Supreme Court Weekly Digest March 14 - 23, 2026

Amicus Curiae - Procedure for Appointing Amicus Curiae for Absentee Appellants – Guidelines – To prevent technical pleas of unfairness, the Supreme Court directed that when appointing an Amicus Curiae due to the absence of a convict's counsel, the Registry should issue notice to the convict's address via the jurisdictional police station - If the convict remains dormant despite service (including service by pasting on the premises), the Supreme Court may proceed to decide the appeal - This process ensures the Court knows if the appeal survives or has abated after long periods. Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Bail – Foreign Nationals – Article 21 of the Constitution of India – Financial Constraints in furnishing Surety –The Respondent, a 32-year-old Ugandan national, was granted bail by the High Court on 15.09.2025 in a case involving the NDPS Act - Despite the Trial Court reducing the surety amount progressively from ₹1,00,000 to ₹25,000, the accused remained in Tihar Jail for months due to her inability to furnish a solvent surety - Held: Article 21 of the Constitution, which protects the right to life and personal liberty, applies equally to foreign nationals prosecuted in India - Once an accused has established a case for bail, financial difficulties or the inability to provide a solvent surety should not act as a barrier to their release - In cases where a foreign national cannot meet surety requirements due to financial constraints, they may be released on a personal bond and subsequently housed in a detention center to ensure they do not leave the country - Supreme Court explicitly grounded its reasoning in the constitutional mandate of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, emphasizing its universal application to any person within the territory of India, regardless of nationality. [Paras 4-13] Customs v. Faridah Nakanwagi, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 278

Bail - The Supreme Court granted regular bail to an accused in the alleged multi-crore Andhra Pradesh liquor scam, invoking its plenary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution. Muppidi Avinash Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 274

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 173(3) – Registration of FIR – Preliminary Inquiry – Safeguard against mechanical registration – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered against a media executive, holding that the allegations were "absolutely vague," "speculative," and "inherently improbable" – Noted that Section 173(3) BNSS provides an additional safeguard for offences punishable between three and seven years - Unlike Section 154 CrPC, where a preliminary inquiry is limited to ascertaining if a cognizable offence is disclosed, Section 173(3) BNSS empowers police to conduct an inquiry to determine if a prima facie case exists even if the information ostensibly discloses a cognizable offence - The legislative intent is to prevent the registration of frivolous cases. In the instant case, the police acted with "unusual expediency" and registered the FIR in a mechanical manner without exercising the option of a preliminary inquiry despite the indeterminate nature of the allegations. [Paras 23-25] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) – Section 528 (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) – Quashing of FIR – Abuse of Process – Supreme Court observed that the FIR was a "glaring example" of an influential media house managing to register a case against its own executive following a fallout - The complaint lacked specific victim names, dates, or instances of the alleged extortion and cheating - If the allegations, even taken at face value, do not constitute an offence or are so absurd that no prudent person could reach a conclusion of sufficient grounds for proceeding, the FIR must be quashed to prevent the abuse of the process of law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Lalita Kumari v. Govt. of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1; Imran Pratapgadhi v. State of Gujarat, (2026) 1 SCC 721; Paras 19-28] Ashish Dave v. State of Rajasthan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 258 : 2026 INSC 244

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) — Section 528 — Quashing of Proceedings — Informant's Right to Hearing — The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that quashed an FIR and consequential criminal proceedings without issuing notice to the informant - The High Court had quashed the case based on a general observation in a previous election-related writ petition suggesting parties withdraw all proceedings - The Supreme Court held that since the FIR disclosed a cognizable offence and a charge-sheet had already been submitted following investigation, the proceedings could not be quashed "straight-away" without giving the informant an opportunity to be heard - Matter restored for fresh consideration. [Relied on District Bar Association and Another vs. Bar Council of India Writ (C) No. 5973 of 2025; Paras 11-13] Suman Kumar Raghav v. Ravindra Kumar Sharma, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 279

Certified Copy - The Supreme Court has reiterated that a statutory appeal cannot be entertained without a certified copy of the impugned judgment. Central Bank of India v. Bijendra Kumar Jha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 273

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 - Quashing of Proceedings - Suicide Note – Held that criminal proceedings quashed where the suicide note lacked material particulars regarding the nature, time, and place of alleged threats – Noted that where a suicide note indicts multiple creditors (nine in this case) without specifying individual roles or showing they acted as a group, a trial based on such a note would be a "futile exercise" and an "abuse of the process of the Court" – Held that Mere evidence of frequency of calls (40 calls in six months) without audio recordings or records of the content of those calls to indicate threats is insufficient to sustain a prosecution under Section 306 IPC – Appeal allowed. [Paras 10-15] Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 313 – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Section 21 – Opportunity to Lead Defense Evidence – The appellant contended he was not afforded an opportunity to examine himself as a defense witness - Supreme Court rejected this, noting that the trial record showed the appellant's statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded and he had the opportunity to avail himself of Section 21 of the P.C. Act but failed to do so during the trial. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 319 – Scope of Judicial Scrutiny – Mini-Trial prohibited – The Supreme Court observed that while Section 319 is an extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly, the Trial Court must not conduct a "mini-trial" or a threadbare credibility assessment of minor contradictions at this stage - In the instant case, the Trial Court erred by overemphasizing minor inconsistencies in witness accounts, the absence of jail records, and the physical plausibility of the complainant escaping injury. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 319 – Summoning of additional accused – Standards of Evidence – Three-Tier Threshold – Supreme Court noted three distinct levels of evidence assessment: (i) Prima facie standard(lowest) for framing formal charges; (ii) Strong and cogent evidence (middle) for summoning additional accused under Section 319 CrPC, where evidence must be reliable and reasonably persuasive but not beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) Proof beyond reasonable doubt (highest) required for conviction. Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Civil Dispute vs. Criminal Offence – Commercial Risk in Movie Production – Supreme Court observed that movie making is a high-risk business where fulfilment of a promise (sharing profits) is not entirely in the control of the promisor - If a transaction involves inherent risk and the conduct of the parties does not reflect dishonest intention from the beginning, the High Court should exercise its inherent powers to quash criminal proceedings and relegate the parties to civil remedies - In the present case, since the movie was actually completed and released, the promise to make the movie was not false, and the dispute regarding profit-sharing remains a civil cause of action. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 482 – Quashing of FIR – Forgery and Fraud – High Court quashed FIR at the threshold while investigation was ongoing and vital forensic evidence was awaited - Supreme Court held that when allegations of forgery are made and documents have been sent to a handwriting expert, quashing the FIR without awaiting the report is unjustified - Once the Court is apprised that the genuineness of signatures is under SFSL analysis, there is no reason to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to stifle the probe - Supreme Court's Observations – i. The High Court prematurely terminated the proceedings despite clear allegations establishing fraud, falsification of documents, and criminal breach of trust; ii. Subsequent SFSL reports confirmed that the signatures on bank nomination documents and sale deeds were forged/facsimile stamps and did not match the admitted signatures of the deceased; iii. The High Court's reliance on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI (2009) 15 SCC 643 was misplaced and irrelevant to the facts of the present case, as the proof of forgery was dependent on the then-pending handwriting expert's report - Held: The impugned judgment of the High Court was set aside - The Investigating Officer was directed to conclude the investigation and file the result before the concerned Court – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Mir Nagvi Askari v. CBI, (2009) 15 SCC 643; Paras 16-23] Sharla Bazliel v. Baldev Thakur, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 256 : 2026 INSC 252

Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) – Section 482 - Quashing of Proceedings – Summoning of Accused – Copyright Infringement – Appeal against High Court order refusing to quash criminal proceedings for alleged copyright infringement of a film script - The Supreme Court observed that summoning an accused is a serious matter and should not be done as a matter of course - The Magistrate's order must reflect an application of mind to the facts and law, involving a careful scrutiny of the evidence to determine if an offence is prima facie made out - In the present case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate (CJM) failed to record satisfaction regarding any specific similarities between the appellant's film 'Kahaani-2' and the complainant's script 'Sabak' - The summoning order was passed in a mechanical manner. Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 142 — Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage — Recognition of Foreign Divorce Decrees — Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order that had dismissed a divorce petition in India on the grounds of a pre-existing US divorce decree - held that the foreign decree was not binding as it was granted on a ground (irretrievable breakdown) not recognized under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the husband had not effectively submitted to the foreign jurisdiction - Exercising its powers under Article 142, the Supreme Court granted a decree of divorce to bring a quietus to the 18-year-long separation - Key Legal Points – i. Non-Binding Nature of Foreign Decrees: A foreign decree of divorce is not conclusive or binding if it is granted on grounds not available under the matrimonial law governing the parties (in this case, the Hindu Marriage Act) and where the opposite party did not voluntarily or effectively submit to the foreign court's jurisdiction; ii. Effective Participation: Mere service of summons or filing a jurisdictional objection by post does not constitute "effective participation" or "voluntary submission" to a foreign forum - Principles of natural justice require a meaningful opportunity to contest the proceedings; iii. Article 142 Power: Where a marriage has irretrievably broken down and parties have been separated for a prolonged period (nearly 18 years), the Supreme Court can exercise its plenary power under Article 142 to dissolve the marriage directly to ensure justice. [Relied on Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi (1991) 3 SCC 451; Paras 8-11] Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 259

Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 — Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Section 482 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023; Section 528 — Quashing of FIR — Duty of High Court to Decide on Merits - The Supreme Court held that when a petitioner seeks the quashing of an FIR, the High Court must consider the merits of the challenge based on available material and applicable law, rather than disposing of the petition with general directions to follow arrest guidelines or concluding it without addressing the underlying grievance - Once jurisdiction for quashing is invoked, the High Court should decide the matter "one way or the other" on its merits. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1947; Pradnya Pranjal Kulkarni vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. (2025 SCC OnLine SC 1948; Paras 5-8] Md. Mashood v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 264 : 2026 INSC 259

Constitution of India – Article 12 – Definition of 'State' – Maintainability of Writ Petition – Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) - The Supreme Court held that the Air Force Group Insurance Society (AFGIS) constitutes 'State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, writ petitions filed by its employees under Article 226 of the Constitution are maintainable - Key Determinants for Article 12 Status – Supreme Court observed that while no single test is exhaustive, the cumulative effect of the following factors established AFGIS as an instrumentality of the State - i. Deep and Pervasive Control - The Society was established with the sanction of the President of India, who also approved its deputation rules; ii. Administrative Dominance - The Board of Trustees and Managing Committee consist entirely of serving senior officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF); iii. Compulsory Nature - Membership and premium deductions are mandatory for all IAF personnel as an integral part of their service conditions, leaving no choice to the individual; iv. Public Function - The Society performs a public duty by providing insurance and welfare to armed forces personnel, which is a core government function linked to national sovereignty and security; v. Self-Representation - The Society had previously represented itself as 'Government' to seek exemptions from service tax under the Finance Act, 1994 – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology (2002) 5 SCC 111; Paras 15-19] Ravi Khokhar v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 244 : 2026 INSC 233

Constitution of India – Article 32 and Article 21 – Right to Legal Representation and Personal Liberty – Transfer of Criminal Case – The Supreme Court deprecated the acts of hooliganism and violence by the District Bar Association, Barabanki, where members passed a resolution to not represent the accused and physically assaulted the office of an advocate who filed a bail application - held that the denial of bail for over two months in a case arising from a trivial scuffle at a toll plaza was unjustified and violative of Article 21 – Noted that denial of bail to the petitioners and the curtailment of their liberty for a period exceeding two months is absolutely unjustified and violative of the Fundamental Right of Liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India warranting exercise of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 32 of the Constitution of India - To ensure a fair trial and proper legal representation - the Supreme Court directed the immediate release of the petitioners on bail and transferred the proceedings from Barabanki, Uttar Pradesh, to Tis Hazari Courts, New Delhi. Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Petition – Delay and Laches – Right to Property – Writ petition filed by Mizo Chief Council seeking compensation for lands allegedly acquired without due process in 1954-55 - Respondents raised preliminary objection regarding inordinate delay of nearly six decades - The Supreme Court reiterated that while Article 32 is a fundamental right, it is not immune from general principles of law and reasonable procedure - Petitions agitating stale claims ought not to be entertained to prevent disturbing settled positions and causing prejudice to third parties - Supreme Court clarified that the operative test is not "unreasonable delay" but "unexplained delay. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Constitution of India – Article 32 – Writ Petition seeking directions regarding alleged violations of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) – Import of animals by private facilities – Legality of CITES permits – Held: The subject matter was previously examined by a Special Investigation Team (SIT) in W.P. (C) No. 783 of 2025, which found no violation of domestic or international law - The CITES Secretarial Document relied upon by the petitioner explicitly records that no evidence was found regarding imports without requisite documentation or for commercial purposes - Once an import is effected under valid permission, it cannot be subsequently treated as prohibited merely because objections are raised later - Disturbing the settled environment, custody, and care of living animals (including rescued animals) after lawful import may itself result in cruelty. [Relied on East India Commercial Co. Ltd. Vs. The Collector of Customs, 1962 AIR 1893; Paras 2-5] Karanartham Viramah Foundation v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 266

