Supreme Court Weekly Digest February 5 - 12, 2026

Supreme Court Weekly Digest February 5 - 12, 2026

Administrative Remedy – Representation to Chief Justice – Re-employment – Supreme Court granted liberty to the petitioner to make a representation before the Chief Justice of the High Court - The Chief Justice is requested to gather information regarding disparities in superannuation ages across States and engage with the State Government on the administrative side - Decisions regarding re-employment and continuation in service must be taken by the Chief Justice in consultation with puisne Judges. [Paras 3-5] Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Anticipatory Bail – Conditional Orders for Deposit: The Supreme Court criticized the Jharkhand High Court for making the grant of anticipatory bail contingent upon the deposit of a specific sum – Noted that High Court had directed the petitioners to file a supplementary affidavit showing payment of Rs. 9,12,926.84/- to the complainant, failing which the bail application would stand dismissed - Held, that the grant of regular or anticipatory bail should not be subject to the deposit of any amount - If a case for bail is made out, the court should pass an appropriate order; if not, it may decline - the court should not pass a conditional order for deposit and then exercise its discretion. [Relied on: Gajanan Dattatray Gore vs. State of Maharashtra & Another [(2025) SCC Online 1571; Paras 8 - 10] Prantik Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 131

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Part III — Sections 61, 73, and 74 — Challenge to Conciliation Award and Partition Deed — Order VII Rule 11 of CPC — Rejection of Plaint — The Supreme Court set aside the rejection of a suit challenging a partition deed (KBPP) and a subsequent Conciliation Award - held that the Jegatheesan group's challenge based on coercion, undue influence, and misrepresentation regarding the KBPP, and the allegation of fraud/fabrication regarding the Conciliation Award, disclosed a real cause of action that could not be summarily dismissed – Noted that while an execution proceeding under Section 36 is pending, an Execution Court cannot examine the validity of a partition deed or family arrangement; such challenges must be resolved through a properly instituted civil suit. J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 15(2), 15(3), and 15(4) — Substitution of Arbitrator — Validity of prior proceedings — The Supreme Court held that while appointing a substitute arbitrator under Section 15(2), the High Court cannot declare proceedings undertaken by the previous tribunal as a "nullity" on the grounds of an IBC moratorium - Held that Section 15 is a mechanism to preserve continuity; prior proceedings remain valid unless the parties agree otherwise or the substitute tribunal, in its discretion, decides to repeat hearings. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 5 and Section 15 — Scope of Judicial Interference — Supreme Court clarified that the jurisdiction under Section 15(2) is limited and must be read with the principle of minimal judicial intervention - A court acting under Section 15(2) cannot exercise powers barred to it under other sections, such as setting aside a Section 16 rejection order (which is not appealable) or interfering with Section 17 orders outside of a Section 37 proceeding. Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 73 — Authentication of Settlement — A settlement agreement (KBPP) not authenticated by the Conciliator as mandated under Section 73(4) and not signed by the parties at the time of the alleged award (Annexure P-2) raises serious questions regarding its status as an award under the Act – noted that coercion within a family context may not always involve physical threats or "life threats"- It can arise from a feeling of subservience or manifest obedience to an elder's opinion, which are matters of evidence and cannot be peremptorily rejected at the threshold of a suit - The plea of constructive res judicata is not applicable when earlier rounds of litigation specifically reserved liberty for the parties to work out their remedies in accordance with law and challenge the partition deed in a Civil Court. [Relied on Dahiben v. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) D. Thr. LRs and Ors. (2020) 7 SCC 366; Paras 23-31] J. Muthurajan & Anr. v. S. Vaikundarajan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 135 : 2026 INSC 139

Bail - Disclosure of Material Facts — Duty of the Accused: The Court emphasized that an applicant seeking bail has a "solemn obligation" to make a full, fair, and candid disclosure of all material facts, specifically criminal antecedents. Suppression of such facts constitutes "fraud on the court," attracting the maxim suppressio veri, expressio falsi(suppression of truth is equivalent to expression of falsehood). [Relied On Kusha Duruka v. State of Odisha (2024) 4 SCC 432; Saumya Chaurasia v. Enforcement Directorate (2024) 6 SCC 401] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144

Bail - Judicial Discretion — Impact of Criminal History: While a history-sheeter is not automatically disentitled to bail, criminal antecedents are a significant factor in judicial discretion, especially when the allegations involve systematic and organized crime (e.g., educational fraud rackets) - that once an investigation is complete and a chargesheet is filed, transfer to a special agency like the CBI should only be directed in exceptional circumstances showing bias, mala fides, or involvement of high-ranking officials – Appeal allowed. [Relied On Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh @ Lalla Babu and another (2012) 9 SCC 446; Paras 28-33, 35- 41] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144

