Alignment of PPAs with Regulations — Held that terms and conditions of a PPA are not unregulated and must be aligned with the Regulations framed by the Appropriate Commission under the 2003 Act - Even if a PPA is amended, it must factor in the statutory definitions of "COD" and "Unit" as provided in the CERC/State Regulations - An unapproved PPA that defines COD based on...
Alignment of PPAs with Regulations — Held that terms and conditions of a PPA are not unregulated and must be aligned with the Regulations framed by the Appropriate Commission under the 2003 Act - Even if a PPA is amended, it must factor in the statutory definitions of "COD" and "Unit" as provided in the CERC/State Regulations - An unapproved PPA that defines COD based on "Project Completion" (requiring combined cycle capacity) is in direct conflict with Regulations that recognize COD in relation to an individual "Unit" (Open Cycle) - Under Section 61(d) of the 2003 Act, the recovery of the cost of electricity in a reasonable manner must be ensured- Held that the respondent supplied continuous power (firm power) from the gas turbine unit during the relevant period, it is entitled to pro-rata fixed charges in addition to variable charges- Appeal dismissed. [Paras 25-32] Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. v. Penna Electricity Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1213 : 2025 INSC 1439
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 29A(4) & 29A(6) - Termination of Mandate and Substitution of Arbitrator – Held, upon the expiry of the initial or extended period for making an arbitral award, the arbitrator cannot proceed with the proceedings as the mandate terminates by operation of law, making the arbitrator functus officio - While this termination is not "absolute" and is subject to court-ordered extensions under Section 29A(4), the court is empowered and obligated under Section 29A(6) to substitute the arbitrator to effectuate the object of the Act, which is the expeditious resolution of disputes - The power of substitution under Section 29A(6) is a separate remedy from those available under Sections 14 and 15 - In the present case, where the mandate expired on 28.02.2023 and the arbitrator failed to pass an award, the High Court erred in merely granting an extension without considering that the mandate had ceased to exist; thus, substitution was warranted - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd. - 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2494; Paras 9-13] Mohan Lal Fatehpuria v. Bharat Textiles, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1190 : 2025 INSC 1409
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Doctrine of Competence-Competence – Limits at Referral Stage – Held that the "hands-off" approach of referral courts does not apply where there is absolutely no prima facie evidence of an intent to effect a legal relationship between the parties- Allowing absolute strangers to force an arbitration reference by merely claiming to be a "veritable party" would lead to "disastrous consequences." [Relied on ASF Buildtech Private Limited vs. Shapoorji Pallonji and Company Private Limited (2025) 9 SCC 76; Paras 38-39] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184 : 2025 INSC 1401
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Privity of Contract and Assignment – Consent Requirement – Held that Rights under a contract are assignable unless the contract is personal or prohibited by agreement, but obligations cannot be assigned without the promisee's consent- Where the tender conditions expressly prohibited subletting or assignment without prior written consent, a unilateral "Settlement-cum-Assignment Agreement" between a contractor and a sub-vendor cannot bind the principal employer to an arbitration agreement. [Relied on Khardah Company Limited vs. Raymon & Co. (1963) 3 SCR 183; Paras 24-30] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184 : 2025 INSC 1401
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11(4) and Section 11(6-A) – Joinder of Non-Signatory– "Veritable Party" Doctrine – Scope of Referral Court's Jurisdiction– Held that While a referral court should generally leave complex questions of joinder to the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 16, it is not a "monotonous automation."- The court must be prima facie satisfied that the non-signatory is a "veritable party" (genuinely intended to be bound) before making a reference- Mere commercial relationship or marking of emails to the principal employer does not establish a legal relationship or intent to bind a third-party sub-vendor to the main arbitration agreement. [Relied on Cox and Kings Limited vs. Sap India Private Limited and Another (2024) 4 SCC 1; Paras 24-35] Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1184 : 2025 INSC 1401
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996– Section 38(2)– Termination of Arbitral Proceedings for Non-Payment of Fees– Distinction between 'Termination of Proceedings' and 'Termination of Mandate'– The Supreme Court clarified the legal framework surrounding the termination of arbitral proceedings due to a party's failure to deposit the required fees- i. Source of Power to Terminate- Held that under Section 38(2), if a party fails to pay their share of the deposit, and the other party also declines to pay that share, the Arbitral Tribunal is empowered to suspend or terminate the arbitral proceedings in respect of the claim or counter-claim; ii. Mandate vs. Proceedings- There exists a critical distinction between the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator (which refers to the authority and duty to adjudicate) and the termination of the proceedings themselves; iii. Effect of Termination under Section 38- Termination of proceedings under Section 38 does not automatically imply the withdrawal of the arbitrator from office under Sections 14 or 15- Instead, it results in the termination of the proceedings under Section 32(2)(c) because the continuation of proceedings has become "impossible."; iv. Procedural Self-Responsibility- Supreme Court emphasized that the consequence of termination is intended to penalize inertia and recalcitrance- Permitting a party whose conduct led to termination to simply restart the mechanism before a new arbitrator would defeat the principle of "procedural self-responsibility. [Relied on Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Afcons Gunanusa JV (2022); Paras 84-95, 252-263] Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1183 : 2025 INSC 1400
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXI Rules 97, 99, and 101 — Powers of Executing Court regarding Lok Adalat Awards — Held, while these provisions enable an Executing Court to address incidental questions during execution (such as the extent of enforceability against a person in possession), they do not authorize the court to examine the validity of the award itself or declare the decree based upon it void - The Executing Court has no authority to annul or set aside a decree that embodies a Lok Adalat award, nor can it sit in judgment over the validity of the compromise. Filing objections in execution cannot be treated as an "efficacious alternative remedy" that bars writ relief. [Paras 15-19] Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1188
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI Rules 89, 90, 92(3), 92(4), and 97-104 – Execution of Decree– Maintainability of Separate Suit vs. Executing Court's Jurisdiction- Supreme Court ruled that once an auction sale is confirmed and the aggrieved party has not sought to set it aside, a separate suit challenging the order confirming the sale is expressly barred under Order XXI Rule 92(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure- Held that the appropriate remedy in such cases is to move an application under Section 47 CPC, limited to grounds such as lack of jurisdiction or nullity of the order- Supreme Court delineated the narrow scope for filing a separate suit to challenge an auction sale confirmed under Order XXI Rule 92- i. Bar under Order XXI Rule 92(3)- A separate suit is generally barred to set aside an order confirming a sale if the grounds (irregularity or fraud in publishing/conducting the sale) could have been raised via applications under Rules 89, 90, or 91; ii. Narrow Exception for "Nullity"- A separate suit may be maintainable only if the execution proceedings and the resulting sale were without jurisdiction and thus a "nullity"; iii. Section 47 CPC Bar- Even if a sale is alleged to be a nullity, a separate suit is barred if the plaintiff is a "party" to the original suit or their "representative" (including pendente lite transferees). Such persons must agitate grievances before the Executing Court under Section 47; iv. Third-Party Suits under Rule 92(4)- A "third party" (not a party to the suit or their representative) may challenge the judgment-debtor's title by filing a separate suit against the auction-purchaser, provided the decree-holder and judgment-debtor are joined as parties- Held that a party cannot bypass the limitation period prescribed for challenging an execution sale under Order XXI Rules 89, 90 or 91 CPC by filing an application under Section 47 CPC after the sale has already been confirmed. [Relied on Harnandrai Badridas v. Debidutt Bhagwati Prasad (1973) 2 SCC 467; Paras 70, 121-128; 141-147; 205, 213, 220- 222] Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1211 : 2025 INSC 1434