Constitution of India – Mitigating Factors for Delay - Supreme Court observed that delay is not a rigid rule of law but a flexible rule of practice guided by judicial discretion - In the present case, Supreme Court declined to dismiss the petition at the threshold despite a 60-year delay due to: i. The unique historical trajectory and political insurgency in Mizoram; ii. Continuous agitation of claims by the Chiefs before various forums; iii. Official assurances and conduct of the State Government that engendered a legitimate expectation of an amicable resolution, thereby dissuading immediate litigation. Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Constitution of India – Right to Property and Burden of Proof – i. Burden of Proof - In cases alleging fundamental rights violations, the initial burden lies on the petitioner to establish the existence and invasion of such rights; ii. Title over Land - held that the petitioner failed to prove that Mizo Chiefs were absolute owners of the land under the British regime - Documents (boundary papers) suggested they functioned as administrative heads rather than proprietary owners; iii. Privy Purses - rejected the plea of discrimination comparing Mizo Chiefs to rulers of Princely States, noting that privy purses were outcomes of specific pre-constitutional contractual arrangements and not a legally enforceable fundamental right - the petitioner failed to establish a clear title to the lands or a specific breach of fundamental rights under the erstwhile Articles 19(1)(f) and 31, the petition was dismissed. [Relied on Tilokchand and Motichand & Ors v. H.B. Munshi & Anr (1969) 1 SCC 110; Rabindranath Bose & Ors v. Union of India & Ors (1970) 1 SCC 84; Assam Sanmilita Mahasangha & Ors vs Union of India & Ors (2015) 3 SCC 1; G.P. Doval & Ors v. Chief Secretary, Government of U.P. (1984) 4 SCC 329; Paras 27-64] Mizo Chief Council Mizoram v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 241 : 2026 INSC 236

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d) and 2(1)(g) — Maintainability of Complaint — Commercial Purpose vs. Banking Service — Summary Proceedings — Fraud and Forgery - Commercial Purpose and Bank Deposits - The Supreme Court held that the mere earning of interest on a Fixed Deposit Receipt (FDR) does not automatically categorize the banking service as being for a "commercial purpose." - Parking surplus funds for safe custody or statutory compliance is not reflective of a commercial intent - if a deposit is made specifically to leverage credit facilities for business augmentation, it would have a direct nexus with profit-generating activity and thus fall under "commercial purpose." Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 - Summary Jurisdiction and Complex Facts – Noted that proceedings before Consumer Fora are summary in nature and not intended to adjudicate complex factual disputes involving criminal or tortious acts like fraud, cheating, or forgery - Where a Bank sets up a subsequent contract of pledge against an FDR which the complainant alleges is fraudulent or based on forged documents such a dispute must be addressed in a regular civil or criminal proceeding rather than under the 1986 Act - The burden to prove that services were availed for a "commercial purpose" lies on the respondent (Bank), whereas the burden to prove "deficiency in service" lies on the complainant. [Relied on Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust vs. Unique Shanti Developers and Others (2020) 2 SCC 265; Chairman and Managing Director, City Union Bank Limited and Another v. R. Chandramohan (2023) 7 SCC 775; Paras 21-31] Sant Rohidas Leather Industries v. Vijaya Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 267 : 2026 INSC 264

Contract Act, 1872 - Error by Bank and Third-Party Decree – Held that the Bank committed a clear breach of duty by unilaterally remitting the amount to the vessel owner despite receiving specific instructions (Form A-2) to remit it to the Plaintiff - The Bank, not being a party to the underlying Charter Party Agreement, could not rely on its terms to ignore the customer's mandate - Under the third-party procedure (Order VIII-A CPC / Order V-A Madras High Court Original Side Rules), the Bank was held liable to indemnify the customer (Defendant No. 1) for this erroneous transfer. [Relied on Bank of Bihar Ltd. v. Damodar Prasad and others (1969) 1 SCR 620; Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Electrosteel Castings Ltd. (2026) 264 Comp Cas 11; Mumbai International Airport (P) Ltd. v. Regency Convention Centre & Hotels (P) Ltd. (2010) 7 SCC 417; Paras 35, 36] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247

Contract Act, 1872 - Necessary Parties and Dominus Litis - Supreme Court rejected the contention that the suit was bad for non-joinder of the vessel owner (principal debtor) - It reaffirmed that the plaintiff is the dominus litis and cannot be compelled to sue a person against whom they seek no relief, unless that person is an indispensable "necessary party" without whom no effective decree can be passed. [Paras 27-32] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247

Contract Act, 1872 - Sections 126, 127, 128, and 140 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order VIII-A – Key Issues – i. Whether a "Corporate Guarantee" issued by a charterer (Defendant No. 1) to a ship repairer (Plaintiff) to pay outstanding dues from freight amounts constitutes a valid, independent guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act; ii. Whether a bank is liable to indemnify its customer under third-party procedure when it erroneously remits funds to the wrong party contrary to express customer instructions – Held that the "Corporate Guarantee" (Exhibit P11) and related communications (Exhibit P10) constituted a valid, independent contract of guarantee under Section 126 of the Contract Act - It was not merely a freight-sharing arrangement as contended by the Appellant – Noted that a guarantee is a voluntary act of taking up the burden of a third party who failed to make payment - Under Section 128, the liability of the surety is co-extensive with that of the principal debtor - The creditor is entitled to proceed against the surety without first exhausting remedies against the principal debtor. [Paras 21-25] Canara Bank Overseas Branch v. Archean Industries Pvt. Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 252 : 2026 INSC 247