Bail Jurisprudence — Distinction between Annulment and Cancellation of Bail - The Supreme Court clarified that an appeal against the grant of bail (annulment) stands on a different footing than an application for cancellation due to post-bail misconduct - While courts are generally slow to interfere with liberty, a bail order is liable to be set aside if it is perverse, illegal, or based on irrelevant material, such as documents whose genuineness is the subject of the trial. [Relied On State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan Etc. (2025) SCC OnLine SC 1702; Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince and another (2025) scc OnLine SC 2580; Paras 13-14, 16-19] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144

Bail - Mandatory Disclosure Framework - To streamline bail proceedings and prevent abuse, the Court provided an illustrative disclosure framework(recommendatory) for all bail applications, which includes – i. Case Details: FIR number, sections, and maximum punishment; ii. Custody Status: Date of arrest and total period of incarceration; iii. Status of Trial: Stage of proceedings and number of witnesses examined; iv. Criminal Antecedents: Detailed list of all FIRs (Pending/Acquitted/Convicted); v. Previous Bail Applications: Details of all prior applications and their outcomes; vi. Coercive Processes: Whether the applicant was ever declared a proclaimed offender or issued Non-Bailable Warrants. [Para 49] Zeba Khan v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 139 : 2026 INSC 144

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Sections 100 and 103 – Jurisdiction of High Court in Second Appeal – Interference with Findings of Fact – Held that the High Court generally does not disturb findings of fact, it is well within its jurisdiction to interfere if such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, founded on conjectures, or result from a misconstruction of documents/inadmissible evidence - Relying on a photocopy (no evidence) to accept the existence of a power to alienate is an error of law that the High Court may rightly correct - Courts should not, by themselves, compare disputed signatures without the assistance of an expert, especially when the signatures used for comparison are not admitted signatures – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Smt. J. Yashoda v. K. Shobha Rani (2007) 5 SCC 730; Jagmail Singh v. Karamjit Singh (2020) 5 SCC 178; O. Bharathan v. K. Sudhakaran (1996) 2 SCC 70; Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Bail — Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Sections 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 22(c), 23, 28, and 29 — Commercial Quantity — Prolonged Incarceration — Parity — The Supreme Court granted regular bail to the appellant despite the seizure of a commercial quantity of contraband - noted that the appellant had been in custody for 4 years, 1 month, and 28 days - Relief was further justified on the grounds of parity, as an identically situated accused person traveling on the same flight had already been granted bail by the Court – Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order denying bail and directed release on stringent terms, including the surrender of her passport. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Legal Aid — Rights of the Accused — Fair Trial — Mandatory Procedure for Trial Courts — The Supreme Court observed that the appellant initially failed to cross-examine witnesses until she engaged her own counsel – Noted that Trial Courts are duty-bound to inform accused persons of their right to legal representation and their entitlement to legal aid counsel if they cannot afford one - Mandatory Directions - Trial Courts must scrupulously adopt a procedure to record in their orders: (i) the offer of legal aid made to the accused, (ii) the response of the accused, and (iii) the action taken thereon, all before commencing the examination of witnesses - This order is to be communicated to the Chief Justices of all High Courts for issuance of suitable instructions to all concerned Trial Courts. Reginamary Chellamani v. State Rep By Superintendent of Customs, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 121 : 2026 INSC 127

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Sections 227 and 228 (and Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) – Discharge and Framing of Charge – Noted that a Judge has the power to sift and weigh evidence for the limited purpose of finding a prima facie case, they cannot conduct a "mini-trial" or a roving inquiry at the threshold stage - If two views are possible and one gives rise to only suspicion (as distinguished from "grave suspicion"), the Trial Judge is empowered to discharge the accused - Supreme Court noted that "the process itself can become the punishment" if responsibility at the framing stage is not exercised with care. [Paras 12 - 21] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141

