departmental Complaints – Held, the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman has the jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment even if the 'respondent' is an employee of a different department or workplace - Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation that an inquiry can only be conducted by the ICC where the respondent is employed. [Relied on Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241; Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606; Paras 44-49, 54-56, 68] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Service Rules and Disciplinary Action – Two-Stage Inquiry Process – Held that in cases involving Central Government employees, the inquiry proceeds in two stages: (i) A fact-finding or preliminary inquiry by the ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace under the POSH Act ; and (ii) If the allegations are proved, the report is sent to the respondent's employer, who may then initiate formal disciplinary proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, where the ICC of the respondent's department acts as the inquiring authority. [Paras 60-63] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415

Social Welfare Legislation – Purposive Interpretation – Held that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation intended to uphold fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution - Any interpretation that compels an aggrieved woman to pursue her remedy at an "alien workplace" of the respondent would create procedural and psychological barriers, defeating the Act's remedial intent. [Relied on Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; Paras 32-35, 72] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415