Criminal Administration of Justice – Fair Trial vs. Expeditious Disposal – Appointment of Amicus Curiae – The Supreme Court emphasized that while fast-tracking criminal appeals is necessary, it must not occur at the expense of basic fairness - Noted that in cases where an appeal is listed after a significant delay (two decades in this instance) and the appellant's counsel is absent, it is a "desirable precaution" for the High Court to issue notice to the appellant regarding the appointment of an Amicus Curiae - While the High Court's intention to render legal assistance is genuine, justice is better served if the convict is informed so they may provide instructions for a "real and meaningful" defence rather than a "token gesture". Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Criminal Law – Convicts on Bail – Duty of Appellant – Supreme Court noted that convicts often neglect to cooperate with the court once their sentence is suspended - Appellants enlarged on bail have a responsibility to keep track of their appeals; they cannot blame the court or an Amicus Curiae for not raising specific grounds if they failed to engage with the proceedings for decades. [Relied on Anokhi Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (2019) 20 SCC 196; Paras 17 - 23] Bhola Mahto v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 265 : 2026 INSC 257

Criminal Law — Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Section 376(2)(g) and Section 506 — Rape — Conviction Set Aside — Appreciation of Evidence — Delayed FIR and Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — The Supreme Court set aside the conviction of the appellants, holding that the prosecution failed to establish the case beyond reasonable doubt - Supreme Court observed that the FIR was lodged after a significant delay of over three months without a cogent explanation - noted that the prosecutrix's version failing to disclose the incident even to her husband but allegedly disclosing it later to a stranger who was never produced as a witness was contrary to natural human conduct. Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238

Criminal Law — Solitary Testimony of Prosecutrix — Reliability — While conviction can rest on the solitary version of a prosecutrix, it must inspire the confidence of the Court - Supreme Court found material inconsistencies in the statements of the prosecutrix regarding the location of the incident (room vs. plot) and the distance from her house, which weakened the prosecution's case - held that the defense of prior enmity (water dispute) between the parties was not properly considered by the lower courts, which had given undue weightage to the prosecutrix's emotional outbursts - In the absence of immediate reporting, supporting evidence such as a medical report becomes crucial - there was a total lack of medical or corroborative evidence to prove the act – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vijayan vs. State of Kerala (2008) 14 SCC 763; Paras 13-18] Rajendra v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 243 : 2026 INSC 238

Criminal Trial – Appreciation of Evidence – Fragmented vs. Cumulative Approach – Held, the Trial Court misdirected itself by treating inconsistencies in isolation rather than assessing the cumulative weight of testimonies and circumstances - Testimony on oath by three witnesses, including the complainant, is sufficient to meet the "strong and cogent" standard for summoning additional accused, even if minor inconsistencies exist which are matters for trial. [Relied on Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92; Neeraj Kumar v. State of UP 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2639; Paras 7-12] Mohammad Kaleem v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 251 : 2026 INSC 251

Election - Where only two candidates contested an election, setting aside the winning candidate's election does not warrant a fresh poll; instead, the runner-up should be declared elected. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to direct a fresh election, after the winning candidate's election as Panchayat Samiti Chairperson was declared null and void. Ramadebi Rautray v. State of Odisha, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 260 : 2026 INSC 243

Equity – Fixation of Reasonable Penal Rent – While upholding the right to deduct penal rent, the Supreme Court noted that full enforcement of the management's penal policy might entirely extinguish the gratuity of retired skilled/semi-skilled workers - In an equitable exercise of jurisdiction, the Court fixed a reasonable sum of Rs. 1,000 per month as penal rent for the period beyond the grace period, balancing the interests of both parties. [Relied on Secretary, ONGC Ltd. v. V. U. Warrier (2005) 5 SCC 245; Paras 16 - 21] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Evidence Act, 1872 – Production of Material Objects – Tainted Currency Notes – The appellant argued that the failure to produce tainted currency notes before the Court was fatal to the prosecution - Supreme Court dismissed this contention as it was raised for the first time during oral arguments at the Supreme Court and was never pleaded in the Trial Court, High Court, or the Special Leave Petition. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Ecological Balance vs. Invasive Species – Held that the mere presence of dense vegetation does not automatically signify a natural forest ecosystem, especially if the growth consists primarily of invasive alien species like Prosopis juliflora (Vilayati Kikar), which can disrupt native biodiversity - Environmental management should prioritize the restoration of native/indigenous species over the protection of harmful invasive monocultures - reiterated that tribunals and courts should not interfere with the implementation of a long-approved Master Plan under the guise of environmental principles once that plan has attained statutory finality - Harmonizing the right to a clean environment under Article 21 with the right to development, the Court noted that integrated transport projects (like the Bijwasan Railway Station redevelopment) serve public interest by decongesting urban zones and optimizing land use. [Relied on The Auroville Foundation v. Navroz Kersasp Mody and Others (2025) 4 SCC 150; Paras 42-65] Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – Section 2 – Deemed Forest – Interplay between Statutory Master Plan and Subsequent Vegetation Growth – The Supreme Court held that land earmarked for a project under an approved Master Plan, which was not recorded as forest or deemed forest at the time the Plan came into force, cannot be subsequently declared a "deemed forest" due to the natural proliferation of vegetation or invasive species over time - Noted that the statutory binding force and sanctity of a Master Plan must prevail to ensure certainty and stability in urban planning - The relevant date for determining whether a parcel of land qualifies as a "deemed forest" is the date of the coming into force of the Master Plan, not the date when project work actually commences on the ground. Naveen Solanki v. Rail Land Development Authority, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 277 : 2026 INSC 270

Frivolous and Vexatious Proceedings – Duty of Court – Held that when quashing is sought on grounds that proceedings are frivolous or malicious, the Court must examine the matter with "greater care" - The Court is not restricted to the averments in the complaint alone but must look into attending circumstances and "read in between the lines" - Noted that the appellant had registered the synopsis and scripts for the film between 2012 and 2013, well before the complainant allegedly met the appellant in June 2015 or registered his script in July 2015 - Since the appellant's work preceded the complainant's script, the question of infringement does not arise - the Screen Writers Association (SWA) Dispute Settlement Committee had already found no similarity between the works, a fact suppressed by the complainant - The proceedings were found to be manifestly frivolous and vexatious - The summoning order and the High Court's judgment are quashed and set aside - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mohd. Wajid & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2023) 20 SCC 219; Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Anr. v. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors., (1998) 5 SCC 749; Paras 13-20] Sujoy Ghosh v. State of Jharkhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 271 : 2026 INSC 267

