Supreme Court Weekly Digest [November 1 - 10, 2025]

Arbitral Award – Execution - Allegation of Fraud/Collusion (Fraud on Corporation) – Held, the maxim "fraud unravels everything" is acknowledged, an execution petition cannot be kept in abeyance based on mere allegations of fraud or collusion by the judgment-debtor's own officials, especially after the arbitral award has attained finality up to the Supreme Court. Entertaining such objections under Section 47, without a finding of fraud or even a prima facie case established, would be an abuse of process akin to a retrial, which is contrary to the object of Section 47. Courts must exercise great caution and circumspection before entertaining such allegations - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley (1956) 1 All ER 341; Electrosteel Steel Limited v. ISPAT Carrier Private Limited 2025 LiveLaw SC 491; Para 34-35, 95-99] MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1060 : 2025 INSC 1279

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; Sections 34(2)(b)(ii), 34(2A), 28(3) - Arbitral Award - Setting Aside - Patent Illegality - Rewriting of Contract – Held, an Arbitral Tribunal, being a creature of contract, cannot unilaterally alter or rewrite the terms of the contract between the parties - An Arbitral Award that grants claims by rewriting the commercial contract, substituting the express terms of the agreement and binding policy directives of a statutory authority, is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the Award and is in conflict with the fundamental policy of Indian Law - Noted that Arbitrator's action of substituting the contractually agreed 'combo meal' tariff with the 'regular meal' tariff for the second meal of the day, and granting reimbursement for an item ('welcome drink') contrary to the policy directives binding on the caterers, amounts to creating a new contract for the parties and is violative of Section 28(3) of the Act, which mandates the Tribunal to take into account the terms of the contract - Appeal allowed. [Relied Ssangyong Engineering and Construction Company Limited v. National Highway Authority of India, (2019) 15 SCC 131; Industrial Promotion and Investment Corporation of Orissa Limited v. Turbo Furguson Steel Private Limited & Ors. 2012 2 SCC 261; Paras 64-72] Indian Railways Catering and Tourism v. Brandavan Food Products, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1076 : 2025 INSC 1294

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 34 & 36 - Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Section 47 - Arbitral Award – Execution - Objection under Section 47 CPC - Plea of Nullity – Scope – Held, the plea of nullity against an Arbitral Award can be raised in a proceeding under Section 47 of the CPC during execution, as the Award is enforced under Section 36 of the A&C Act as if it were a decree of the Civil Court - Such a challenge lies within a very narrow compass, limited exclusively to the ground of jurisdictional infirmity or voidness - An Executing Court cannot go behind the decree - Objections regarding errors of fact and law are outside the scope of Section 47 - Objections to arbitral award execution maintainable only if decree is void or without jurisdiction. [Relied on Vasudev Dhanjibhai Modi v. Rajabhai Abdul Rehman, (1970) 1 SCC 670; Paras 16-23] MMTC Ltd. v. Anglo American Metallurgical Coal Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1060 : 2025 INSC 1279

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Section 7 & 11(6) – Validity of Arbitration Agreement – Interpretation of Dispute Resolution Clause - The Supreme Court examined whether a three-tier dispute resolution clause, which mandated negotiation, followed by "arbitration through senior management comprising respective Chairmen of the two parties (Arbitrators)" – Held, this is not a clause does not constitute a valid arbitration agreement - An arbitration agreement must contemplate an intention to refer disputes to a private tribunal for adjudication and a willingness to be bound by its decision - The words used must disclose a determination and obligation to go to arbitration, not merely contemplate the possibility - The decision of the private tribunal must be final and binding on the parties - Noted that the penultimate sentence of Clause 8.28, which stipulates that the complaining party shall seek remedies through the courts of law if the dispute is not resolved within fifteen (15) days after the proposed "arbitration," clearly indicates that the process was an attempt at amicable resolution inter se rather than a definitive submission to arbitration - Where an agreement provides that the decision will not be final and binding, or that an unsatisfied party may file a civil suit, it cannot be termed an arbitration agreement - The mere use of the word "arbitration" multiple times is not clinching or decisive - The A&C Act acknowledges the existence of an arbitration agreement based on its substance rather than its form, and an express intention of the dispute being resolved through arbitration is necessary to meet the threshold of Section 7 - The clause did not constitute an arbitration agreement in the first place, subsequent correspondence where the respondent did not deny its existence cannot displace the original lack of intention to arbitrate, especially as the correspondence was not unequivocally clear about referring disputes to arbitration - Appeal dismissed. [Relied on Jagdish Chander v. Ramesh Chander 2007 5 SCC 719; Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. IVRCL AMR Joint Venture, (2022) 20 SCC 636; K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573; Paras 15-27] Alchemist Hospitals Ltd. v. ICT Health Technology Services India Pvt. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1070 : 2025 INSC 1289

