Supreme Court Weekly Digest: November 11 - 20, 2025

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 31(7)(b) - Post-Award Interest is Mandatory – Held, the grant of post-award interest under Section 31(7)(b) (pre-amended) is mandatory, and the only discretion vested in the Arbitral Tribunal is to decide the rate of interest to be awarded - Where the arbitrator does not fix any rate of interest, the statutory rate of 18% per annum shall apply - Clause (b) is in contrast with clause (a) and is not subject to party autonomy; it does not give the parties the right to "contract out" interest for the post-award period - The phrase "unless the award otherwise directs" relates to the rate of interest and not the entitlement of interest. [Relied on Morgan Securities & Credits Pvt Ltd. v. Videocon Industries Ltd. (2022 INSC 898; R.P. Garg v. The General Manager, Telecom Department & Ors. (2024 INSC 743; Paras 37, 38, 41-44] Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118 : 2025 INSC 1327

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 34(2)(b)(ii) read with Explanation 1 and Section 34(2A) Proviso - Challenge to Arbitral Award - High Rate of Interest - Public Policy – Held, the imposition of an exorbitant interest rate in a purely commercial transaction, considering contemporary commercial practices, cannot be said to be against the fundamental policy of Indian Law or against the basic notions of morality or justice under the restricted meaning given to "public policy of India" post the 2015 amendments - A difference or controversy as to the rate of interest falls outside the scope of a challenge on the ground of conflict with the public policy of India, unless it is evident that the rate awarded is so perverse and so unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the Court - The proviso to Section 34(2A) explicitly prohibits re-appreciation of evidence - Where the learned Arbitrator's findings on the genuineness of the loan agreement and the interest rate (here, 24% p.a.) have been concurrently upheld by the courts below, a contrary view would amount to re-appreciation of evidence, which is barred - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on OPG Power Generation Private Limited v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India Private Limited (2024 SCC OnLine SC 2600; Paras 45-53] Sri Lakshmi Hotel Pvt. Ltd. v. Sriram City Union Finance Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1118 : 2025 INSC 1327

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 528- Quashing of FIR- Constitution of India - Article 142 - Inherent Power to Quash- The Supreme Court, exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, quashed an FIR in its entirety, including the offence of Dacoity which the High Court had sustained despite an amicable settlement - Held that once the High Court accepted the compromise and quashed the FIR for the other offences there was no justification to sustain the FIR for the dacoity charge, as the factual matrix for all offences was inseparable and arose from a single transaction- Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 15] Prashant Prakash Ratnaparki v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1114 : 2025 INSC 1323

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu) – Section 10(2)(i) – Notice Not Mandatory - Held, issuance of a two-month notice under the Explanation to Section 10(2)(i) is not a mandatory condition precedent for a landlord to seek eviction- The Explanation merely provides an instance where default is presumed to be wilful- It does not take away the Rent Controller's discretion to determine wilfulness in the absence of such notice- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R. Pattabiraman (1985) 1 SCC 591; Trimurthi Fragrances (P) Ltd. v. Government of N.C.T. of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1247; Paras 25-28] K. Subramaniam v. Krishna Mills Pvt.Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1098 : 2025 INSC 1309

Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu) – Section 10(2)(i) – Wilful Default– "Without Prejudice" Payments- Held, filing of appeal or revision against an order fixing fair rent does not operate as an automatic stay of execution – Failure to pay determined rent during the pendency of proceedings, without obtaining a specific stay order from the appellate/revisional forum, constitutes 'wilful default' warranting eviction- Mere filing of an appeal does not operate as a stay of the decree or order under appeal, as per the statutory ordainment in Order XLI Rule 5(1) of the CPC- Where a tenant challenges the fixation of fair rent but fails to seek or obtain a stay of its operation, the failure to pay the determined rent constitutes wilful default- The Court clarified that where a tenant pays arrears pursuant to a judicial order marked "without prejudice," such payment does not constitute a waiver of the landlord's right to seek ejectment for the prior wilful default- The payment merely saves the tenant from immediate adverse consequences during the pendency of the lis but does not erase the default committed earlier. [Paras 23, 24, 29, 30] K. Subramaniam v. Krishna Mills Pvt.Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1098 : 2025 INSC 1309

