Supreme Court Weekly Digest November 21 - 30, 2025 Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2)...
Supreme Court Weekly Digest November 21 - 30, 2025
Acquisition of Land for Industrial Purposes Act, 1997 (Tamil Nadu) - Sections 7(2), 7(4) and 12 - Land Acquisition - Concluded Contract - Payment of Interest – Held, a concluded contract voluntarily entered into between the Government and the landowner/person interested for the determination of compensation under Section 7(2) or Section 7(4) of the 1997 Act is a complete package and excludes itself from the purview of the 1997 Act thereafter - The rights and liabilities of the parties would only be governed by the terms of the contract - Section 12 of the 1997 Act, which speaks of payment of interest from the time of taking possession until compensation is paid or deposited, has no application to a case where an agreement has been entered into between the parties under Section 7 - Once an agreement is finalized, the agreement becomes sacrosanct, and all disputes with respect to the determination of rent and interest would get subsumed within the contract itself - A party to a contract cannot be permitted to have recourse to two different modes (contract and statutory remedy) after having accepted the compensation under the contract without any demur or protest - The High Court committed a fundamental error in invoking Section 12 for the payment of interest from the date of the notice under Section 3(2) of the 1997 Act till the date of the impugned judgment, after giving a clear finding that the agreement was a complete package - The contract voluntarily entered into shall not be disturbed by taking recourse to the statutory provisions which are sought to be excluded by such contract. [Paras 14-25] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332
Arbitration Agreement – Unilateral Appointment Clause – Validity and Severability - Held that a clause in a public-private contract (Clause 25) which mandates unilateral appointment of an arbitrator by an ineligible authority (Managing Director) and further stipulates that "no arbitration shall be held" if such appointment fails, is void ab initio as it violates the principle of nemo judex in causa sua and is contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution - the invalidity of the appointment procedure does not destroy the core agreement to arbitrate - Applying the doctrine of severability, the offending portions, including the negative covenant, must be severed, and the substantive arbitration agreement survives, thereby enabling the court to appoint an independent arbitrator under Section 11(6). [Relied on the Constitution Bench judgment in Central Organisation for Railway Electrification v. ECI SPIC SMO MCML (JV) 2025 4 SCC 641; Para 12] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Section 11 – Appeal against dismissal of a request case under Section 11 by the High Court - Constitution of India; Articles 14 & 298 – State as Model Litigant - Held that lethargy and indifference by a public authority, where contractual obligations demand prompt responsiveness, falls short of the standards of fairness required of a State entity under Articles 14 and 298 of the Constitution – The State must act as a model litigant – fair, responsive, and transparent in its dealings – Silence or procedural evasion by senior officers is inconsistent with the constitutional trust reposed in public authorities - Public Officers are custodians of public faith, not mere administrators – A stern warning was issued to the then Managing Director of the respondent company for such neglect, cautioning that any repetition may invite adverse remarks or even personal accountability. [Relied on State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and another (2000) 9 SCC 94; Para 11, 15-19] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Mother Agreement Prevails over Ancillary Contracts (Novation) - Held that the BSA, being the principal or "mother agreement", defines the long-term commercial relationship, and its arbitration clause (Benin seat) prevails over the different arbitration clauses contained in subsequent, limited-purpose Sales Contracts (with Respondent No. 2) and High Seas Sale Contracts (HSSAs with Respondent No. 3) - There was no clear and unequivocal intention to substitute the BSA with the subsequent contracts; thus, the BSA was not novated - Disputes rooted in obligations under the BSA must be resolved through the arbitration agreed therein (Benin). [Relied on Balasore Alloys Ltd. v. Medima LLC 2020 9 SCC 136; Paras 27-30] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342
Arbitration And Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 11 (Appointment of Arbitrator) - Review Jurisdiction – Extent of Judicial Intervention (Section 5) - Held that once an arbitrator is appointed, the arbitral process must proceed unhindered - There is no statutory provision for review or appeal from an order under Section 11, which reflects a conscious legislative choice - held, while setting aside the Patna High Court's order allowing the review petition and recalling its earlier appointment of an arbitrator, despite the party having actively participated in the proceedings and seeking review nearly three years later - Held that the High Court did not have the jurisdiction to reopen or review its earlier order passed under Section 11(6) of the A&C Act - Once the appointment was made, the court became functus officio and could not sit in judgment over the very issue it had already settled - The review order cuts against the grain of the Act, undermines the principle of minimal judicial interference, and effectively converts the review into an appeal in disguise - Noted that High Courts, as courts of record, do possess a limited power of review, such power is extremely circumscribed in matters governed by the Arbitration Act - It may be exercised only to correct an error apparent on the face of the record or to address a material fact that was overlooked. It cannot be used to revisit findings of law or reappreciate issues already decided - Appeal allowed. [Para 11, 15-18] Hindustan Construction Company Ltd. v. Bihar Rajya Pul Nirman Nigam Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1153 : 2025 INSC 1365
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 36(3) - Stay of Arbitral Award for Payment of Money - Conditions for Unconditional Stay- Held that the mere filing of an application to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not render the award unenforceable; a separate application for stay must be filed- Held that Court has discretionary power under Section 36(3) to grant a stay "subject to such conditions as it may deem fit"- For an arbitral award for payment of money, the Court must have "due regard" to the provisions for grant of stay of a money decree under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)- Unconditional stay of a money award is generally governed by the Second Proviso to Section 36(3), which mandates an unconditional stay if a prima facie case is made out that the arbitration agreement, contract, or the making of the award was induced or effected by fraud or corruption- Supreme Court held that for granting the benefit of unconditional stay of execution of a money-decree (or an arbitral award in the form of a money-decree), an "exceptional case" must be established, meaning the award must be shown to be more than prima facie- i. Egregiously perverse; ii. Riddled with patent illegalities; iii. Facially untenable; iv. Or such other exceptional causes similar in nature- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order granting an unconditional stay because the award-debtors did not claim the award was induced by fraud or corruption, nor did their case fall into any of the exceptional categories laid down in the Lifestyle Equities case- Appeals allowed. [Relied on: Lifestyle Equities C.V. and Another v. Amazon Technologies Inc., 2025 INSC 1190; Paras 26-34] Popular Caterers v. Ameet Mehta, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1144 : 2025 INSC 1354
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Sections 2(1)(f), 2(2), 11(6) - Maintainability of Section 11 Petition for Foreign-Seated Arbitration - Conflict of Arbitration Clauses - Juridical Seat - Held that an International Commercial Arbitration and Jurisdiction under Section 11(6) - The dispute between the Petitioner (an Indian partnership firm) and Respondent No. 1 (a company incorporated in Benin) is an international commercial arbitration as defined under Section 2(1)(f) of the Act - Since the Buyer-Seller Agreement (BSA) provides that arbitration shall "take place in Benin" (Article 11) and shall be "governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of Benin" (Article 5 of Addendum) , Benin is the juridical seat of arbitration - Consequently, Part I of the 1996 Act, which includes Section 11, is excluded by operation of Section 2(2) for arbitrations seated outside India - Held that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a petition under Section 11(6) for the appointment of an arbitrator - Held that Part I of the 1996 Act has no application to arbitrations seated outside India. [Relied on Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. 2012 9 SCC 552; Paras 23-26, 30] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342
Arms Act, 1959; Section 13(2a) Proviso - Grant of Arms License- Held that exercise of Discretion - Where no time limit is prescribed by the rules for the police verification report, the licensing authority's discretion to grant a license without the report must be exercised within a 'reasonable time'- Issuing a license merely two days after requesting a police report constitutes an unjustified and arbitrary exercise of this discretion- Appeal allowed. [Para 20] Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Bail - Cancellation of - Dowry Death - Annulment of Bail Order - Perversity of High Court Order - The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the deceased's father and annulled the bail granted to the accused-husband by the High Court, holding that the High Court's order was perverse and unsustainable as it failed to consider material evidence and settled legal principles - Supreme Court reiterated the distinction between the cancellation of bail (due to post-bail misconduct) and the annulment of bail (due to legal infirmity/perversity in the order) - Bail granted without due application of mind to relevant factors - such as the gravity of the offence, prima facie evidence, and statutory presumptions - may be annulled, even in the absence of post-bail misconduct - held that the High Court failed to appreciate the seriousness of the offence - the unnatural death of a young woman within four months of marriage - and the statutory presumption - Supreme Court held that he Court emphasized that dowry death is not merely an offence against an individual but a crime against society at large, necessitating strict judicial scrutiny and a firm deterrent judicial response to uphold the majesty of law and send an unequivocal message against this social evil - Such heinous offences strike at the very root of human dignity and violate the constitutional guarantees of equality and life with dignity under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India - They corrode the moral fibre of the community, normalize violence against women, and erode the foundations of a civilized society - Appeal allowed. [Relied on R. Rathinam v. State by DSP 2000 2 SCC 391; State of Karnataka v. Sri Darshan, etc. 2025 INSC 979; Kans Raj v. State of Punjab ((2000) 5 SCC 207; Paras 17-25] Yogendra Pal Singh v. Raghvendra Singh @ Prince, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1150 : 2025 INSC 1367