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS) - Section 47 - Grounds of Arrest - Mode of Communication - Mandatory Requirement – Held, to achieve the intended objective of the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, the grounds of arrest must be informed to the arrested person in each and every case without exception - The mode of communication of such grounds must be in writing in the language the arrested person understands - The constitutional safeguard would be rendered nugatory if authorities are merely permitted to read out the grounds and claim compliance - The constitutional mandate provided in Article 22(1) is a constitutional safeguard in the form of fundamental rights and is not a mere procedural formality - It is an unexceptional duty cast upon the State to provide the arrested person with the grounds of arrest to enable that person to defend himself by consulting a legal practitioner of his choice - If the grounds of arrest are not furnished to the arrestee in writing, this non-compliance results in a breach of the constitutional and statutory safeguards, rendering the arrest and subsequent remand illegal, and the person will be entitled to be set at liberty. [Relied on Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India and Others (2024) 7 SCC 576; Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2024) 8 SCC 254; Suhas Chakma v. Union of India & others 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3031; Paras 8, 22, 34-56] Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1066 : 2025 INSC 1288

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) — Order XXII Rule 6 — Abatement of Appeal – Held, If an appellant dies prior to the hearing of the appeal, and their legal heirs are not brought on record, and the appeal is subsequently decided, the judgment and decree passed in that appeal are a nullity - The protection offered by Order XXII Rule 6 is not applicable if the party dies prior to the appeal being heard - Where the first appellate decree is a nullity, the decree passed by the trial court is the only decree holding the field and is liable to be executed - The trial court's decree revives for being executed - If a decree is a nullity, its invalidity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced, even at the stage of execution - The executing court erred in declining to execute the trial court's decree on the ground that it had merged with and was superseded by the first appellate court's decree, because the latter was a nullity - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Amba Bai and others vs. Gopal and Others 2001 INSC 263; Rajendra Prasad & Anr. v. Khirodhar Mahoto & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2275 of 1994; Bibi Rahmani Khatoon and others vs. Harkoo Gope and others 1981 INSC 100. Paras 11- 16] Vikram Bhalchandra Ghongade v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1067 : 2025 INSC 1283

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) - Suit for Partition and Separate Possession - Validity and Effect of Release Deeds – Admissibility of Unregistered Partition Deed (Palupatti) for Collateral Purposes – Computation of Shares under Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (Unamended Section 6) – Held, a registered relinquishment deed releasing share of a coparcener in the joint family property, operates immediately regardless of its implementation - Supreme Court set aside the concurrent findings of the High Court and Trial court, which refused to consider the Appellant's exclusive share in the suit property, despite there being a registered relinquishment deeds by Appellant's two brothers releasing their respective shares in Appellant's favor, and a subsequent family settlement (palupatti) in 1972, which formally recorded the separation of the remaining coparceners and delineated their respective shares, which had been independently managed ever since - A family arrangement recorded in writing, when relied upon only to explain how the parties thereafter held and enjoyed the properties, does not require registration for that limited collateral use - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Elumalai v. M. Kamala [(2023) 13 SCC 27; Thulasidhara v. Narayanappa [(2019) 6 SCC 409; Paras 7-9] P. Anjanappa v. A.P. Nanjundappa, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1074 : 2025 INSC 1286