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Distinction between 'Levy' (Section 3) and 'Measure of Tax' (Section 4)– Valuation cannot determine Excisability- Held, Section 3 creates the charge and defines the nature of the levy (manufacture of excisable goods), whereas Section 4 provides the measure (value) for the levy- The Revenue Court erred by conflating the two- The "transaction value" under Section 4 is relevant only after the taxable event (manufacture of excisable goods) is established- The measure of tax cannot be invoked to prove that what has been produced is excisable. [Relied on Union of India v. Bombay Tyre International Ltd., (1984) 1 SCC 467; Paras 39-43] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 11A(1) Proviso – Extended Period of Limitation – Suppression of Facts- Supreme Court set aside the invocation of the extended period of limitation (5 years)- It held that mere failure to declare does not amount to wilful suppression- There must be a positive act with an intent to evade payment of duty. Since the assessee held a bona fide belief regarding non-inclusion and had filed returns, no suppression was established- Appeals allowed. [Relied on Pahwa Chemicals Private Limited v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2009) 4 SCC 658; Continental Foundation Joint Venture Holding v. CCE, (2007) 10 SCC 337; Paras 74-80] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Central Excise Act, 1944- Section 11D – Excess Collection of Duty – Does not confer Excisability- Rejected the Revenue's argument that because the assessee allegedly collected excise duty on the total value from the buyer, the goods are excisable- If excess duty was collected, the Revenue should have invoked Section 11D for recovery of that amount, but such collection does not render an immovable product excisable. [Paras 72-73] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Central Excise Act, 1944 – Section 2(d) – Excisability – Test of Movability – Erection and Installation of Plant- Supreme Court held that a steam generating plant/boiler, assembled and erected at site using civil engineering materials (concrete, grouting, etc.), which cannot be dismantled without substantial damage, is "immovable property" and not "goods."- Therefore, it is not excisable- The mere size and weight of the boiler made it impossible to assemble before erection- The final product (steam generating plant) emerging at the site is immovable; hence, the contract price cannot be treated as the assessable value for excise purposes. [Relied on Quality Steel Tubes (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1995) 2 SCC 372; Mittal Engineering Works (P) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, (1997) 1 SCC 203; Sirpur Paper Mills Ltd v. Collector of Central Excise, (1998) 1 SCC 400; Paras 59-64] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Order XLVII Rule 1 - Review Jurisdiction - Whether a subsequent reversal/modification of a legal position by another judgment can constitute a ground for review – Held, no liberty to seek review on the basis of a later judgment - Supreme Court declined to follow the observation made in Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., RP(C) No. 359/2023 in CA No. 5783/2022, which had granted liberty to aggrieved parties to seek review based on the Court's later decision - The three-judge Bench in Ganpati Dealcom failed to notice the earlier three-judge Bench decision in KL Rathi Steels (decided on 17.05.2024), held that, KL Rathi Steels—a prior co-equal Bench decision—must prevail - Liberty to seek review cannot be granted merely because another judgment has changed the law later - Petition dismissed. [Paras 2-4] Union of India v. Virendra Amrutbhai Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1107

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VIII Rule 6A – Counter Claim – Maintainability against Co-Defendant – Held, a counter-claim cannot be directed solely against a co-defendant; it must be directed against the plaintiff– While a counter-claim can be based on a different cause of action than that put forth in the suit, it should be incidental or connected with that cause of action and has necessarily to be directed against the plaintiff- Counter claim by defendants 2 & 3 against defendant No. 1 for specific performance in a suit filed by the plaintiff set aside- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Rohit Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar, (2006) 12 SCC 734; Para 10, 14] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908– Order XXI Rule 31– Execution of Compromise Decree– Burden of Proof– Held, in an execution petition, the primary onus lies on the decree-holder to show that the judgment debtor has wilfully disobeyed the conditions of the decree– Where the decree-holder failed to produce cogent evidence that the judgment debtors were in possession of the suit property (idols/religious articles) or had violated the terms of the 1933 compromise decree, execution cannot be ordered based on mere presumptions– Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof– Noted that the Executing Court erred by assuming possession based on the absence of earlier disputes- Reiterated that the burden of proving a fact especially within the knowledge of a person lies upon him, and the appellants failed to discharge the burden of proving violation of the decreeAppeal dismissed. [Paras 24- 28] Kapadam Sangalappa v. Kamatam Sangalappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1093 : 2025 INSC 1307

