Administrative Law — Public Trust Doctrine — Prospective Regularisation based on Market Value — Reference date for valuation – Held that accepting the Banthia Committee's methodology, once an allotment is judicially declared illegal, the original concessional price becomes entirely irrelevant - Regularisation is not a continuation of the original transaction but a prospective...
Administrative Law — Public Trust Doctrine — Prospective Regularisation based on Market Value — Reference date for valuation – Held that accepting the Banthia Committee's methodology, once an allotment is judicially declared illegal, the original concessional price becomes entirely irrelevant - Regularisation is not a continuation of the original transaction but a prospective fresh grant of legal legitimacy - The entity seeking regularisation must bear the full cost of legality based on the fair market value (Ready Reckoner rate) as on the date of the High Court's judgment declaring the illegality (November 2014), along with interest, rather than a discounted historical price. [Paras 34 - 37] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Administrative Law — Regularisation Terms and Pricing — Methodology for Financial Restitution — Rejection of Parity Principle — Computation of regularisation premium for an illegal allotment - Developer sought parity with other co-operative housing societies and individual allottees regularised under a 2005 policy based on historical rates – Held - The principle of equality under Article 14 does not require unequals to be treated as equals - A large commercial enterprise developing a 10,50,000 sq. feet complex cannot claim parity with housing societies or individuals - historical valuations frozen at the time of the irregular allotment (2005 Sankaran Committee methodology) cannot form the baseline for regularisation decades later, as it allows the wrongdoer to benefit from frozen lower land values. [Paras 30 - 33] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Anticipatory Bail - Cancellation of - Abuse of Authority by Law Enforcers - The Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court granting anticipatory bail to three police officers accused of extorting cash from a citizen in exchange for a gold bar recovered during a search. The anticipatory bail granted by the High Court was cancelled. When police officers, who are duty-bound to protect citizens, themselves indulge in extortion, it creates a serious dilemma for citizens who have no option but to seek protection from the very authority that is abusing its power. The Court expressed strong disapproval of such uniformed excesses. State of Maharashtra v. Rahul Datta Bhosale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 592 : 2026 INSC 596
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Directions - Appeal by MPRDC against the arbitral award of ₹49 crores + 14.75% pre-award interest dismissed - High Court directed to release the deposited amount with interest to the respondent within two weeks. Appellant directed to pay the balance award amount with accrued interest within three months. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Ease of Doing Business & Foreign Investment - Uniformity, predictability, certainty, and finality in arbitral proceedings and their enforcement are essential for improving India's ease of doing business and attracting foreign investment. Excessive judicial re-examination of evidence and contractual terms at Sections 34/37 undermines party autonomy and investor confidence. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Finality and Res Judicata in Arbitration - Once a jurisdictional issue (here, arbitrability vis-à-vis the Madhya Pradesh Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam, 1983) has been raised, adjudicated by the arbitral tribunal, and affirmed through multiple judicial forums including the Supreme Court, it attains finality between the parties. A subsequent change in law (e.g., *LG Chaudhary II*) cannot be used to reopen the issue at the execution/enforcement stage. Attempting to do so amounts to abuse of process. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Judicial Interference in Arbitration - Arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism has not failed in India; however, courts have sometimes failed arbitration by excessive and unwarranted interference. Judicial intervention has often proved to be “a cure without a disease”. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Judicial Restraint - Judges handling arbitration matters must remain conscious of the foundational objectives of the Arbitration Act — speedy resolution, finality, and minimal judicial interference. Inconsistent judicial approaches cast a shadow on the viability of arbitration in India. Judicial restraint is the cornerstone of a successful arbitration ecosystem. Once an arbitral award attains finality on jurisdictional and other issues, repeated attempts to reopen it through successive proceedings must be firmly discouraged. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Pre-Award Interest - A contractually agreed pre-award interest rate cannot be assailed as being contrary to public policy of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Madhya Pradesh Road Development Corporation Ltd. v. Jabalpur Corridor Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 580 : 2026 INSC 590
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 33 & Section 34(3) – Limitation for filing Application to set aside Arbitral Award – Commencement of Limitation after disposal of Section 33 application - The Supreme Court held that once the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 33 of the Act is formally invoked, the limitation period of three months prescribed under Section 34(3) for challenging the arbitral award commences only from the date on which the Section 33 request is disposed of by the Tribunal - Supreme Court clarified that Section 34(3) does not distinguish between applications under Section 33 that are ultimately allowed or dismissed, nor does it restrict the benefit of deferred limitation only to applications that are found to be "maintainable" - Whether the application under Section 33 succeeds, fails, or is found to warrant no modification is not determinative; what matters is that the jurisdiction was formally invoked and the proceedings remained pending. [Paras 13-19] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 33 & Section 34(3) – Prevention of Abuse of Process - Supreme Court cautioned that where applications under Section 33 are found to be sham, frivolous, or mala fide, or solely filed to defeat the limitation under Section 34(3) of the Act, courts are justified in imposing exemplary and punitive costs to maintain the balance between preserving legitimate remedies and preventing the abuse of the process of law. [Para 17, 18] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34(3) – Distinction from cases without formal invocation - The Supreme Court distinguished the present case from its earlier ruling in State of Arunachal Pradesh v. Damani Construction Co. (2007) 10 SCC 742 - held that the reliance on Damani Construction is misplaced where formal applications under Section 33 are admittedly filed within the statutory period and entertained by the Tribunal - In Damani Construction, the party had merely written a letter seeking a review/clarification outside the contours of Section 33 without formally invoking the Tribunal's jurisdiction. [Para 16] National Highway Authority of India v. T. Younis, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 589 : 2026 INSC 616
Bail - Cancellation of - A coordinate Bench of the High Court is not powerless to cancel bail granted by another coordinate Bench where the bail was secured by placing incorrect or wrong facts before the Court. If it comes to the notice of the Court that bail has been obtained by suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, it can always examine the matter and pass appropriate orders, including cancellation of bail. Suraj Mahananda v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 586
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 442 (erstwhile Section 401 of CrPC) — Revisional Jurisdiction of the High Court — Judicial Restraint vs. Indulgence — High Court's order permitting the accused to travel to the USA for medical treatment, on the ground that he appeared before the Magistrate on 12 previous occasions and undertook to return within 6 months, held to be an unsustainable exercise of indulgence rather than judicial restraint - The Supreme Court observed that the trial had not commenced even after 10 years of filing the chargesheet due to the proactive role of the accused in initiating multifarious proceedings and securing interim protections, including the misuse of an order suspending a Look Out Circular (LoC) to leave the country without court permission - comparable medical facilities exist domestically in India. [Paras 8, 9] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(f) – Burden of Proof and Standard of Proof for Marketability – The burden of establishing that a transformed product is "marketable" or "capable of being marketed" lies entirely on the Revenue - Marketability is a question of fact that must be proved through objective evidence of trade parlance and commercial understanding, showing that the product can stand independently in the market as a distinct article - A mere assertion, a hypothetical possibility of sale, or the mistaken past conduct of an assessee paying duty under a bona fide error cannot discharge this burden - The standard of proof to be met by the Revenue is that of preponderance of probabilities, calibrated proportionately to the nature, rarity, or character of the specific goods in question. [Relied on Navin Chemicals Manufacturing & Trading Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, (1993) 4 SCC 320; Servo-Med Industries (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (2015) 14 SCC 47; Union of India v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd., 1962 SCC OnLine SC 148; Moti Laminates (P) Ltd. v. CCE, (1995) 3 SCC 23 ; Paras 84-95] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(f) – Definition of "Manufacture" – Two-fold Test – Transformation and Marketability – Process of cutting, grooving (routing), and bending Aluminum Composite Panels (ACPs) to specific sizes for installation on building facades does not amount to "manufacture" – What enters the process is an ACP consisting of two aluminum sheets bonded to a polyethylene core, and what emerges is still an ACP cut to a particular size – The essential character, material properties, and commercial identity of the goods remain entirely unchanged – The process merely adapts the dimensions and shape of the panels to facilitate their specific use or installation as cladding, which amounts to superficial changes rather than a transformation into a distinct commercial product. [Paras 65 - 76] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35G(1) and Section 35L(1)(b) – Appellate Jurisdiction of High Court vs. Supreme Court – Dispute on Excisability of Goods – An appeal involving the determination of the taxability or excisability of goods goes to the root of assessment and is intrinsically connected with the "rate of duty" - Under Section 35G(1), the High Court's appellate jurisdiction explicitly excludes orders relating to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or the value of goods for the purpose of assessment - the appropriate remedy against an order of the Appellate Tribunal determining the excisability of a product lies exclusively before the Supreme Court under Section 35L, and not the High Court. [Paras 19-38] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 35L(2) [as inserted by the Finance (No. 2) Act, 2014] – Nature of Amendment – Clarificatory and Retrospective Application – Sub-section (2) of Section 35L, which explicitly states that the determination of any question having relation to the rate of duty shall include the determination of taxability or excisability of goods, is clarificatory and declaratory in nature - It does not create new liabilities or a new right of appeal, but merely makes explicit what was already implicit in the structural scheme of Sections 35G and 35L - the presumption against retrospectivity does not apply, and the amendment operates retrospectively. [Paras 43-53] Alupro Building Systems Pvt. Ltd v. Commissioner of Central Excise Bangalore-II, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 599 : 2026 INSC 582
Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - Where civil and criminal remedies are available on the same cause of action and based on the same set of facts, both proceedings can be maintained. However, if an aggrieved person elects to invoke both remedies, there must not be an unreasonable or inordinate delay between the institution of the civil suit and the lodging of the FIR. An unexplained delay of 23 years in filing the FIR after instituting a civil suit on identical allegations is sufficient ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court quashed the FIR registered in 2024 against the appellants in respect of a property dispute involving an allegedly forged Power of Attorney and sale deed, when the respondent-complainant had already filed a civil suit in 2001 raising the very same allegations. Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Civil and Criminal Remedies – Parallel Proceedings – Inordinate Delay in Filing FIR - A long, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR in a case arising from a civil dispute raises strong suspicion of mala fide intent, vengeance, or an attempt to harass the other party after failing or anticipating failure in the civil proceedings. A frustrated litigant cannot be permitted to use criminal machinery as a weapon of harassment. The absence of a limitation period for criminal prosecution does not justify inordinate delay when the facts were known to the complainant for decades. Appeal allowed. Criminal proceedings quashed. [Relied on: Kishan Singh v. Gurpal Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 775] Nazibul Rahim Khan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 608 : 2026 INSC 619
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - A defendant cannot be permitted to radically alter or retract her stand in a civil suit by filing an additional written statement under Order VIII Rule 9 CPC after the commencement of trial, particularly when the new plea is wholly inconsistent with the original defence. A party cannot, under the garb of an additional written statement, introduce a completely contradictory case to achieve what is otherwise barred by the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 CPC (amendment of pleadings after trial has begun). Such an attempt amounts to an abuse of process of court and is impermissible under Order VI Rule 7 CPC, which prohibits a party from raising allegations inconsistent with its previous pleadings except by way of amendment. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII Rule 9 - The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration of unlawful possession and eviction. In her original written statement, the defendant claimed to be a bona fide co-sharer. After framing of issues and extensive cross-examination of the plaintiff's witness, the defendant sought to file an additional written statement along with a counterclaim, claiming instead that she was a tenant under the plaintiff. The Trial Court rejected the application. The High Court, however, permitted filing of the additional written statement (subject to costs) while rejecting the counterclaim. Allowing the plaintiff's appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the Trial Court's rejection. The Court held that the defendant's attempt was a clear volte-face and a belated attempt to overcome the statutory embargo on amendments after trial had commenced. The filing of such an application at an advanced stage of the trial was held to be a clear abuse of process. Mondira Ghosh v. Chaitali Ghosh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 579 : 2026 INSC 545
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Requirements of clear, unequivocal and unconditional Admission - Held, a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC can be passed only where the admission by the defendant is clear, categorical, unconditional and unequivocal. A mere reference to statements or inconsistencies does not amount to an admission sufficient for granting judgment on admission when disputed questions of fact exist which require adjudication in a full-fledged trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – Key principles laid down: 1. Every statement made by a party in the pleadings does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. The admission must be unambiguous and must clearly establish the liability of the defendant towards the plaintiff. 2. Pleadings cannot be read in a piecemeal manner; they must be construed holistically. 3. Disputed questions of fact cannot be resolved by way of judgment on admission. 4. Revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC is limited and cannot be exercised by the High Court to substitute its own interpretation of the written statement merely because another view is possible, in the absence of jurisdictional error or material irregularity. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XII Rule 6 – Judgment on Admission – In a dispute relating to distribution of sale proceeds of a jointly owned agricultural property sold for ₹15.31 crore, the plaintiff sought a decree under Order XII Rule 6 CPC against defendant No.3 for recovery of ₹44,79,167/- on the basis of an alleged admission in the written statement that each co-owner had received ₹3 crore under a family settlement. The District Court rejected the application, holding that the matter required trial. The High Court allowed the revision and decreed the suit. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the District Court's order, holding that there was no clear, unconditional admission of liability by defendant No.3, and the issues involved disputed questions of fact which could only be decided after full trial. Pushpa v. Dayawati, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 610 : 2026 INSC 603
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Section 100 – Second Appeal – Scope of interference with concurrent findings –High Court is not justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no evidence, or suffering from material illegality or misreading of evidence - Merely because another possible view may arise from the same material on record does not justify interference under Section 100 CPC – noted that to emphasize that where two inferences are possible from a set of circumstances, the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. [Relied on Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribai Sopan Gujar (1999) 3 SCC 722] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573
Code of criminal procedure, 1973 – section 392 – Anomalous and Irrational Consequences – The Supreme Court pointed out that a mechanical application of Sajjan Singh could lead to highly undesirable or discriminatory results under Article 14 - if a Division Bench unanimously decides to acquit two convicts but divides on the third, sending the entire composite appeal to a third Judge could put the unanimously acquitted persons at risk of conviction - in a State appeal against acquittal, it could risk the conviction of individuals whose acquittals were unanimously favoured by the Division Bench - Expressing its respectful disagreement with the coordinate bench ruling in Sajjan Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1999) 1 SCC 315, the Bench referred the question of whether Sajjan Singh lays down the correct law to a larger Bench to be constituted by the Hon'ble Chief Justice of India. [Paras 35-41] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Code of criminal procedure, 1973 – section 392 – scope of referee judge's jurisdiction in composite appeals – difference of opinion – Whether a third Judge, upon a reference under Section 392 CrPC due to a division of opinion regarding one co-accused, can reopen and examine the case of other co-accused whose convictions were unanimously upheld by the Division Bench – Supreme Court doubted the correctness of its two-judge bench decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of M.P. (1999) – Matter referred to a larger Bench - Statutory Interpretation of Section 392 CrPC – "An Appeal" vs "The Appeal" – The Supreme Court highlighted the significant linguistic shift from Section 429 of the 1898 Code (which used "the case") to Section 392 of the 1973 Code (which uses "an appeal" and "the appeal") - Highlighting the anaphoric use of the definite article, the Supreme Court observed that while the indefinite article "an appeal" triggers the provision for any appeal resulting in a divided opinion, the definite article "the appeal" limits the referee Judge's jurisdiction strictly to the specific instance or individual appeal where the division occurred - Merely because multiple convicts file a composite joint appeal, it cannot mean that a unanimous decision dismissing the appeal against some convicts can be reopened by the third Judge if the division of opinion relates only to another co-accused. [Relied Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, (1972) 2 SCC 466; Paras 29 – 32] Dr. Rakesh Kumar Gupta v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 615 : 2026 INSC 632
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 464 — Defect, Omission, or Irregularity in Charge — Absence of Prejudice - No finding or sentence is invalid due to an error, omission, or defect in the framing of charges unless a failure of justice has been occasioned - Where the accused's name was initially included in the charge framing order for offenses under Sections 302/120-B IPC, and the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed trial, they were fully cognizant of the case against them - If the witnesses were thoroughly cross-examined by the defense counsel regarding the murder charge, no prejudice is caused to the accused, and the trial is not vitiated. [Paras 41 - 43] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 482 — Quashing of FIR — Civil Dispute Given a Criminal Colour — Extraordinary Delay — Improvement in Subsequent Complaint - Criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to become a weapon of harassment and coercion in disputes predominantly concerning title over immovable property - High Court erred in refusing to exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC where a long-standing property dispute pending before civil courts since the year 2000 was converted into criminal proceedings - In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Supreme Court owes a duty to look into attending circumstances emerging from the record over and above the averments in the FIR - Where the initial complaint dated 21.05.2009 did not contain any allegation of extortion, demand of money, or criminal intimidation, but a subsequent FIR lodged after seven months introduced these grave allegations for the first time, such material improvements support the contention that the criminal proceedings are an afterthought to criminalize a civil dispute - An unexplained and extraordinary delay of nearly eight to nine years in registering the FIR (incidents pertaining to 2001, FIR registered in 2009), coupled with circumstances creating serious doubt about the genuineness of the prosecution, warrants quashing - A State Government Circular discouraging registration of FIRs in civil disputes cannot justify the complete inaction of the complainant who was actively litigating before civil courts and had alternative legal remedies available under Sections 154(3), 156(3), and 200 of the CrPC. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604; Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 315; Paras 30-60] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Companies Act, 2013 – Voting Rights at AGM by Juristic Members (Societies/Trusts) – “Vote-Cast-First” Rule Rejected - Where rival groups within a society/trust claim authority to exercise voting rights attached to shares held by such juristic member in a company's Annual General Meeting, the validity of the vote is not determined by priority in point of time. The vote must be cast only by the person(s) lawfully authorised under the society's governing documents (such as its constitution, rules, or trust deed) and in accordance with the statutory framework under the Companies Act, 2013 and the Companies (Management and Administration) Rules, 2014. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme relating to remote e-voting does not recognise chronology as the basis for determining the validity of a vote. Once a valid vote is cast on behalf of a member, the member cannot vote again. Courts cannot substitute the principle of “first in time” for the requirement of lawful authority. The High Court's direction that the first vote cast on behalf of a society would prevail, irrespective of the source of authority (Board of Trustees or Managing Committee), was set aside as being contrary to law. The validity of a vote cast on behalf of a society cannot be determined merely by priority in point of time and must rest upon lawful authority traceable to the governing documents of the society and the statutory framework governing voting. Hindustan Medical Institution v. Birla Corporation, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 583 : 2026 INSC 554