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 136 — Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XXIII Rule 1 and Order XLVII Rule 7(1) — Maintainability of second Special Leave Petition (SLP) — Public Policy and Finality of Litigation - Held that a second SLP is not maintainable against a judgment that was earlier challenged and resulted in an abortive outcome, such as an unconditional withdrawal or a dismissal without reasons, especially where no specific liberty was granted to approach the Supreme Court again - The principle derived from Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC applies to SLPs under Article 136 - Permitting a party to return to the Court to challenge the same order after an unsuccessful review in the High Court without having obtained prior liberty to move for special leave again amounts to "re-litigation" and violates the doctrine of finality (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium). [Relied on Upadhyay and Co. v. State of U.P. (1999) 1 SCC 81] Kangra Central Cooperative Bank v. Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1205 : 2025 INSC 1416
Constitution of India, 1950 – Articles 14 and 16 – Compassionate Appointment, whether a matter of right – Held, compassionate appointment is an exception to the general rule of public employment and is not a vested right- The objective is to enable the family of a deceased employee to tide over sudden financial crisis on humanitarian grounds. It is a concession and not a right- The mere eligibility of an applicant does not entitle them to a specific post or a higher post than what was held by the deceased- Once a dependent has applied for, accepted, and joined a post on compassionate grounds, the right to be considered for such appointment stands consummated- No further or second consideration for a higher post arises, as it would lead to "endless compassion"- The purpose of relieving the family's financial distress is served once the initial appointment is made. [Relied on Umesh Kumar Nagpal vs. State of Haryana & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 138; State of Karnataka v. V. Somyashree (2021) 12 SCC 20; State of Rajasthan v. Umrao Singh (1994) 6 SCC 560; Paras 11- 12] Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1203 : 2025 INSC 1423
Constitution of India: Article 21 - Applicability of Section 436-A CrPC - Article 21 vs. National Security - Supreme Court clarified that Section 436-A CrPC expressly excludes offences for which death is a prescribed punishment - the accused were charged under Section 302 IPC and Section 16 UAPA (both punishable by death), they were ineligible for bail under this specific provision - While Article 21 rights (speedy trial, liberty) are sacrosanct and apply to all prisoners, they are not absolute - In cases involving "heinous offences" that threaten national security or sovereign authority, individual liberty must be balanced against the integrity of the nation - In statutes like UAPA where a "reverse burden of proof" exists (Section 43E), prolonged incarceration is particularly "insidious." - Held that the State and Judiciary must ensure such accused are "meaningfully equipped" with legal aid and resources to reclaim their innocence, as procedural delays otherwise make liberty "hostage to clogged dockets." - Held that the High Court erred in its initial legal reasoning for granting bail, the Supreme Court declined to cancel it- Noted the "glacial pace" of the trial (15 years pending) and that the accused had not misused their liberty, influenced witnesses, or delayed the trial during the three years they were out on bail. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb (2021) 3 SCC 713; Paras 11-16, 18, 19, 21, 22] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1196 : 2025 INSC 1418
Constitution of India – Article 142 – Dissolution of Marriage – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13(1)(i-a) – Cruelty – Long Separation as Mental Cruelty - Supreme Court exercised its discretionary power under Article 142 to dissolve a marriage that had been a "legal fiction" for over two decades - The parties had been living separately for 24 years with no children from the wedlock and unsuccessful mediation attempts- Held that where a marriage is wrecked beyond hope of salvage, public interest lies in recognizing the reality rather than keeping parties tied to a dead relationship - Held, a long period of continuous separation without any hope of reconciliation amounts to mental cruelty to both parties - The spouses' strongly held views and refusal to accommodate each other for a long period constitute conduct that makes the matrimonial bond beyond repair - The power to do "complete justice" under Article 142(1) is not fettered by the doctrine of fault and blame applicable to standard divorce petitions under the Hindu Marriage Act - Even if one spouse opposes the dissolution, the Court can grant a divorce if the marriage is irretrievably broken down. [Relied on Shilpa Sailesh vs. Varun Sreenivasan, (2023) 14 SCC 231; Rakesh Raman vs. Kavita, (2023) 17 SCC 433; Samar Ghosh vs. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511; Naveen Kohli vs. Neelu Kohli, (2006) 4 SCC 558; Paras 23-33] N v. A, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1210 : 2025 INSC 1436
Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to Speedy Trial – Prolonged Incarceration – The right to a speedy trial is an inseparable facet of Article 21- Unduly long deprivation of liberty pending trial strikes at the heart of constitutional guarantees- If the State or prosecuting agency lacks the wherewithal to ensure a speedy trial, it cannot oppose bail solely on the ground of the seriousness of the offense- Article 21 applies irrespective of the nature of the crime. [Relied on Javed Gulam Nabi Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 9 SCC 813; Paras 12, 14] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440
Consumer Protection – Repudiation of Insurance Claim – Fire Insurance – Proximate Cause vs. Preceding Event – Held, once it is established that loss is caused by a specified peril like "Fire," the cause igniting the fire becomes immaterial unless it stems from a peril expressly excluded under that specific head- The insurer cannot refuse to indemnify damage caused by fire on the ground that the fire was triggered by an incident (theft/burglary) which is excluded under a different clause (RSMD - Riot, Strike, and Malicious Damage), especially when the "Fire" peril clause itself does not list theft as an exclusion- Exclusion clauses must be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of the insured in case of ambiguity- An exclusion clause cannot be interpreted in a way that conflicts with the main purpose of the contract or "crosses swords" with the primary object of indemnification- reaffirmed that the law does not look into the "causes of causes." - As long as there is an actual fire, something on fire that ought not to be, and the fire is accidental (not instigated by the insured), any loss attributable to it is covered- Supreme Court allowed a fire insurance claim, noting that the insurer can't deny claim saying that the proximate cause of fire was not provided in the specified peril- Appeal allowed. [Relied on New India Assurance Company Limited v. Mudit Roadways (2024) 3 SCC 193; Texco Marketing Private Limited v. Tata AIG General Insurance Company Limited (2023) 1 SCC 428; Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. 2025 SCC OnLine 2309; Paras 20-28] Cement Corporation of India v. ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1215 : 2025 INSC 1444
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971- Section 12 - Power to punish and forgive - Statutory Scheme of Apology – Precedents - Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta – Held, the power to punish for contempt necessarily carries the concomitant power to forgive when a contemnor demonstrates genuine remorse and repentance - Courts must exercise contempt jurisdiction with circumspection, ensuring the power is not used as a personal armor for Judges or a sword to silence criticism - Once a contemnor expresses sincere remorse and tenders an unconditional apology at the earliest opportunity, the Court should examine if such an apology satisfies the statutory parameters under Section 12 for discharge or remission of sentence - While the majesty of law must be preserved, Section 12 recognizes human fallibility - The proviso and Explanation to Section 12 empower the Court to discharge a contemnor or remit a sentence if the apology is bona fide, even if it is qualified or conditional - In the absence of material suggesting an apology lacks bona fides, Courts should consider remitting the sentence in accordance with law - A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides - The binding element of a judgment is its ratio decidendi - the principle derived from the application of law to specific facts—and not every observation or isolated sentence. Earlier decisions can only be applied as precedents where the factual matrix is materially similar - Appeal allowed. [Relied on. Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi (1996) 6 SCC 44; Royal Medical Trust v. Union of India (2017) 16 SCC 605; Paras 9-10] Vineeta Srinandan v. High Court of Judicature at Bombay, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1192 : 2025 INSC 1408