Constitutional Law - Separation of Powers - Judicial Independence - Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 - Legislative Override - The Supreme Court reiterated that an executive or legislative action that frustrates or overturns a mandatory direction or a finding of unconstitutionality previously issued by the Court, without remedying the underlying basis for the declaration of invalidity, amounts to an impermissible legislative override and violates the basic structure doctrine, specifically the principle of judicial independence- held that the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which contains provisions identical to the previously struck-down Ordinance and sections of the Finance Act, 2017- including the minimum age requirement of fifty years, the truncated four-year tenure for members, and the mandate for the Search-cum-Selection Committee (SCSC) to recommend a panel of two names- is invalid as it constitutes a direct attempt to negate binding judicial directions and encroach upon the judicial sphere- clarified that all appointments of Members and Chairpersons whose selection or recommendation by the Search-cum-Selection Committee was completed before the commencement of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, shall be protected- Such appointments will continue to be governed by their respective parent statutes and the conditions of service as laid down in the previous binding judgments, rather than by the truncated tenure and altered service conditions introduced by the 2021 Act. [Relied on Madras Bar Association v. Union of India and Another (2021) 7 SCC 369; S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 124; Paras 84-86, 87-89, 90, 117, 118, 136-141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Constitution of India, 1950– Article 129, 137, 142 and Curative Jurisdiction– Supreme Court Rules, 2013– Order XLVIII– Nithari Killings– Supreme Court allows curative petition and acquits accused-petitioner, setting aside the death sentence (commuted to life) affirmed in 2011– Held, allowing a conviction to stand on an evidentiary foundation that the Court has subsequently rejected as involuntary or inadmissible in companion cases arising from the same facts violates Articles 14 and 21 – To preserve the integrity of the adjudicatory process, the Court must intervene ex debito justitiae when two sets of outcomes rest on an identical evidentiary foundation but are irreconcilable. [Relied on Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra 2002 4 SCC 388; Paras 1, 10, 15, 22] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Constitution of India; Article 21 – Investigation – Fair Trial – Supreme Court criticized the investigation for negligence, delay, and failure to probe material angles like organ trade – Failure to secure the crime scene, lack of independent medical documentation during custody, and botched forensic collection undermined the prosecution's case– Held that suspicion, however grave, cannot replace proof beyond reasonable doubtPetition allowed. [Paras 15, 18, 21] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Consumer Protection Act, 1986; Section 2(1)(d)— 'Consumer'— 'Commercial Purpose'— Exclusion from definition - Held, for an activity or transaction to be considered for a "commercial purpose," it should have a close and direct nexus with a profit-generating activity- What must be seen is the dominant intention or dominant purpose for the transaction—whether it is to facilitate some kind of profit generation for the purchaser - "commercial purpose" is understood to include business-to-business transactions between commercial entities - Where an established company buys a product license (software) to automate its business processes, the object is to reduce costs and maximise profits- Such a transaction has a nexus with the generation of profits and is therefore for a commercial purpose - The 'Explanation' to Section 2(1)(d) of the 1986 Act, which excludes use for earning a livelihood by means of self-employment, does not apply to a company - Held that there is a difference between a self-employed individual and a corporation. [Relied on: Lilavati Kirtilal Mehta Medical Trust v. Unique Shanti Developers and Ors. 2020 2 SCC 265; National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Harsolia Motors and Ors. ((2023) 8 SCC 362; Para 15-18, 20-27] Poly Medicure Ltd. v. Brillio Technologies Pvt. Ltd; 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1102 : 2025 INSC 1314

Court of Records - The Supreme Court has reiterated that High Courts are Courts of Record and that whatever is recorded in their proceedings is presumed to be correct and cannot be contradicted later by parties or counsel- Petition disposed of petition with liberty to file an appropriate application before High Court to address the grievance regarding the unauthorized concession. [Relied on State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak & Anr. 1982 2 SCC 463; Para 2-4] Savita v. Satyabhan Dixit, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1096

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Section 164 – Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 24 – Confession – Admissibility – Held, confession recorded under Section 164 CrPC was inadmissible as it was recorded after 60 days of uninterrupted police custody without meaningful legal aid, and the accused was under the influence/proximity of the Investigating Officer – The confession contained assertions of tutoring and torture, attracting the bar under Section 24 of the Evidence Act – A statement judicially discredited in 12 other cases cannot be treated as voluntary in the present case. [Paras 11, 17] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy – Limits on Legislative Power- Held that Parliament cannot nullify binding judicial declarations under Article 141 by legislative restatement of previously-struck provisions. A legislature may neutralise a judgment only by curing the identified defect, not by repeating what was invalidated- explained that a Legislature may remove the substratum of a judgment, but cannot directly override it. [Relied on NHPC Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2023 INSC 810, where the Court; Paras 118–119, 136–141] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Environmental Law - Correct systemic weaknesses in tiger governance, the Supreme Court issued several pan-India directions- i. All States must notify core and buffer areas within 6 months; ii. All States must prepare or revise Tiger Conservation Plans within 3 months; iii. Steering Committees for each Tiger Reserve must be constituted within 2 months and meet twice annually; iii. NTCA must monitor whether TCPs and Steering Committees are effectively functioning; iv. Community-based tourism models must replace mass tourism- The Court further held that Critical Tiger Habitats under the Wildlife Protection Act must be treated at par with Critical Wildlife Habitats under the Forest Rights Act, ensuring consistency in recognition of ecological value and rights of forest dwellers. [Paras 47, 48 - 50] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Environmental Law– Environment (Protection) Act, 1986– Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) Notification, 2006– Judicial Discipline and Precedent– Review– Per Incuriam- Supreme Court in Review Petition recalls its earlier judgment (JUR: Vanashakti v. Union of India) which had struck down the 2017 Notification and 2021 Office Memorandum providing for ex post facto Environmental Clearance (EC) in certain circumstances- Held that a Bench of two-Judges is bound by an earlier view taken by another Bench of co-equal strength- If a subsequent Bench considers that the law laid down earlier by a co-equal Bench requires reconsideration, the only available option is to refer the matter to a larger Bench- The judgment delivered by a subsequent Bench of two Judges in ignorance of the earlier binding judgment of a Bench of co-equal strength is per incuriam in law- The earlier judgment (JUR), being a two-Judge Bench, failed to notice the binding co-ordinate Bench judgments in D. Swamy v. Karnataka State Pollution Control Board and Others and Pahwa Plastics Private Limited and Another v. Dastak NGO and Others on the issue of ex post facto EC, rendering it per incuriam- The failure to consider binding co-ordinate precedents constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record, making the review warranted and imperative- Writ Petition and Appeal are restored. [Relied on Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1; Paras 80-101, 115-127] Confederation of Real Estate Developers of India v. Vanashakti, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1116 : 2025 INSC 1326