Bail - Requirement of Reasons for Granting Bail - While elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail, an order that is dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in the grant of bail - Such an order is non-speaking and violates the principles of natural justice - Held that court must strike a balance and exercise discretion judiciously, considering factors like the nature of the allegations, severity of punishment, criminal antecedents, and a prima facie satisfaction. [Paras 19, 20] Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155 : 2025 INSC 1370
Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (Kerala) – Sections 11, 12, and 18 – Eviction for Arrears of Rent – Procedure in Appeal – Held, in an appeal challenging an eviction order passed under Section 12(3) of the Act, 1965, a fresh application under Section 12(1) of the Act, 1965 before the Appellate Authority is not mandatory - Section 12(1) specifically bars a tenant from contesting an eviction petition or preferring an appeal unless they have paid or deposited all arrears of rent admitted to be due - The power to evict under Section 12(3) is by operation of law, and no fresh application for eviction is required from the landlord - As the Appellate Authority only tests the exercise of jurisdiction by the Rent Control Court, it is not required to re-determine the issue of default or the outstanding amount of rent - Appellate Authority has full discretion to pass any order in accordance with law, including dismissing the appeal, extending time for deposit, or directing the tenant to pay/deposit the amount determined by the Rent Controller as a condition for hearing the appeal - The Appellate Authority is not obliged to give four weeks' time to deposit the outstanding rent as stipulated in the proviso to Section 12(2) for the Rent Control Court, as the Appellate Authority is not passing an order under Section 12(3) once again -Appeals allowed. [Relied on Manik Lal Majumdar & Ors. vs. Gouranga Chandra Dey & Ors. (2005) 2 SCC 400; Paras 28-38, 43, 44] P.U. Sidhique v. Zakariya, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1130 : 2025 INSC 1340
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXI Rule 90(3) - Setting Aside Execution Sale - Bar on Raising Grounds Available Before Sale Proclamation - Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) - Duty of Executing Court to Consider Selling Only a Portion of Property- Held that Order XXI Rule 64/66(2)(a) CPC casts a duty on the executing Court to first decide whether selling the entire property is necessary to satisfy the decree or if a portion would suffice. A sale without examining this aspect would be illegal - the insertion of Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC places an incumbent duty on the judgment debtor, or any other interested person, to satisfy the executing Court that the ground for setting aside the sale could not have been taken on or before the date the sale proclamation was drawn up- Held that if the judgment debtor had notice from the executing Court but acquiesced by taking no action before the date of the sale, they would be precluded by Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC from assailing its legality or correctness thereafter - Held that the High Court erred in failing to give effect to the bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, assuming the obligation under Order XXI Rule 66(2)(a) CPC would operate independently of the judgment debtors' lapse - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Desh Bandhu Gupta vs. N.L. Anand & Rajinder Singh, (1994) 1 SCC 131; Paras 10-18] G.R. Selvaraj v. K.J. Prakash Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1141 : 2025 INSC 1353
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Order XXXVIII Rules 5, 8, 10; Order XXI Rule 58 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (T.P. Act) - Section 53 - Attachment Before Judgment - Pre-existing Rights - Fraudulent Transfer - Claim Petition - Supreme Court examined whether attachment before judgment ordered under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC could validly operate against a property already transferred by a registered sale deed executed prior to the institution of the suit, and whether a creditor could challenge such a transfer as fraudulent under Section 53 of the T.P. Act within the framework of a claim petition under Order XXXVIII Rule 8 read with Order XXI Rule 58 CPC - Held that essential condition for invoking attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC is that the property sought to be attached must belong to the defendant on the date of institution of the suit - Property already transferred prior to the suit cannot be attached under this provision. Order XXXVIII Rule 10 CPC safeguards the rights of strangers by clarifying that attachment before judgment does not affect pre-existing rights of non-parties - Attachment before judgment is only a protective measure and does not create any charge or ownership in favour of the plaintiff - Appeal allowed. L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Scope of Claim Petition (Order XXXVIII Rule 8 r/w Order XXI Rule 58 CPC): Held that mechanism under Rule 8, being a protective procedure for third-party claimants asserting independent rights, cannot be expanded to transform the attachment procedure into a substantive enquiry under Section 53 of the T.P. Act - Determination of whether a sale deed is fraudulent is exclusively governed by Section 53 of the T.P. Act - The plaintiff's remedy, if any, for a prior fraudulent transfer lies exclusively under Section 53 of the T.P. Act - The onus to establish that the transfer was made with an intent to defeat or delay creditors lies squarely upon the party alleging fraud - Mere suspicion cannot substitute legal proof - The creditor (Respondent No. 1) failed to produce cogent evidence showing that the dominant purpose of the transfer was to defeat his rights. [Relied on Vannarakkal Kallalathil Sreedharan v. Chandramaath Balakrishnan, (1990) 3 SCC 291; Hamda Ammal v. Avadiappan Pathar, (1991) 1 SCC 715; Paras 11-20] L.K. Prabhu @ L. Krishna Prabhu v. K.T. Mathew @ Thampan Thomas, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154 : 2025 INSC 1364
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Advocates Act, 1961 - Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 - Civil Manual - Pursis Claiming 'No Instructions' - Withdrawal of Vakalatnama - Whether the Trial Court erred in proceeding with the suit after the 'no instructions' pursis was filed by the defendants' advocate, claiming no instructions, without serving a fresh notice on the defendants - Held that the Appellate Court's finding that the Trial Court did not commit a wrong in proceeding with the matter was a plausible view based on the material on record and did not warrant interference by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution - Held that the pursis was simply an intimation of prospective action and did not reflect a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama - The Trial Court rightly decided to ignore such pursis as it was not a valid notice/intimation to the Court about the withdrawal of the Vakalatnama as contemplated under the Advocates Act and Civil Manual - The procedure prescribed for the withdrawal of a Vakalatnama (Clause 660(4) of the Civil Manual and Rule 8(4) of Chapter XXXII of Schedule VII of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960) requires the advocate to file a note requesting permission to withdraw and also file a copy of the intimation to the client along with its written acknowledgment, or a letter from the client instructing withdrawal - This procedure was not applicable as the pursis did not pray for, nor was it treated as, a withdrawal of the Vakalatnama by the Trial Court - Held that the High Court, in considering the procedure for withdrawal of Vakalatnama, clearly exceeded its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in interfering with a well-reasoned order of the Appellate Court - Held that power under Article 227 is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, and not for correcting mere errors - The Appellate Court's order was not amenable to interference - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Radhey Shyam & another v. Chhabi Nath & Ors. (2015) 5 SCC 423; Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 675; Paras 15-23] Shri Digant v. P.D.T. Trading Co., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1140 : 2025 INSC 1352
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Order XLI Rule 5 - Interim Relief Pending Appeal Against Dismissal of Suit - Held that dismissal of Suit does not preclude grant of interim relief in a pending appeal - Appellate Court has co-extensive power with the original court to grant appropriate interim relief to prevent irreparable injury and preserve the status quo pending final disposal of the appeal - The statement of law that once a suit is dismissed, no interim relief could be granted pending the appeal preferred against such judgment and order passed by the trial court is not approved - Reliance placed by the first appellate court on Order XLI Rule 5 while declining to grant status quo is grossly misplaced, as the considerations laid thereunder relate to stay on the execution of a decree, which is not the case where a suit is dismissed - Grant of relief is a discretionary power of the appellate court to be exercised judicially based on prima facie case, irreparable injury, and balance of convenience - The appellate court must independently consider the application for interim relief on its own merits and established legal principles, and should not just look into the final outcome of the suit - Held that an application seeking to maintain status quo filed before the appellate court cannot be dismissed solely because the suit for specific performance stood dismissed - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 20] Mohammadhanif Mohammadibrahim Patel v. Pallaviben Rajendra Kumar Patel, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1138 : 2025 INSC 1347