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) - Section 482 - Quashing of FIR - Scope of High Court's power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to Quash FIR/Criminal Proceedings - The power to quash an FIR or criminal proceeding under Section 482 Cr.P.C. must be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, in exceptional and rarest of rare cases. At the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial or embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint - The Court has only to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offence - If a cognizable offence is disclosed, the Court should not thwart the investigation – Held, the High Court erred in quashing the proceedings primarily on the ground that the two specific incidents of harassment/dowry demand mentioned in the subsequent FIR were absent from the earlier complaints and were thus an "afterthought" or a "counterblast" - This approach amounts to conducting a mini-trial, which is prohibited under Section 482 Cr.P.C. - A First Information Report (FIR) is not an encyclopaedia and is not required to disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported - Appeal allowed. [Relied on State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajan Lal and Others, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 19 SCC 401; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Aryan Singh and Others, (2023) 18 SCC 399; Paras 17, 18, 20-27] Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1080 : 2025 INSC 1287

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(1), 378(2), 378(3), Proviso to Section 372 — Appeal against Acquittal — Cases investigated by CBI - Maintainability of State Government's Appeal in CBI-Investigated Case - Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that the authority of the State Government to appeal from an order of acquittal is excluded in cases investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (CBI), as per Section 378(2) of the CrPC - The State of Chhattisgarh's application for leave to appeal was, therefore, not maintainable - The right of a victim to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC only applies to orders of acquittal passed after the provision came into effect on December 31, 2009 - Since the judgment of acquittal was rendered on May 31, 2007, the appeal filed by the de-facto-complainant (Satish Jaggi) was not maintainable - The High Court should have adopted a liberal and pragmatic approach in condoning the significant delay (1373 days) in the CBI's application seeking leave to appeal, especially in a sensitive case involving grave allegations (conspiracy to murder a rival political party member) - The delay was condoned to ensure the challenge to the acquittal is examined on merits, not rejected on technicalities - Matter was remitted to High Court for fresh consideration. [Relied on Lalu Prasad Yadav and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Anr. (2010) 5 SCC 1; Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through LRs v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2019) 2 SCC 752; Paras 19, 20, 26-33] CBI v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1069 : 2025 INSC 1285

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) — Section 378(1), 378(2), 378(3), Proviso to Section 372 — Appeal against Acquittal — State Government's right to file an appeal against acquittal of the accused - Examined and deliberated in a suitable case involving the following situations - i. The complaint was lodged by the State Government or its officers; ii. Investigation was partly done by State Police; iii. Prosecution was commenced at the instance of the State Government; iv. The State Government has a stake in the criminal proceedings and; v. the jurisdiction of the CBI had been invoked at the instance of the State Government. CBI v. Amit Aishwarya Jogi, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1069 : 2025 INSC 1285

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – Section 389 – Suspension of Sentence – Life Imprisonment – Held, the appellate court, while considering the plea for suspension of sentence of life imprisonment, must ensure that the convict is in a position to point out something very palpable or a very gross error in the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis of which he is able to make good his case that on this ground alone, his appeal deserves to be allowed and he be acquitted - The High Court failed to follow well-settled principles. It should have given a fair idea of the prosecution case, the type of evidence led, and the nature of evidence against each accused before exercising discretion - The High Court committed a serious error by suspending the sentence of life convicts via a cryptic order merely by recording that allegations were general and omnibus, without discussing the nature of evidence or the role of the accused as members of an unlawful assembly - Appeal allowed. [Paras 14-28] Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1087

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 482, 156 (3) - Quashing of FIR - Scope of High Court's Power - Investigation by Police – Held, the power under Section 156(3) can be invoked by the Magistrate before taking cognizance and is in the nature of a pre-emptory reminder to the police to exercise its plenary power of investigation - The Magistrate is justified in adopting this course if the allegations disclose a cognizable offense, and forwarding the complaint for investigation "will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate” - Direction under Section 156(3) is issued when on account of credibility of information available, or weighing the interest of justice it is considered appropriate to straightaway direct investigation - When a prayer for quashing the FIR is made, the High Court only has to consider whether the allegations in the FIR disclose the commission of a cognizable offense and must permit the investigating agency/police to investigate the allegations in the FIR - When facts are hazy and investigation has just begun, the High Court should be circumspect and allow the police to proceed - Order of High Court set aside and FIR restored, Police were directed to investigate the case expeditiously - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Ramdev Food Products Private Limited v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 6 SCC 439; Madhao v State of Maharashtra, (2013) 5 SCC 615; Paras 34-43] Sadiq B. Hanchinmani v. State of Karnataka, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1064 : 2025 INSC 1282