Environmental Law - Nationwide mandate to notify Eco-Sensitive Zones for all Tiger Reserves - The Court has directed that all Tiger Reserves must have notified Eco-Sensitive Zones (ESZs) within one year - Supreme Court endorsed the MoEF&CC's 2018 advisory stating that the minimum extent of ESZs must cover the entire buffer and fringe areas, with at least a one-kilometre radial cushion around critical habitat where the buffer is missing - Held that ESZs, traditionally notified around National Parks and Sanctuaries, must apply equally to Tiger Reserves, reinforcing the ecological shield around these landscapes - Once notified, the same restrictions as those under the 9 February 2011 ESZ Notification will apply - This includes a complete ban on mining within one kilometre of tiger habitats, buffer areas or ESZ boundaries, whichever is larger. [Paras 47] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Environmental Law - Prohibited activities in buffer and fringe areas - The Supreme Court approved the Expert Committee's list of prohibited activities, including - i. commercial mining; ii. Sawmills; iii. polluting industries; iv. commercial firewood use; v. major hydroelectric projects; vi. introduction of exotic species; vii. hazardous substance production; viii. low-flying aircraft and tourism aircraft; ix. waste discharge into natural ecosystems; x. tree felling without approval- Held that regulated activities, such as hotels, water use, road widening and night vehicular movement, will require adherence to strict wildlife safeguards and must be consistent with Tiger Conservation Plans. [Paras 47] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Environmental Law - Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Forest Conservation Act, 1980 - Restoration Ecology - Corbett Tiger Reserve - Ecological Damage – Restoration - The Supreme Court accepted the recommendations of the Expert Committee regarding the ecological damage caused in the Corbett Tiger Reserve (CTR) - The State of Uttarakhand is directed to restore the ecological damage caused to the CTR under the supervision, guidance, and control of the Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - Restoration Principle – Ecocentrism - The principle of restoration requires the State to take steps for the identification and effective implementation of active restoration measures that are localized to the particular ecosystem that was damaged - The focus must be on restoration of the ecosystem as close and similar as possible to the specific one that was damaged - Reiterated that the approach for Tiger Safaris and conservation must be of ecocentrism and not of anthropocentrism, and the precautionary principle must be applied - Reaffirmed the directions from the earlier judgment in T.N. Godavarman case concerning the sourcing of animals for Tiger Safaris - i. Animals sourced for Safaris shall not be from outside the Tiger Reserve; ii. Only injured, conflicted, or orphaned tigers may be exhibited as per the 2016 Guidelines; iii. The contrary provisions in the 2019 Guidelines, which permitted the sourcing of animals from zoos, were quashed - Noted that despite earlier directions, Uttarakhand has not completed the departmental proceedings against delinquent Indian Forest Service officers - The State has been given three further months to conclude the process. [Paras 43 - 46] In Re Corbett, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1112

Evidence Act, 1872; Section 27 - Circumstantial Evidence - Recovery of Weapon – Held, conviction cannot be solely based on the recovery of a pistol and an FSL Report when the alleged eye-witnesses turn hostile, the motive is unproved, and the recovery is made from a place accessible to other family members; the prosecution must prove the guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of cogent material and evidence- For a recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act to be relevant, the information received from the accused must "relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” - The disclosure statement must make it clear that the recovered pistol was the one used in the commission of the offence - Mere recovery of a weapon, even with a supporting FSL report, is not sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the absence of other corroborative evidence connecting the accused to the crime - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Manjunath & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) SCC OnLine SC 1421; Paras 15-25] Govind v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1106 : 2025 INSC 1318