Contract Act, 1872 - Section 74 - Inapplicability to Court -Supervised Sales - Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate - Conduct of Litigant - A forfeiture condition stipulated by the NCLT while granting an extension of time in a liquidation proceeding cannot be equated with a forfeiture clause in a private contract - a defaulting purchaser cannot invoke Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act to seek a refund on the grounds that the stakeholders suffered no actual loss - A party cannot "approbate and reprobate" by acting upon an order (e.g., making partial payments after an extension is granted) and subsequently assailing the conditions of that same order - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Kridhan Infrastructure Private Limited vs. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan and others, (2021) 6 SCC 94; Paras 12-19] Shri Karshni Alloys v. Ramakrishnan Sadasivan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1195 : 2025 INSC 1411
Contract Law – Agreement to Sale – Suppression of Encumbrance – Refund of Advance – Suit for refund of advance money decreed in favour of the purchaser where the seller suppressed the existence of a prior mortgage - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the Trial Court's decree and held that the fraudulent suppression of encumbrances on the property in an agreement to sell constitutes a valid ground for refund of advance payment - Held that High Court laid "undue emphasis" on an abstract sentence in cross-examination suggesting the appellant had knowledge of the bank liability on August 25, 2008 - This was "totally misplaced" as the parties had no interaction prior to September 2008, a fact admitted by the respondent himself - The respondent's failure to reply to a legal notice alleging concealment and his subsequent agreement to reduce the sale price by ₹35 Lakhs were significant reflections of "deceit practiced by him" - Held that it is common practice for landowners to keep original title deeds in bank lockers. Therefore, the appellant's explanation for not insisting on inspecting original deeds at the time of the agreement (where only 10% of the consideration was paid) was "reasonable and justified" - Held that the Trial Court committed no error in decreeing the suit. The High Court's judgment was set aside. [Paras 29-32] Moideenkutty v. Abraham George, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1207 : 2025 INSC 1428
Criminal Jurisprudence – Bail – "Bail is the rule and jail is the exception" – Rights of Undertrials – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Supreme Court reiterated that criminal law presumes a person to be innocent until proven guilty- an under-trial prisoner should not be jailed indefinitely unless there is a clear threat to society, risk of influencing witnesses, or flight risk- emphasized that the legal process should not itself become a punishment. [Relied on Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713; Para 11] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440
Criminal Law — Circumstantial Evidence — Last Seen Together — Non-disclosure of essential facts in FIR — Fatal Omissions — Investigation Lapses — Appeal against conviction under Sections 363, 376(2)(i), 201 IPC and Sections 3/4 of POCSO Act - Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant who had remained incarcerated for nearly thirteen years - The First Information Report (FIR), lodged by an informant (PW-1) who claimed complete knowledge of the incident, failed to mention the names or descriptions of the four boys who purportedly saw the accused pushing the child victim out of his house – Held, the omission of such vital facts, including the identity of material witnesses and the "last seen together" circumstance, brings the entire prosecution case under a grave cloud of doubt - Reconfirming the "five golden principles" (Panchsheel) for conviction based on circumstantial evidence as laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda Case - The chain of evidence incomplete and the testimony of the "last seen" witnesses to be unconvincing, dubitable, and potentially "cooked up" - To ensure clarity and efficient appreciation of evidence, the Supreme Court issued mandatory directions to all trial Courts across India to incorporate structured tabulated charts at the conclusion of every criminal judgment, summarizing witnesses examined, documents exhibited, and material objects produced - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Amar Nath Jha v. Nand Kishore Singh, (2018) 9 SCC 137; Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026; down in Sharad Birdhichand Sharda v. State of Maharashtra, (1984) 4 SCC 116; Paras 22, 34, 35, 68, 76- 82] Manojbhai Jethabhai Parmar v. State of Gujarat, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1208 : 2025 INSC 1433
Criminal Procedure – Bail Cancellation – Ground of non-appearance before Police Station – Sustainability of cancellation when Trial is in progress – Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had cancelled the appellant's bail solely due to non-compliance with a condition requiring appearance at the police station on the 1st and 16th of every month- Supreme Court observed that the appellant had already undergone custody for 1 year and 11 months prior to the initial grant of bail and was regularly appearing before the Trial Court- Supreme Court laid down key principles- i. Police Presence vs. Trial Attendance: Once a chargesheet has been filed and the case is committed to the Court of Sessions for trial, a condition requiring the accused to appear at a police station is prima facie not tenable if the accused is already appearing regularly before the Trial Court; ii. Reasonableness of Grounds: Cancellation of bail merely on the "pretext" of non-appearance at a police station, without evidence of the accused failing to attend trial proceedings, is not a correct approach or a valid ground for revoking liberty- Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 9] Sheikh Irshad @ Monu v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1185
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 - Sanction for Investigation - Supreme Court quashed the FIR and subsequent proceedings against a former Chairman of the Committee for regularization of unauthorized occupation- observed that the FIR was registered based on a third complaint that was nearly identical to two previous complaints which had already been investigated by the Lokayukta and found to lack merit- held that the proceedings were vitiated due to the absence of prior sanction- Referring to the Government Order dated 14th March 2016 (applicable to the Anti-Corruption Bureau at the time), the Court noted that no investigation could be carried out in respect of actions or recommendations made by a public servant in discharge of official functions without prior approval- Since no such sanction was obtained, the preliminary report and FIR operated in the face of an express legal bar- Supreme Court reiterated the settled parameters for exercising inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to prevent the abuse of the process of law and secure the ends of justice- It specifically relied on the categories of cases illustrated in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, noting that Category 6 (existence of an express legal bar) and Category 7 (proceedings manifestly attended with mala fide) were applicable to the present case- Supreme Court quashed the corruption case against Karnataka's Leader of Opposition & BJP MLA R. Ashoka in an alleged irregularity made in the land allotment during his tenure as the Chairman of the Committee for the regularisation of unauthorised occupation - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335; State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa, (2002) 3 SCC 89; Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330; Paras 12, 14-20] R. Ashoka v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1214 : 2025 INSC 1441
Criminal Procedure – Double Jeopardy and Abuse of Process – Filing of criminal complaint in India after adjudication by foreign courts on same issue – Suppression of material facts – Held, continuing criminal proceedings in India for an alleged offence that was previously adjudicated upon and attained finality in both civil and criminal courts of a foreign country (UAE) constitutes an abuse of the process of law - Such actions amount to double jeopardy - The complainants concealed the dismissal of their prior foreign criminal complaints and civil suits when initiating the subject complaint in India - It is a settled principle of law that an agent (Power of Attorney holder) cannot depose in favor of the principal regarding facts that are within the exclusive knowledge of the latter - The complainant firm, having no branch or business in India, sought to invoke proceedings through a Power of Attorney holder who could not depose on facts exclusive to the principal - Appeals allowed. [Relied on M/s Naresh Potteries v. M/s Aarti Industries 2025 SCC OnLine SC 18] Adil Noshir Mithaiwala v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1201