Constitution of India – Article 142(1) – Dissolution of Marriage on Irretrievable Breakdown - The Supreme Court possesses the inherent, discretionary jurisdiction under Article 142(1) to dissolve a marriage on the ground of its irretrievable breakdown to do "complete justice," even if the facts do not strictly satisfy a statutory ground under the prevailing personal law - This power is exercised with great care and caution when the Court is fully convinced that the marriage is totally unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvation, and that the continuation of a formal legal tie on paper is unjustified and merely perpetuates frustration - Given that the parties were living separately for over 15 years, mediation had failed, and both were financially independent doctors with no children from the wedlock, it was deemed a fit case to sever the ties and put an end to a stale, frozen relationship. [Relied on Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Nayan Bhowmick v. Aparna Chakraborty, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2798; Vikas Kanaujia v. Sarita, (2025) 3 SCC 748; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, (2019) 9 SCC 409; Paras 29-37] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Criminal Procedure – Right to Speedy Trial and Timely Investigation – Duty of Constitutional Courts - Inordinate Delay in Investigation – Appeal against High Court order dismissing a writ petition seeking directions to file a charge-sheet in a criminal complaint pending for nearly two decades – Constitutional courts cannot remain mute spectators to prolonged and endless investigations – Right to speedy trial is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 of the Constitution, which inherently includes the timely completion of investigations – If an investigation continues for an unduly long period without adequate justification, the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to intervene instead of dismissing the plea on technical or alternative-remedy grounds. [Paras 10 - 13] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626
Constitution of India – Judicial Review of Employer's Decision on Suitability – Appointment to Disciplined Force – Criminal Antecedents and Acquittal via Compounding - Even after a truthful disclosure of past criminal cases ending in acquittal, an employer retains the discretion to assess a candidate's suitability for appointment - such a decision cannot be arbitrary - To survive judicial review, it must be supported by material on record demonstrating that an offence involving moral turpitude was indeed committed and that the candidate was linked to it, despite earning an acquittal on technical grounds, benefit of doubt, or due to witnesses turning hostile or being won over. [Para 14] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Constitution of India – Seventh Schedule, List II, Entry 34 – Betting and Gambling – Online Gaming – Games of Skill vs. Games of Chance – Scope of legislative competence of States – Interpretation of the conjunction "and" – Article 14 – Manifest Arbitrariness – Article 19(1)(g) – Res Extra Commercium – List II, Entry 1 – Public Order - The Supreme Court set aside the findings of the Madras High Court and Karnataka High Court which held that Entry 34 of List II is restricted to games of chance - The expression "betting and gambling" cannot be split disjunctively or interpreted narrowly as "betting on gambling" to provide immunity to games of skill played for stakes - Entry 34 of List II empowers the State Legislatures to regulate or prohibit betting activities on both games of chance and games of skill when played for stakes. [Relied on: State of U.P. v. Lalta Prasad Vaish, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3029; Welfare Association v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358; Paras 217-228, 267 – 273] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 14 — Public Interest Litigation — Regularisation vs. Demolition — Doctrine of Proportionality and Irreversibility — Irregular allotment of land by City and Industrial Development Corporation Limited (CIDCO) to a private developer without a competitive tender process - The High Court declared the allotment illegal and ordered restoration/demolition but granted liberty to apply for regularisation – Held that demolition of a fully operational commercial complex (shopping mall and hotel) after 17 years, an investment of ₹450 crores, 8,000 livelihoods, and ₹100 crores of annual tax revenue would not vindicate public interest - The severity of a remedial measure must bear a rational and proportionate relationship to the nature and magnitude of the wrong - Financial prejudice to the public authority can be remedied through a rigorous financial recovery mechanism, whereas demolition causes catastrophic and irreparable socio-economic harm - Public law must distinguish between remedies that restore public welfare and those that merely punish at the cost of the public - Demolition order set aside. [Paras 22, 23, 24, 26] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 21 — Fundamental Right to Travel Abroad vs. Right to Speedy Trial and Societal Interest — Interplay and Balancing of Rights — While Article 21 guarantees the fundamental right to personal liberty, including the right to travel abroad, such a right is not absolute and cannot be viewed in isolation - A balance must be struck between the individual liberty of the accused on one hand, and the victim's right to a speedy trial along with the larger societal interest in ensuring the effective administration of criminal justice on the other. [Para 10] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226(1) and Article 226(2) — Territorial Jurisdiction of High Court — Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) / Border Security Force (BSF) — Dismissal from Service — Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens - Key Legal Principles Summarized by Supreme Court – i. Territorial Jurisdiction based on Situs of Office: Even if the entire cause of action arises outside the territorial limits of the Delhi High Court (e.g., the misconduct occurred and the dismissal order was issued elsewhere), a member of the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF), including the BSF, can maintain a writ petition before the Delhi High Court under Article 226(1) of the Constitution - This is because the overall command, administration, and superintendence vest in authorities whose offices are situated in New Delhi (the Union of India and the Director General, BSF); ii. Inapplicability of Forum Non Conveniens to Article 226(1) Writs - The doctrine of forum non conveniens is misapplied when used by a High Court to refuse to exercise discretionary writ jurisdiction invoked under Article 226(1) based on the situs of the respondent's office - When a suitor chooses a forum that is highly convenient to the respondents themselves, and where the official records are readily available or can be summoned, applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens becomes self-defeating and denies access to justice. [Relied on Shri Ranjeet Mal v. General Manager, Northern Railway (1977) 1 SCC 484; Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India (2004) 6 SCC 254; Dinesh Chandra Gahtori v. Chief of Army Staff (2001) 9 SCC 525; Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee (2008) 3 SCC 456; Paragraph 21-40] Baksish Ahmad v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 616 : 2026 INSC 630
Constitutional Law – Right to Pension – Nature of Pension – Plea of Financial Burden – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 300A – Held that Pension is not a bounty, grace, or a matter of financial convenience dependent on the employer - It is a deferred wage and a hard-earned benefit amassed by virtue of long and continuous service, constituting "property" within the meaning of Article 300A of the Constitution - A constitutional right cannot be rendered illusory or defeated on account of administrative inaction or the plea of financial burden. [Paras 41-74] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Criminal Jurisprudence – Pre-marital and Consensual Relationships – Offence of Cheating based on False Promise to Marry - Physical relationships between consenting unmarried adults do not automatically warrant an adverse inference against a candidate's character - Where a relationship spans a considerable period, a presumption of valid consent arises - Merely because a long-standing relationship between adult neighbors does not culminate in marriage, it cannot be logicized that an offence of cheating was committed or that a subsequent compromise before a Lok Adalat amounts to an admission of guilt. [Paras 18-20] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Criminal Jurisprudence – Presumption of Innocence – Evidentiary Value of Police Report in Compounded Cases - Unless a charge is proven in a court of law, the presumption of innocence prevails - Where an offence like cheating depends entirely on the subjective deception of the prosecutrix, and the prosecutrix chooses to compound the matter before a Lok Adalat without any evidence of coercion or threat, a mere indictment in a police report (based on statements recorded during investigation) cannot form the sole basis for an employer to draw an adverse inference regarding the candidate's character. [Relied on Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471; Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2024) 5 SCC 264; Commissioner of Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685; Paras 22 - 25] Gajula Thirupathi v. Telangana State Level Police Recruitment Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 606 : 2026 INSC 493
Criminal Justice Administration – Loss of Case Records during Active Investigation – Misplacement of original case papers and FSL reports in transit between police station and Magistrate – Held, such incidents strike at the very core of the criminal justice system and render bona fide complaints inactionable – Even if records are lost or witnesses are untraceable, the investigating agency cannot keep the investigation pending indefinitely; it must either reconstruct records or file an appropriate closure report before the Magistrate – State directed to conclude the investigation within six weeks and file an explanatory compliance affidavit. [Relied on Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2511; Paras 16, 17, 18] Sahil Abdulsattar Mansuri v. Safimahamad Fafirbhai Mansuri, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 601 : 2026 INSC 626
Criminal Law - Quashing of FIR - Recording of FIR Contents in Quashing Orders - Delay not a Ground for Quashing FIR - Duty of High Court while Quashing FIR - While quashing an FIR, the High Court must give a fair idea in its order regarding the contents of the FIR and the nature of allegations levelled therein. Reproduction of the entire FIR is not necessary, but sufficient reference to the nature of the crime and allegations is expected so that the higher courts can meaningfully assess whether there was proper application of mind by the High Court. Delay in lodging the FIR by itself, without anything more, cannot be a ground to quash the FIR. Delay is a factor that may be considered by the Trial Court while appreciating evidence during trial. At the stage of considering a petition for quashing of FIR, the High Court is required to examine whether the FIR discloses the commission of any cognizable offence. The Court must advert to the nature of the crime and the allegations made in the FIR. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR registered under Sections relating to attempt to murder and other offences under the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) solely on the ground of 24 days' delay in lodging the FIR, without examining the contents of the FIR or the nature of allegations. The Supreme Court restored the FIR and allowed the police to proceed in accordance with law. Pushpendra v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 584