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 27 – Discovery – Recoveries made at the instance of the accused rejected- Supreme Court noted that no contemporaneous disclosure memo was proved, remand papers were contradictory, and the recovery site (open drain/strip) was accessible to the public and police before the accused's arrival – Once prior knowledge is established and disclosure is not contemporaneously proved, Section 27 ceases to operate – Recoveries of skulls/bones treated as seizure from an already known place rather than discovery. [Paras 12, 18] Surendra Koli v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1091 : 2025 INSC 1308

Evidence Law - Dock Identification After Long Delay – Unreliable - Held, identification of the accused for the first time in Court after 8½ years, that too through video-conferencing, by an elderly witness with weak distant vision, is inherently unsafe to rely - The witness was not wearing spectacles despite admitting weak eyesight; no prior TIP was conducted with her presence; improvement regarding clothes (black shirt) introduced for first time during deposition - all cumulatively render dock identification unreliable. [Paras 52 - 56] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322

Income Tax Act, 1961 – Section 245HA – Revival of Appellate Proceedings – Held, Appellate proceedings will stand revived and Section 245HA of the 1961 Act will be applicable only if the application for settlement is rejected without providing for terms of settlement - The stand of the Revenue that the assessee must give up his right to contest the assessment order on merits, if the settlement application is rejected without providing for terms of settlement, is misconceived and must be rejected - Where an application is pending before the Settlement Commission, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) should keep the appellate proceedings in abeyance till the disposal of the application by the Settlement Commission in terms of the 1961 Act - Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) was Justified in condoning delay and setting aside the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and restoring the first appeal, considering the peculiar facts of the case - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 3 - 7] Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-1 Surat v. M. D. Industries Pvt Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1111

Insurance Law - Contract of Insurance is a contract of uberrima fides (utmost good faith) – Held, the proposer is not under a duty to disclose facts which he did not know and which he could not reasonably be expected to know at the material time - An exclusion clause in the policy is to be construed in a manner that it does not defeat the main purpose of the contract and could even be read down to serve the main purpose of the policy that is to indemnify the policy holder - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Canara Bank vs. United India Insurance Company Limited and Ors. (2020) 3 SCC 455; Para 24, 25-30] Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd v. National Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1100 : 2025 INSC 1315

Insurance Law - Exclusion Clause - Boiler & Pressure Plant Insurance Policy - Burden of Proof – Held, a subsequent discovery of damage or corrosion cannot be used to repudiate the claim as it would defeat the main purpose of the insurance contract - In the absence of a stand that the boiler and its parts had a prescribed life and had outlived it, or that there was a failure on the part of the insured in making full and complete disclosure, making the contract voidable, exclusion clause 5 could not have been pressed into service to repudiate the claim of the insured - The burden of proof to bring the case within the exclusionary clause lies on the insurance company - When an insurer accepts the risk, it can repudiate the claim on limited grounds such as: (a) by pleading and proving that there was a failure on the part of the insured in making disclosure of a material fact which renders the contract voidable at the instance of the insurer; and (b) by demonstrating that the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance exclude such claims. [Paras 20-25, 33-39] Kopargaon Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd v. National Insurance, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1100 : 2025 INSC 1315

Judicial Custody - Habeas Corpus petition for release of accused in judicial custody - When bail applications have been rejected - Scope of Writ Petition against Judicial Custody – Held, the custody of an accused person in a criminal case, where a First Information Report (FIR) is registered, a chargesheet is filed, and multiple bail applications have been dismissed by the High Court, cannot be held to be unlawful in a writ petition for habeas corpus - High Court's decision to allow a habeas corpus petition filed by the daughter of the accused, directing his release on bond, after the High Court itself had rejected four prior bail applications filed by the accused, is a "totally without jurisdiction" exercise of power and a "novel method" adopted to scuttle the due process of law - The process followed is "totally unknown to law" - The High Court, in the guise of hearing a habeas corpus petition, cannot examine the merits of the criminal case and direct release, effectively sitting as an appellate court over its own orders rejecting bail. Such action "shocks the conscience" of the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15 - 17] State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kusum Sahu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1110

Motor Accident Compensation - Enhancement - Minor Victim (77.1% Disability) - The Supreme Court enhanced the compensation awarded to a minor victim from Rs. 7.48 Lakhs to Rs. 15.13 Lakhs - Held, compensation must be favourably addressed considering the severity of injuries and disability - Awarded Rs. 3 Lakhs towards 'Pain and Suffering' and Rs. 3 Lakhs towards 'Loss of Marriage Prospects'- Supreme Court added 40% for future prospects, a multiplier of 15 and calculating for 77.1 % disability, loss of future earnings was calculated at Rs. 7, 03,337/-; lumpsum of Rs. 50,000/- was awarded for medical expenses; attendant charges at Rs. 40,000/- and loss of amenities at Rs. 80,000/-; Appeal allowed. [Relied on Sona (minor) vs. Manual C.M. (Civil Appeal No. 002316 of 2025); Paras 5, National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi & Others (2017) 16 SCC 680; Kajal vs. Jagdish Chand (2020) 4 SCC 413; K.S. Muralidhar v. R. Subbulakshmi & Anr. (2024 SCC Online SC 3385); Paras 4-6] Riyas v. P.N. Shinosh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1094 : 2025 INSC 1303