Delay and Laches– Writ Jurisdiction– Negative Discrimination– Article 14- Noted that respondents approached the Court for a higher post after a gap of three and nine years respectively after joining as Sweepers- Held, inordinate delay in seeking compassionate appointment or a higher post is fatal- Prolonged delay dilutes the sense of "immediacy" which is the core of compassionate appointment policies- Respondents claimed parity with others who were allegedly granted appointments to higher posts- Held, Article 14 does not envisage "negative equality"- If an illegality or mistake was committed in favor of one person, it cannot be a ground for the Court to mandate the State to perpetuate the same illegality for others- Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Orissa v. Laxmi Narayan Das (2023) 15 SCC 273; Paras 13-19] Director of Town Panchayat v. M. Jayabal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1203 : 2025 INSC 1423
Directions issued by Supreme Court- 1. It is directed that States and even the Union Government consider changes as are necessary to the educational curriculum across levels, reinforcing the constitutional position that parties to a marriage are equal to one another and one is not subservient to the other as is sought to be established by giving and taking of money and or articles at the time of marriage; 2. The law provides for the appointment of Dowry Prohibition Officers in States. It is to be ensured that these officers are duly deputed, aware of their responsibilities and given the necessary wherewithal to carry out the duties entrusted to them; 3. The contact details (name, official phone number and email ID) of such an officer designated to this position are disseminated adequately by the local authorities ensuring awareness of citizens of the area; 4. The police officials, as also the judicial officers dealing with such cases, should periodically be given training, equipping them to fully appreciate the social and psychological implications which are often at the forefront of these cases. This would also ensure a sensitivity of the concerned officials towards genuine cases versus those which are frivolous and abusive of the process of law; 5. The High Courts are requested to take stock of the situation, ascertain the number of cases pending dealing with Section 304-B, 498-A from the earliest to the latest for expeditious disposal; 6. we also recognize that many people today are/have been outside the education fold, and that it is equally, if not more so, important to reach them and make accessible and comprehensible, the relevant information regarding the act of giving or taking of dowry as also other acts sometimes associated therewith, other times independent thereof (mental and physical cruelty) is an offence in law. [Para 26] State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1209 : 2025 INSC 1435
Doctrine of Lis Pendens – Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – The doctrine applies to suits where a right to immovable property is "directly and specifically in question"- This includes mortgage suits where the prayer is for the sale of the property to satisfy a debt- A pendente lite transferee is bound by the result of the litigation regardless of notice- held that the doctrine of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies even to a money recovery suit where the debt is secured by a mortgage over immovable property, and that the bar on transfer operates irrespective of whether the proceedings are contested or ex parte- Section 52 casts an embargo on the parties to the suit from transferring the property in question, in order to preserve the subject matter of the lis and to prevent the rights of the parties from being defeated by alienations pendente lite. If the doctrine were made inapplicable to ex-parte proceedings, a party would deliberately abstain from appearing before the court, transfer the property during the pendency of the suit, and thus, render the adjudication of rights in the said suit, infructuous- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Celir LLP V. Sumati Prasad Bafna 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727; Mahesh Prasad v. Musammat Mundar (1950 SCC OnLine All 16; Sanjay Verma v. Manik Roy (2006) 13 SCC 608; Paras 70-75, 220-222] Danesh Singh v. Har Pyari, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1211 : 2025 INSC 1434
Doctrine of Merger and Review Jurisdiction - Dismissal of an SLP via a non-speaking order does not attract the doctrine of merger; thus, a review petition remains maintainable before the High Court - If the High Court refuses to exercise its review jurisdiction or finds no error apparent on the face of the record, the original judgment attains finality inter-partes - No appeal lies against an order rejecting a review petition under Order XLVII Rule 7(1) of the CPC - Held that mere reference of an issue to a Larger Bench does not unsettle declared law - High Courts must continue to decide matters based on the law as it stands and cannot await the outcome of a reference or review unless specifically directed by the Supreme Court. [Relied on T K David v. Kuruppampady Service Cooperative Bank Limited (2020) 9 SCC 92; Paras 20-25] Kangra Central Cooperative Bank v. Kangra Central Cooperative Bank Pensioners Welfare Association, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1205 : 2025 INSC 1416
Dowry Death - Section 304B IPC - Section 113B Evidence Act - Section 498A IPC - Sections 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Conviction Restored - Supreme Court set aside the High Court's acquittal and restored the conviction of the husband and mother-in-law- observed that dowry is a "cross-cultural evil" found not only in Hindu society but also in other communities, including Islam, where the protective function of 'mehr' is often hollowed out by dowry demands- Supreme Court reiterated the essentials for a conviction: (a) death by burns or bodily injury, (b) occurring otherwise than under normal circumstances, (c) within 7 years of marriage, (d) where the woman was subjected to cruelty/harassment by the husband or his relative "soon before her death," and (e) such cruelty was in connection with a dowry demand- Held that in the present case, the deceased died of burn injuries within one year of marriage, and demands for a motorcycle, TV, and Rs. 15,000 were established. [Relied on Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana (1998) 3 SCC 309; Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana (2010) 12 SCC 350; Devender Singh v. State of Uttarakhand (2022) 13 SCC 82] State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1209 : 2025 INSC 1435
Economic Offences – Grant of Bail – Standard of Review – Held that the gravity of the offense is a factor, all economic offenses cannot be treated alike- Neither statute nor jurisprudence supports an automatic rule that bail should be denied in every case of economic fraud- The seriousness of the charge is relevant but not the sole determinant for denying bail, especially when prolonged incarceration becomes punitive. [Relied on Satender Kumar Antil v. CBI, (2022) 10 SCC 51; Paras 16, 17] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440
Electricity Act, 2003 — Sections 61, 62, 86(1)(b) and 178 — Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) — Commercial Operation Date (COD) — Firm vs. Infirm Power — Conflict between unapproved PPA and Statutory Regulations — The Supreme Court affirmed the findings of the TNERC and APTEL, holding that power supplied continuously from a Gas Turbine in Open Cycle mode after successful synchronization cannot be termed "infirm power" merely because the project-wide COD (Combined Cycle) had not been reached- held that the electricity supplied by them from the date of synchronization of their power generation to the grid is entitled to receive fixed charges, even if the entire project is not fully commissioned. [Relied on PTC India Limited vs. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 4 SCC 603; Tata Power Company Limited vs. Reliance Energy Limited (2009) 16 SCC 659; KKK Hydro Power Limited vs. Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board Limited 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1847; Paras 30-31] Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd. v. Penna Electricity Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1213 : 2025 INSC 1439
Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 – Sections 2, 3, and 4 – Maharashtra Prevention and Containment of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Regulations – Regulation 10- Supreme Court examined whether a notice issued by a Municipal Corporation directing a private doctor to keep his clinic open during the lockdown constitutes "requisitioning" of services - Interpretation of "Requisitioning" – Noted that High Court had held that a notice directing a private practitioner to keep their clinic open was merely to ensure continuity of essential services and did not amount to a specific requisition for COVID-19 duty - Supreme Court reversed this narrow interpretation, holding that given the "compelling situation" of the pandemic and the invocation of the Epidemic Diseases Act, such notices constitute "requisition" of services - Declared that a conjoint reading of the Epidemic Diseases Act, the Maharashtra COVID-19 Regulations, and specific Municipal confirms the requisition of services of doctors and medical professionals - Supreme Court refused to accept the "simplistic submission" that the absence of an individual letter of appointment or specific "drafting" meant there was no requisition - The invocation of special laws to mandate service under threat of criminal prosecution (Section 188 IPC) is sufficient to infer requisitioning - While the Court established the fact of "requisition," it clarified that individual claims still depend on evidence - The claimant must prove the deceased lost their life while performing COVID-19-related duties - Held that the families of doctors who died while doing their duties during the Covid-19 pandemic are entitled to the Central Government's insurance coverage scheme "Pradhan Mantri Garib Kalyan Package: Insurance Scheme for Health Workers Fighting COVID-19", even if they were not formally requisitioned by the Government. [Paras 16 - 30] Pradeep Arora v. Director, Health Department, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1199 : 2025 INSC 1420
Executive Authority vs. Cabinet Policy – Relaxation of Rules – Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's finding that a valid State Policy adopted by the Cabinet cannot be rescinded by an Executive Officer on mere procedural grounds, such as a Cabinet Memorandum not being routed through the Chief Secretary - Since the Chief Secretary was the Ex-Officio Secretary of the Cabinet and Chairman of the State Level Empowered Committee that cleared the appointments, the State could not plead ignorance or disapproval of the process. [Relied on Arun Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2007) 5 SCC 580; Paras 2-6] State of Assam v. Mukut Ranjan Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1204
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 36(1)(viii) – Deduction for Special Reserve – Profits "Derived From" Long-Term Finance – - Interpretation of "Derived From" vs. "Attributable To"- Scope and Interpretation- Supreme Court dismissed the appeals filed by the National Cooperative Development Corporation (NCDC), holding that specific income heads- namely dividend income from shares, interest on short-term bank deposits, and service charges for monitoring Sugar Development Fund (SDF) loans- do not qualify for deduction under Section 36(1)(viii) of the Act- Supreme Court emphasized that the phrase "derived from" is narrower than "attributable to.”- Following the amendment by the Finance Act, 1995, the legislature intended to "ring-fence" this fiscal benefit to only those profits having a direct, first-degree nexus with the core activity of providing long-term finance- Any income that is even a "step removed" from such core activity is excluded. [Relied on Cambay Electric Supply Industrial Co. Ltd. v. CIT (1978) 2 SCC 644; Paras 9-16] National Cooperative Development Corporation v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1193 : 2025 INSC 1414
Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 44C – Deduction of 'Head Office Expenditure' – Applicability to 'Exclusive' vs 'Common' Expenditure – Whether expenditure incurred by the head office of a non-resident assessee exclusively for its Indian branches falls within the ambit of Section 44C, thereby limiting the permissible deduction to the statutory ceiling of 5% of adjusted total income - Held that section 44C does not create any distinction between 'common' and 'exclusive' head office expenditure - The term 'head office expenditure' defined in the Explanation to Section 44C is based on the nature of the expense (executive and general administration) and its geographic location (incurred outside India), making it irrelevant whether the expenditure is shared across global branches or incurred solely for Indian operations - Clause (c) of Section 44C, which refers to expenditure "attributable to" the business in India, is wide enough to encompass both shared expenses and exclusive expenses- even exclusive expenditures incurred outside India are subject to the statutory ceiling provided under Section 44C - Appeals allowed. [Paras 41-49] Director of Income Tax (IT)-I, Mumbai v. American Express Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1206 : 2025 INSC 1431
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Liquidation Process - Private Sale - Regulation 33(2)(d) vs. 33(2)(c) - NCLT Rules, 2016 — Rule 15 — Power to Extend Time and Impose Forfeiture - Supreme Court clarified that a sale initiated after the failure of public auctions and the decision of stakeholders to sell assets at scrap value, which then proceeds via an application for NCLT approval, falls squarely under Regulation 33(2)(d) (sale with prior permission of Adjudicating Authority) rather than Regulation 33(2)(c) - Under Rule 15 - the NCLT has the power to extend time for payment upon such terms as the justice of the case requires - Where a purchaser fails to meet their own committed timelines and seeks extensions, the NCLT is justified in stipulating a forfeiture clause for any future deviations to ensure the expeditious resolution of the liquidation process. Shri Karshni Alloys v. Ramakrishnan Sadasivan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1195 : 2025 INSC 1411
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 8 and 9 - Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - Pre-existing Dispute - Moonshine Defence - Supreme Court set aside the NCLAT judgment which had dismissed an operational creditor's Section 9 application on the grounds of a "pre-existing dispute" - Held that a dispute must be "substantial and not mere moonshine" to warrant rejection of a CIRP application - In this case, the Corporate Debtor (CD) had explicitly confirmed its ledger account showing a debt of shortly before the demand notice - The CD continued making payments even after raising minor grievances in correspondence, which negated the existence of a bona fide dispute - Clarified that the adjudicating authority must "separate the grain from the chaff" and reject spurious or illusory defenses. Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1200 : 2025 INSC 1410
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 - Section 9 - Delay in filing application – Held that NCLAT erred in attributing delay to the operational creditor for waiting from August 2021 to February 2023 to file the Section 9 application - Supreme Court noted that a separate CIRP was already active against the CD during this period, and the creditor had correctly attempted to lodge its claim with the then-Interim Resolution Professional - The creditor filed its own application only after a withdrawal application was moved in the earlier CIRP - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mobilox Innovations Private Limited vs. Kirusa Software Private Limited (2018) 1 SCC 353; IBA Health (India) Private Limited vs. Info-Drive Systems Sdn. Bhd. (2010) 10 SCC 553; Tata Consultancy Services Limited vs. SK Wheels Private Limited (2022) 2 SCC 583; Paras 10-20] Saraswati Wire and Cable Industries v. Mohammad Moinuddin Khan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1200 : 2025 INSC 1410
Interpretation of "Soon Before Her Death" - Cruelty Under Section 498A IPC- Held that the phrase cannot be given a restricted or narrow meaning. The best criterion is "reasonable time"- There must be a reasonable, if not direct, nexus between the death and the dowry-related cruelty- Noted that a demand was made just a day prior to the incident, establishing this nexus- Once the prosecution demonstrates that the woman was subjected to cruelty/harassment for dowry "soon before her death," the Court shall presume that such person caused the dowry death- This is a rebuttable presumption. [Relied on Aluri Venkata Ramana v. Aluri Thirupathi Rao 2024 SCC OnLine SC 5473; Paras 14, 17-24] State of U.P. v. Ajmal Beg, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1209 : 2025 INSC 1435
Interpretation of Statutes – Use of the word 'Where' in Section 11(1) – Held, the expression "where the respondent is an employee" in Section 11(1) of the POSH Act is a procedural trigger and not a jurisdictional constraint - The word 'where' functions as a 'conditional conjunction' (meaning 'in case' or 'if') to denote different scenarios (employee vs. domestic worker) and the corresponding procedure to be followed. [Relied on Davies Jenkins & Co. Ltd. and Davies (Inspector of taxes) 1968 AC 1097; Paras 37-44, 47-50, 60-67] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415
Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987; Sections 21 and 22E — Challenge to Lok Adalat Award — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Held, the statutory finality attached to a Lok Adalat award leaves no room for an appellate or plenary civil remedy - The validity of such an award cannot be reopened through an ordinary civil suit or by treating execution proceedings as a vehicle for setting it aside - The only recognized avenue of challenge is the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, which is supervisory and exceptional in nature - This applies equally to a party to the award and a third party affected by it. [Relied on State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660; Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy, (2018) 13 SCC 480; Paras 8-14] Dilip Mehta v. Rakesh Gupta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1188