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973– Sections 53 and 53A– Medical Examination of Accused– Held that these provisions allow medical examination (including DNA profiling) only when it affords evidence as to the commission of the offence- Where the paternity of a child is not a fact in issue for the alleged offences (Cheating/Harassment), invoking these sections to order a DNA test is a misconstruction of the statute. [Paras 55-57, 59] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Interpretation of Section 13(1A) Proviso – Held, Section 13(1A) consists of two parts - The main provision allows appeals against judgments and orders - The proviso acts as an exception only for interlocutory orders, restricting appeals to those specifically enumerated in Order XLIII CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 - Orders rejecting a plaint (Decrees) fall under the main provision, not the restrictive proviso - Appeal allowed. [Paras 17-18, 21] MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 13(1A) – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order VII Rule 11 read with Section 2(2) – Appeal against Rejection of Plaint – Maintainability – Held, an order rejecting a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC constitutes a "decree" as defined under Section 2(2) CPC as it conclusively determines the rights of the parties – Such an order is appealable under the main provision of Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – The High Court erred in treating it as an interlocutory order restricted by the proviso to Section 13(1A) – The proviso cannot be invoked to curtail the scope of the main provision regarding final judgments and decrees. MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300

Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – Section 13(1A) – Distinction between 'Rejection of Plaint' and 'Rejection of Application for Rejection of Plaint' - Supreme Court clarified that while an order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 11 is not appealable under Section 13(1A) as it is not enumerated in Order XLIII CPC, an order actually rejecting the plaint results in a decree and is appealable. [Relied on Bank of India v. Maruti Civil Works 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 2667; Paras 18-19] MITC Rolling Mills v. Renuka Realtors, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1085 : 2025 INSC 1300

Compassionate Appointment - Civil Death - Date of Death - Decree of Civil Court - Evidence Act, 1872; Section 108 - Presumption of Death (Civil Death) – Held, in cases of civil death, a person is presumed to be dead only if their whereabouts are not heard of for seven years from the date the person went missing - The death will be presumed to be on the expiry of seven years from the date the person disappeared, unless a contrary or specific date of death is proved by adducing cogent evidence - A decree of a Civil Court declaring a person to be dead, pursuant to the seven-year statutory period having elapsed, does not, by itself, fix a precise date or time of death - The decree is silent on the specific date of death unless direct or circumstantial evidence is provided - The burden to prove the date or time of the death lies upon the person who makes such an assertion. [Relied on LIC v. Anuradha, (2004) 10 SCC 131; Paras 6, 7] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

Compassionate Appointment - Civil Death - Retirement and Acceptance of Retiral Dues: Where the missing employee was treated to be in continuous service and duly retired during the period he was missing, and his family members accepted all the retiral dues and are receiving monthly pension, the family has accepted the father's retirement. In these circumstances, the son (Respondent No. 2) cannot claim compassionate appointment, as the father is deemed to have died a civil death after his retirement date - The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's judgment and allowed the appeal - The Court left it open to the appellants to consider the case of the respondent for appointment for any suitable post independent of the claim for compassionate appointment, if otherwise permissible in law - Appeal allowed. [Paras 4,9, 10-12] Commissioner, Nagpur Municipal Corporation v. Lalita, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1065 : 2025 INSC 1280