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Section 200 (Complaint to Magistrate) — Second Complaint for Same Occurrence — Maintainability — Abuse of Process of Law - Held that a second complaint filed by the same informant for the same occurrence by invoking Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. is not maintainable after a detailed investigation has been conducted, a negative (closure) report has been filed qua the appellants, and the informant has not challenged the negative report - Merely adding a new offence (e.g., Section 308 IPC) for the same occurrence does not make the second complaint maintainable against the same accused who were dropped from the earlier investigation - Allowing such a complaint amounts to a gross abuse and misuse of the process of law. Ranimol v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1148
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Section 482 (Inherent Powers of High Court) — Quashing of Proceedings — Double Jeopardy - Lodging of Two FIRs/Complaints - Held that the High Court ought to have invoked its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings initiated by the second private complaint, as the proceedings were vexatious and the issue of double jeopardy would arise, dealing with the liberty of a person - The lodgment of two FIRs is not permissible in respect of one and the same incident - The prohibition extends to any further complaint by the same complainant and others against the same accused subsequent to the registration of a case under the Code, for an investigation would have already commenced, and allowing further registration would amount to an improvement of the facts mentioned in the original complaint - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Surender Kaushik & Ors vs State Of U.P & Ors. (2013) 5 SCC 148] Ranimol v. State of Kerala, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1148
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Section 197 - Sanction to Prosecute Public Servant - Mandate for Application of Mind – Held, the order granting sanction must ex facie disclose the application of mind by the sanctioning authority, including consideration of the evidence and material placed before it - A mechanical and non-speaking sanction order vitiates the prosecution. Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC); Section 482 - Constitution of India; Article 21 - Quashing of Criminal Proceedings - Right to Speedy Investigation – Held, criminal proceedings are liable to be quashed under the inherent power of the High Court when there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in completing the investigation, which violates the accused's right under Article 21 of the Constitution - The cumulative effect of a vitiated sanction under Section 197 CrPC and an unexplained delay of 15 years in investigation warrants the quashing of criminal proceedings - Supreme Court issued directions - i. To file a supplementary chargesheet is a part of section 173(8) CrPC; Court is not rendered functus office having granted such permission; ii. Reasons are indispensable to the proper functioning of the machinery of criminal law; iii. If investigation into a particular offence has continued for a period that appears to be unduly long, that too without adequate justification, such as in this case, the accused or the complainant both, shall be at liberty to approach the High Court under Section 528 BNSS/482 CrPC, seeking an update on the investigation or, if the doors of the High Court have been knocked by the accused, quashing. It is clarified that delay in completion of investigation will only function as one of the grounds, and the Court, if in its wisdom, decides to entertain this application, other grounds will also have to be considered. [Relied on Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. (1979) 4 SCC 172; Paragraph 21- 23] Robert Lalchungnunga Chongthu @ R L Chongthu v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1128 : 2025 INSC 1339
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Locus Standi to Lodge FIR - General Principle - Sections 67 and 136 of U.P. Revenue Code, 2006 – Held, the High Court erred in setting aside the cognizance taken by the Special Judge on the ground that the Gram Pradhan had no locus standi to lodge the First Information Report (FIR) - It is a well-recognized principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set out or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary - The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, has no provision which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for prosecution of a public servant or any other person who has allegedly committed an offence - The Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 ('the 1984 Act'), which was invoked in the charge sheet, does not have any specific provision limiting the eligibility of the person making the complaint - The other Acts referred to in the charge sheet also do not indicate anything contrary to the general principle - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Dr. Subramanian Swamy vs. Dr. Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64; Paras 6-10] Lal Chandra Ram v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1134
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 439 – Bail - Principle of Parity - Requirement of Reasons for Granting Bail - Parity as a Sole Ground for Bail - Held that the High Courts speak in one voice that parity is not the sole ground on which bail can be granted - This is the correct position in law - Parity, when considered, must focus on the 'position' of the accused, which is not met only by involvement in the same offence, but on their role in the crime - In the case of co-accused, considering bail on parity with accused was misplaced because their roles at the time of the shooting were not the same - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai Makwana(Koli) and Anr. [(2021) 6 SCC 230; Ashok Dhankad v. State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. [2025 SCC Online SC 1690; Paras 10-15] Sagar v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1155 : 2025 INSC 1370
Constitutional Law – Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Article 14) – Public Tenders – Arbitrariness- Held even in the absence of contractual rights, the State's administrative discretion in rescinding or cancelling an LoI is subject to constitutional discipline, particularly the requirement that State action must not be arbitrary, unreasonable, or actuated by mala fides- The scope of judicial review in contractual matters is confined to testing administrative action against the touchstones of illegality, irrationality, mala fides, and procedural impropriety, focusing on the decision-making process, not the decision itself- Courts should not interfere unless the State's action is "palpably unreasonable or absolutely irrational and bereft of any principle"- Reasons for Cancellation: Administrative orders must be read in light of the concomitant record, and reasons need not be stated in haec verba in the communication, so long as they can be discerned from the file and are not post-hoc justifications- The legitimacy of administrative reasoning must be tested with reference to the material that existed at the time the decision was made. [Relied on Tata Cellular v. Union of India 1994 6 SCC 651] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Constitution of India, 1950; Article 226 - Constitutional Jurisdiction - Judicial Review of Administrative Action - Statutory Authorities - Interplay with IBC Moratorium - Held that the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 is not curtailed by Section 14 of the IBC - The High Court is competent to entertain a writ petition and direct statutory authorities to process a redevelopment proposal in favour of a new developer, even during the pendency of CIRP - Such directions fall in the public law domain and do not encroach upon the NCLT's jurisdiction or offend the moratorium, especially where the corporate debtor has no subsisting contractual or proprietary interest in the project. [Relied on Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd v. Amit Gupta and others 2021 7 SCC 209; Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and others 2020 13 SCC 308; Para 17, 20] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366
Constitution of India - Governor's Power To Assent To Bills– Discretion – Timelines– Judicial Review– The Supreme Court, exercising its Advisory Jurisdiction under Article 143(1), provided its opinion on the scope and contours of the powers of the Governor under Article 200 and the President under Article 201 regarding the assent, withholding, or reservation of Bills passed by the State Legislature- The Governor has three constitutional options when a Bill is presented: (i) assent, (ii) reserve the Bill for the consideration of the President, or (iii) withhold assent and return the Bill to the Legislature with comments- The power to 'withhold' assent simpliciter under the substantive part of Article 200 is qualified by the first proviso, requiring the Governor to return the Bill for reconsideration (unless it is a Money Bill)- The first proviso qualifies "withholds assent" in the substantive part of Article 200, mandating return with comments rather than creating a fourth option of withholding simpliciter, as withholding without return defies constitutional logic especially for Money Bills- Held that timelines can't be fixed for Governors/President for bills' assent, there is no concept of deemed assent- held that the concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" to the Bills if the timelines are breached was antithetical to the spirit of the Constitution and against the doctrine of separation of powers- The concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" is virtually a take-over of the functions reserved for the Governor- Held that held that Governors and President cannot be subjected to judicially prescribed timelines for their decisions on Bills under Articles 200/201- Supreme Court warned that allowing the Governor to simply withhold the Bill, without returning it to the Assembly, will negate the principles of federalism which hold that federalism as a basic structure of the Constitution. [Paras 38-40, 44-50] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Constitution of India - Governor Not Bound by Aid and Advice- Held