Constitutional Law — Article 14 — Manifest Arbitrariness — Executive memoranda issued by the State that departed from the AICPI-linked formula stipulated in the ROPA Rules without an independent study or rational basis were held to be "manifestly arbitrary" - Noted that State action must be governed by reason and the "lacking in reasoned principle" prong of manifest arbitrariness applies when a State ignores its own statutory stipulations. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Petition – Domestic Workers' Rights – Minimum Wages – Separation of Powers – Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus declaring that domestic workers have a fundamental right to minimum wages under Articles 21 and 23 and challenging their exclusion from the Minimum Wages Act and Code of Wages, 2019 - Held: Supreme Court declined to issue a positive mandamus for the enactment of law, emphasizing the doctrine of separation of powers - While acknowledging the vulnerable status of domestic workers and the lack of legislative protection, noted that an enforceable decree cannot be passed if it requires the legislature to enact a specific law - Supreme Court impressed upon State Governments to consider the grievances highlighted by the petitioners and urged the development of suitable mechanisms to prevent exploitation and ensure minimum wages. [Relied on Ajay Malik vs. State of Uttarakhand and another [(2025) INSC 118]; Paras 2-8] Penn Thozhilalargal Sangam v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 124

Constitution of India – Articles 48A, 51A(g), 226, and 32 – Environmental Law – Protection of Reserved Forests – Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants – Due Process – Rule of Law – The Supreme Court addressed the State's obligation to protect reserved forests while balancing the rights of long-standing human habitations - Noted that while forests are vital ecological systems and carbon sinks, and the State has a constitutional mandate to safeguard them, such protection must be pursued through lawful, non-arbitrary means. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) - Statutory Interpretation - Definition of "Consumer" - Commercial Purpose - Onus of Proof - The Supreme Court set aside the NCDRC's dismissal of a consumer complaint, holding that the mere act of leasing out a residential flat does not, by itself, classify the purchase as being for a "commercial purpose" – Noted that the onus of proving that a complainant falls within the exclusion clause of Section 2(1)(d) (i.e., that the goods or services were obtained for a commercial purpose) rests squarely upon the service provider and not the complainant - This burden must be discharged based on a "preponderance of probabilities". Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Dominant Purpose Test - To exclude a person from the definition of a 'consumer', it must be proved that the dominant intention or purpose behind the purchase was to facilitate profit generation through commercial activity, showing a close and direct nexus between the transaction and such profit-generating activity - The mere purchase of immovable property, or even multiple units, does not ipso facto attract the exclusion clause unless a commercial dominant purpose is established – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Shriram Chits (India) Private Limited vs. Raghachand Associates (2024) 9 SCC 509; Laxmi Engineering Works vs. P.S.G. Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583; Paras 11-17] Vinit Bahri v. Mgf Developers Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 117 : 2026 INSC 114

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 – Sections 13 and 22 – Procedure and Evidence – Applicability of Indian Evidence Act – Held that the Indian Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam) is not strictly applicable to Consumer Forums, the Principles of Natural Justice must be followed - If a party seeks to cross-examine a witness or expert whose affidavit is on record, the Commission should evolve a procedure to permit such cross-examination—via written questions, video conferencing, or a court-appointed Commission to ensure fair play. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135

Consumer Protection – Deficiency in Service – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence and Proof – Challenge to the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) order awarding ₹2,00,00,000/- compensation for a faulty haircut – Held that while the finding of deficiency in service was upheld in the first round of litigation, the quantum of compensation must be based on "material evidence and not on the mere asking" - Compensation to the tune of crores cannot be awarded based on unauthenticated photocopies of documents, especially when their authenticity is denied by the opposite party. ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135

Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 (Maharashtra) — Section 23(2) and Section 154 — Membership of Housing Society — Delay in Payment of Contribution — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had quashed the grant of membership to the legal heirs of a long-term tenant - held that since the Society had passed a resolution in 2005 to admit the predecessor-in-interest as a member upon payment, and that resolution was never revoked, the heirs were entitled to membership upon depositing the amount with interest - Supreme Court noted that denying membership while the parties remained in peaceful, undisputed possession of the flat would create a "serious anomaly" and "subsisting tussle". [Paras 41-45] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Equitable Relief — Enhanced Interest for Delay — While recognizing the membership, Supreme Court provided liberty to aggrieved members to seek "enhanced interest" or "additional amounts" due to the significant delay (from 1995/2005 to 2025) in making the contribution – Appeals allowed. [Para 47] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal) – Sections 6(1)(j), 53, 57A, and 57B – Power of Review – Jurisdiction of Revenue Officer – Quasi-Judicial Authorities – Separation of Powers - Whether a Revenue Officer, as a quasi-judicial authority under the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (WBEA) Act, 1953, possesses the inherent or statutory power to review a vesting order that has attained finality, especially in the absence of an express legislative mandate - Key Findings of the Court – i. No Inherent Power of Review - Supreme Court reiterated that the power of review is not an inherent power; it must be expressly conferred by statute or by necessary implication - Quasi-judicial authorities can only exercise those powers specifically bestowed upon them by law; ii. Interpretation of Section 57A - held that Section 57A, which allows the State to invest authorities with the "powers of a Civil Court," does not amount to a blanket conferment of the power of substantive review - Such an interpretation would conflict with Section 57B(3), which expressly prohibits Revenue Officers from reopening matters already decided or determined; iii. Separation of Powers & Basic Structure - Conferring judicial functions like the power of review upon executive functionaries (like Revenue Officers), who lack judicial training or independence from executive control, blurs the demarcation between the executive and judiciary - This encroaches upon the Separation of Powers, which is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution; iv. Failure on Merits of Review – Held that even if jurisdiction existed, the 2008 review failed the criteria under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC - The respondent-company failed to prove it was "exclusively engaged in farming" as of January 1, 1952, despite ample opportunities in 1971 - Subsequent economic considerations or "amicable settlements" are not legally sustainable grounds for review – v. Nullity of Orders without Jurisdiction - An order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction is void ab initio and a nullity. Its invalidity can be challenged at any stage, including collateral proceedings. [Relied on: Patel Narshi Thakershi v. Pradyuman Singhji, (1971) 3 SCC 844; Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437; Union of India v. Madras Bar Assn., (2010) 11 SCC 1; Balvant N. Viswamitra v. Yadav Sadashiv Mule, (2004) 8 SCC 706; Paras 31-89] State of West Bengal v. Jai Hind Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 126 : 2026 INSC 132

Eviction Procedure – Procedural Safeguards – Supreme Court recorded and approved a policy mechanism evolved by the State of Assam to ensure fairness in removing encroachments: i. Committee Constitution: A committee comprising forest and revenue officials will be formed to oversee the process; ii. Notice and Hearing: Alleged unauthorized occupants must be served a notice and granted an opportunity to produce evidence of their right to occupy the land; iii. Revenue vs. Forest Land: If land is found within revenue limits and outside notified forest areas, the matter must be referred to the Revenue Department; iv. Speaking Order: If an occupation is found to be unauthorized after scrutiny, a speaking order must be passed and served; v. Grace Period: A 15-day notice period must be granted to vacate the premises after the speaking order is served. Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 85 – Registration Act, 1908 – Section 33 – Presumption as to Power of Attorney – The presumption of valid execution and authentication under Section 85 of the Evidence Act or Section 33 of the Registration Act applies only when the original document or legally admitted secondary evidence is produced - In the absence of an original or properly adduced secondary evidence, it is impermissible to apply these sections to conclude the extent of authority granted to an agent. [Para 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134

Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 63, 64, and 65 – Admissibility of Secondary Evidence – Photocopy of Power of Attorney – Primary evidence is the "best evidence" rule, and secondary evidence is an exception admissible only upon laying a factual foundation. A photocopy is a mechanical copy and constitutes secondary evidence - It cannot be admitted as evidence unless the party establishes the legal right to lead secondary evidence by proving the original's existence and providing valid reasons for its non-production under the specific exceptions of Section 65 - A photocopy is no evidence unless proved by following the prescribed procedure. [Paras 20 - 23] Tharammel Peethambaran v. T. Ushakrishnan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 128 : 2026 INSC 134

Evidence Law - Admissibility of Documents – Mode of Proof – Distinction between an objection to the "admissibility" of a document and its "mode of proof" - A prompt objection to the mode of proof (e.g., producing photocopies instead of originals) is necessary to allow the party tendering the evidence an opportunity to cure the defect – Noted that in this case, the appellant categorically denied the photocopies and filed applications for the production of originals and cross-examination, which the Commission failed to address - The Supreme Court found the award of ₹2,00,00,000/- unjustified as the respondent failed to establish actual financial loss or a causal link between the haircut and lost career opportunities - The appeal was partially allowed, restricting the compensation to the ₹25,00,000/- already released to the respondent. [Relied on Malay Kumar Ganguly v. Dr. Sukumar Mukherjee and others (2009) 9 SCC 221; Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple and another (2003) 8 SCC 75; Dr. J.J. Merchant and others v. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635; Paras 17-22] ITC Limited v. Aashna Roy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 129 : 2026 INSC 135