Criminal Procedure – Faulty Investigation – Impact on Prosecution Case - Supreme Court further observed that while the investigating agency was expected to act with greater sensitivity given that it was a case of multiple murders, a faulty or sub-standard investigation cannot be a sole ground to discard other reliable, substantial material evidence brought on record by the prosecution - The concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the High Court were based on a proper appreciation of circumstantial evidence and called for no interference. [Relied on Rameshbhai Mohanbhai Koli v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 11 SCC 111; Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1978) 4 SCC 435; Anter Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 657; Mallikarjun v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 8 SCC 359; Paras 12-20] Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538
Criminal Procedure — Release of Passport vs. Permission to Travel Abroad — Reversal of High Court and Sessions Court orders - The Supreme Court restored the Magistrate's order directing the release of the passport to the accused, while clarifying that such release does not automatically amount to a permission to leave the country - The accused is restricted from flying out of India without obtaining the express permission of the Sessions Court post-committal of the case. [Relied on Rajesh Ranjan Yadav v. CBI, (2007) 1 SCC 70; Paras 11 - 14] Seesa Santosh v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 603 : 2026 INSC 628
Criminal Trial – Interested / Related Witness - Testimony of the victim's father (PW-1) and sisters (PW-2 and PW-3) cannot be discarded solely on account of relationship - Relationship is not a ground to affect the credibility of a witness if the ocular testimony is otherwise natural, trustworthy, and cogent – Held that the appellants cannot claim the benefit of parity merely because some co-accused were acquitted - An order of acquittal for other co-accused does not lead as a necessary corollary to the acquittal of the convicts if the evidence against the latter stands on a substantially distinct and higher footing (direct eyewitness accounts and precise Section 27 recoveries). [Relied on Shaik Ahmed v. State of Telangana, (2021) 9 SCC 59; Willian Stephen v. The State of Tamil Nadu and Anr., (2024) 5 SCC 258; Wahid v. State Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 3 SCC 341; Goverdhan & another v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2025) 3 SCC 378; Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
DNA test - Paternity Disputes - An acquittal in a criminal prosecution for rape under Section 376 IPC does not operate as a bar to the determination of paternity in a civil suit and does not preclude the court from directing a DNA test. An acquittal in a criminal case merely means that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt; it does not conclusively negate the existence of a biological relationship between the parties. In paternity disputes, especially where inheritance rights are claimed, DNA profiling constitutes the most reliable and scientific method of determining biological parentage when other evidence is inconclusive. The right to know one's biological father and the consequent legal rights flowing therefrom must be balanced against the alleged father's right to privacy. In appropriate cases, the interest of the child in establishing parentage outweighs privacy concerns, particularly when there is no material to show that the mother had any other relationship during the relevant period. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600
DNA test - Paternity Disputes - The respondent, born in 1999, instituted a civil suit after attaining majority seeking a declaration that he is the biological son of the appellant and is entitled to a share in his property. The appellant had been acquitted in a rape case filed by the respondent's mother. Relying on the acquittal and earlier proceedings, the appellant opposed the suit and resisted a DNA test order passed by the Trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the respondent had lived his entire life under the shadow of disputed parentage. Leaving the issue unresolved would potentially deny him legitimate rights if he is found to be the biological son. The Court emphasized the indispensable nature of DNA evidence in modern paternity disputes and directed the appellant to undergo DNA profiling. Chaturbhuj Pradhan v. Amar Pradhan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 612 : 2026 INSC 600
Essential Commodities Act, 1955 – Section 3 – Uttar Pradesh Essential Commodities (Regulation of Sale and Distribution Control) Order, 2016 – Clause 2(p) – Government Order No. 6 of 2019 dated 05.08.2019 – Paragraph IV(10) and Paragraph V – Compassionate Appointment / Allotment of Fair Price Shop – Exclusion of 'Married Daughter' from the definition of 'Family' – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 15(1) – Gender-based Stereotype - Key Issue - Whether the blanket exclusion of a 'married daughter' from the definition of 'family' for the purpose of allotment of a fair price shop under the dependent/compassionate quota is constitutionally sustainable – Supreme Court held – i. Gender Discrimination and Arbitrary Classification - The Supreme Court held that the exclusion of a married daughter from the definition of "family" under Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order and Paragraph IV(10) of the G.O. fails the test of reasonable classification and is manifestly arbitrary - The distinction lacks any intelligible differentia having a rational nexus with the welfare-oriented object of the scheme, which is to provide immediate financial relief to the dependent family of a deceased dealer; ii. Impermissible Stereotypes - Supreme Court observed that while a married son continues to be considered a part of the family, a daughter is excluded solely because of her marriage - This distinction is founded upon a gender-based stereotype that a daughter loses all ties with her natal family upon marriage which is incompatible with the constitutional guarantees of equality under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution; iii. Dependency as a Question of Fact - Dependency is a question of fact to be determined in each individual case and cannot be conclusively or speculatively presumed based entirely on marital status or assumptions regarding local residence; iv. Doctrine of Purposive Construction Applied - Applying the doctrine of purposive construction to avoid an unjust or arbitrary result, the Court read down the provision - The expression "daughter" in Clause 2(p) of the 2016 Order must be interpreted to include a married daughter, provided she establishes factual dependency on the deceased dealer, submits a dependency certificate along with No Objection Certificates (NOCs) from other adult family members, and satisfies all other eligibility criteria, including local residence. [Relied on Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia & Ors. v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar & Ors., 1958 SCC OnLine SC 6; Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar & Ors., (1954) 2 SCC 791; Shailesh Dhairyawan v. Mohan Balkrishan Lulla, (2016) 3 SCC 619; Paras 18-27] Kulsum Nisha v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 588 : 2026 INSC 617
Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 133 r/w. 114, Illustration (b) — Accomplice/Approver Testimony — Worthiness of Credit and Prudence of Corroboration - The combined result of Section 133 and Illustration (b) to Section 114 is that an accomplice is a competent witness, and a conviction based on uncorroborated testimony is not illegal per se - as a rule of prudence, courts require corroboration in material particulars to safely connect the accused with the crime - The corroboration need not be direct and can be circumstantial, nor must it confirm every single material fact independently Creditworthiness is evaluated cumulatively, the approver must not be a planted witness, their testimony must be intrinsically natural, and it must be inculpatory rather than exculpatory - If the disclosure is complete and inspires confidence, it cannot be discarded merely because the approver did not inflict the fatal blow or implicate himself to the exact same extent as the other co-accused. [Paras 24 - 36] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Recovery of Incriminating Articles – Hostile Panch/Seizure Witnesses – Value of Investigating Officer's Testimony - Appeal against the dismissal of a criminal appeal by the Madhya Pradesh High Court, which upheld the Trial Court's order convicting the appellant under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC for the murder of four family members - The appellant challenged the conviction, arguing inter alia that the recovery of the incriminating articles (empty phials of Calmpose injection, clothes, and rope) under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was unreliable because the independent panch/seizure witnesses turned hostile – Held that dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that it is a well-settled principle of law that a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be discarded or vitiated merely because the panch witnesses turned hostile, provided that the recovery is otherwise convincingly proved through the testimony of the Investigating Officer - The prosecution successfully proved the recovery at the instance of the appellant through the credible testimony of the Investigating Officer (PW-24), which was further corroborated by the postmortem and viscera reports showing traces of "Diazepham" (Calmpose). Uperndra Khare v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 607 : 2026 INSC 538
Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 9 – Test Identification Parade (TIP) vs. Dock Identification & Section 27 Recoveries - The appellants contended that the absence of a formal TIP vitiated their identification – Held that A TIP is corroborative and not a substantive piece of evidence - The eyewitnesses (PW-2 and PW-3) had a clear daylight opportunity to observe the kidnappers - More crucially, the identity is decisively cemented by infallible recoveries made pursuant to disclosures under Section 27 of the Evidence Act specifically, the recovery of the living child at the behest of one appellant and the recovery of the crime weapon (.315 bore pistol) at the behest of the other. These direct recoveries negate the necessity of a formal TIP. [Paras 26 - 28] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Denial of Conjugal Rights & Persistent Refusal of Sexual Intercourse - Denial of conjugal rights, including the persistent refusal of sexual intercourse without a reasonable cause, constitutes mental cruelty and serves as a valid ground for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Withholding sexual intimacy inflicts severe emotional distress and fundamentally undermines the bedrock of marriage. [Para 19] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) – Mental Cruelty – Long Separation & Rigid Approaches - Where a couple has lived separately for a substantial duration (over 15 years in this case) with no hope for reconciliation, forcing them to live together after such a prolonged period itself constitutes cruelty to both sides - In matrimonial matters involving two individuals, it is not for the society or the Court to sit in judgment over which spouse's approach is correct - their strongly held, unaccommodating views and persistent refusal to adjust over a long span of time amount to mutual cruelty. [Paras 23, 24, 25] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(ia) & Section 13(1)(ib) – Desertion – Evolution into Mental Cruelty & Conduct During Pendency of Litigation - Even if the statutory ground of 'desertion' under Section 13(1)(ib) has not been formally pleaded, an Appellate Court is justified in examining the overall conduct of the parties and the manner in which they discharged matrimonial obligations - Appeal is a continuation of the suit - If a statutory period of desertion continues indefinitely during the pendency of litigation without any genuine effort at reconciliation or cohabitation, it aggravates marital agony - An Appellate Court can legitimately treat such prolonged physical separation, geographical estrangement, and complete emotional alienation as a realistic indicator of mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA - In such instances, the confirmation of a divorce decree by the Appellate Court is a lawful application of the statutory ground of cruelty, not an automatic invocation of Article 142. [Paras 21 – 27] Sonal Talpada v. Veerbhan Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 594 : 2026 INSC 620
Hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 – section 8 – doctrine of parens patriae – judicial scrutiny - Doctrine of Parens Patriae and Judicial Oversight - Section 8 of the HMGA embodies the doctrine of parens patriae (parent of the nation), framing guardianship as a strictly Court-supervised fiduciary responsibility where the welfare of the minor reigns paramount - The statutory requirement of seeking prior judicial approval before alienating a minor's immovable property reflects legislative caution to protect proprietary interests against irreversible decisions - Supreme Court's role under Section 8 is to perform an independent, rigorous, and forward-looking assessment of risk versus benefit, balancing the genuine welfare of the minor against the economic rights of adult co-owners to derive reasonable value from the property. Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621
Hindu minority and guardianship act, 1956 – section 8 – transfer of minor's immovable property – development agreement – best interest of the child - Alienation of Minor's Property via Development Agreement - The appellant (mother/natural guardian of the minor) sought permission under Section 8 of the HMGA to transfer the minor's undivided share in a joint family property to a developer in exchange for a monetary sum and a residential flat ( share in a flat) - The District Court and High Court rejected the application holding that the "necessity or evident advantage" to the minor was not adequately demonstrated beyond a bald statement - Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that an undivided share in undeveloped land often remains a passive, notional interest with minimal immediate utility and is susceptible to encroachment or disputes - transitioning this illiquid asset into a constructed residential unit along with liquid cash transforms it into immediate usable property capable of funding the minor's education, health, and advancement – Supreme Court clarified that while this is not an absolute proposition of law and must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, in the present facts, the conversion was demonstrably for the minor's "evident advantage" under Section 8(4) of the Act - The permission was granted subject to protective conditions, including depositing the minor's monetary share into a nationalized bank with auto-renewal until majority. Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – In the present case, the second wife and four daughters of the deceased each inherited a 1/5th share as tenants-in-common. The sale of a portion of the property by the widow purportedly as Karta for legal necessity (sister's marriage) was held invalid to the extent it affected the shares of the daughters. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decree in favour of the daughters. [Relied on: M. Arumugam v. Ammaniammal, (2020) 11 SCC 103] Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8 & 19 – Intestate Succession – Nature of Property Inherited by Heirs – Tenants-in-Common vs. Joint Tenancy – Karta and Legal Necessity - Heirs inheriting property of a Hindu male dying intestate under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, take the property as tenants-in-common with definite and separate shares, and not as joint family/coparcenary property or as joint tenants. The concept of “Kartaship” does not apply to such property. Consequently, no co-heir can alienate the shares of other co-heirs by invoking the doctrine of legal necessity while acting as Karta of the family. Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 8 & 19 – Intestate Succession – Upon intestate succession under the HSA, each heir acquires a distinct, identifiable share which is heritable by their own legal heirs and does not pass by survivorship. Property inherited under Section 8 retains its individual and statutory character and does not automatically become coparcenary property in the hands of the heirs. A co-heir (including a widow) has full rights only over her own share and cannot alienate any portion of the shares belonging to other co-heirs on the ground of legal necessity. Darubai v. Kamalabai, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 581 : 2026 INSC 613
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Condonation of Re-filing Delay Beyond 28 Days for IBC Appeals - While the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (SCR) allow a 28-day window for curing defects and permit discretionary condonation of re-filing delay for general laws, this relaxation cannot override the express statutory edict of the IBC - An appeal under Section 62 must be defect-free to be considered validly instituted within the limitation period - Litigants cannot circumvent the rigorous timelines of the IBC by filing a defective appeal as a device to save limitation and curing defects at leisure - Once the 60-day statutory window under the IBC and the 28-day curing window under the SCR close, the right to appeal stands frozen and extinguished – Supreme Court has no power to condone any re-filing delay beyond the permissible 28 days for an appeal under Section 62 of the IBC. [Paras 15 - 25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – No Differentiated Threshold for Neutral Officers / Liquidators - Serial Indulgence Impermissible – Noted that the fact that the appellant is a neutral officer (Liquidator) acting for the benefit of stakeholders does not permit the Supreme Court to invoke its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to dilute or override the express statutory timeframes of the IBC - The statute does not carve out a separate threshold or relaxation for such officers - A litigant who has previously secured a liberal construction of "sufficient cause" and condonation of re-filing delay at an earlier appellate stage (e.g., under Section 61 before the NCLAT) cannot claim a similar exercise of judicial discretion automatically at successive appellate stages - The discipline of limitation under the IBC does not countenance serial condonations of delay, as it would defeat the legislative objective of expedition and finality. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations (P) Ltd. v. Kirusa Software (P) Ltd. (2018) 1 SCC 353; Kalparaj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (2021) 10 SCC 401; Saturn Ventures and Advisors Pvt. Limited v. S. Gopalakrishnan (2025 SCC OnLine SC 2484); Distinguished from CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure & Developers (P) Ltd. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1406); Paras 19-24] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Section 62 – Supreme Court Rules, 2013 – Order VIII Rule 6(3) & (4) – Condonation of Delay in Filing and Re-filing Appeal – Insurmountable Jurisdictional Bar - Strict Timelines under IBC Prevail over Procedural Rules - The statutory scheme of limitation under the IBC is strict and time-bound - An appeal under Section 62 of the IBC must be presented within 45 days, with an extendable grace period of only 15 days upon showing sufficient cause - The absolute statutory outer limit is 60 days, beyond which the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to condone filing delay ceases entirely. [Para 20-25] CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 611 : 2026 INSC 629
Jurisprudence – Ex ante vs. Ex post judicial scrutiny - Distinction Between Post-Facto Liability and Preventive Assessment - Supreme Court demarcated the conceptual difference between ex ante mechanisms (preventive, forward-looking assessments made before harm or conduct occurs) and ex post mechanisms (retrospective scrutiny determining legality, liability, or punishment after the fact) - Section 8 of the HMGA is an illustrative example of an ex ante statutory mechanism, mandating prior judicial assessment to forestall foreseeable harm to a minor's proprietary rights before any transaction can validly take effect. [Relied on Vishwambhar & Ors. v. Laxminarayan, (2001) 6 SCC 163; Nangali Amma Bhavani Amma v. Gopalkrishnan Nair, (2004) 8 SCC 78; Saroj v. Sunder Singh, (2013) 15 SCC 727; Annie Besant v. G. Narayaniah, 1914 SCC OnLine PC 40; Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 565; Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248; Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena, (2015) 6 SCC 353; Paras 1018] Shephali Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 597 : 2026 INSC 621
Land Disposal/Allotment Policy — New Bombay Disposal of Lands Regulations, 1975 — Regulation 4 — Modes of Disposal — Mode of allotment through individual application – Held that since Regulation 4 permits disposal of CIDCO plots not only by auction or tender but also by considering individual applications as determined from time to time, an allotment on an individual application where earlier tender attempts had failed was not per se illegal - The legal infirmity lay in the pricing mechanism and the absence of a transparent competitive process, not in the mode of allotment itself. [Paras 18 - 21] K. Raheja Corp. v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 575 : 2026 INSC 551
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Section 9 — Subsequent Statutory Enhancement of Royalty — Contractual terms vs. Statutory Amendment — Liability to pay enhanced royalty on dispatch - The Supreme Court held that the enhancement of a mineral's royalty rate via statutory amendment overrides pre-existing contractual arrangements or tender conditions limiting a bidder's liability - Royalty is legally linked to the dispatch or removal of minerals from the leased area, not the date of auction or contract finalization - Successful auction purchasers who remove or transport the mineral after a statutory rate revision comes into force are legally liable to pay the enhanced royalty rate - Contractual provisions must give way to statutory amendments. [Paras 11-13] Director of Mines and Geology v. BMM Ispat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2026 INSC 627
Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Section 9 — Royalty cannot be frozen by contract — Interpretation of "Dispatch" – The Supreme Court clarified that the word "applicable" regarding the royalty rate denotes applicability at the relevant time of removing the goods and does not freeze the rate of royalty to the date of the auction agreement - Relying on the 9-Judge Bench decision, the Supreme Court reiterated that royalty is fundamentally payable on the dispatch/movement of minerals from the leased area - If the movement of minerals occurs after a statutory revision, the buyer cannot escape the liability of the enhanced rate due to a piecemeal or delayed approach in transporting the mineral. [Relied on Mineral Area Development Authority v. SAIL, (2024) 10 SCC 1; Paras 9 - 13] Director of Mines and Geology v. BMM Ispat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 600 : 2026 INSC 627