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Joint Meeting Requirement – Under Section 5(3) of the Rules, the approval of the Gang Chart must occur after a joint meeting between the District Magistrate and the Superintendent of Police – Held that no indication of such a meeting in the records, which constitutes a violation of the prescribed rules - Relying on the principle that when a statute prescribes a thing to be done in a particular manner, it must be done in that manner or not at all - Noted that since the Act permits the mere naming of a person as a "gangster" with "perilous consequences" to individual liberty, the prescribed procedure must be followed scrupulously – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vinod Bihari Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 SCC Online SC 1216; Paras 8-12] Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (Uttar Pradesh) – Section 3(1) – Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 – Rules 5 and 16 – Quashing of FIR – Procedural Irregularity in Gang Chart – The Supreme Court quashed an FIR registered under the Act of 1986 on the grounds that the accompanying Gang Chart was not prepared in accordance with the statutory mandate – Held that a valid Gang Chart requires the recommendation of the Nodal Officer (SHO) and the Additional Superintendent of Police, followed by approval from the Superintendent of Police and the District Magistrate - These recommendations must be in written form and approvals must be evidenced by signatures - In the present case, a certified copy of the Gang Chart obtained from the Court lacked these necessary signatures and recommendations. Gabbar Singh v. State of U.P., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 275 : 2026 INSC 271

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 31(1) — Arbitral Proceedings — Counterclaim vs. Set-off — 'Clean Slate' Principle — Whether a respondent can raise a plea of set-off in arbitration proceedings after the approval of a Resolution Plan, even if its counterclaim was not part of the plan and stands extinguished - Held, that once a Resolution Plan is approved under Section 31(1) of the IBC, all claims not included in the plan stand extinguished - a respondent cannot seek any affirmative relief through a counterclaim that was not part of the approved plan - if the specific terms of the Resolution Plan only bar payments or settlements and do not expressly or impliedly exclude the plea of set-off as a defense, such a plea can be raised to defend against the appellant's claim - The plea of set-off is permitted only as a defensive tool to prevent the appellant from succeeding entirely or in part - If the amount due to the respondent exceeds the amount awarded to the appellant, the surplus is not recoverable. If the appellant's proceedings are withdrawn, the counterclaim/set-off defense fails. [Relied on Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. (2021) 9 SCC 657; Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Aircel Ltd. & Dishnet Wireless Ltd. (Resolution Professional) (2024) 4 SCC 668; Paras 21-27] Ujaas Energy Ltd. v. West Bengal Power Development Corporation Ltd., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 272 : 2026 INSC 268

Legal Profession – Professional Misconduct – Supreme Court expressed concern over the "sorry state of affairs" where legal professionals turned into perpetrators of violence - noted that while fraternity among lawyers is understandable, it cannot justify lawlessness or the burning of a colleague's property for defending an accused - The Bar Council of India was directed to take appropriate action against the erring members. [Paras 12-17] Vishvjeet v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 257 : 2026 INSC 254

Maternity Benefit – Adoptive Mothers – Constitutional Validity of Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 (pari materia with Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961) – Age Limit for Adoption – The Supreme Court struck down the three-month age limit prescribed for an adopted child to entitle the adoptive mother to maternity benefits - held that the distinction between women adopting a child below three months and those adopting an older child lacks a rational nexus with the object of the legislation, which is to dignify motherhood and ensure child welfare - Key Findings noted – i. Motherhood vs. Childbirth: Supreme Court emphasized that maternity benefit is associated with the process of motherhood rather than the biological process of childbirth - Motherhood is a gradual process that takes shape in the heart, and the bond formed outside the womb is as crucial as that formed inside; ii. Article 14 (Equality): The three-month cap was found to be discriminatory and under-inclusive - Adoptive mothers are similarly situated regardless of the child's age, as the need for emotional bonding, nurturing, and family integration remains constant; iii. Article 21 (Reproductive Autonomy): Adoption is an expression of reproductive and decisional autonomy - Denying benefits based on an arbitrary age threshold violates the mother's right to a dignified life and the child's right to holistic care; iv. Practical Unworkability: noted that the legal procedure to declare a child "legally free for adoption" under the Juvenile Justice Act and CARA Regulations typically exceeds two to three months - Thus, the age limit rendered the statutory benefit illusory and otiose in practice; v. Best Interest of the Child: The principle of "best interest" is a continuing obligation that persists throughout the integration period; vi. Judicial Redrafting of Section 60(4): directed that the provision must now be meaningfully read as: "A woman who legally adopts a child or a commissioning mother shall be entitled to maternity benefit for a period of twelve weeks from the date the child is handed over"; vii. Paternity Leave: Supreme Court urged the Union of India to recognize paternity leave as a social security benefit, noting that shared parenting is essential for a child's development and for dismantling gendered roles. [Relied on Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Female Workers (Muster Roll), (2000) 3 SCC 224; Deepika Singh v. PGIMER, Chandigarh, (2023) 13 SCC 681; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd., (1974) 4 SCC 656; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India, (1984) 2 SCC 244; State of Kerala v. Unni, (2007) 2 SCC 365; Paras 66-69, 75-82, 131-136, 146-152, 155-158, 166] Hamsaanandini Nanduri v. Union of India, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 250 : 2026 INSC 246

Motor accident compensation — Procedural Lapses — Non-joinder of driver — Held: The provision for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial piece of legislation intended to enhance social justice, the rigours of procedure, such as not adding a driver as a party, cannot be allowed to defeat the purpose of the Act, especially as the trial is summary in nature. [Relied on Helen C. Rebello & Ors. Vs. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (1999) 1 SCC 90; Sebastiani Lakra vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. (2019) 17 SCC 465; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Patricia Jean Mahajan & Ors. (2002) 6 SCC 281; Paras 12-17] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Assessment of Disability and Loss of Earning Capacity – Functional Disability vs. Physical Disability – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision to reduce the functional disability of the appellant-claimant from 63% to 30% - held that the High Court failed to provide cogent reasons for disregarding the Medical Board's certificate and the neuropsychological report which evidenced severe cognitive impairment, partial blindness, and intellectual disability resulting from a head injury - Noted that for a professional like a Manager, whose role depends on memory and analytical skills, such neurological deficits lead to a profound erosion of faculties essential for employment - the Supreme Court enhanced the functional disability to 100% for the purpose of computing compensation - Supreme Court increased the compensation from ₹35.61 lakh (as fixed by the Madras High Court) to ₹97.73 lakh, restoring and expanding the approach adopted by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT). [Paras 21 - 30] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Duties of Appellate Courts – When an appellate court interferes with the findings of fact recorded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), especially regarding disability assessment, it must undertake a thorough reappreciation of evidence and assign clear, convincing reasons - Mechanical reductions of compensation without independent analysis of medical records are not sustainable in law – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343; Paras 22 - 35] R. Halle v. Reliance General Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 261 : 2026 INSC 260