Forest Rights – Recognition of Legal Occupation – Supreme Court noted that certain residents, such as those in "Forest Villages" listed in the 'Jamabandi Register' or title holders under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, are legally authorized and not liable for eviction - directed the parties to maintain status quo regarding the land in occupation until a speaking order is passed and the subsequent 15-day notice period expires. [Paras 9-13] Abdul Khalek v. State of Assam, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 134 : 2026 INSC 140

Hindu Law – Alienation – Legal Necessity – Karta's Power - held that alienations by a Karta in favor of a single coparcener must be strictly proved to be for legal necessity - Vague or general recitals in sale deeds regarding "family needs" or "debts" are insufficient to bind the interests of other coparceners - upheld the item-wise scrutiny performed by the lower courts to distinguish between proved legal necessity and impermissible alienations. [Para 33] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Joint Family Property – Burden of Proof - Supreme Court affirmed that while the mere existence of a joint family does not render all properties joint, once it is established that ancestral properties yielding income existed and acquisitions were made during the subsistence of the joint family, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition to prove the same - noted that Hindu law does not require coparceners to establish the exact source of funds for every acquisition made by the Karta if a sufficient nucleus is shown. [Relied On Shrinivas Krishnarao Kango v. Narayan Devji Kango and Ors. (1954) 1 SCC 544; Pattusami Padayachi v. Mullaiammal and others MLJ (II) 1976 225; Paras 29, 30] Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Hindu Law – Wills – Suspicious Circumstances - upheld the rejection of an unregistered Will executed 72 hours prior to the testator's death - Key suspicious circumstances included the use of a thumb impression by a testator who was literate and habitually signed documents, the involvement of a close relative as a scribe instead of a professional, and the exclusion of natural heirs - since the Appellant did not challenge the Trial Court's rejection of the Will at the First Appeal stage, the finding attained finality - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, finding no ground to interfere with the High Court's judgment, which had correctly applied principles of Hindu Law regarding coparcenary property and legal necessity – Appeals dismissed. Dorairaj v. Doraisamy, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 119 : 2026 INSC 126

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 14 — Moratorium vs. Arbitral Continuity — Noted that the High Court erred in nullifying arbitral orders passed during a moratorium period while exercising jurisdiction under the Arbitration Act - The Supreme Court used its powers under Article 142 to declare transactions (sale of flats) made pursuant to such arbitral orders as lawfully valid to protect third-party homebuyer rights. [Relied on Yashwith Constructions Pvt. Ltd. v. Simplex Concrete Piles India Ltd. & Anr. (2006) 6 SCC 204; Interplay Between Arbitration Agreements under Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 & Stamp Act, 1899, In re, (2024) 6 SCC 1; Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2578; Official Trustee v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, 1968 SCC Online SC 103; Paras 28-47] Ankhim Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. Zaveri Construction Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 133 : 2026 INSC 137

Judicial Review – Recruitment Process – Interference with Answer Key – Power of High Court to act as Subject Expert – Held: The High Court, while exercising its power of judicial review, cannot assume the role of a "super-examiner" or subject expert - Even in examinations for judicial services where Judges may have vast legal experience, the exercise of re-evaluating or re-considering an answer key should ordinarily be left to domain experts. Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Conventional Heads – Loss of Consortium vs. Loss of Love and Affection – Subsumption of Heads – Held: Compensation in death cases is restricted to three conventional heads: loss of estate, loss of consortium, and funeral expenses. "Loss of love and affection" is not a distinct head of compensation and is comprehended within the broader head of "consortium," which encompasses spousal, parental, and filial consortium. [Paras 22 - 29] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Quantum of Compensation – Evidence of Income – Salary Certificate – Held: Determination of income must be founded on proof placed on record and cannot rest on conjecture. Where a salary certificate (Exhibit P-14) and corroborating employer affidavit (PW-3) establish a fixed monthly salary, it is impermissible for courts to assess income at a lower figure without evidence impeaching such documents - Held: Considering the dependents had been pursuing legal proceedings for 15 years since the death of the victim in 2011, the Court enhanced the interest rate to 9% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till realization. [Para 32] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Section 166 and 168 – Just Compensation – Future Prospects – Held: The addition of future prospects to the established income of the deceased is not a matter of judicial discretion but a mandatory legal requirement. For a deceased who was self-employed or on a fixed salary and below the age of 40 years, an addition of 40% towards future prospects is compulsory. The High Court erred in failing to apply this binding precedent. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC (2009) 6 SCC 121; Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram (2018) 18 SCC 130; Paras 17, 18, 19] V. Pathmavathi v. Bharthi Axa General Insurance Co. Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 132 : 2026 INSC 131