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Pay and Recover Principle – Breach of Policy Conditions – Held, even where there is a breach of insurance conditions (such as overloading or carrying gratuitous passengers), the insurer can be directed to satisfy the award with liberty to recover the same from the vehicle owner– Insurance companies cannot evade their obligation to compensate victims in motor accident cases, even when there is a breach of a policy condition- Insurers retain the right to recover the compensation amount from the vehicle owner thereafter - Appeal allowed to the extent of applying the 'pay and recover' principle. [Relied on National Insurance Company Limited v. Swaran Singh 2004 3 SCC 297; Rama Bai v. Amit Minerals 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2067; Para 8-12] Akula Narayana v. Oriental Insurance Company Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1095 : 2025 INSC 1301

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37(1)(b) – Grant of Bail in Offences Involving Commercial Quantity – Twin Conditions – The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's orders granting bail, holding that the High Court failed to properly apply the statutory bar under Section 37 - The twin conditions—recording a satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail—must be demonstrably complied with - Held that the High Court's conclusion that there was no material to show knowledge was arrived at without discussion of the respondent's statements under Section 67 of the NDPS Act and circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, such as the respondent placing orders, controlling logistics, coordinating with the overseas supplier, and being present when the consignment was opened - Noted that High Court did not examine whether the circumstances, taken at face value, could prima facie indicate conscious control or involvement sufficient to attract the presumption of culpable mental state under Section 35 of the NDPS Act - Matter remitted to the High Court for fresh consideration of the prayer for bail, requiring a complete and fair appraisal of the rival contentions based on the material, and adhering to the parameters of Section 37. [Paras 15-22] Union of India v. Vigin K Varghese, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1101 : 2025 INSC 1316

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) - Section 37 - Mandatory Conditions for Bail - Release on bail for offences involving commercial quantity is the exception, and negation of bail is the rule – Held, the provisions of the NDPS Act must be interpreted literally and not liberally to prevent frustrating the object, purpose, and preamble of the Act - The issue of long incarceration or delay in trial (accused in custody for 1 year and 4 months and charges not framed) does not dispense with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 in a case involving a commercial quantity and prima facie evidence of organized drug trafficking - Since the accused was charged with offenses punishable with ten to twenty years rigorous imprisonment, it could not be said that the Respondent has been incarcerated for an unreasonably long time - An undertaking given by the accused's brother (a Sepoy in the Indian Army) to ensure compliance with bail conditions is of no relevance because the brother cannot be imprisoned if the accused absconds - Despite long custody and delayed framing of charges, the allegations are serious, as the recovery was much in excess of the commercial quantity and the accused allegedly got cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Narcotics Control Bureau vs. Kashif (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3848; Paras 11-15] Union Of India V. Namdeo Ashruba Nakade, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1109

National Tribunals Commission – Mandatory Direction- Reiterating earlier constitutional directives, Supreme Court ordered the Union of India to establish a National Tribunals Commission within four months—a structural safeguard for ensuring independence, transparent recruitment, and uniform administration of tribunals. [Paras 151–153] Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120 : 2025 INSC 1330

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; Section 138 – Dishonour of Cheque – Settlement at Revisional Stage – Acquittal subject to condition of depositing cost with Legal Services Authority – Held, the direction imposing costs on the appellant, to be paid to the Legal Services Authority, cannot be sustained in the eye of law, particularly when the complainant does not want any further amount, and the appellant has expressed inability to comply with the same, which is not in dispute - Held that the case Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. [(2010) 5 SCC 663 which provide for imposition of costs in NI Act depending on at which stage the case was compounded, could not be treated as binding. [Para 5-7] Rajeev Khandelwal v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1103

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 - Sections 9(m) and 10 - Aggravated Sexual Assault - The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a man found guilty of aggravated sexual assault on a 4-year-old girl, rejecting his plea for acquittal based on the absence of medical evidence and eyewitness testimony, holding that the consistent and credible evidence of the child's parents was sufficient to sustain the conviction - The Supreme Court reiterated the well-settled principle that medical evidence will take a backseat and even if it does not corroborate with the ocular evidence, the latter would be allowed to prevail where it is consistent and cogent- Appeal partly allowed. [Paras 5 - 9] Dinesh Kumar Jaldhari v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1105 : 2025 INSC 1317