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 52A – Sampling and Seizure – Mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with Section 52A is not fatal to the prosecution – Held, sampling at the spot, rather than before a Magistrate, does not automatically void the prosecution - If the oral or documentary evidence inspires confidence regarding the seizure and conscious possession, the conviction can be upheld - Emphasized that procedural irregularities are not fatal unless they create discrepancies affecting the integrity of the seized substance or render the prosecution case doubtful - A reduction in the weight of the sample (from "about 50g" to 40.6g) was found to be sufficiently explained by the loss of moisture and natural drying of the ganja (leaves and seeds) over a 40-day period between seizure and analysis - Slight differences in weight do not undermine the prosecution case if they are not "enormous" - Held that it lacks the discretion to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum mandated by the legislature for the possession of a commercial quantity under Section 20(b)(ii)(C) - While humanitarian considerations (age, family status) may be relevant for executive remission, they cannot override statutory mandates - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Surinder Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2020) 2 SCC 563; Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2011) 3 SCC 521; Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr., (2008) 16 SCC 417; Paras 23, 27, 29, 30, 32] Jothi @ Nagajothi v. State, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1197 : 2025 INSC 1417
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 300, Exception 4 – Culpable homicide not amounting to murder – Ingredients of 'Fight' – Held, to attract Exception 4, four ingredients must be satisfied - (i) no pre-meditation; (ii) a sudden fight; (iii) the act is committed in the heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner - The term 'fight' implies a mutual assault involving the use of criminal force and a bilateral transaction where blows are exchanged, rather than a mere verbal duel - Where the accused is armed and the deceased is unarmed, and there is no evidence of an exchange of blows, Exception 4 cannot be invoked even if a sudden quarrel preceded the incident - Inflicting multiple knife blows on vital parts of an unarmed person indicates the accused acted in a cruel manner, further disqualifying the act from Exception 4. Surender Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1202 : 2025 INSC 1412
Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302/34 & Section 460 – Murder and House trespass – Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 11 – Credibility of Eyewitness – Omission in FIR – Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellant, holding that the omission of the accused's name in the FIR, despite the informant having received a detailed account from the sole eyewitness immediately after the incident, is a material lacuna that goes to the root of the matter - Supreme Court observed that the eyewitness (PW-2) provided minute details of the assault to the informant (PW-1) but omitted the name of the accused, who was her own brother-in-law and well-known to her - The subsequent explanation that she was "unwell" or that the accused's "mask fell off" during the incident was viewed as a "subsequently cooked up" story and a "clear manipulation" to implicate the appellant due to prior enmity - Held that if the eyewitness had actually identified the accused by name in her initial statement, there was no justification for conducting a TIP - The conduct of a TIP for a known person indicates that the witness could not identify the assailants at the time of the incident - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., AIR 1975 SC 1026; Paras 41-48] Govind Mandavi v. State of Chattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1182 : 2025 INSC 1399
Penal Code, 1860 - Section 304B - Dowry Death - Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 498A - Cruelty by Husband - Demand for ornaments during 'Chhoochhak' ceremony - Supreme Court set aside the conviction under Section 304B IPC, holding that a demand for a gold ring and chain made during the Chhoochhak ceremony (performed after the birth of a child) does not qualify as a "dowry demand." - To attract Section 304B, the demand must be for property or valuable security given or agreed to be given specifically in connection with the marriage - Since the demand in this case was related to the birth of a child and not the marriage itself, the invocation of Section 304B was unjustified - Upheld the conviction under Section 498A, finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant subjected the deceased to cruelty - Evidence showed the deceased was tortured, prevented from visiting or meeting her parents, and was heard weeping at night after the demands for gold ornaments were not met - Where the appellant had already undergone one year and five months of rigorous imprisonment - exceeding the one-year sentence imposed by the lower courts under Section 498A - the Supreme Court directed that no further sentence be imposed - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Satvir Singh vs. State of Punjab (2001) 8 SCC 633; Paras 6-9] Baboo Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1194
Precedent — Ratio Decidendi vs. Obiter Dicta — Article 141 of the Constitution of India — Supreme Court observed that the decision in Ratan Babulal Lath v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 16 SCC 287 does not constitute a binding precedent on the point that the PC Act is a "self-contained code" excluding the CrPC - A judgment serves as a binding precedent only when it discloses material facts and discusses the legal principles applied to those facts; a conclusion reached without detailed discussion of the statutory scheme or relevant provisions passes sub silentio - Appeal allowed. [Paras 13, 15, 16] State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1189 : 2025 INSC 1413
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; Section 18A — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 102 — Seizure vs. Attachment — Held, the power of a police officer to seize property under Section 102 CrPC and the power of attachment under Section 18A of the PC Act (incorporating the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944) are not mutually exclusive - These powers operate in distinct or complementary spheres - While attachment is a sequential, deliberative judicial process involving natural justice, seizure is an investigative tool intended to secure property quickly to facilitate smooth investigation - Clarified that bank accounts and fixed deposits can be frozen under Section 102 CrPC even in cases registered solely under the PC Act. [Relied on MCD v. Gurnam Kaur (1989) 1 SCC 101; State of Maharashtra v. Tapas D. Neogy (1999) 7 SCC 685; Paras 8, 9, 11, 14-16] State of West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Dey, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1189 : 2025 INSC 1413
Private Defense – Held, section 300 Exception 2 is inapplicable where there is no evidence to show that the accused or his property was attacked by the deceased - If the deceased was unarmed and the accused failed to raise a plea of self-defense in his Section 313 CrPC statement or lead defense evidence, the benefit of exceeding the right of private defense is not available - Case would not fall under Exception 4 to Section 300 - Infliction of 4 knife blows to an unarmed person, on vital parts of the body, is indicative of the accused acting in a cruel manner, and that there is not any mitigating circumstances on basis whereof the sentence may be reduced by altering the conviction of the appellant for an offence lesser than one punishable under Section 302 IPC - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra, (1978) 3 SCC 330; Awadhesh Kumar v. State of U.P. & Anr., (2019) 10 SCC 323; Paras 7-12] Surender Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1202 : 2025 INSC 1412
Public Employment – Victims of Terrorism Rehabilitation Policy - One-Time Settlement in lieu of Reinstatement - Supreme Court disposed of an appeal filed by the State of Assam regarding the appointment of persons under a state policy intended to promote the welfare of families who assisted in curbing terrorist activities and organizing the return of militants to the mainstream - Considering the long pendency of the litigation and the efflux of time, Supreme Court accepted the State Government's offer of a one-time settlement - Directed the State to pay ₹5,00,000 (Rupees Five Lakhs) to each of the 40 respondents within two months, in lieu of reinstatement and arrears of salary. State of Assam v. Mukut Ranjan Sarma, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1204
Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Overriding Effect over State Rent Control Legislations - Doctrine of Stare Decisis - Binding Nature of Larger Bench Decisions – Held, the provisions of the PP Act 1971 prevail over State Rent Control legislations regardless of whether the premises were let out prior to or after the commencement of the Act - Clarified that once the character of a premises transforms into "public premises" within the meaning of Section 2(e) of the PP Act, the summary procedure for eviction under the Act applies to all occupants, including those inducted as tenants before the premises were acquired by the Government or a statutory corporation - Held that a Bench of lesser or co-equal strength must strictly follow the law declared by a larger Bench - Criticized the departure taken in Suhas H. Pophale vs. Oriental Insurance Company Limited (2014), stating that not following the law laid down by a Constitution Bench under the "guise of clarifying" it constitutes judicial indiscipline. [Relied on Ashoka Marketing Ltd. and Another vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors. (1990) 4 SCC 406; Paras 5-10] Life Insurance Corporation v. Vita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1198 : 2025 INSC 1419
Remand of Cases - Exercise of Jurisdiction – Held that while Higher Courts often remand cases for fresh hearing due to violations of natural justice, the modern view is to curtail unnecessary litigation - Remand should be avoided if it merely generates a fresh round of litigation on a settled issue or is based on a wrong interpretation of law. [Relied on State of Uttar Pradesh v. Sudhir Kumar Singh and others (2021) 19 SCC 706; Para 16, 17] Suvej Singh v. Ram Naresh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1187 : 2025 INSC 1405
Remedies available to an aggrieved person against the order passed by the arbitral tribunal terminating proceedings under Section 38- held that when an arbitral tribunal terminates proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the first remedy for the parties is to seek a recall of that order before the tribunal itself, which must then decide whether the termination should stand. If the tribunal recalls the order and revives the arbitration, an aggrieved party has no immediate recourse and must participate in the proceedings, challenging the final award only under Section 34. However, if the recall plea is rejected, the aggrieved party may approach the court under Section 14(2), where the court will examine whether the arbitrator's mandate was validly terminated. If the court finds the termination illegal, it may set aside the order and remand the case to the tribunal or, if necessary, appoint a substitute arbitrator under Section 15. [Paras 296-308] Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1183 : 2025 INSC 1400
Revenue Code, 2006 (Uttar Pradesh); Section 30 - Correction of Revenue Map - Finality of Litigation - Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had remanded a map correction matter for fresh consideration – Held, Section 30 of the Code (corresponding to Section 28 of the 1901 Act) is for correcting "errors or omissions" and cannot be used to reopen issues that attained finality years ago or to change a plot's location for better value - Private respondents' attempt to seek the same relief 17 years after their initial application was dismissed (which attained finality in 2001) was an abuse of process - Clarified that Section 30 involves two parts - i. the annual maintenance of maps/field books and ii. the correction of specific errors or omissions - It cannot be invoked to change a plot's location simply because the owner desires a better spot. [Relied on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others (1999) 6 SCC 237; Para 12-14] Suvej Singh v. Ram Naresh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1187 : 2025 INSC 1405
SARFAESI Act, 2002; Article 371A of the Constitution of India — Implementation in Nagaland- Held that the provisions of the SARFAESI Act could only be implemented in the State of Nagaland with effect from 10th December, 2021, pursuant to the notification issued under Article 371A(1)(a)(iv)- Any recovery process initiated under the SARFAESI Act prior to this date in Nagaland is without jurisdiction, especially regarding the transfer of land ownership which is protected under special constitutional provisions. North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Nedfi) v. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1216 : 2025 INSC 1446
SARFAESI Act, 2002; Sections 2(1)(zd), 2(1)(zf), and 13- Secured Creditor and Security Interest - For the invocation of the SARFAESI Act, the existence of a "security agreement" and the creation of a "security interest" in favour of a "secured creditor" is a mandatory prerequisite- Where a borrower (Company) mortgages property to a third party (Village Council) as a guarantor, rather than directly to the lender (Corporation), the lender does not qualify as a "secured creditor" under Section 2(1)(zd)- A mere guarantee agreement without the creation of a right, title, or interest in the immovable property in favour of the lender does not constitute a "security agreement". North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Nedfi) v. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1216 : 2025 INSC 1446
SARFAESI Act vs. RDB Act, 1993- Recovery Procedures- Maintainability of Writ Petition despite Alternative Remedy- Held that unlike the SARFAESI Act, which requires a mortgage to enforce security interest without court intervention, an original application under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy (RDB) Act can be filed for the recovery of both secured and unsecured loans- Held that although High Courts should generally refrain from exercising jurisdiction when statutory remedies under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act are available, a writ petition is maintainable if the action of the financial institution is wholly without jurisdiction- If no security interest was ever created, the lender cannot relegate the borrower to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under the SARFAESI Act- Appeal dismissed. [Distinguished from M.D. Frozen Foods Exports Private Limited v. Hero Fincorp (2017) 16 SCC 741; UCO Bank v. Deepak Debbarma (2017) 2 SCC 585; Paras 21-36] North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd. (Nedfi) v. L. Doulo Builders and Suppliers Co. Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1216 : 2025 INSC 1446
Service Law – Payment of Gratuity – Applicability of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 4, Section 5 – Held, even in cases of resignation, an employee who has rendered continuous service for not less than five years is entitled to gratuity under Section 4(1)(b) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 - In the absence of a notification under Section 5 of the 1972 Act exempting the Corporation, the claim for gratuity cannot be denied - The legal heirs are entitled to receive gratuity for the service rendered along with 6% interest per annum from the date of resignation till payment - The respondent Corporation fairly conceded to the release of leave encashment benefits to the family members of the deceased employee - The legal heirs are entitled to receive the amount towards leave encashment. [Paras 10, 11] Ashok Kumar Dabas v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1186 : 2025 INSC 1404
Service Law – Resignation vs. Voluntary Retirement – Forfeiture of Past Service – Pensionary Benefits – The deceased employee, a conductor with the Delhi Transport Corporation (DTC), resigned in 2014 after nearly 30 years of service citing family circumstances- He later sought to withdraw the resignation and claimed pensionary benefits, arguing that his resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement- Held that as per Rule 26 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, resignation from service entails forfeiture of past service unless withdrawn in the public interest- Since the resignation was accepted and the request for withdrawal was declined, the past service stands forfeited- Re-classifying a resignation as voluntary retirement would render Rule 26 nugatory and obfuscate the legal distinction between the two concepts- Consequently, the appellant is not entitled to pensionary benefits. [Relied on BSES Yamuna Power Limited v. Ghanshyam Chand Sharma and another (2020) 3 SCC 346; Paras 9-12] Ashok Kumar Dabas v. Delhi Transport Corporation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1186 : 2025 INSC 1404
Service Rules and Disciplinary Action – Two-Stage Inquiry Process – Held that in cases involving Central Government employees, the inquiry proceeds in two stages: (i) A fact-finding or preliminary inquiry by the ICC at the aggrieved woman's workplace under the POSH Act ; and (ii) If the allegations are proved, the report is sent to the respondent's employer, who may then initiate formal disciplinary proceedings under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, where the ICC of the respondent's department acts as the inquiring authority. [Paras 60-63] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415
Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – Section 11(1), Section 2(o), and Section 9 – Jurisdiction of Internal Complaints Committee (ICC) – Inter-Departmental Complaints – Held, the ICC constituted at the workplace of the aggrieved woman has the jurisdiction to entertain and inquire into a complaint of sexual harassment even if the 'respondent' is an employee of a different department or workplace - Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation that an inquiry can only be conducted by the ICC where the respondent is employed. [Relied on Eera v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 15 SCC 133; Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241; Balasinor Nagrik Coop. Bank Ltd. v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya, (1987) 1 SCC 606; Paras 44-49, 54-56, 68] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415
Social Welfare Legislation – Purposive Interpretation – Held that the POSH Act is a social welfare legislation intended to uphold fundamental rights under Articles 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution - Any interpretation that compels an aggrieved woman to pursue her remedy at an "alien workplace" of the respondent would create procedural and psychological barriers, defeating the Act's remedial intent. [Relied on Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan 1957 SCC OnLine SC 8; Paras 32-35, 72] Dr. Sohail Malik v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1191 : 2025 INSC 1415
Specific Heads of Income Disallowed- Dividend Income- Held that dividends are a return on investment in share capital, not a "loan or advance."- A shareholder is not a creditor and cannot sue for debt; thus, the nexus to "long-term finance" is absent- Interest on Short-term Deposits: Interest earned on idle surplus funds parked in banks is "at best attributable" to the business but not "derived from" the activity of long-term financing- Supreme Court distinguished between the broad genus of "Business Income" and the specific species of profits defined under Section 36(1)(viii)- Held that since the funds belonged to the Government and the appellant acted only as a nodal agency/intermediary without risking its own capital, the service fee received is an agency commission and not profit from providing finance- Held that The 1995 Amendment was specifically designed to prevent financial corporations from claiming deductions on diversified, non-core income. The appellant's receipts failed the strict rigor of the "derived from" test and the definition of "long-term finance" provided in the Explanation to Section 36(1)(viii)- Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Bacha F. Guzdar v. CIT (1954) 2 SCC 563; Paras 21-28] National Cooperative Development Corporation v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1193 : 2025 INSC 1414
Statutory Interpretation – Section 479 of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) (formerly Section 436-A CrPC) – Supreme Court refuted the interpretation that an accused charged with offenses punishable by life imprisonment or death is categorically disentitled from seeking bail despite substantial incarceration- Section 479 BNSS is intended to de-clog prisons and must be read as an additional ground for bail, not a mandate to keep prisoners incarcerated until they complete one-half or one-third of a sentence- Appeal allowed. [Paras 21- 24] Kapil Wadhawan v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1212 : 2025 INSC 1440
Statutory Interpretation – Taxing Statutes – Definition of 'Head Office Expenditure' – Tripartite Test – Held that Taxing statutes must be strictly construed according to the natural construction of their words- When the language is plain and unambiguous, courts must give effect to that meaning regardless of the consequences- Held that "plain meaning" must be understood in context, as words are unambiguous only when studied within the specific context of the provision- For an expenditure to qualify as 'head office expenditure' under Section 44C, three conditions must be satisfied: (i) it must be incurred outside India; (ii) it must be in the nature of executive and general administration; and (iii) it must fall within the specific species enumerated in clauses (a), (b), or (c), or be expressly prescribed under clause (d) of the Explanation. [Relied on CIT v. B.C. Srinivasa Setty (1981) 128 ITR 294; Paras 70-85] Director of Income Tax (IT)-I, Mumbai v. American Express Bank Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1206 : 2025 INSC 1431
Systemic Directions To High Courts In All UAPA Matters - Supreme Court relied on NCRB's Crimes in India Report 2023 showing 3,949 UAPA cases pending trial and 4,794 pending investigation to underline the magnitude of delay - It asked all Chief Justices of High Courts to: (a) to examine the number of cases pending within their States under laws such as the UAPA, posing a reverse burden of proof on the accused; (b) to ascertain the number of special courts designated to try the said offences, and if special courts have not been designated, the number of Sessions courts dealing with matters under these legislations and to take up the matter with the appropriate authority if it is found that they are not sufficient; (c) to discern, whether posting of judicial officers in these courts as also staffing is sufficient, thereby foreclosing a ground for delay and adjournment, and if not, then suitable order for posting be issued expeditiously- Supreme Court directed- a) that the list prepared in accordance with- shall be organised in order of case registered, to the extent possible and permissible, from the earliest to latest- Requisite directions be issued to the special courts/sessions courts to take up the matters registered earliest, first, unless otherwise warranted; (b) In consultation with the appropriate authority, the High Court to ascertain the position with respect to appointment/allotment of prosecutors/special public prosecutors, as may be applicable, to ensure that the matters, once taken up, are not further delayed on that count; (c) For those cases that have been pending for more than five years, the concerned court be directed to take stock of the situation as and when they are taken up, record detailed order taking note of the previous reasons for adjournment if available, refrain from granting adjournments on routine requests and take up the matter on a day-to-day basis; (d) The High Court concerned will periodically, seek reports from the concerned Courts dealing with these matters and take up issues that may be confronting the said courts, on the administrative side so as to ensure smooth functioning. [Relied on Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496; Paras 23-24] Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dayamoy Mahato, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1196 : 2025 INSC 1418
The Supreme Court clarified the following things- i. Section 32 of the Act, 1996 is exhaustive and covers all cases of termination of arbitral proceedings under the Act, 1996. The power of the arbitral tribunal to pass an order to terminate the proceedings under the scheme of the Act, 1996 lies only in Section 32(2); ii. Sections 25, 30 and 38 of the Act, 1996 respectively, only denote the circumstances in which the tribunal would be empowered to take recourse to Section 32(2) and thereby, terminate the proceedings; iii. The use of the expression “the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal shall terminate” in Section 32 of the Act, 1996 and its omission in Section(s) 25, 30 and 38 of the said Act, cannot be construed to mean that the nature of termination under Section 32(2) is distinct from a termination under the other aforesaid provisions of the Act, 1996; iv. The expression “mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal” is merely descriptive of the function entrusted to the tribunal, namely, the authority and duty to adjudicate the disputes before it. It refers to the obligation of the arbitral tribunal to administer the arbitration by conducting the proceedings in order to adjudicate upon the disputes referred to it; v. Irrespective of whether the proceedings are terminated on account of the passing of a final award, or by the withdrawal of claims, or on account of default by the claimant, or the intervention of any impossibility in the continuation of the proceedings, the legal effect remains the same, inasmuch as the arbitral tribunal thereafter stands divested of its authority to act in the reference; vi. The common thread that runs across Sections 25, 30 32 and 38 of the Act, 1996 respectively is that although the arbitral proceedings may get terminated for varied reasons, yet the consequence of such termination remains the same i.e., the arbitral reference stands concluded and the authority of the tribunal stands extinguished; vii. There is a clear distinction between a procedural review and a review on merits- The arbitral tribunal possesses the inherent procedural power to recall an order terminating the proceedings as such power is merely to correct an error apparent on the face of the record or to address a material fact that was overlooked- It does not tantamount to revisiting the findings of law or reappreciating the substantive issues already decided. [Paras 96- 105, 134-135, 415, 416] Harshbir Singh Pannu v. Jaswinder Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1183 : 2025 INSC 1400