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Jurisdictional Fact – Applicability of Statutes – The applicability of the PG Act depends on "jurisdictional facts" - facts that must exist before an authority can assume jurisdiction - If an employee falls under the exclusionary clause of Section 2(e), the Controlling Authority lacks jurisdiction to award benefits under the PG Act - – Section 14, which provides an overriding effect to the PG Act over other enactments, can only be invoked by those who first qualify as "employees" under Section 2(e) – Noted that since the appellants were excluded by the definition itself, the overriding clause cannot be applied to defeat the specific exclusion. N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Section 2(e) – Definition of "Employee" – Exclusionary Clause – Employees of Heavy Water Plant (HWP), Tuticorin – The Supreme Court held that retired employees of the Heavy Water Plant (HWP), which functions under the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), are not covered under the Payment of Gratuity Act (PG Act) - Noted that HWP is an adjunct or ancillary of the DAE and is not a separate corporate entity or PSU - Since the appellants held civil posts under the Central Government and were governed by the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, they fall squarely within the exclusionary limb of Section 2(e) of the PG Act – Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Arun Kumar v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 732; Mahalakshmi Oil Mills v. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164; Paras 12, 13] N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143

Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 – Statutory Interpretation – Section 2(e) of PG Act – Use of "Means" and "Does Not Include" – The use of "means" coupled with "does not include" signifies exclusionary language that strictly removes certain classes from the scope of the provision – Noted that a person holding a post under the Central or State Government who is governed by any other Act or Rules providing for gratuity is excluded at the threshold from the definition of "employee". N. Manoharan v. Administrative Officer, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 137 : 2026 INSC 143

Penal Code, 1860 — Distinction between False Promise and Breach of Promise — held that a breach of promise (where an initially serious intention is later hindered by unforeseen circumstances) is not a "false promise" (where there is no intention to marry from the beginning) - Supreme Court expressed concern over the "disquieting tendency" of giving broken relationships the color of criminality, noting that such misuse of the justice machinery trivializes the offense of rape and burdens the judiciary – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Naim Ahamed vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 15 SCC 38; Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, (2024) 11 SCC 39; Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, (2025) 5 SCC 764; Samadhan vs. State of Maharashtra, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2528; Paras 19-27] Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124

Penal Code, 1860 — Scope of Section 376(2)(n) IPC — "Repeatedly" — The provision contemplates a series of separate acts of sexual assault committed at different points in time, often under fear, pressure, or continued deceit - Held that a consensual relationship turning acrimonious does not satisfy the ingredients of this section. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124

Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376(2)(n) — Rape on false pretext of marriage — Consensual relationship vs. Misconception of fact — Quashing of FIR — The Supreme Court quashed the criminal proceedings against an advocate-accused where the complainant, also an advocate, was a married woman with a child and had pending divorce proceedings - held that since the complainant was already married and legally ineligible to enter into a second marriage under Section 5(i) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, any alleged promise of marriage by the accused was legally unenforceable and could not be termed a "misconception of fact" to vitiate consent. Pramod Kumar Navratna v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 118 : 2026 INSC 124

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 2(1)(u) – "Proceeds of Crime" – The definition is wide enough to include property equivalent in value to the property obtained from criminal activity - This allows for the attachment of alternate property if the direct proceeds of crime are unavailable – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India (2023) 12 SCC 1; Paras 37-52] Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(3), 8(7), and 8(8) – Interplay between Adjudication, Confiscation, and Restoration – Finality of Confirmation Order – Held: Section 8(7) and Section 8(8) are stand-alone provisions - An application for confiscation under Section 8(7) can only be decided by the Special Court once the confirmation order passed under Section 8(3) attains finality - If a confirmation order is challenged before a higher forum (Appellate Tribunal or High Court), a "deemed embargo" operates on the conclusion of proceedings under Section 8(7) until that challenge is resolved - The Special Court must refrain from deciding Section 8(7) applications while an appeal under Section 26 is pending, as the doctrine of merger applies. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(7) – "Material before it" – The expression "material before it" in Section 8(7) has a limited import, primarily to demonstrate the contingency (death of accused, proclaimed offender, etc.) and entitlement to possession - A party who suffered an adverse order under Section 8(3) can only seek relief under Section 8(7) if there is "new material" not previously considered by the Adjudicating Authority or higher forums. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130

Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 – Section 8(8) and 2016 Rules – Claim for Restoration – An application under the second proviso to Section 8(8) for restoration of property during trial is maintainable only if the claimant satisfies the essential conditions under Rule 2(b) and Rule 3A of the Prevention of Money-laundering (Restoration of Confiscated Property) Rules, 2016 - This includes acting in good faith, not being involved in money laundering, and suffering a quantifiable loss. Nav Nirman Builders & Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 127 : 2026 INSC 130

Re-evaluation of Answer Sheets – Absence of Statutory Provision – Held: The High Court rightly restated the settled legal position that re-evaluation of an answer sheet is impermissible unless the governing rules, regulations, or policy expressly provide for it – Held that if an answer key has been vetted by the High Court on the administrative side, any judicial challenge to its correctness should ideally be referred back to an administrative committee or a committee of subject experts (including eminent law professors and language experts) for reassessment – Supreme Court should not take the responsibility of determining the correctness of specific answers itself - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's directions to award marks for specific questions and delete others - The matters were referred to an administrative committee of the High Court to re-examine the disputed questions (Nos. 8, 74, and 96) and provide an opinion to the Public Service Commission. [Paras 7-9] Jharkhand Public Service Commission v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 138

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (2013 Act) – Statutory Interpretation - Interplay with Limitation Act, 1963 - Applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 74 of the 2013 Act – i. The Supreme Court held that Section 74 of the 2013 Act, which provides for appeals to the High Court, does not "expressly exclude" the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Condonation of Delay) is applicable to appeals filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act; ii. Mandatory nature of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act – Supreme Court emphasized that for a special law to oust the Limitation Act, the exclusion must be "clear, apparent and manifest." Mere prescription of a specific period of limitation in a special statute does not amount to an express exclusion of the 1963 Act; iii. Interpretation of Section 103 of the 2013 Act - Section 103, which states the Act is "in addition to and not in derogation of any other law," facilitates borrowing from the Limitation Act to ensure the 2013 Act functions as a complete code - Barring the application of the 1963 Act would render Section 103 redundant and otiose; iv. Nature of the Authority under the 2013 Act - The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Authority is treated as a "Civil Court" and its proceedings are "judicial proceedings" - An award passed by the Authority under Section 69 partakes the character of a "decree" and a "judgment" under the CPC - This reinforces the judicial nature of the appellate remedy under Section 74; iv. Land Acquisition Initiated under 1894 Act (Section 24(1)(a)) - In cases where proceedings began under the 1894 Act but no award was passed before January 1, 2014, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation apply - This includes the appellate mechanism under Section 74 of the 2013 Act - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, condoned the delays, and directed the High Courts to adjudicate the first appeals on their merits. [Relied on Mangu Ram v. Municipal Corporation Delhi (1976) 1 SCC 392; Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129; H.S.I.I.D.C. Ltd. v. Deepak Agarwal (2023) 6 SCC 51; Paras 59-85] Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. S.V. Global Mill Ltd, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 130 : 2026 INSC 138

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Section 14-A – Nature of Appellate Jurisdiction – Held that an appeal under Section 14-A is a statutory first appeal on both facts and law – Noted that High Court does not function merely as a revisional or supervisory court but as a first appellate court obliged to independently evaluate the material on record - A mechanical affirmation of a Trial Court's order without independent scrutiny is inconsistent with settled appellate jurisprudence. [Paras 17, 18] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141

Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Quashing of Charges – Requirement of Knowledge – The Supreme Court quashed charges under the SC/ST Act against the appellant, observing that "knowledge" of the victim's caste is an essential ingredient for attracting liability under Sections 3(2)(v) and 3(2)(va) – Held that where the FIR and Section 161 CrPC statements are silent on the use of casteist slurs or the specific identity of the victims as SC/ST members, the charge cannot stand - Allowing proceedings to continue without a prima facie disclosure of statutory ingredients amounts to an abuse of the process of law. [Relied on Sajjan Kumar v. CBI (2010) 9 SCC 36; Bani Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (1996) 4 SCC 720; State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh (1977) 4 SCC 39; Paras 14, 15, and 19] Dr. Anand Rai v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 136 : 2026 INSC 141

Service Law – Allocation of Cadre – Indian Police Service (IPS) – Request for re-allocation to 'insider' vacancy – Finality of Selection – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals of an IPS officer seeking re-allocation from the Tamil Nadu cadre to an 'insider' vacancy in the Rajasthan cadre from the 2004 examination batch - held that cadre allocation cannot remain fluid indefinitely, as it would lead to a "chain reaction" of reshuffling among selected candidates from the same batch – Noted that the appellant, who was third in the merit list for the 'insider' vacancy, raised his grievance in 2010, six years after the selection process - noted that the appellant had already served in the Tamil Nadu cadre for over two decades by the time of the final hearing. Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119