that the Governor enjoys discretion in choosing from the three constitutional options and is not bound by the aid and advice tendered by the Council of Ministers while exercising his function under Article 200- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- In the absence of a constitutionally prescribed time limit, it is not appropriate for the Court to judicially prescribe timelines for the exercise of powers by the Governor under Article 200 or the President under Article 201- The Governor's decisions under Article 200 are not justiciable on merits, but Courts may issue limited mandamus for prolonged inaction without merits review; no judicial timelines or deemed assent permissible, as Article 142 cannot supplant constitutional functions. [Relied on In Re: Special Courts Bill 1978 1979 1 SCC 380; State of Bihar v. Kameshwar Singh 1952 INSC 28, para 235; Union of India v. Valluri Basavaiah Chowdhary 1979 INSC 93, para 19; Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. State of Bihar 1983 INSC 61, Paras 85-99, 103-114, 154-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Constitution of India - Opinion on Tamil Nadu Governor judgment- The Tamil Nadu judgment was delivered by a two-judge bench, in which the Court held that the Tamil Nadu Governor acted mala fide in reserving the Bills for the President after they were re-enacted by the State Assembly. It therefore held that those Bills were "deemed assented" using Article 142 and consequently laid down timelines for the President and the Governor to follow- Supreme Court held that prescribing timelines were wrong- The bench also held that there was no occasion for the two-judge bench to having laid down timelines for the President- Held that the paragraphs 260-261 of the judgment in State of Tamil Nadu, pertaining to the imposition of timelines on the Governor under Article 200 are erroneous- Supreme Court also pointed out that there was no occasion for the issue of setting a timeline for disposal of Bills referred to the President under Article 201, to arise before this Court, while considering State of Tamil Nadu- Held that any observations on the aspect of timelines applicable to the President under Article 201, or conclusions thereof on this aspect, are merely obiter, and ought to be treated as such- Held that the use of the expression “as soon as possible” in the first proviso makes it clear that the Constitution infuses a sense of urgency upon the Governor and expects him to act with expediency if he decides to declare the withholding of assent. [Paras 153-159] In Re Assent, Withholding or Reservation of Bills by the Governor and the President of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124 : 2025 INSC 1333
Doctrine of Approbate and Reprobate – Estoppel – Held, the private respondents, having agreed to the compensation by negotiation, are totally estopped from seeking any relief beyond the terms of the contract. Seeking interest after agreeing to the determined amount is a clear case of approbation and reprobation - The doctrine means that no party can be allowed to accept and reject the same thing; one cannot "blow hot and cold" - A person cannot be allowed to have the benefit of an instrument while questioning the same - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Union of India and Others v. N. Murugesan and Others, (2022) 2 SCC 25; Paras 18, 21, 23] Government of Tamil Nadu v. P.R. Jaganathan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1126 : 2025 INSC 1332
Employees' Provident Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (EPF&MP Act) - Order of Payment from Sale Proceeds: From the proceeds of the sale of the assets by the secured creditor - i. The first charge would be for the dues under the EPF&MP Act (including contribution, interest, penalty, and damages); ii. The remaining proceeds are then applied in satisfaction of the secured debt of the appellant-bank; iii. Workmen are granted liberty to approach the appropriate authority under the MRTU & PULP Act to determine their dues, which would only be satisfied if any amount remains after satisfaction of the provident fund dues and the secured creditor's debt. [Relied on Maharashtra State Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, (2009) 10 SCC 123; Paras 17-27] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335
Employees' Provident Funds And Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (EPF&MP Act) - Section 11(2) - Securitisation And Reconstruction Of Financial Assets And Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 26E - Priority of Dues - First Charge Vs. Priority to Secured Creditors – Held, the statutory first charge created under Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act in respect of provident fund dues has precedence over the priority conferred on a secured creditor under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act - While Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act (introduced later in 2020) provides an overriding non-obstante clause conferring priority to a secured creditor's debts over all other debts and government dues, this priority cannot be equated with a "first charge" - Section 11(2) of the EPF&MP Act expressly creates a statutory first charge on the establishment's assets for the amount due, and this first charge prevails over the priority given under Section 26E of the SARFAESI. [Paras 22 - 24] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335
Environment & Mining – Aravali Hills and Ranges – Conservation and Regulation of Mining – Importance of Aravalis as a "green barrier" against desertification – Uniform Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges – Prohibition of Mining in Core/Inviolate Areas – Need for a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) on the lines of the Saranda Forest Plan- Supreme Court directed the Centre to prepare a comprehensive Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) before any new mining activity is permitted in the ecologically fragile region of “Aravali Hills and Ranges” spread across the states of Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan, and Gujarat- Supreme Court accepted the operational definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges recommended by the Committee constituted on May 9, 2024, for the purpose of regulating mining- i. Aravali Hills: Any landform in Aravali districts having an elevation of 100 metres or more from the local relief- The entire landform within the area enclosed by the lowest contour is part of the Aravali Hills; ii. Aravali Range- Two or more Aravali Hills located within a proximity of 500m from each other. [Para 40, 42-48] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Environmental Law - Principle of Commencement of Limitation ('First Accrual') - Project Proponent's Obligation to Advertise - When the duty to communicate the EC vests in multiple authorities, the period of limitation for filing an appeal under Section 16(h) will commence from the earliest of the date on which the communication is carried out by any of the duty bearers. This is based on the principle of "first accrual," where, if a legal challenge is based on multiple grounds, the period of limitation runs from the date when the right to sue first accrues - The communication must be clear and complete. Once this condition is satisfied by one duty bearer, the person aggrieved cannot "pick and choose later communications from other duty bearers for reckoning the period of limitation" - It is not a legal requirement that the entirety of the environmental clearance is published in the newspaper - It is sufficient compliance if the project proponent publishes the grant of the EC and indicates the substance of the conditions and safeguards - The advertisement is sufficient if it notifies the public of the EC grant and where the complete and comprehensive information is available (e.g., the website of MoEF&CC/SEIAA or with the SPCB) - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Medha Patkar & Ors. v. Ministry of Environment & Forests, UOI and Ors. 2013 SCC Online NGT 63; V. Sundar Proprietor Chemicals, India v. Union of India & Ors. 2015 SCC Online NGT 145; Paras 15-21] Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1123 : 2025 INSC 1331
Environmental Law - Prohibition in Core/Inviolate Areas - Supreme Court accepted the recommendation for prohibition of mining in core/inviolate areas - These areas include - i. Protected Areas (including tiger reserves and all identified tiger corridors); ii. Areas covered under Draft or Final Eco Sensitive Zone (ESZ)/Eco Sensitive Area (ESA) or the default ESZ as per Supreme Court orders; iii. Areas within 1.0 km of the boundary of a Protected Area; iv. Areas where plantations have been raised with government/agency funds; v. Areas within 500 m from the boundary of Ramsar sites and Wetlands. [Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Environmental Law - Regulation of Existing Mining – Held, mining activities already in operation are permitted to continue strictly in compliance with the recommendations made by the Committee in paragraph 8 of its report - Supreme Court declined to impose a complete ban on ongoing legal mining, citing the ill consequences, such as the rise of illegal mining and criminalisation. [Relied on State of Bihar and Others v. Pawan Kumar and Others 2022 2 SCC 348; Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Section 13 - Divorce – Cruelty – Desertion – Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage - Duty of Court: Supreme Court directed that before concluding that a marriage has broken down irretrievably, it is imperative upon the Family Court or the High Court to determine which party is responsible for breaking the marital tie and forcing the other to live separately- A finding of irretrievable breakdown is likely to have devastating effects, especially on children, unless there is cogent evidence for wilful desertion or refusal to cohabit and/or look after the other spouse- The conclusion regarding irretrievable breakdown puts the Courts under an onerous duty to deeply analyse the entire evidence, consider social circumstances, and the background of the parties- The Supreme Court found that the High Court, in granting divorce on the ground of cruelty, failed to advert to the wife's plea that she was thrown out of the matrimonial home and did not undertake the necessary exercise to determine the essential issues- The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and remitted the matter back to the High Court for a fresh consideration in accordance with the law- Appeal allowed in part. [Paras 4-7] A v. I, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1143