Railway Claims Tribunal Act, 1987; Section 124A - Compensation for Death in Railway Accident - Bona Fide Passenger - Contributory Negligence – Held, merely because a deceased passenger, who had a valid ticket, boarded a wrong express train that passed through his destination, it cannot be construed that he was not a bona fide passenger - The railway authorities' contention that he was not a bona fide passenger was rejected- The Supreme Court rejected the Railways' plea under Section 124A Proviso Clause (b) that the death was caused by the deceased's self-negligence (jumping from a running train) - No sane person would attempt to deboard or alight from a running express train, and the plea of the deceased having jumped off the train was a plea without proof - It was incumbent upon the railway authorities to prove this plea, and the DRM Report was silent on this aspect - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 14] Shrikumar Gupta v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1115

Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 (Tamil Nadu) – Challenge to Public Auction Sale – Non-compliance with statutory remedy and limitation period - Sections 37-A and 38 - Noted that Sections 37-A and 38 provide a complete mechanism for setting aside a sale of immovable property, either by depositing the due amount or by challenging material irregularity, mistake, or fraud. Both provisions prescribe a mandatory limitation period of 30 days from the date of sale- Supreme Court found that the appellant admittedly failed to file any application under these sections within the prescribed 30-day limitation period, despite the auction sale occurring on July 29, 2005- The belated challenge, raised after more than four years, was held to be impermissible- Supreme Court clarified that there was no order staying the conduct of the auction itself, only the confirmation- The stay on confirmation does not suspend the statutory obligation to seek redress within 30 days as per Sections 37A or 38 of the Act- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lily Thomas v. Union of India 2000 6 SCC 224; Paras 16-18, 22-25] Kolanjiammal v. Revenue Divisional Officer Perambalur District, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1108 : 2025 INSC 1319

Service Law – Gramin Dak Sevak (Conduct and Engagement) Rules, 2011 – Misappropriation of Public Funds – Judicial Review of Disciplinary Authority's Decision – Held, the High Court misdirected itself and travelled beyond the scope of jurisdiction exercisable in a matter of judicial review - Judicial review only permits scrutiny of the process of inquiry and not the case on merits, especially when no defect in the inquiry process was pointed out - The High Court erred by going into the merits of the controversy, examining the admission of guilt by the respondent, and setting aside the punishment - The Court noted that the documents clearly established the factum of embezzlement, evidenced by the passbooks being stamped with receipt of the amount but having no corresponding entries in the post office's books of accounts - Mere deposit of the embezzled amount subsequent to being caught will not absolve an employee of the misconduct - The respondent's explanation of having stamped the passbooks due to "ignorance of the Rules" after 12 years of service was rejected as "farfetched" and unacceptable - Supreme Court set aside the reinstatement of the Post Master who was removed from the service for embezzling the depositors amount for its personal use. The Court said mere deposit of the embezzled money will not absolve an employee of the misconduct - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 11] Union of India v. Indraj, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1104 : 2025 INSC 1313

Service Law - Guidelines on seniority - Supreme Court issued certain guidelines for the filling up of the DJ posts invoking powers under Article 142 of the Constitution - i. The seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 Regular Promotees, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR; ii. Only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated; iii. If the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made; iv. After the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre; v. The statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented - Clarified that these guidelines are not intended to resolve any inter-se dispute - The guidelines are general and mandatory to be incorporated into the regulations governing inter-se seniority of higher judicial services - The guidelines will not reopen any decided issues related to inter-se seniority disputes. [Paras 97-100] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328

Service Law – Higher Judicial Services (HJS) – Inter Se Seniority – Direct Recruits (DR) - Regular Promotees (RP) - LDCE Promotees (LDCE) – Held, previous service in the lower rungs of the judiciary (Junior Division/Senior Division) cannot be reckoned for granting weightage, preferential treatment, or a separate quota for determining inter se seniority, fixation in higher grades (Selection Grade/Super Time Scale), or assignment of administrative duties within the common cadre of the HJS - Once appointed to the common cadre of the Higher Judicial Service, all members lose the 'birthmark' of the source from which they were recruited (RP, LDCE, or DR), and the service rendered in the feeder category pales into insignificance - The theory of classifying District Judges within the HJS based on their length of service in the lower rungs subverts the guarantee of equality available to members of the common cadre - Further advancement within the HJS, including promotion to higher grades, must be based on merit-cum-seniority, evaluated on the basis of performance and service rendered within the HJS cadre and not the lower feeder cadre - Supreme Court ruled out any special quota/weightage for promotee judges in the posts of District Judges, observing that there is no nationwide pattern of disproportionate representation of direct recruits in the Higher Judicial Service. [Relied on State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Sh. Triloki Nath Khosa & Ors. (1974) 1 SCC 19; Paras 54-65, 94] All India Judges Association v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119 : 2025 INSC 1328