Service Law – Consumption of Vacancy – Supreme Court observed that even if a senior candidate (Rishikesh Meena or Rajesh Kumar) does not join or accept an 'insider' vacancy, the next candidate in the merit list does not gain an automatic right to claim allocation to that specific post - Finality must be attached to the selection and allocation process to prevent administrative instability – Appeals dismissed. [Paras 9-12] Rupesh Kumar Meena v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 122 : 2026 INSC 119

Service Law — Dearness Allowance (DA) — Legally Enforceable Right — Financial Inability of State — The Supreme Court held that the right to receive Dearness Allowance is a legally enforceable right that accrued in favor of the employees of the State of West Bengal – Held that while the State has the discretion to formulate its pay structure, once it incorporates a specific standard (like the All-India Consumer Price Index - AICPI) into its statutory rules (ROPA Rules, 2009), it cannot deviate from that mechanism through executive memoranda. State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123

Service Law - Departmental Inquiry — Proof of Misconduct — Fabrication of Medical Certificate — Graver the charge, greater the need for caution and circumspection — Findings of Inquiry Officer based on "word against word" without expert verification held perverse — Where a charge of forgery entails mandatory dismissal, fair play requires a thorough investigation consistent with principles of natural justice – Facts - The appellant, a Court Attender, was dismissed from service on charges of unauthorized absence and submitting a fabricated medical certificate. The Inquiry Officer relied on the statement of a Medical Practitioner (PW-2) who denied issuing the certificate, despite admitting the appellant consulted him and that the letterhead belonged to him - The High Court upheld the dismissal - Supreme Court Findings – i. Perversity in Findings: The Supreme Court held that the Inquiry Officer's conclusion was perverse as it was based on no credible evidence - noted that the rubber stamp on the disputed certificate was identical to the one used by the doctor on official notices; ii. Need for Handwriting Expert: Since the certificate was fully handwritten and the doctor's undisputed signatures varied, the Inquiry Officer should have referred the matter to a handwriting expert before recording a finding of forgery; iii. Standard of Proof for Grave Charges: When charges involve consequences like loss of livelihood, investigations must be consistent with the requirement of the situation and fair play. [Relied on Sawai Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (1986) 3 SCC 454; Paras 31-45] K. Rajaiah v. High Court for the State of Telangana, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 140 : 2026 INSC 142

Service Law — Paucity of Funds as a Defense — Supreme Court categorically rejected the State's plea of financial inability or paucity of funds as a ground to deny the payment of statutory dues like DA - Once a legal right is established, the State, as a "model employer," must honor its obligations regardless of the financial burden - Findings returned in the first round of litigation, which declared DA a legally enforceable right and were reaffirmed by the dismissal of a review petition, attain conclusive finality and bind the parties. [Relied on Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi (1981) 1 SCC 608; Sivanandan CT v. High Court of Kerala (2024) 3 SCC 799; Jitendra Kumar v. State of Haryana (2008) 2 SCC 161; hayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 9 SCC 1; Assn. for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 1; Lily Thomas v. Union of India (2000) 6 SCC 224; Paras 39-59] State of West Bengal v. Confederation of State Government Employees, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 120 : 2026 INSC 123

Service Law – Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers – Jharkhand Superior Judicial Service (Recruitment, Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2001 – Article 233 and 309 of the Constitution of India – Petitioner, a Principal District and Sessions Judge, sought enhancement of retirement age to 61 or 62 years - Held, enhancement of retirement age requires a policy decision and consequential amendment in Service Rules - While some States have enhanced the age to 61/62 years to match government departments, such issues should not be resolved through judicial orders for individual benefit - A holistic view is required by stakeholders to ensure parity across States - Writ Petition under Article 32 not entertained. Ranjeet Kumar v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 123

Society - Autonomy of Society — General Body Resolutions — Supreme Court emphasized that the Society's General Body, in an AGM held on September 30, 2025, had ratified the membership of the appellants and the subsequent purchaser – Noted that the High Court's conclusion that the Revisional Authority acted in excess of jurisdiction was unsustainable, especially since the appellants had initially approached the Society's Authorised Officer and only then availed statutory remedies under the MCS Act. [Paras 43-44] Shashin Patel v. Uday Dalal, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 125 : 2026 INSC 125