Insolvency And Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Sections 3(27), 14, and 60(5) - Development Agreement - Corporate Debtor – Assets – Moratorium – Termination - Right of Corporate Debtor/Developer in a redevelopment project - Held that Development rights arising from a Development Agreement do not constitute "assets" or "property" of the Corporate Debtor under Section 3(27) of the IBC if the agreement was validly terminated by the owner (Housing Society) for non-performance prior to the initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) - The moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC is intended to preserve existing assets and does not revive terminated contracts or protect rights that have ceased to exist prior to insolvency - Held that the National Company Law Tribunal's (NCLT) jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) cannot be invoked to set aside a legitimate termination of a contract based on breaches unrelated to the corporate debtor's insolvency - The IBC is not designed to serve as a refuge for corporate debtors who, by their persistent default, abandon performance, or frustrate urban welfare projects involving human rehabilitation - held that a contract which has been lawfully terminated before the initiation of insolvency proceedings cannot be treated as an “asset” or “property” of the corporate debtor, and therefore does not enjoy the protection of the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code - Appeal dismissed. [Paras 15, 16] A.A. Estates v. Kher Nagar Sukhsadan Co-Operative Housing Society Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1151 : 2025 INSC 1366
Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) - Section 7(5)(b) Proviso - Application for initiation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by a financial creditor -Rejection for incompleteness - Mandatory requirement of notice to the applicant to rectify the defect within seven days of receipt of such notice prior to rejection - Held that Notice issued by the Joint Registrar of the NCLT under Rule 28 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 (general scrutiny/defect removal provision) is insufficient and cannot substitute the specific, mandatory notice required under the proviso to Section 7(5)(b) of the IBC - The notice under the IBC must be given to the applicant itself to rectify the defect in the application within seven days of the receipt of such notice - Service on an authorised representative, while permissible under Rule 38(5) of the NCLT Rules, was held insufficient to satisfy the mandate of the IBC in this context, as the IBC is the substantive legislation. [Relied on Dena Bank vs. C. Shivakumar Reddy and another, (2021) 10 SCC 330; Paras 11-16] Livein Aqua Solutions v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1135 : 2025 INSC 1349
Issue Estoppel - Held that the Petitioner is barred by issue estoppel from re-agitating the same issues of the operative agreement, the seat of arbitration, and the scope of the arbitration clauses, which were already decided by the High Court in its judgment when it dismissed the Petitioner's Anti-Arbitration Injunction Suit by allowing Respondent No. 1's application under Section 45 - The High Court's findings that the BSA constituted the principal agreement, the agreements were distinct, and the arbitration clause in the BSA remained binding are findings of jurisdictional fact that cannot be reopened - Held that arbitration petition is dismissed as it is fundamentally misconceived, legally untenable and foreclosed both in law and by issue estoppel. [Relied on Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board Peermade & Anr. 1999 5 SCC 590; Paras 35, 38] Balaji Steel Trade v. Fludor Benin S.A., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1132 : 2025 INSC 1342
Legal Maxims & Judicial Precedents – Finality of Judicial Verdicts – Judicial Discipline- Bail Cancellation – Section 439 Cr. PC- Article 141 of the Constitution- Supreme Court emphasized the fundamental importance of maintaining the sanctity and finality of judicial verdicts for the rule of law and public confidence- Held that the conclusive nature of judicial orders ensures the resolution of disputes and prevents endless litigation- The pronouncement of a verdict by a bench on a particular issue of law should settle the controversy, being final, and has to be followed by all courts as law declared by the Supreme Court- Allowing a verdict to be reopened because a later different view appears better would defeat the purpose of Article 141 and undermine the Court's authority- A subsequent bench of a different combination should defer to the view expressed by the earlier bench, unless there is a patent reason to interfere- Held that overturning a prior verdict by a later verdict does not necessarily mean that justice is better served.”, adding that any modification to the bail condition would violate the spirit of Article 141 of the Constitution to give finality to the decision of the Supreme Court- Application dismissed. [Relied on Brown v. Allen and referenced Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra, (2002) 4 SCC 388; Paras 48-51] Sk. Md. Anisur Rahaman v. State of West Bengal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1146 : 2025 INSC 1360
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (Delhi MC Act) – Section 347A Building Plans – Deemed Sanction– Mixed Use Regulations– Mandatory Commercial Use - Appeal against an order of the High Court affirming the grant of deemed sanction to building plans for the construction of a residential house by the Appellate Authority - MCD/Tribunal and the District Judge - The original house was 85 years old and in a dilapidated condition - The Corporation did not take a decision on the plans, leading to the Tribunal granting deemed sanction - The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and held that the owner of a residential property in an area notified for mixed land use cannot be compelled to develop the property with a commercial unit on the ground floor, especially when the owner wants to use the property only for residential purpose - Held that a bare perusal of the relevant Circular dated 27.05.2009 makes it clear that the High Court correctly held that owners cannot be compelled to convert the ground floor of their residential accommodation to a commercial unit; they may choose to do so - Clause 1 of the Circular states that Building Plans on notified commercial streets/roads can be sanctioned for commercial use/partly commercial/partly residential/fully residential as per the choice of the applicant - The MPD-2021 provision permitting shops on the ground floor in notified areas does not imply that owners are compelled to develop the property in that manner - The new provision is an enabling provision for those who want to use it for mixed purpose - Considering the arbitrary and high-handed manner in which the appellant harassed the respondents over the past 15 years, the Supreme Court imposed costs of Rs. 10,00,000/- on the appellant, payable to the respondents- Appeal dismissed. [Relied on M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors; Paras 7, 10-14, 19, 20] South Delhi Municipal Corporation v. Bharat Bhushan Jain, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1121 : 2025 INSC 1324
National Company Law Tribunal Rules, 2016 (NCLT Rules) - Rule 34(4) - Verification of Petition/Application by Affidavit - Defective Affidavit (Affidavit deposed to on 17.07.2023 but application verified on 26.07.2023) - Effect on Section 7 application - Held that a mere filing of a 'defective' affidavit in support of a Section 7 application does not render the application non est (non-existent) or liable to be rejected at the threshold - The defect in the affidavit is curable and is neither an incurable nor a fundamental defect - Rules of procedure are a handmaiden to justice and should not be used to defeat substantive rights; procedural defects and irregularities which are curable should not entail automatic dismissal or rejection, unless the statute or rule mandates it. [Relied on: Vidyawati Gupta and others vs. Bhakti Hari Nayak and others (2006) 2 SCC 777; Uday Shankar Triyar vs. Ram Kalewar Prasad Singh and another, (2006) 1 SCC 75; Paras 18- 20] Livein Aqua Solutions v. HDFC Bank, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1135 : 2025 INSC 1349
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010; Section 16(h) - Limitation for Appeal against Environmental Clearance (EC) - Commencement of Period of Limitation - Duty to Communicate EC - "Earliest of the Date" Principle – Held, Section 16(h) of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 provides a period of thirty days from the date on which the order granting Environmental Clearance (EC) is "communicated" to an "any person aggrieved" to prefer an appeal to the Tribunal - The Proviso allows for a further period not exceeding sixty days for filing the appeal if the Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause - The maximum condonable period is 90 days (30 days + 60 days) - The communication contemplated under Section 16(h) is intended to be in rem and not in personam, as environmental issues operate as public law concerns, and the expression "any person aggrieved" must receive a liberal construction - The obligation to "communicate" the EC order vests in a plurality of duty holders, including: (i) the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC), (ii) the Project Proponent, and (iii) the Pollution Control Board(s) (SPCB/SEIAA). This obligation flows from the Environment Protection Act, 1986, read with the Environment Impact Assessment Notification 2006 (specifically Paragraph 10) and the conditions of the EC. [Relied on Khatri Hotels (P) Ltd. v. Union of India (2011) 9 SCC 126] Talli Gram Panchayat v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1123 : 2025 INSC 1331