Constitution of Independent Committee Indispensable for Complex Housing Disputes - Article 136 Jurisdiction Inadequate - The Supreme Court has directed the constitution of a one-member committee headed by Justice Pankaj Naqvi (Retd.), former Judge of the Allahabad High Court - i. to conduct an independent inquiry into the long-pending housing dispute involving the Shiv Kala Charms Project in Greater Noida; ii. List those willing to jointly develop and complete the remaining towers; iii. Formulate a fair mechanism to apportion GNIDA's dues among verified allottees; iv. Prepare a comprehensive plan for completion of the project in a time-bound manner; v. Explore the auction of unclaimed or unverifiable flats in Towers 3 and 4 to recover construction and land costs, if necessary - The case, pending for nearly two decades, involves hundreds of defrauded homebuyers who had invested in the project developed under the Golf Course Sahkari Awas Samiti (GCSAS), in collaboration with M/s Shiv Kala Developers Pvt. Ltd. - The Supreme Court, observed that the matter had acquired considerable administrative magnitude and intricacy, and that the resolution of overlapping issues concerning restoration of lease, identification of genuine allottees, determination of dues, and completion of stalled construction was "unlikely if not impossible in the proceedings under Article 136 of the Constitution of India" - held that the constitution of an independent Committee was indispensable to ensure an expeditious and efficacious resolution of the controversy. [Paras 33-45] Ravi Prakash Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1075 : 2025 INSC 1291

Constitution of India, 1950 - Articles 141 and 144 - Judicial Discipline - Stare Decisis - Duty of Courts – Held, law laid down by the Supreme Court is binding on every court and authority in the country - Judicial discipline is a constitutional duty and requires courts to apply precedent as it stands and give full and faithful effect to appellate directions - A judgment that minimizes a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent, undermining the unity of law and credibility of the courts. [Paras 14] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296

Constitution of India; Article 300A (Right to Property) - Freedom to Sell Property - Immovable Property Transactions - The constitutionally protected right to own immovable property inherently includes the freedom to freely acquire, possess, and dispose of it at will - Courts must balance the freedom to buy and sell property with the Governmental duty to ensure integrity in transactions - A requirement in rules/regulations that impedes or restrains easy and effective transfer of property is illegal, as it has the direct effect of 'depriving of property' and such delays impinge on the right to hold and dispose of property. [Paras 29, 30] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Constitution of India – Article 21 – Right to Privacy – DNA Profiling – Held that compelling an individual to undergo DNA testing is a grave intrusion into their bodily autonomy and privacy- Such a direction must satisfy the threefold requirement of (i) legality, (ii) legitimate State aim, and (iii) proportionality- In a case alleging cheating and harassment, proving biological paternity is collateral and lacks a direct nexus to the offence, thereby failing the test of legitimate aim and proportionality. [Relied on K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, 2019 1 SCC 1; Paras 46-48, 53] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Delhi Ridge– Morphological Ridge– Protection and Identification– Supreme Court reiterated that areas possessing the morphological features of the Ridge (Geological Ridge), even if not notified as "Reserved Forest," require equal protection – Directed the DRMB to ensure the identification process of the Morphological Ridge is completed and to remove encroachments from both the notified Ridge and Morphological Ridge – Criticized the GNCTD for the 30-year delay in issuing the final Section 20 notification under the Indian Forest Act, 1927. [Relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Kenneth Builders & Developers (P) Ltd., (2016) 13 SCC 561; Paras 11-13, 34-37, 57(iii)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986– Section 3(3)– Constitution of Statutory Delhi Ridge Management Board (DRMB)– The Supreme Court directed the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEF&CC) to constitute the DRMB as a statutory body under Section 3(3) of the EP Act– Held, the Board effectively functioned without statutory backing for decades, merely on Court orders; giving it statutory status ensures accountability, transparency, and subjection to the jurisdiction of the National Green Tribunal (NGT) and Constitutional Courts– The Board shall act as a “single-window” authority for all issues concerning the Delhi Ridge to avoid conflicting orders from multiple committees. [Paras 40-42, 45, 57(i)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090