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Section 166 — Compensation — Deduction of Group Insurance Scheme (GIS) benefits — Held: Amounts received by the dependents of a deceased under an employer-provided group insurance scheme or other contractual/social security benefits cannot be deducted from the compensation awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act - These benefits arise from an independent contractual relationship and lack the requisite nexus with the statutory compensation payable for death in a motor vehicle accident - The principle of balancing loss and gain cannot be invoked to diminish the statutory entitlement to "just compensation." [Paras 14 - 16] Managing Director, KSRTC v. P. Chandramouli, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 245 : 2026 INSC 241

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 2(30) and 147 – Requisition of Vehicle for Election Duty – Determination of Liability – Whether the registered owner/insurer or the requisitioning authority (State) is liable for compensation in case of an accident involving a vehicle requisitioned under statutory orders - Held: When a public authority requisitions a privately owned vehicle for public purposes (such as Gram Panchayat Elections), the nature of possession and control changes entirely - The registered owner is divested of custody and decision-making power, and the vehicle is placed at the disposal of the State for governmental functions – Held that the requisitioning authority assumes the role of the "owner" for the period of requisition. District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Shifting of Liability from Insurer to State – The insurance policy obtained by the owner covers "regular and lawful use" in the ordinary course - Compelled deployment under statutory command cannot be characterized as "regular use" within the usual contemplation of the insurance contract - To fasten liability on the insurer for risks generated exclusively by governmental action would be to extend the contract beyond the agreed risk - responsibility for accidents occurring during the requisition period rests with the requisitioning authority (State) and not the insurer – Although Section 160 of the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1950, does not expressly authorize requisitioning manpower, if the authority utilizes the services of the driver provided with the vehicle, it implicitly recognizes the driver's competence to operate the vehicle under its control - The liability remains with the State even if the driver is an employee of the original owner, as the driver operates under official directions during the requisition period. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi (2008) 1 SCC 414; Purnya Kala Devi v. State of Assam (2014) 14 SCC 142; Paras 8-12] District Magistrate v. National Insurance Company, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 280 : 2026 INSC 279

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Section 50 – Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted – Non-compliance with mandatory requirements – Provision of "Third Option" for search – Noted that the High Court's acquittal of the accused was upheld where the Investigating Officer, while apprising the accused of his rights, provided a "third option" to be searched by the Police Officer instead of only a Magistrate or a Gazetted Officer - Such an option is contrary to the statutory mandate of Section 50, which only allows for search before a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate – Held that although the contraband (11 kg 50 grams of Charas) was recovered from a bag carried by the accused, Section 50 was attracted because a personal search was also conducted alongside the search of the bag – noted that the prosecution's case was further weakened by the testimony of PW-8 (shopkeeper), who denied providing an electronic weighing scale as claimed by the police, stating he only possessed traditional scales - This discrepancy rendered the prosecution's version of events doubtful and untrustworthy. [Relied on State of Rajasthan v. Parmanand and Another (2014) 5 SCC 345; Suresh and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2013) 1 SCC 550; Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja v. State of Gujarat (2011) 1 SCC 609; Paras 17-18] State of Himachal Pradesh v. Surat Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 246 : 2026 INSC 240

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 14, 2(m) and Schedule I - Jurisdiction of NGT - Removal of Encroachment - The Supreme Court set aside an NGT order directing the removal of a temple and associated structures allegedly built on land earmarked for a park/open space - held that for the NGT to exercise jurisdiction under Section 14, there must be a "substantial question relating to environment" involving the implementation of specific enactments listed in Schedule I of the Act - Since the dispute involved alleged violations of Municipal Laws and Town Planning Acts which are not included in Schedule I, the NGT lacked the jurisdiction to order the removal of the encroachment. Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 2(m) - Substantial Question Relating to Environment - Definition includes instances of direct violation of specific environmental statutory obligations affecting the community at large, substantial damage to environment/property, or measurable damage to public health. Jurisdiction is strictly limited to the seven central environmental laws specified in Schedule I. [Paras 7-10] Narender Bhardwaj v. 108 Super Complex R.W.A., 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 249

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 – Section 138 – Dishonour of Post-dated Cheques – Presumption of Cheating – Dishonour of a post-dated cheque by itself is not sufficient to presume the existence of a dishonest intention at the time of issuance - Post-dated cheques are often issued to discharge existing or future liabilities and do not carry a representation of sufficient funds at the time of issuance - While dishonour may trigger proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act, it does not ipso facto amount to cheating under Section 420 IPC unless dishonest intention is proved from the start. [Relied on Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc. (2011) 1 SCC 74; Vesa Holdings Private Limited and Another v. State of Kerala and others (2015) 8 SCC 293; Paras 12-20] V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265

Penal Code, 1860; Section 302 and Section 498A - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 32 - Dying Declaration - Reliability of Dying Declaration in cases of high percentage of burns - Conviction Upheld – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's reversal of an acquittal, affirming the conviction of the appellant for murdering his wife by pouring kerosene and setting her on fire - held that even with 80-90% burn injuries, a dying declaration is reliable if the attending doctors certify the patient was in a fit and conscious state to make a statement - The evidence of the victim's daughter (PW-3), who was an eyewitness to the appellant fetching kerosene and setting the deceased on fire, was found to be "clinchingly" credible - Supreme Court dismissed the defense's argument regarding inconsistencies in witness testimonies (PW-7 and PW-16), noting that the professional medical opinion of the treating doctors (PW-10 and PW-11) carries more weight regarding the deceased's mental capacity than the contradictory statements of other witnesses - noted that a mere discrepancy in the investigation officer's statements would not discredit the dying declaration when the doctor has approved the deceased's fit state of mind to give statements. [Paras 11-23] Subramani v. State of Karnataka, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 255 : 2026 INSC 249

Penal Code, 1860; Section 306 - Abetment of Suicide - Debt Recovery – Held a creditor making repeated phone calls or persistent demands for the return of money lent does not, by itself, constitute the offence of abetment of suicide - Such a demand is a lawful act - Supreme Court observed that in the absence of evidence showing the deceased was beaten or physically assaulted, mere demands for dues cannot be inferred as abetment - noted that the deceased might have committed suicide due to depression from being unable to clear the debt rather than due to the actions of the creditors. Dhirubhai Nanjibhai Patel Lotwala v. State of Gujarat, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 270