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Claim Petition — Double Benefit / Deduction of Ex-gratia Financial Assistance — Interplay with State Welfare Rules — Eligibility of Mother as a Dependent – i. Deduction of Financial Assistance under Service Rules – held that the High Court was fully justified in deducting the ex-gratia financial assistance amount receivable by the eligible dependents under the Haryana Compassionate Assistance to the Dependents of Deceased Government Employees Rules, 2006 from the total compensation assessed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 - The component of "loss of income" or "pay and allowances" cannot be paid a second time to the claimants, as it would exceed the actual pecuniary loss suffered and operate as a financial windfall/windfall profit; ii. Independent Entitlement of a Dependent Mother - While statutory rules must be strictly interpreted, courts cannot lose sight of the paramount object of social welfare legislations, which is to award just and adequate compensation to all dependents - Under the Haryana Pension Scheme of 1964 (read with the 2006 Rules), a dependent parent is ineligible for ex-gratia financial assistance if the deceased employee leaves behind a widow or children - this statutory ineligibility under service rules does not diminish or negate the independent legal injury suffered by the mother under the Motor Vehicles Act; iii. Prevention of Unjust Enrichment by Insurer - Setting off the entire financial assistance amount against the collective pool of compensation thereby depriving a dependent mother of her rightful share under the head of loss of dependency amounts to an illegal and unjust enrichment of the Insurance Company at the cost of a dependent parent - The mother's distinct share ( share of the total loss of dependency) cannot be set off or consumed by the service benefits paid exclusively to the widow and daughter. [Relied on Reliance General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shashi Sharma and Others, (2016) 9 SCC 627; Sarla Verma and Others v. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr., (2009) 6 SCC 121; State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others, (2003) 7 SCC 484; Ram Kala Devi v. State of Haryana and Another, 2025 SCC OnLine P&H 12159; Paras 15-25] Sarla Devi v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 578 : 2026 INSC 575
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Criminal Antecedents Relevant - Previous involvements in similar NDPS offences are a strong indicator that the accused is likely to indulge in similar offences if released on bail, thereby failing the second condition under Section 37. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Prolonged Incarceration - Mere detention for a period of one year and seven months, where the accused faces a possible sentence of up to 20 years, does not by itself justify grant of bail on the ground of violation of Article 21 of the Constitution, particularly when statutory restrictions under special enactments like the NDPS Act are in play. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Sovereignty over Personal Liberty in Drug Cases - In matters involving the supply of narcotic drugs, which constitute a war against the nation affecting public health and the national economy, the sovereignty of the country must prevail over the personal liberty of the accused. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Strict Compliance with Section 37 NDPS Act - While dealing with applications for bail in cases involving commercial quantities of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, courts are mandatorily required to satisfy the twin conditions under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985 — i.e., (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence, and (ii) that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Failure to record such satisfaction renders the order granting bail unsustainable. State of Punjab v. Balraj Singh @ Billa, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 590 : 2026 INSC 618
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Conviction and sentence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for dishonour of cheque can be quashed, if the parties enter into a settlement and the offence is compounded under Section 147 of the NI Act. Parsharvanath Weld Wires v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 585
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - When a company or NGO authorises a specific individual to sign and issue cheques on its behalf, along with the responsibility of making payments under an agreement, such person is treated as the 'drawer' of the cheque and attracts criminal liability under S. 138 NI Act, upon dishonour. The Treasurer of an NGO, who was appointed as the authorised signatory to execute an MoU, sign cheques, and make payments to the respondent, was the 'face' of the organisation and solely responsible for the consequences of the dishonoured cheque. The Court clarified that the liability arises when the conditions under Section 141 NI Act are satisfied, even for authorised signatories. Mere designation as an authorised signatory does not automatically absolve personal liability if the person is the one who actually signed the cheque and was entrusted with the payment obligation. Reliance on Shri Gurudatta Sugars Marketing Pvt. Ltd. v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Deshmukh (2024) was held to be misplaced in the facts of this case. The conviction was upheld; however, considering the appellant was only the Treasurer, the sentence was modified. The appellant was directed to pay a fine of ₹1.5 crore to the respondent (TSSPDCL) within two months, with default rigorous imprisonment of one year. K. Ranganayakulu v. State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 605 : 2026 INSC 555
Official Secrets Act, 1923 - The appellant, a retired Major General and former Joint Secretary in the Cabinet Secretariat (R&AW), was prosecuted under Sections 3 and 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with Sections 409 and 120B IPC for publishing a book containing allegedly classified information relating to India's external intelligence. The CBI filed a chargesheet and sought to keep the relied-upon classified documents in a sealed cover. The Trial Court directed supply of the documents to the accused under Section 207 Cr.P.C. The High Court modified this order and permitted only inspection of the documents. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order. Documents forming part of the chargesheet which are relied upon by the prosecution must ordinarily be supplied to the accused. Withholding them merely on the ground that the case involves the Official Secrets Act is impermissible. The Court relied upon Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Satyen Bhowmick, (1981) 2 SCC 109, held that Section 14 of the OSA does not take away the valuable right of the accused to receive copies of relied-upon documents. The apprehension of the prosecution regarding national security is not sufficient to override this right. Adequate safeguards exist under Section 5 of the OSA, which penalises any unauthorised disclosure of such documents even by the accused or his lawyers outside the court proceedings. The Supreme Court directed the CBI to supply typed copies of the documents sought by the appellant under Section 207 Cr.P.C. within two months. Inspection of the documents, if required, may be permitted during court proceedings by the Trial Court. This judgment reinforces the primacy of fair trial rights even in cases involving national security and official secrets. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614
Official Secrets Act, 1923 - the invocation of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 does not bar or justify the denial of supply of documents relied upon by the prosecution in the chargesheet to the accused. Mere apprehension that supply of such documents would endanger the safety and security of the country is not a valid ground to withhold them. An accused has a statutory and fundamental right under Section 207 Cr.P.C. to receive copies of the documents relied upon in the chargesheet, as denial of the same would cause serious prejudice to his right to a fair trial and effective defence. V.K. Singh v. CBI, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 602 : 2026 INSC 614
Online Gaming - Alternative Source of State Legislative Competence – Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Independent of Entry 34, the State Legislatures derive complete competence to regulate and ban online staking platforms under Entry 1 of List II ("Public Order") - Public order is an expression of wide connotation that encompasses public safety, social tranquillity, and the prevention of social and economic disorders - The rampant, digitally-mediated addiction and massive financial accumulation by online platforms trap vulnerable sections and disrupt the "even tempo of the life of the community," creating an immediate threat to the orderly state of society. [Relied on: Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124; State of Rajasthan v. Shri G. Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544; Rev. Stainislaus v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1977) 1 SCC 677; Arun Ghosh v. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98; Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1; Paras: 332 – 357] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Online Gaming - Distinction and Correct Application of Landmark Precedents (RMDC Line & K.R. Lakshmanan) - Supreme Court clarified that the landmark rulings in RMDC-I, RMDC-II, and K.R. Lakshmanan were misunderstood by the High Courts - None of these decisions foreclosed the State's power over betting on games of skill – i. RMDC-I & RMDC-II Clarified - In RMDC-I, the definition of "prize competitions" was held to be a gambling adventure as it invited the general public to forecast uncertain future events where common masses lacked statistical expertise – the Supreme Court in RMDC-I approvingly cited Hamilton's Hedaya, which explicitly states that even chess (a game of pure skill) constitutes gambling if anything is staked - RMDC-II explicitly left scope for States to step in if games of substantial skill started to pose problems for the State or cause public harm; ii. K.R. Lakshmanan Clarified - The immunity granted to horse-racing was based on a specific statutory exception carved out by the legislature itself and was limited to highly-regulated betting inside the physical club premises on the day of the race. It cannot shield the "veil of invisibility" and uncontained access inherent in online cyberspace gaming. [Distinguished: State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala (RMDC-I), AIR 1957 SC 699; R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala v. Union of India (RMDC-II), AIR 1957 SC 628; Dr. K.R. Lakshmanan v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1996) 2 SCC 226; Paras 244-245, 251-253, 279, 282-289] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Online Gaming - Introduction of Stakes Converted Games of Skill into Betting/Gambling – Res Extra Commercium – Supreme Court ruled that while a genuine skill-based competition played without stakes does not amount to gambling, the moment real monetary stakes are introduced, the activity constitutes betting and gambling - A player or third person placing a bet on the uncertain outcome of a game of skill with the hope of winning more than what was staked transforms the business into a betting enterprise. [Relied on: M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1995 SC 1770; P.N. Krishna Lal v. Govt. of Kerala, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 187; Paras 264-320] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Online Gaming - No Manifest Arbitrariness under Article 14 – Empirical Evidence and Policy Decisions - The amended provisions do not suffer from manifest arbitrariness or discrimination under Article 14 - The classification and prohibition of staking money in cyberspace are backed by empirical studies, expert committee reports (such as the Justice K. Chandru Committee), and large-scale public surveys detailing severe socio-economic distress, gaming addiction, financial ruins, and child development harms - The State is fully competent to take such policy decisions for public welfare. [Relied on: Polestar Electronic (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner, Sales Tax, (1978) 1 SCC 636; Paras 292, 305, 306 – 331, 350-365] State of Tamil Nadu v. Junglee Games India Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 591 : 2026 INSC 594