Evidence Act, 1872– Section 112– Presumption of Legitimacy– DNA Test– Held that presumption under Section 112 is “conclusive proof” of legitimacy for a child born during a valid marriage- It can only be displaced by strong, cogent, and unambiguous evidence of “non-access” between the spouses- Mere assertions of adultery, simultaneous access, or the wife's willingness to undergo a test are insufficient to rebut this presumption- A DNA test cannot be ordered as a matter of course to rove into paternity when the presumption remains unrebutted. [Paras 23-26, 37] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Evidence Act, 1872 – Section 114 – Adverse Inference – Held that an adverse inference for refusal to undergo a DNA test can only be drawn if the court first validly orders the test after finding an “eminent need.”- If the prerequisites for ordering the test (rebuttal of Section 112 presumption) are not met, the question of drawing an adverse inference does not arise- Appeal allowed. [Relied on Aparna Ajinkya Firodia v. Ajinkya Arun Firodia 2023 INSC 146; Paras 50] R. Rajendran v. Kamar Nisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1086 : 2025 INSC 1304

Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 45, 73 - Comparison of Signature/Handwriting - Suit for Declaration and Injunction – Held, power under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Act, which allows the court to compare disputed signatures or handwriting with admitted ones, can only be invoked for an admitted document for the purpose of comparison of signatures or handwriting - The High Court erred in allowing an application under Section 45 read with Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, at the revisional stage, after the trial had already concluded - Appeal allowed. Hussain Bin Awaz v. Mittapally Venkataramulu, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1083

Finance Act, 1994– Section 65(88) read with Section 65(105)(v)– Real Estate Agent– Service Tax Liability– Held, the definition of 'Real Estate Agent' is service-centric and requires a contract of agency– Where a developer acquires land and transfers title to a corporate entity based on a 'fixed average rate' as per an MOU, acting on a principal-to-principal basis, the activity constitutes trading in land/transfer of title and not a taxable service– The profit or loss arising from the difference between the negotiated land price and the fixed rate is not a commission or consultancy charge – Transfer of title in immovable property is expressly excluded from the definition of 'Service' under Section 65B(44)(a)(i) of the Finance Act, 1994. [Para 34, 38-44] Commissioner of Service Tax v. Elegant Developers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1088 : 2025 INSC 1299

Finance Act, 1994– Section 73(1) Proviso– Extended Period of Limitation– Suppression of Facts– Mere non-payment of service tax or failure to file returns without an element of intent or deliberate suppression is insufficient to invoke the extended period of limitation– Where transactions are conducted through valid banking channels and duly recorded in books of account, no wilful suppression can be inferred- Appeals dismissed. [Relied on Stemcyte India Therapeutics Pvt. Ltd. v. CCE & ST, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1412; Para 48-53, 49] Commissioner of Service Tax v. Elegant Developers, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1088 : 2025 INSC 1299

Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 - Section 15 - Principles of Natural Justice - Opportunity of Hearing - The Supreme Court set aside an order of the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) that directed the closure of civil suits and action against unauthorized construction and commercial use of residential property in Gurugram, on the ground that the directions were issued without joining the affected parties (appellants) and affording them an opportunity of hearing - Observed that while unauthorized construction or commercial use of residential property cannot be protected, the determination of such fact must be made by the authorities affording due opportunity to the owners and occupiers - Held that opportunity of hearing is a sine qua non for fair administration of justice and a Court's observations should not adjudicate the rights of any unheard party - Set aside order of High Court. [Paras 9 - 12] Gaurav Kohli v. State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1061

Institutional Framework– Inclusion of Central Empowered Committee (CEC)– Held that to prevent duplication of work and two separate levels of scrutiny, directed that a representative of the CEC be made a formal member of the DRMB– Further directed the constitution of a "Standing Committee" headed by the CEC member to handle day-to-day functioning and conservation efforts, as the full DRMB (chaired by the Chief Secretary) cannot meet daily- Relying on the principle of restoration, the Supreme Court held that the State cannot merely penalize culprits but must actively restore damaged ecosystems– The DRMB's core function is defined as the preservation, scientific management, and ecological restoration of the Ridge. [Paras 48-50, 55-56, 57(ii)] In Re Delhi Ridge, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1090