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 420 – Cheating – Ingredients – Essential requirement of dishonest intention from the inception – The Supreme Court held that to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive must exist at the time the inducement was made - Mere failure to keep a promise subsequently cannot be the sole basis to presume dishonest intention existed from the beginning - Every breach of contract does not give rise to an offence of cheating unless deception was played at the very inception. V. Ganesan v. State, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 269 : 2026 INSC 265

Precedent – Nature of Orders – Article 141 – that the High Court relied on Ram Naresh Singh v. Bokaro Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4740 of 2017) as a binding precedent to direct the release of gratuity with only nominal rent deductions - Held: The order in Ram Naresh Singh was passed on grounds of equity in specific facts and did not purport to lay down a binding precedent - An order passed on facts cannot be elevated to the status of a precedent by operation of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. [Para 17] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – Sections 7 and 13(2) – Illegal Gratification – Trap Proceedings – Evidentiary Value of Shadow Witness – Credibility of Independent Witnesses – The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of an Excise Constable caught in a trap for demanding and accepting a bribe of ₹500 - held that the testimony of a shadow witness (PW-2) cannot be branded as "interested" merely because they are acquainted with the complainant - To disqualify a witness as interested, the defense must provide specific material demonstrating actual hostility. Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239

Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016 – Sections 2(r) and 33 – Constitution of India – Articles 14 and 16 – Arbitrary Ceiling on Disability – Validity of fixing a 60% maximum disability limit for the post of Assistant District Attorney (ADA) - Held: The Supreme Court set aside the High Court judgment that upheld the denial of appointment to a candidate with 90% locomotor disability – Held that the RPwD Act, 2016 establishes a "floor" (minimum 40%) for benchmark disability but does not empower the State to create an arbitrary "ceiling" that excludes those with higher degrees of disability, provided they can perform the functional requirements through reasonable accommodation - Key Principles – i. Arbitrariness of Disability Caps: Prescribing an upper limit of 60% disability for a legal professional role (ADA) has no rational nexus with the nature of duties, which primarily require mental alacrity and legal acumen; ii. Reasonable Accommodation: The State has a positive obligation to make necessary modifications to ensure persons with disabilities enjoy rights on an equal basis - A candidate's capability must be assessed on actual functional competence rather than an abstract medical percentage; iii. Statutory Misinterpretation: By fixing a maximum limit, the respondents essentially "rewrote" the statutory definition of "benchmark disability" to the detriment of the protected class – Directed Respondent No. 1 directed to issue an appointment letter to the appellant within two weeks and the State of Himachal Pradesh is directed to pay Rs. 5 lakhs in costs to the appellant for unjust denial of appointment and prolonged litigation – Appeal allowed. [Relied on Vikash Kumar v. U.P.S.C. (2021 5 SCC 370); Paras 22-40] Prabhu Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 254 : 2026 INSC 253

Securities Law – SEBI (Prohibition of Fraudulent and Unfair Trade Practices Relating to Securities Market) Regulations, 2003 (PFUTP) – Regulations 3 and 4 – Fraudulent Diversion of Funds – Ratification by Shareholders – Legality of Post-Facto Approval - Core Issue: Whether a company that raises funds through preferential allotment for specific disclosed objects can, after immediately diverting those funds for unauthorized purposes, legitimize the illegality through a subsequent shareholders' resolution – Supreme Court noted the following – i. PFUTP and Fraud: The definition of "fraud" under PFUTP Regulations is expansive and does not require a strict "deceit" element as per common law - Diversion of funds raised for a specific object to an undisclosed purpose constitutes a breach of Regulation 3 and Regulations 4(2)(f), (k), and (r); ii. Irregularity vs. Illegality: Supreme Court distinguished between an "irregularity," which can be regularized, and an "illegality," which cannot - An act that is "ultra vires" or violates statutory regulations impacting public interest and multiple stakeholders cannot be ratified even if all shareholders agree; iii. Public Interest Dimensions: SEBI Regulations have public law dimensions designed to protect the integrity of the market - A private resolution by shareholders cannot wipe off a crystallized liability or waive rights involving public policy; iv. Parallel Proceedings: Held, that the Whole Time Member (WTM) and the Adjudicating Officer (AO) operate in separate fields the former for protective measures/disgorgement and the latter for imposing penalties and both proceedings are maintainable on the same set of facts. [Relied on SEBI v. Kanaiyalal Baldevbhai Patel (2017) 15 SCC 1; Shri Lachoo Mal v. Shri Radhey Shyam (1971) 1 SCC 619; Government of Andhra Pradesh v. K. Brahmanandam (2008) 5 SCC 241; SEBI v. Kishore R. Ajmera (2016) 6 SCC 368; Paras 41-66] Securities and Exchange Board of India v. Terrascope Ventures, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 248 : 2026 INSC 245

Sentencing – Mitigating Circumstances – Delay and Age – While sustaining the conviction, the Court modified the sentence due to the passage of time and the appellant's advanced age - The appellant was approximately 40 years old at the time of the offense (1990) and 75 years old at the time of the final judgment – Supreme Court reduced the sentence to the statutory minimums: 6 months for Section 7 and 1 year for Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act. [Paras 15-25] Raj Bahadur Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 242 : 2026 INSC 239

Service Law – Accelerated Promotion – Counter-Extremism/Naxal Activities – Parity in Treatment – Judicial Review of Committee Decisions – The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's direction to grant accelerated promotion to a police constable (Respondent) who resisted a Naxalite attack on a police station - The State had denied the promotion claiming the Respondent's role was "nominal" compared to a colleague (G. Venkat Reddy) who received the benefit – Supreme Court found the Committee's assessment "perverse" as it was admitted that the Respondent, while on roof-top guard sentry duty, fired more rounds at the Naxalites than the promoted colleague and was instrumental in repelling the attack - Held, when collective efforts repel an attack, it is unfair to belittle the role of individual personnel to deny them benefits intended to boost the morale of the force - While the Court's intervention in decisions taken by specialized Committees for out-of-turn promotion is minimal, such decisions are not immune to interference if they are found to be unfair or based on perverse findings – Appeal dismissed. [Relied on State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. vs. Sanjay Shukla (Civil Appeal No. 2040 of 2023, decided on March 27, 2023; Paras 9, 10] State of Telangana v. P. Srinivas, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 263 : 2026 INSC 258