Service Law - Police Service — Dismissal — Appointment based on Forged Degree/Certificate - The respondent, appointed as a Constable in Delhi Police in 1988, was dismissed from service in 1997 after a complaint in 1996 alleged his appointment was based on a forged and fabricated degree/certificate - The Central Administrative Tribunal ("CAT") and the High Court of Delhi set aside the dismissal and remanded the matter for a full-fledged departmental inquiry - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that the orders passed by the CAT and the High Court were unsustainable – Held, the act of getting an appointment in a uniformed service like the police, which is supposed to uphold the rule of law, on the basis of a forged degree/certificate is un-condonable - In the particular facts and circumstances of the case, where the forgery was established, the absence of a full departmental inquiry may not be a factor to vitiate the final order of dismissal from service - Appeal allowed. [Para 8] Commissioner of Police v. Ex. Ct. Vinod Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1117

Specific Performance – Limitation – Impleadment – Where defendants sought to raise a counter-claim for specific performance regarding an agreement dated 02.12.2002 in an impleading application filed only in the year 2006, Supreme Court held the claim was grossly delayed and hit by limitation – No liberty granted to file a separate suit as the claim could not survive. [Para 13, 15] Sanjay Tiwari v. Yugal Kishore Prasad Sao, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1097 : 2025 INSC 1310

Test Identification Parade (TIP) – Adverse Inference Not Justified - Courts below erred in drawing adverse inference from the accused's refusal to participate in TIP when - i. Prosecution failed to establish that accused was kept baparda post-arrest; arrest memo showed no such entry; ii. Witness never attended any TIP proceedings; prosecution produced no document proving her presence; iii. TIP proceedings fundamentally flawed; identifying witness's signature absent on TIP documents - Supreme Court issues mandatory directions - When a witness is examined through video-conferencing, and the defence wishes to contradict the witness using previous written statements, the statement/document must be electronically transmitted to the witness and Sections 147–148 BSA (144–145 Evidence Act) procedure must be strictly followed - This ensures fair trial and effective cross-examination - Supreme Court reiterates that although it generally does not interfere with concurrent findings, it will do so when such findings are perverse, based on misreading of evidence, or result in grave miscarriage of justice, held that interference is warranted when material evidence is ignored or misappreciated. [Relied upon Mekala Sivaiah v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2022) 8 SCC 253; Paras 31-33, 42-49, 57–65] Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113 : 2025 INSC 1322

Valuation – Inclusion of Bought-out Items – bought-out items delivered directly to site not includable- Held that the final product (erected boiler) is immovable and not excisable, the Court held that the value of duty-paid bought-out items (delivered directly to the buyer's site and not brought to the assessee's factory) cannot be included in the assessable value of the boiler parts cleared in CKD condition- The base value for duty cannot be equated with the total contract price. [Paras 64, 82] Lipi Boilers Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1092 : 2025 INSC 1297

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 (WP Act)—Section 24(2)(c)—Continuance of Rights—Forest Rights Act, 2006 (FRA)—Section 3, 4(1)—Protection of Tribal/Forest Dweller Rights—State's apprehension that declaration of a Wildlife Sanctuary would adversely affect the rights of tribals and traditional forest dwellers rejected—Held, the contention that existing rights, including those relating to public infrastructure like roads and schools, would be lost is a "bogey" and a "figment of imagination"- Provisions contained in Section 24(2)(c) of the WP Act (allowing for continuance of rights) read with Section 3 and 4(1) of the FRA amply protect the rights of forest dwellers and Scheduled Tribes, as the FRA is a non-obstante clause- The necessity to strike a balance between environmental protection and the need for development emphasized- Supreme Court directs the State Government of Jharkhand to notify the area comprising of 126 compartments as notified in the 1968 notification, excluding six compartments as a Wildlife Sanctuary within a period of three months from the date of the judgment. [Relied on Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India and Others (1996) 5 SCC 1; Centre for Environmental Law, World Wide Fund-India v. Union of India and Others 2013 8 SCC 234; Paras 68-104] In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1099 : 2025 INSC 1311

Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972—Section 26A—Declaration of Sanctuary in Reserve Forest—Delay by State Government in notifying the Saranda Game Sanctuary (31,468.25 hectares, notified in 1968) as a Wildlife Sanctuary under the WP Act—Held, the State of Jharkhand's "totally unfair" and "dilly dallying tactics" over a period of time, especially after giving multiple assurances to the Court about its intent to notify the area- that the declaration of the area as a Wildlife Sanctuary will not affect ancillary activities permissible under Sections 3 and 4 of the FRA- The Supreme Court issued a Mandamus directing the State to proceed with the notification of the 31,468.25 hectares as the Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary- Directed that no mining activities shall take place within national parks and wildlife sanctuaries and within an area of 1 kilometre from such national park or wildlife sanctuary. In Re Saranda Wildlife Sanctuary, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1099 : 2025 INSC 1311