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee shall operate with the following broad Terms of Reference- i. The Committee shall oversee and ensure full, faithful and time-bound implementation of the directions contained in the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, including those issued based on the recommendations of the Justice P.C. Tatia Committee; ii. The Committee shall prepare a scientifically grounded, time-bound River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the river system that includes Rivers Jojari, Luni and Bandi and formulate a comprehensive plan for its execution in coordination with the State Government and concerned authorities/agencies- This plan shall incorporate scientific, technical and administrative measures for remediation of contaminated topsoil, rejuvenation of groundwater aquifers, restoration of river ecology, revival of flora and fauna, prevention of future contamination, and long-term environmental monitoring. iii. In order to accurately map the sources of pollution, the Committee may conduct a comprehensive on ground survey of every discharge point, pipeline, drain, channel or outlet that leads into the Jojari, Bandi or Luni rivers or any of their tributaries- The Committee shall identify all legal and illegal discharge points, determine the nature of effluents released through each of them, and ascertain whether such discharges comply with statutory standards. iv. The Committee may, with the assistance of suitable expert bodies, examine the feasibility of making all existing SCADA meters fully online and integrated into a common monitoring dashboard to enable effective and continuous oversight and real time data monitoring of discharge of industrial effluents- The Committee shall also assess the feasibility of installing SCADA meters, or any other compatible monitoring devices, at all Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) so that the quantity and quality of effluent discharged from such plants can be monitored on a real-time basis- v. The Committee may schedule and conduct audits including surprise checks of the CETPs, STPs, oxidation ponds, drainage systems, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) units and industrial primary treatment plants at appropriate intervals- The Committee shall specify compliance benchmarks and ensure that non-compliance is addressed promptly- vi. The performance audits of Common Effluents Treatment Plants (CETPs) and Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) undertaken by educational institutions engaged by the State of Rajasthan shall be submitted to the Committee, which shall examine the findings, direct remedial measures and ensure that deficiencies identified in the audits are rectified without delay; vii. All action plans, technical reports, feasibility studies and remedial proposals prepared by IIT Jodhpur, MNIT Jaipur, MBM Engineering College, BITS Pilani or any other institution engaged by the State shall be placed before the Committee- The Committee shall evaluate the scientific soundness, feasibility and environmental efficacy of each recommendation and give its suggestions on their implementation; viii. The Committee shall assess the existing treatment capacity vis-à-vis actual industrial and municipal discharge and prepare a timebound infrastructural augmentation plan- This may include, wherever necessary, the installation of new CETPs or STPs, enhancement of existing capacity, creation of additional conveyance pipelines, adoption of 56 Zero Liquid Discharge (ZLD) technologies, and establishment of integrated waste management systems- ix. The Committee shall identify officials, authorities or industries/industrial units responsible for non-compliance or dereliction of their obligations- Upon identification of such individuals and/or industries/industrial units, the Committee shall recommend appropriate disciplinary action, prosecution under applicable statutes, and/or recovery of environmental compensation, as the facts may justify- It shall ensure that the principle of “Polluter Pays” is applied effectively and that no violator is permitted to escape liability; xi. The Committee shall have full authority to call for records, issue directions to State and local bodies, seek technical assistance from national institutions including but not limited to National Environmental Engineering Research Institute (CISR-NEERI) and ensure strict implementation of all environmental safeguards; xii. The Committee shall also be at liberty to examine and address all such matters as may be incidental, ancillary or consequential to the aforesaid Terms of Reference- This shall include any issue which, in the considered view of the Committee, bears a nexus with the prevention of pollution, restoration of the river ecosystem, augmentation of treatment infrastructure, or enforcement of environmental norms- The Committee shall have full authority to take such steps as are reasonably necessary to secure the objectives of the directions issued by this Court and to ensure that the environmental and constitutional rights of the affected communities are effectively safeguarded. [Para 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341
National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 - Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) – Held, recognizing the Aravalis' ecological fragility, rich biodiversity (including 22 wildlife sanctuaries, 4 tiger reserves, and wetlands), and water recharging function, the Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) to prepare a Management Plan for Sustainable Mining (MPSM) through ICFRE (Indian Council of Forestry Research and Education) for the entire continuous geological ridge extending from Gujarat to Delhi, on the lines of the MPSM for Saranda- i. No new mining leases are to be granted until the MPSM is finalised by the MoEF&CC through ICFRE; ii. The MPSM must- Identify permissible, ecologically sensitive, conservation-critical, and restoration priority areas where mining shall be strictly prohibited or permitted only under exceptional/scientifically justified circumstances; Incorporate an analysis of cumulative environmental impacts and the ecological carrying capacity of the region; Include detailed post-mining restoration and rehabilitation measures. [Para 50] In Re Issue Relating to Definition of Aravali Hills and Ranges, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1127 : 2025 INSC 1338
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Distinction between 'delivery' and 'presentation' illustrated - Supreme Court distinguished delivery (Section 46 NI Act) from presentment (Section 64 NI Act) - Held that delivery involves the drawer handing the cheque to the payee, and, in case of account-payee cheques, the payee delivering it to his own bank - This stage is covered by Section 142(2)(a) - Presentment is the act of presenting the cheque to the drawee bank for payment; this stage is relevant for Section 142(2)(b). [Relied on Bijoy Kumar Moni v. Paresh Manna 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3833; Paras 42-50] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Section 138, 142(2) & 142A — Territorial Jurisdiction — Transfer of Pending Cases — Effect of Amendment Act, 2015 - Jurisdiction Post-2015 Amendment - Held that Supreme Court reiterates that the jurisdiction to try a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act is vested in the court within whose local jurisdiction the bank where the payee or holder in due course maintains an account (and where the cheque is delivered for collection) is situated. [Para 76] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — Transfer of Cases where Evidence Commenced (Section 145(2) Stage) - Held that a complaint which was originally filed in a court (MM, Kolkata) that later lacked jurisdiction due to the 2015 Amendment, but had already reached the stage of recording of evidence under Section 145(2) of the Act before it was returned, should be transferred back to that original court - Allowing the parties to contest the complaint afresh in the court of proper jurisdiction (JMFC, Bhopal) would amount to a procedural impropriety detrimental to the accused - The Supreme Court applies the exception carved out in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod Case; principle laid down in paragraph 22 of this judgment, which allowed cases that had reached the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond to continue in the court where they were pending, is applied to meet the ends of justice - Held that cases where the trial had reached the stage of summoning, appearance of the accused, and the recording of evidence had commenced as per Section 145(2) Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, should continue in the same court where the trial was ongoing - Petition is allowed. [Relied on Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 12; Paras 76-82] Jai Balaji Industries Ltd. v. Heg Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1149 : 2025 INSC 1362
One Time Settlement (OTS) - Quashing of Criminal and Civil Proceedings upon Full and Final Settlement with Lender Banks – Peculiar Facts of the Case – OTS Amount Higher than FIR Allegation – Issue - Whether the Supreme Court should exercise its discretion to quash multiple criminal and civil proceedings arising from alleged loan defalcation and money laundering, in a scenario where the petitioners have agreed to deposit a substantial sum towards full and final settlement with the lender banks and investigating agencies - The Supreme Court allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed all criminal and civil proceedings against the petitioners, subject to the deposit of Rs. 5100 crores as a full and final settlement with the lender banks and investigating agencies on or before December 17, 2025 - This order was based on a consensus reached, where the petitioners agreed to deposit the amount demanded by the investigating agencies to put a quietus to the entire litigation - Held that if public money, settled in the One Time Settlement (OTS), was returned to the banks, the continuation of criminal proceedings would not serve any useful purpose - Held that the petitioners voluntarily agreed to deposit the full amount demanded to settle the matter and protect public money, the discretion to quash all related proceedings (CBI, ED, PMLA, Fugitive Act, SFIO, Black Money, and Income Tax) was deemed deserving of exercise - Held that the directions issued are strictly in the peculiar facts of this case and shall not be treated as precedent. Hemant S. Hathi v. Central Bureau of Investigation, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1139
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Consensual Relationship vs. Rape – Held, mere break-up of a relationship between a consenting couple cannot result in the initiation of criminal proceedings - What was a consensual relationship at the initial stages cannot be given a colour of criminality when the said relationship does not fructify into a marriage - Misuse of the criminal justice machinery to convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation - The case is a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious - High Court's refusal to quash the proceedings under Section 528 of BNSS was unsustainable - The continuation of the prosecution would be an abuse of the court machinery - The FIR and Charge-sheet were quashed - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, 2024 11 SCC 398; Paras 28-32, 34, 40] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Sections 376, 376(2)(n), 507 - Rape on promise of marriage - Quashing of FIR and Charge-sheet - Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), Section 528 - Held that a relationship that continued for three years and involved multiple physical acts, with the woman being well-educated, married (with the marriage still subsisting), and voluntarily meeting the man on each occasion, cannot be retrospectively branded as rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage - The physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of the offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage. [Relied on Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 4 SCC 197] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351
Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) - Vitiation of Consent (Section 90 IPC/Section 19 Indian Contract Act, 1872) – Held, for consent to be vitiated by a false promise of marriage, it must be established that the promise was made from the very beginning with an intention to deceive the woman solely to persuade her to have a physical relationship - The law must remain sensitive to genuine cases where the promise was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment. [Relied on Prashant vs. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 5 SCC 764] Samadhan v. State of Maharasthra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137 : 2025 INSC 1351
Pleadings and Documents – Supreme Court Practice and Procedure – Paper-Books – Photographs – Directions to Registry and Advocates-on-Record (AORs)- The Supreme Court directed its Registry not to clear any paper-book for listing where the photographs appended are black-and-white - Supreme Court further issued directions, to be circulated amongst all Advocates-on-Record (AORs), stating that unless proper coloured photographs, along with distance dimensions and supported by a conceptual plan, are appended, the material shall not be allowed to be placed on record, and the matter will remain in the list of 'defects not cured' till further orders - For photographs filed through e-mail or e-filed, the AORs were directed to simultaneously submit hard copies of the coloured photographs also. [Paras 1-3] Dinamati Gomes v. State of Goa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1136
Prenatal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act of 1994 (the 1994 Act) – Issue - A Writ Petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution, questioning the age criterion of 35 years and above imposed on pregnant women seeking pre-natal diagnostic/screening under the 1994 Act - Supreme Court noted that while the petitioner may not have made out a case of discriminatory treatment or violation of Articles 14, 15, and 21, the issues raised warrant consideration by the expert body - Held that the right to reproductive autonomy is a graded right (under Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act) and right of access to diagnostic facilities a regulated one (under PC-PNDT Act) - Noted that upto certain weeks, you have full autonomy - Then you have a guided autonomy - And in certain other cases beyond 24 weeks, it is the judicial intervention which has permitted the autonomy to be preserved - This is a completely different area. Here is an interface between prevention of a crime, which is rampant, because sex-selection / sex-determination becomes intrinsically connected with certain diagnostic procedures - right to access to diagnostic facilities, which is a part of Article 21 rights, is regulated to a certain extent - The Supreme Court disposed of the Writ Petition with a direction to the Central Supervisory Board, constituted under the 1994 Act, to treat the entire pleadings, including the counter affidavit and the rejoinder affidavit, as a representation-cum-material for their consideration - The Competent Authority may consider making any amendment/modification/clarification of the existing Rules or Form 'F' in public interest if the petitioner has made out a comprehensive case for the same. [Para 5-7] Meera Kaura Patel v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1152
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) - Sanction under Section 19 of the PC Act – Competence and Jurisdictional Validity - Held that Under Section 19(1) of the PC Act, where the appointing authority of the accused is the State Government, the sanction for prosecution must be accorded by the State Government and by none other - The Explanation to Section 19(4), which includes the "competency of the authority to grant sanction" as an error, becomes relevant only when the question of the validity of the sanction is under scrutiny before the appellate or revisional forum, as provided in sub-Section (3) of Section 19 - The earlier decisions relied upon by the State were distinguished on this basis - The trial Court was given liberty to summon original records/contemporaneous documents pertaining to the appointment to decide the validity of the sanction - If the sanction is found valid, the trial shall proceed - If found otherwise, the chargesheet is to be returned to the investigating agency for procuring fresh sanction from the appropriate authority. [Relied on Refer Nanjappa v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 14 SCC 186; Paras 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43] T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1147 : 2025 INSC 1356
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act) - Section 19 – Validity of Sanction – Effect of Exoneration in Departmental Proceedings on Criminal Trial - Supreme Court rejected the argument that exoneration of the accused-appellant in the departmental proceedings should lead to automatic discharge in the criminal case - The standard of proof required in disciplinary proceedings (preponderance of possibilities) is significantly lower than that required in a criminal trial (proving the case beyond all reasonable doubt) - Held that Exoneration in departmental proceedings does not, ipso facto, furnish a ground for dropping the criminal charges, particularly in Trap Cases - The conclusion of the disciplinary authority that the guilt could not be proved merely on the testimony of the trap laying officer was held to be premature and unfounded - Held that Conviction in a trap case can be based even on the evidence of the trap laying officer, if found reliable and trustworthy, and the mere fact that a decoy/complainant turns hostile would not adversely affect the case of the prosecution - The possibility of the criminal case still resulting in conviction, irrespective of the fact that the witnesses turned hostile in the departmental inquiry, is a realistic possibility. [Relied on N. Narsinga Rao v. State of A.P., (2001) 1 SCC 691; Neeraj Datta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) (2023) 4 SCC 731; Paras 27- 32, 41] T. Manjunath v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1147 : 2025 INSC 1356
Public Interest and Directions - Held that in projects of public importance, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS) for vulnerable citizens, the State's decision to cancel a tender or restart the process is itself an aspect of public interest- While upholding the cancellation and setting aside the High Court's judgment, the Supreme Court directed the Appellant-State to- i. Hold a Fact-Finding Enquiry to ascertain the details of ePoS machines, components, or allied services produced or supplied under the cancelled LoI and their utilisation by the Department during the pilot or demonstration stages; ii. Assess the value and costs of installation of such verified tangible assets or work and reimburse the Respondent-company on the principle of quantum meruit (equitable reimbursement) to make good the losses suffered; iii. Clarified that no claim for loss of profit, expectation, or consequential damages shall survive; iv. Granted liberty to the Appellant-State to issue a fresh tender forthwith- Appeal allowed. [Paras 20-56] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Registration Act, 1908 — Section 17(1)(e) — Deed Assigning Decree for Specific Performance of Agreement of Sale of Immovable Property — Whether such a deed requires compulsory registration - A deed assigning a decree for specific performance of an agreement of sale of immovable property is not compulsorily registrable under Section 17(1)(e) of the Registration Act, 1908 - The assignment deed in this case did not require registration because the decree itself, which is for specific performance, does not create or purport to create any right, title, or interest in any immovable property. [Relied on Babu Lal vs. M/s Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and others [(1982) 1 SCC 525; Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Limited (2) through Director vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2012) 1 SCC 656; Paras 21, 25-28] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329
Right to Life (Article 21) - Right to a Healthy Environment - River Pollution - Sustained Administrative apathy- Supreme Court took suo moto cognizance of the grave environmental catastrophe in the Jojari, Bandi, and Luni river system in Rajasthan, noting the pollution affects 2 million lives and is a fallout of "sustained, systemic collapse of regulatory vigilance and utter administrative apathy stretching over nearly two decades"- Held that when environmental degradation reaches such proportions, the injury transcends the ecological realm and becomes a "direct constitutional injury" requiring immediate judicial redress- The belated flurry of administrative activity, triggered solely by judicial intervention, underscores a prolonged period of regulatory apathy and institutional neglect- The installed capacities of Sewage Treatment Plants (STPs) and Common Effluent Treatment Plants (CETPs) are grossly inadequate, resulting in the discharge of untreated/partially treated effluents, which is emblematic of a systemic failure- The interim stay previously operating on the National Green Tribunal's final order dated 25th February, 2022, is modified, clarified, and lifted to allow the implementation of the substantive remedial, regulatory and preventive directions contained therein- he interim stay shall continue to operate only in respect of (i) the remarks made against RIICO and other authorities/Corporations, and (ii) the direction imposing environmental compensation of Rs. 2 Crores upon them- Directed the constitution of a High-Level Ecosystem Oversight Committee, headed by a retired High Court Judge, to supervise the remedial measures- The Committee is mandated to oversee the full implementation of NGT directions, prepare a comprehensive River Restoration and Rejuvenation Blueprint for the entire river system, map all discharge points, and conduct recurring audits of all treatment and monitoring infrastructure. [Relied on Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 SCC 598; Paras 9, 11, 22, 27] In Re 2 Million Lives At Risk, Contamination In Jojari River, Rajasthan, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1131 : 2025 INSC 1341