Service Law – Disciplinary Proceedings – Continuance after Superannuation – Permissibility of Punishment – Punjab and Sind Bank Officers' Service Regulations, 1982; Regulation 20(3)(iii) – Punjab and Sind Bank Employees' Pension Regulations, 1995; Regulation 48 - The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of a writ petition filed by a retired bank officer challenging a punishment of "reduction by three stages in the time scale of pay" imposed after his superannuation - Key Findings by Supreme Court – i. Continuance of Proceedings: If service rules permit, disciplinary proceedings initiated before superannuation can be continued and brought to a logical conclusion even after the employee attains the age of superannuation; ii. Legal Fiction of Service - Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the Service Regulations creates a legal fiction where the officer is deemed to be in service until the proceedings are concluded; iii. Implementability of Punishment - The Court rejected the argument that only penalties under Pension Regulations could be imposed post-retirement - held that a punishment of reduction in pay scale relates back to the date of superannuation and is implementable because pension is computed based on the salary last drawn/payable; iv. Misconduct by Bank Officers: A bank officer holds a position of trust - Failure to ensure the end-use of a loan constitutes a financial irregularity that exposes the bank to risk and amounts to misconduct, regardless of whether an actual loss was suffered. [Relied on Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. Rabindranath Choubey (2020) 18 SCC 71; Ramesh Chandra Sharma vs. Punjab National Bank and Another (2007) 9 SCC 15; State Bank of India vs. Ram Lal Bhaskar (2011) 10 SCC 249; Paras 25-37] Virinder Pal Singh v. Punjab and Sind Bank, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 268 : 2026 INSC 266

Service Law – Equitable Relief – Creation of Supernumerary Post – To balance the equities between a candidate already in service (Appellant) and a deserving candidate deprived of selection due to a contested answer (Respondent No. 3), Supreme Court directed the creation of a supernumerary post – Appellant to retain seniority over the new appointee. [Relied on Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others (2013) 14 SCC 494; Paras 7 - 11] Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248

Service Law – Interpretation of "Ratio" vs "Quota" – The Supreme Court clarified that the 11% allocation was intended to upgrade the cadre by ensuring experienced graduates are appointed to Supervisor posts, previously filled from the open category direct recruitment - This earmarking did not reduce the chances of SSLC-only holders, as their 29% ratio remained intact and was not reduced by the amendment. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242

Service Law – Merit-Based Selection – No Edge for Graduates – The selection process, involving an OMR and main written test focusing on pediatric health, provided a level playing field - The fact that non-graduates significantly outnumbered graduates in the final selection (235 out of 317) dispelled any apprehension that graduation conferred an unfair advantage or "edge" in the examination – Noted that The High Court's interpretation that the quotas were mutually exclusive was termed a "judicial fiat" that interfered with the executive's rule-making authority. "What the executive did not think fit to do by prescription in the Rules, could not have been done by a judicial fiat" – Appeals allowed. [Relied on Sanjay Kumar v. Narinder Verma (2006) 6 SCC 467; Paras 13-23] Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242

Service Law – Payment of Gratuity – Retention of Staff Quarters – Adjustment of Penal Rent from Gratuity – Reciprocal Obligations – The management of Steel Authority of India (SAIL) challenged the High Court's direction to release the full gratuity with interest to retired employees who had failed to vacate official accommodation – Held that the obligation of an ex-employee to vacate staff quarters and the obligation of the management to release gratuity are mutual and reciprocal - Neither can be enforced in isolation - Under Rule 3.2.1(c) of the SAIL Gratuity Rules, 1978, the management is expressly empowered to withhold gratuity for non-vacation of company accommodation - no interest is payable on the gratuity amount withheld during the period of unauthorized occupation. [Paras 19 & 20] Management of Steel Authority of India v. Shambhu Prasad Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 262 : 2026 INSC 263

Service Law – Recruitment – Integrated Child Development Scheme (ICDS) – Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services – Selection to the post of Supervisor – Eligibility of Graduate Anganwadi Workers to compete in the 29% quota reserved for SSLC holders - Special Rules for the Kerala Social Welfare Subordinate Services, 2010 – Amendment effective from 01.01.2014 – Distribution of Vacancies – Held that the 11% ratio carved out specifically for Anganwadi Workers with a graduate degree does not exclude such graduates from applying under the 29% quota earmarked for Anganwadi Workers with SSLC and 10 years' experience - held that graduates naturally possess the lower SSLC qualification; therefore, unless the rules expressly prohibit higher qualifications or exclude graduates from the general pool, they are eligible to compete in both categories. Shiny C.J. v. Shalini Sreenivasan, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 247 : 2026 INSC 242

Service Law – Recruitment – Judicial Review of Answer Keys – Ambiguity in Multiple Choice Questions (MCQs) – Selection for the post of Law Officer – Dispute over the correct answer to a question regarding the immunity of the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution from judicial review – Recruiting body considered "Ninth Schedule" (Option B) as correct, while the respondent claimed "None of the above" (Option D) was correct based on the 'Basic Structure' doctrine – Held: When High Court Judges themselves hold divergent views on the interpretation of Constitutional provisions and Supreme Court precedents spanning decades, law graduates appearing for a recruitment exam cannot be expected to reach a singular "correct" conclusion by such complex interpretation – Both candidates found to be deserving of accommodation as both answers could be considered correct from different perspectives. Charan Preet Singh v. Municipal Corporation Chandigarh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 253 : 2026 INSC 248

Special Courts Act, 2009 (Bihar) — Confiscation of Property — Death of Public Servant during pendency of Appeal — Effect on Confiscation Proceedings against spouse/relative - The Supreme Court held that confiscation proceedings initiated under the Bihar Special Courts Act, 2009 (BSCA) do not automatically abate or get set aside upon the death of the public servant if the property is held by a relative or spouse who was also put to notice – Noted that "abatement" in criminal proceedings discontinuation due to the death of the accused is distinct from "acquittal" and does not constitute a comment on the merits of the case - Under Section 19 of the BSCA, confiscated property can only be returned in two specific scenarios: (a) modification or annulment of the order by the High Court, or (b) acquittal by the Special Court - Since the Act does not account for the death of a public servant as a ground for returning property, and because non-public servants can be proceeded against for holding illegally acquired assets, the High Court is required to decide such appeals on their merits rather than dropping them due to the death of the primary accused. [Relied on Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183; Gurmail Singh v. State of U.P. (2022) 10 SCC 684; P. Nallammal v. State (1999) 6 SCC 559; Para 8-12] State of Bihar v. Sudha Singh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 276 : 2026 INSC 272