Penal Code, 1860 — Section 120-B — Criminal Conspiracy to Commit Murder — Liability for Foreseeable Crimes - To establish criminal conspiracy under Section 120-A, a meeting of minds to execute an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is vital - Direct evidence is rarely available, and conspiracy can be inferred from surrounding circumstances and conduct - One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is jointly liable for every reasonably foreseeable crime committed by other members in furtherance of the common design, irrespective of whether they directly participated in or had specific knowledge of the collateral act - Where a group forcefully separates victims to steal a vehicle using deadly weapons (Gandasa), causing grievous hurt or murder is a foregone, foreseeable conclusion - The conspirator maintaining a vigil while co-participants execute the killings is justifiably liable under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC. [Paras 50 – 55] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 364A – Demand for Ransom – Proof through Oral Testimony - The defence argued that the absence of Call Detail Records (CDRs) and a Section 65-B certificate under the Evidence Act was fatal to establishing a ransom demand – Held that Unlike cases purely dependent on electronic evidence, the present case features consistent, unshaken, and corroborative oral testimonies from multiple witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-3) coupled with the Investigating Officer's testimony (PW-7) proving a ransom demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs - The lack of a CDR from a rural telephone exchange in 2003 cannot paralyze the criminal justice system when substantive oral evidence remains cogent and unimpeached. [Paras 23-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 364A & Section 368 – Kidnapping for Ransom – Ingredients and Proof – Arms Act, 1959 – Section 25 – Conviction Upheld -– Threat to Life or Hurt – Firearm Usage - The appellants challenged their conviction under Section 364A IPC contending that no explicit threat to cause death or hurt was administered to the 8-year-old victim - Held that stopping young, defenceless children on their way to school by brandishing a .315 bore country-made pistol inherently constitutes a severe threat to cause death or hurt - The active use of a lethal weapon satisfies the statutory requirement of a threat under Section 364A IPC. [Paras 21-30] Harjindra Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 598 : 2026 INSC 569
Penal Code, 1860 - Sentence Modification — Substitution of Life Imprisonment with Period Already Undergone - While maintaining the conviction under Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC, the Supreme Court took into account that the incident dated back to 1984, the co-convicts had been granted state remission, and the appellant had served over 18 years of actual imprisonment - Modifying a life sentence to a fixed-term sentence or the period already undergone is permissible provided the sentence served exceeds 14 years - Sentence modified to the period already undergone, and immediate release directed. [Paras 45 - 62] Gopi Chand @ Pappu v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 609 : 2026 INSC 598
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 420 — Cheating — Essential Ingredients - To constitute the offence of cheating, there must exist deception, fraudulent inducement, and consequential delivery of property coupled with dishonest intention at the inception of the transaction - A disputed civil claim pending before a competent civil court cannot automatically be treated as a fraudulent misrepresentation so as to attract Section 420 of the IPC, especially in the absence of any allegation that the complainant delivered any property, money, or valuable security to the accused. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 384, 504, 506, and 511 — Extortion & Criminal Intimidation — Vague Allegations - Where the FIR fails to specify the date, place, or exact circumstances of the alleged demand of money, and no property or money was actually delivered pursuant to such a threat, the ingredients of extortion under Section 384 are absent - General observations that the accused "tried" to extort money cannot automatically attract Section 511 of the IPC when the substantive allegations are completely vague - allegations under Sections 504 and 506 fail when the FIR does not disclose the exact words uttered or the surrounding circumstances of intimidation - when substantive offences are not made out, the charge of conspiracy under Section 120-B necessarily fails - Criminal antecedents cannot constitute the sole or even the primary basis to decline the quashing of criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC - It is the duty of the Court to see whether the essential ingredients of the alleged offences in the impugned FIR are prima facie made out - General observations regarding the "modus operandi" or "proclivity" of the accused cannot replace the requirement of fulfilling the basic ingredients of the offences. Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Sections 463, 464, 465, 467, 468, and 471 — Forgery — Making of a "False Document" — Disputed Claim of Title - The essential ingredient of forgery is the making of a "false document" as defined under Section 464 of the IPC - When a person executes a document (such as a Power of Attorney) claiming a property as their own or asserting a share pursuant to revenue entries, they are not pretending to be someone else, nor is it a case of impersonation or forged signatures - A disputed claim of title, whether ultimately sustainable in law or not, cannot be equated with the making of a false document - If the document is not a false document, there is no forgery, and Sections 467 and 471 of the IPC are not attracted. [Relied on Mohd. Ibrahim v. State of Bihar, (2009) 8 SCC 751] Bhikhubhai Govindbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 593 : 2026 INSC 532
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – Liability of public servant for indirect demand of bribe through subordinates – Scope of “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person - A public servant is liable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 even if he does not personally demand or receive the bribe, provided he attempts to obtain an undue advantage through a third party or for the benefit of another person (including subordinates). Explanation 2 to Section 7 expressly covers situations where the illegal gratification is sought indirectly or for another person, and the actual receipt of the bribe is not essential for attracting liability at the prima facie stage. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court which had quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector on the ground that there was no direct demand or acceptance of bribe by him. The Court held that the Sub-Inspector's alleged instructions to the complainant to “do something for the other police officials” or “make those boys happy”, coupled with a demand of ₹50,000 routed through a third person and subordinates, constituted a veiled demand and an “attempt to obtain undue advantage for another person” within the meaning of Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 of the PC Act. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 7 read with Explanation 2 – The requirement of a direct, personal and express demand by the public servant himself is not warranted by the statute. Explanation 2 broadens the scope to include indirect demands and benefits to others. Senior public servants cannot escape liability by orchestrating the collection of bribes through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability. A narrow interpretation of Section 7 would create a dangerous loophole in anti-corruption law and render Explanation 2 redundant. At the stage of quashing an FIR, the Court must examine whether the allegations prima facie disclose commission of the offence. Questions of guilt or innocence are to be decided at trial. The FIR and all consequential proceedings against the accused public servant were restored. State by Lokayuktha Police v. Sri K. Rangayya, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 587 : 2026 INSC 574
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - In exercise of its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court set aside the conviction and sentence of the appellant under Sections 5(1) and 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012 (10 years rigorous imprisonment) after the appellant and the victim solemnised their marriage following the victim attaining the age of majority and the appellant paid ₹10,00,000 as compensation to the victim. The Court took note of subsequent events, including the victim's statements expressing her desire to settle the matter and live with the appellant as his spouse, and the absence of any objection from the State (subject to the order not being treated as a precedent). The appeals were allowed and the judgments of the Trial Court and Madras High Court were set aside. The appellant and the victim were left free to live peacefully as spouses in society. Maruthupandi v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 614
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — Rule 9(3), Rule 9(4), and Rule 9(5) — Mandatory Nature of Timelines for Payment of Auction Sale Consideration — Absence of Written Agreement for Extension of Time — Effect of Non-Compliance - Setting aside the auction sale, the Supreme Court held that the provisions of Rule 9 of the SARFAESI Rules are not ornamental or directory, but are couched in mandatory terms that go to the root of the validity of the sale - Under Rule 9(4), the balance purchase price must be paid within fifteen days of the confirmation of the sale, or within such extended period as agreed upon in writing between the parties - Any deviation from this timeline, in the absolute absence of a demonstrably valid written agreement for an extension executed prior to the payment, constitutes a material irregularity that completely vitiates the auction process - The failure of the borrower or guarantor's legal heirs to liquidate outstanding dues cannot serve to validate or sanctify a sale process that is fundamentally infirm and non-compliant with the governing statutory rules. [Relied on Sri Siddeshwara Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal, (2013) 10 SCC 83; IDBI Bank Ltd. v. Ramswaroop Daliya, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2878; Paras 25 – 42] M.R. Vasumathi v. Authorized Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 613 : 2026 INSC 633
Service Jurisprudence – Delay and Laches – Continuing Cause of Action – Arrears Limitation – Held - Pensionary benefits constitute a recurring and continuing cause of action - A substantive claim for pension cannot be rejected or defeated solely on the ground of delay and laches - the grant of financial arrears must be balanced with settled principles of limitation; where the claim was not raised prior to approaching the court, arrears shall remain restricted to a period of three years and two months preceding the filing of the Original Application before the Tribunal. [Relied on Jagrit Mazdoor Union (Regd.) and Others v. Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. and Another, 1990 Supp SCC 113; Yashwant Hari Katakkar v. Union of India and Others, (1996) 7 SCC 113; M.L. Patil (Dead) through LRs v. State of Goa and Another, (2023) 1 SCC 660; Vinod Kumar and Others v. Union of India and Others, (2024) 9 SCC 327; Jaggo v. Union of India and Others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826; Paras 79-83] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Service Jurisprudence – State as a Model Employer – Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14, 38, 39, and 43 – Equity and Social Justice – Held that long-serving employees who have rendered continuous, uninterrupted service spanning decades and have been functionally assimilated into the regular framework cannot be retained in a precarious status to deny them social security - The distinction between temporary and permanent employment becomes substantively illusory when the nature of duties performed is identical to regular employees - The State, as a model employer, is bound by constitutional mandates to ensure fair conditions of work and economic justice. [Paras 35-40] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Service Law - A person with higher qualification cannot be appointed to a post exclusively reserved for candidates with lower educational qualifications - Suppression of higher qualification renders appointment non-est. The Supreme Court held that when a post is specifically earmarked for candidates possessing lower educational qualifications (e.g., up to 10th standard), a candidate who possesses higher qualifications and suppresses the same to secure appointment deprives genuinely eligible and deserving candidates of the opportunity. Such an appointment is liable to be cancelled. The State, as a model employer, is justified in reserving certain posts for less educated persons so that they are not required to compete with more highly qualified candidates. Permitting over-qualified candidates to occupy such posts would defeat the very object of the reservation. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581