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - Compensation vs. Job in Lieu of Acquired Land - Held, under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, on land being acquired, the family is entitled only to the compensation which has already been paid - There is no provision under the Act for the grant of a job in lieu of the acquired land - A policy decision for giving a job in lieu of acquired land cannot prevail over the statutory provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - The Supreme Court found no error or illegality in the authorities and the High Court dismissing the claim for a job, which was filed more than 18 years after the framing of the policy - Petition dismissed. [Para 3] Sanjeev Kumar v State of Haryana, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1079

Landlord-Tenant Law – Eviction Suit – Bona Fide Need – Challenge to Title of Landlord - Eviction suit – Held, a tenant who came into possession of rented premises through a rent deed executed by a landlord cannot subsequently challenge the landlord's ownership, especially after having paid rent for decades - The bona fide need was projected as the plaintiff joining her husband's sweets and savouries business, which operates in an adjacent shop, to expand it into the rented premises - The bona fide need stands established in this case - The concurring decisions of the three courts had "not considered the material evidence and entered into findings in a perverse manner based on mere surmises and conjectures" - The tenant having come into possession of the tenanted premises by a rent deed executed by the earlier landlord, cannot turn around and challenge his ownership - Directed the recovery of rent arrears from January 2000 till the handing over of possession - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9 - 14] Jyoti Sharma v. Vishnu Goyal, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1081 : 2025 INSC 1099

Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 (Odisha) - Rule 27(4)(iv) - Interpretation of 'Previous Financial Year' - Scope of Judicial Review in Tender Matters - Natural Resources Allocation - Maximization of Public Revenue – Held, a public tender is an instrument of governance to maximize public value, not a private bargain - The obligation of the Tendering Authority is to interpret its terms consistently and to ensure the interpretation advances the object of the tender - The Court must intervene when an interpretation is a demonstrable misconstruction of a tender condition or is irrational, especially when it narrows competition and excludes the highest bidder on a ground unsupported by law, thereby vitiating the decision-making process - The interpretation must serve the purpose of the tender, which is mainly to maximize the revenue to the State when dealing with a natural resource - The constitutional duty to interfere is beyond question when an authority misinterprets a condition that diminishes competition and deprives the State of its legitimate revenue - The successful bidder was held entitled to a refund of the deposited amount along with interest at 6% per annum from the date of deposit on the principle of restitution - Appeal allowed. [Relied on TATA Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651; Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka & Others (2012) 8 SCC 216; Paras 9-16] Shanti Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Odisha, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1077 : 2025 INSC 1295

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Inter-State Stage Carriage Permits on Notified Intra-State Routes – Override of Chapter VI over Chapter V (Section 98) – Validity of Permits on Overlapping Routes – Judicial Precedents – Issue - Whether a stage carriage permit can be granted to a private operator on an inter-State route, in terms of an InterState Reciprocal Transport (IS-RT) Agreement executed under Section 88 of the 1988 MV Act, when a portion of that inter-State route is common to an intra-State route which has been notified in terms of a scheme approved under Chapter VI of the Act – Held, Chapter VI of the 1988 MV Act, containing special provisions for state transport undertakings, has an overriding effect on Chapter V (which includes Section 88 concerning IS-RT Agreements) and any other inconsistent law or instrument, by virtue of Section 98 - An IS-RT Agreement, being merely an agreement between two States and not a law under the relevant MV Act, cannot override the provisions of an approved scheme and notified routes under Chapter VI - If there is a prohibition to operate on a notified route or routes (under an approved scheme), no permits can be granted to any private operator whose route traverses or overlaps any part or whole of that notified route - Substantial question of law is no longer res integra in view of the decisions of larger/Constitution Benches, which are equally binding - The grant of relief to private operators becomes "well-nigh impossible" - Supreme Court directed the Principal Secretaries of the Transport Departments of the States of Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) to meet within 3 months to discuss modalities for fully working out the IS-RT Agreement - The States may explore whether partial exclusion of interState routes from the approved scheme can be permitted to further public interest - Appeals allowed. [Relied on Adarsh Travels Bus Services v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1985) 4 SCC 557; Paras 23, 26, 40-42, 45, 49, 50] U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Kashmiri Lal Batra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1062 : 2025 INSC 1281