Scheduled Tribe Claim – Dismissal of claim after completing medical education – Petitioner admitted to MBBS course against a Scheduled Tribe seat on the basis of a 'Mannervarlu' Tribe claim – Scrutiny Committee dismissed the claim while proceedings were pending and education was completed – Whether the completed education should be protected - Held that considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, and particularly taking into account that the precious medical education would go waste if protection is not granted, the Supreme Court was inclined to protect the education undertaken by the petitioner - The education undertaken for the MBBS Degree shall stand protected as he had already completed course during pendency of proceedings - It was clarified that the petitioner shall not hereinafter claim any benefit on the basis of him belonging to the Scheduled Tribe category. [Paras 4, 5] Vedkumar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1133
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act) - Section 26E - Secured Creditor's Priority - Workmen's Dues - Workmen's Dues (Unquantified): The workmen's dues which have not been quantified as of now cannot have any priority over the secured creditor's claim, which is conferred priority under Section 26E of the SARFAESI Act, if the proceeds can only satisfy the secured debt - Appeals allowed. [Para 28] Jalgaon District Central Coop. Bank Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1125 : 2025 INSC 1335
Service Law - Alteration of Selection Criteria - Weightage of Qualifications - Jammu and Kashmir Services Selection Board (Board) - Recruitment of Foresters - Academic Qualification for Forester - Held that the minimum academic qualification for the post of Forester was or equivalent with Science - Stress was primarily on physical attributes and viva voce, not solely academic criteria - The Board initially provided 25 points for a B.Sc. Forestry degree out of a total of 100 points - After conducting interviews, the Board changed the evaluation criteria, differentiating between a 4-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 25 points) and a 3-year B.Sc. Forestry course (awarded 20 points) - Altering the evaluation procedure after the interviews were held, when candidates had completed their participation in the selection process, was found to be arbitrary and lacking a rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved - Held that the change in the evaluation criteria was made at the stage of preparation of the select list and was deemed arbitrary by the Supreme Court - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on K. Manjusree vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. (2008) 3 SCC 512; Tej Prakash Pathak v. High Court of Rajasthan (2025) 2 SCC 1; Paras 10, 11] J and K Service Selection Board v. Sudesh Kumar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1156
Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Nature of a Decree for Specific Performance — Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 54 — Interest in Immovable Property- Held, a decree for specific performance merely recognizes a claim for specific performance of a contract and does not elevate the status of a decree-holder to that of the owner of the property in question - Neither a contract for sale nor a decree passed on that basis for specific performance gives any right or title to the decree-holder; the right and title passes only on the execution of the deed of sale (conveyance) and its registration - A contract for the sale of immovable property, by itself, does not create any interest in or charge on such property - The personal obligation created by an agreement of sale is described in Section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of a contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein - The contract between the parties is not extinguished by the passing of the decree for specific performance, and it subsists notwithstanding the decree - The suit is deemed to be pending even after such a decree, and the Court passing the decree continues to retain control - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Amol and others vs. Deorao and others 2011 SCC OnLine Bom 11; Paras 16-21, 27] Rajeswari v. Shanmugam, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1122 : 2025 INSC 1329
Tender – Letter of Intent (LoI) – Cancellation of LoI – Arbitrariness in State Action – Judicial Review in Contractual Matters – Public Interest – Quantum Meruit- Held that an LoI is, in the ordinary course, a precursor to a contract and not the contract itself- A Letter of Intent merely conveys the Government's intention to enter into an agreement and creates no enforceable obligation until a Letter of Acceptance (LoA) or contract is executed- It is a provisional communication signifying the State's intent to enter into a formal arrangement upon the fulfilment of certain technical and procedural conditions- The acceptance of a tender and the consequential formation of a binding contract are contingent upon the satisfaction of these prerequisites- An LoI creates no vested right until it passes the threshold of final and unconditional acceptance; it is but a "promise in embryo". [Relied on resser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. [(2006) 1 SCC 751; Rajasthan Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service (P) Ltd. [(1996) 10 SCC 405] State of Himachal Pradesh v. OASYS Cybernatics, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1142 : 2025 INSC 1355
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Central Zoo Authority (CZA) - Translocation of Captive Animals - IUCN Guidelines - Central Empowered Committee (CEC) - A.N. Jha Deer Park - Supreme Court acknowledged that the Deer Park suffered from chronic managerial deficiencies and persistent non-compliance with statutory standards, leading to an exponential increase in the deer population, far exceeding the carrying capacity of the 10.97-acre enclosure- The DDA's lack of requisite capacity and the risks of overcrowding (stress, weakened immunity, disease) made scientific population management through regulated translocation "indispensable" for the welfare of the deer- noted the serious and prima facie credible allegations made by the petitioner-Society regarding gross irregularities in the translocation of 261 deer already undertaken to Rajasthan- These violations included- i. Transporting vulnerable categories (pregnant females, juveniles, antlered males); ii. Severe overcrowding in vehicles, such as 40 deer and a fawn in one truck; iii. Absence of veterinary assistance, sedation, food, or water during long journeys; iv. Lack of pre-translocation genetic screening, tagging/identification, tranquilisation protocols, veterinary fitness certification, or behavioural acclimatisation; v. No scientific assessment of the recipient sanctuaries' carrying capacity, predator-prey dynamics (the reserves are tiger-bearing), or habitat suitability; vi. No post-release tracking mechanisms (telemetry collars/radio chips) were used. [Paras 17-21] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Hotriculture Dda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1145 : 2025 INSC 1358
Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 - Principles of environmental protection and humane treatment of wildlife- Directions- Articles 48A, 51A(g), and 21 of the Constitution- Supreme Court gave following directions- i. Supreme Court directed the Central Empowered Committee (CEC), working under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, to conduct two comprehensive, on-ground surveys and file detailed reports within eight weeks; ii. To enumerate the present deer population, ecological carrying capacity, veterinary infrastructure, and the maximum number of deer that can be sustainably and humanely maintained; iii. To inspect Ramgarh Vishdhari Tiger Reserve and Mukundra Hills Tiger Reserve in Rajasthan, and report on the number of deer surviving, habitat suitability, predation risks, and compliance with CZA and IUCN Guidelines; iv. The CEC shall prepare a comprehensive roadmap for any future translocation, ensuring strict conformity with statutory and IUCN Guidelines, covering methodology, tagging, transportation, and post-release monitoring; v. Directed DDA to refrain from organising or permitting any commercial events, private parties, or non-conservation-related gatherings within the Deer Park premises or its surrounding buffer zones, and instead develop educational outreach programmes; vi. The DDA must place a report on record detailing the past and present status of the land formerly designated for deer enclosures, including the "unexplained reduction of more than 20 acres". [Para 18-23] New Delhi Nature Society v. Director Hotriculture Dda, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1145 : 2025 INSC 1358
Writ Petition - Alternative Remedy of Appeal to High Court - Dismissal - Rule of Self-Imposed Restriction - Supreme Court upheld the High Court's dismissal of a writ petition filed under Article 226, primarily due to the appellant's failure to pursue the alternative remedy of appeal provided under Section 130 of the Customs Act, 1962, to the High Court itself - When the statutorily designated alternative forum happens to be the High Court itself (and not an ordinary functionary/tribunal), refusal to entertain a writ petition under Article 226 should be the rule, and entertaining it an exception - Where a remedy is available to a party before the High Court in another jurisdiction (like a reference/appeal provided by statute), the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not normally be exercised, as that would allow the machinery set up by the statute to be bypassed – Held, If a petitioner has disabled himself from availing the statutory remedy by his own fault, he cannot use that as a ground for the High Court to exercise its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Article 226 - The appellant approached the High Court in writ jurisdiction well after the 180-day limitation period prescribed for an appeal under Section 130 - The High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari, especially since the appellant had an equally efficacious remedy before the High Court in a separate jurisdiction which he failed to avail - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on: Thansingh Nathmal v. A. Mazid, Superintendent of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419; Paras 9-16] Rikhab Chand Jain v. Union of India, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1129