Service Law – Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) – Non-communication of Entries: Obligation to communicate ACR entries, adverse or otherwise - The respondents contended that prior to the 2008-09 policy shift, only 'Average' or 'Below Average' gradings were communicable – Held that the nomenclature of an entry is immaterial; its determinative effect is what matters - Even a 'Good' or 'Very Good' entry becomes adverse in character if it makes an incumbent ineligible for promotion or prejudicially affects empanelment prospects - Non-communication of such entries carries civil consequences, depriving the employee of a fair opportunity to seek redressal or make representations. [Paras 12 – 17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Department of Posts – Casual Labourers (Grant of Temporary Status and Regularisation) Scheme, 1991 – Circular dated 30.11.1992 – Rule 10(1-B) of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 – Entitlement of temporary status casual labourers to pensionary benefits in the absence of formal regularisation – Held - A casual labourer, upon conferment of "temporary status" and subsequent completion of three years of continuous service in that capacity, is treated at par with temporary Group 'D' employees - This parity functions as a parity in substantive service benefits (including leave, increments, GPF, and pensionary benefits) rather than an identity of formal service status - The expression "after regularisation" in Clause 6 of the 1991 Scheme does not restrict or act as a mandatory prerequisite for the core entitlement to a pension; rather, it provides an additional benefit of counting 50% of the past temporary status service towards retirement benefits once a formal order of regularisation is passed - The foundational right to a pension for such employees flows independently from the operational framework of the Scheme, the Departmental Circular dated 30.11.1992, and Rule 10(1-B) of the CCS (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965 - If a temporary status casual labourer completes the minimum qualifying service of 10 years after attaining parity with temporary Group 'D' employees, they are entitled to superannuation pension, retirement gratuity, and family pension upon death, even in the absolute absence of a formal order of regularisation. [Paras 47-76] Bhikhani Devi v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 582 : 2026 INSC 612
Service Law – Destruction of Records – Weeding Out During Pendency of Litigation – Adverse Inference - The respondents admitted that the appellant's original ACR service records were destroyed/weeded out in 2013, despite the active pendency of the present civil appeal before the Supreme Court filed in 2009 – Held that Service records are mandatorily required to be retained until the final conclusion of judicial proceedings - The destruction of the records during the pendency of the litigation severely prejudiced the appellant's case and precluded judicial scrutiny - a strong adverse inference is liable to be drawn against the employer-respondents. [Paras 15-17] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Fixation of Pay – Weightage for Past Service – Promissory Estoppel – Withdrawal of pay weightage benefits on the ground that Railway Service is not Central Government Civil Service – Held that unjustified, The Board, having explicitly accepted the pro-rata pension contribution from the Railways and acted upon its own "Board Orders" and settlements for years, is estopped from unilaterally withdrawing the benefit of weightage from the appellant - The High Court erred in holding that because the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964 and CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 do not apply to railway servants, their service cannot be reckoned for pay fixation. [Relied on Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36; Moti Ram Deka v. North East Frontier Railway, AIR 1964 SC 60; State of Assam v. Kanak Chandra Dutta, AIR 1967 SC 884; Paras 32-39, 44 - 47] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562
Service Law – Promotion – Applicable Rules – Date of Vacancy vs. Date of Consideration – Recruitment Rules – Amendment by Substitution – Meaning and Effect - Held that the right to be considered for promotion is governed exclusively by the statutory rules in force at the time the actual consideration for promotion takes place, and not by the rules that existed when the vacancies originally arose - Public servants do not possess a vested right to be considered under the old or repealed rules - Held that the term "substitution" used in amending or subordinate legislation ordinarily has the effect of deleting the old provision and bringing the new provision into existence in its place - The old rule ceases to exist from the text, and subsequent consideration must be done under the newly substituted rules unless the legislature intended otherwise - Where promotions were granted on a purely ad-hoc basis subject to the outcome of a pending litigation, they do not constitute a "completed act" or create a vested right to protection under the repealed rules - Allowing the Civil Appeal, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment - The Apex Court held that the legal foundation applied by the High Court was incorrect in view of the three-Judge bench decision in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Raj Kumar (2022), which explicitly overruled the Y.V. Rangaiah doctrine - Supreme Court ordered that all existing vacancies must be filled strictly in accordance with the 2016 Rules. [Relied on State of Himachal Pradesh & Others v. Raj Kumar & Others, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 680; State of Odisha & Ors. v. Sreepati Ranjan Dash, 2026 INSC 505; Gottumukkala Venkata Krishamraju v. Union of India & Others, (2019) 17 SCC 590; Zile Singh v. State of Haryana & Others, (2004) 8 SCC 1; Paras 20- 30] Jagdish Prasad v.P.M. Manoj Kumar, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 596 : 2026 INSC 572
Service Law – Promotion – Indian Railway Medical Service – Evaluation Criteria & Allocation of Points - Challenge to non-promotion to the post of Chief Medical Director in Higher Administrative Grade (HAG) - The Railway Board's promotion policy dated 22.05.1996 prescribed a whole-number point system for Annual Confidential Report (ACR) gradings - The Selection Committee awarded the appellant a fractional score of 19.5 points despite her five-year ACR grading being uniformly 'Very Good' (which mandated 20 points) – Held that there is no provision in the promotion policy for awarding points in fractions - The assessment was made without an objective basis, and the appellant must be deemed to have secured 20 points based on her consistent 'Very Good' gradings. [Paras 16] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Retrospective Promotion – Retiral Benefits vs. Arrears of Salary - Appellant retired from service during the pendency of litigation – Held that where an employee is found to have been treated unfairly in the promotional evaluation, but the original service records are unavailable due to inadvertent weeding out, granting dynamic monetary relief like arrears of salary on a 'no work, no pay' relaxation may not be feasible - the ends of justice are met by directing the grant of notional promotion from the date her juniors were promoted, along with a mandatory re-fixation of pension and payment of retiral arrears. [Relied on Prabhat Ranjan Singh v. R.K. Kushwaha, 2018 INSC 796; Dev Dutt v. Union of India, 2008 INSC 630; distinguished from Union of India v. Chaman Rana, 2018 INSC 230; Paras 18, 19] Dr. Indira Saranath v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 577 : 2026 INSC 553
Service Law – Status of Railway Servants – Civil Post under the Union – Article 309 and Article 311 of the Constitution of India – Whether a railway servant ceases to be a member of the civil service of the Union merely because separate service rules govern their recruitment, conduct, control, and pension – Held that No, A railway servant remains a person holding a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Union under the administrative control of the Central Government - The delegation of powers to the Railway Board does not separate the status of a railway servant from that of a Central Government employee, as the Railway Board functions as the Government of India itself for railway administration - Service under the Railway Board is service under the Central Government. [Paras 42, 43] Bency John v.Kerala State Electricity Board, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 576 : 2026 INSC 562
Service Law - The respondent was appointed as a temporary Bank Attendant in Syndicate Bank against a post reserved for candidates having qualifications up to the 10th standard. He concealed the fact that he was a graduate. The Management terminated his services upon discovering the suppression. The High Court set aside the termination and ordered reinstatement. The Supreme Court reversed the High Court's order. Held, Mere possession of higher qualification does not entitle a candidate to claim appointment to a post for which lower qualification is prescribed. - Suppression of higher educational qualification in such cases amounts to fraud on the public employment process. - Public employment must be offered strictly in accordance with the prescribed qualifications so that all eligible candidates get a fair opportunity. Appeal allowed. Termination of the respondent upheld. [Relied on: Jomon K.K. v. Shajimon P. & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 381. General Manager (Hr) v. K. Poovarasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 595 : 2026 INSC 581
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Key Legal Findings by Supreme Court – i. Validity of Agreement- The Supreme Court restored the Trial Court's finding that the sale agreement was genuine and valid, noting that the defendant's plea of it being a "security document" was an improbable afterthought unsupported by evidence; ii. Adverse Inference- The defendants' failure to reply to the plaintiff's legal notice creates an adverse inference against them; iii. Readiness and Willingness Established - The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, by paying approximately 93% of the consideration and issuing a legal notice promptly after the defendants became evasive, demonstrated sufficient continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Act. A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573
Specific Relief Act, 1963 – Section 16(c) – Readiness and Willingness – Requirement of – Readiness and willingness must be gathered from the entirety of facts and circumstances, including the overall conduct of parties - It is not a theoretical requirement; payment of a substantial portion of the sale consideration can be a significant indicator of the plaintiff's readiness - so long as a suit for specific performance is filed within the period of limitation, mere delay cannot be a ground for refusing the relief - reiterated that the question of readiness and willingness is a question of fact to be determined based on the conduct of the parties and material circumstances. [Relied on Madhukar Nivrutti Jagtap v. Pramilabai Chandulal Parandekar (2020) 15 SCC 731; Paras 11-21] A. Shahul Hameed v. N. Malligarjuna, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 604 : 2026 INSC 573