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988— Section 166— Compensation— Multiplier— Application of Split Multiplier – Held, the practice of applying a split multiplier for calculating compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is generally foreign to the Act and is not to be used by Tribunals and/or Courts in the calculation of compensation - A split multiplier is only to be used in exceptional circumstances, and such circumstances must be recorded - The deceased's superannuation from service hardly qualifies as an 'out of the ordinary,' 'exceptional,' and 'cogent' reason to justify the use of a split multiplier, as retirement is a natural progression - The age of the deceased is the criterion to be utilized for the multiplier - The Supreme Court noted the divergent opinions on the application of the split multiplier, both intracourt and inter-court, which deprives Tribunals of guidance and creates a concerning situation for judicial discipline - The Supreme Court calculated the compensation based on the principles in Pranay Sethi Case, applying a multiplier of 11 for the age of 51 years, 15% future prospects, and conventional heads with 10% enhancement every three years - Appeal allowed. [Relied on National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi ((2017) 16 SCC 680; Sarla Verma v. DTC 2009 6 SCC 121; Paras 12-19] Preetha Krishnan v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1073 : 2025 INSC 1293

Municipalities Act, 1961 (Madhya Pradesh) - Section 22(1)(d)(iii) - The Madhya Pradesh Nagar Palika Nirvachan Niyam, 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) - Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Section 138 - Representation of the People Act, 1951 - Section 100(1)(d)(i) & (iv) - Constitution of India - Article 19(1)(a) & Article 136 – Held, candidate convicted under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, 1881, and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment - Failed to disclose this conviction in the affidavit filed along with the nomination form as mandated by Rule 24-A(1) of the Rules of 1994 - Rule 24-A(1) mandates every candidate to furnish information regarding "any disposed criminal case in which he has been convicted" - The format of the affidavit requires disclosure of conviction and sentence of imprisonment for a duration of one year or more - Failure to furnish such information results in non-compliance with the Rules - The requirement to furnish information, including criminal antecedents, is in furtherance of the electorate's right to information under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India - Non-disclosure or suppression of material information deprives voters of making an informed and advised choice - By failing to disclose the conviction, the candidate furnished false and incorrect information, making the acceptance of the nomination form improper - This constitutes a breach of Rule 24-A of the Rules of 1994 and attracts the ground under Section 22(1)(d)(iii) of the Act of 1961 for declaring the election void - When there is non-disclosure of criminal antecedents, the question of whether the election was materially affected does not arise, as such non-disclosure amounts to undue influence - The wrongful acceptance of the nomination form of the returned candidate renders the election void and, by itself, indicates the result was materially affected - In the absence of a provision in the Rules to condone such non-compliance, adopting such a course would do violence to the Act of 1961 and the Rules of 1994 - The eligibility of a candidate is determined as on the date of submission of the nomination form; thus, the subsequent acquittal in appeal after the election was of no consequence - Petition dismissed. [Relied on Krishnamoorthy Vs. Shivakumar and others 2015 INSC 960; Kisan Shankar Kathore vs. Arun Dattatray Sawant & Others 2014 INSC 384; Paras 22-25] Poonam v. Dule Singh, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1068 : 2025 INSC 1284

Penal Code, 1860 – Section 149 – Unlawful Assembly – When Section 149 IPC is made applicable, the Court should be mindful that all that is required to be looked into is whether the accused was one of the members of the unlawful assembly or not - Even if a particular accused has not participated in the actual assault, he could still be held guilty. Chhotelal Yadav v. State of Jharkhand, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1087

Private Forests Acquisition Act, 1975 (MPFA) (Maharashtra) — Section 3(1) read with Section 2(f)(iii) (Vesting of Private Forest) — Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) — Section 35(3) (Notice) — Mandatory Preconditions – Held, vesting of private land in the State as 'private forest' under the MPFA, based on a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, requires strict adherence to the statutory sequence - The expression "issued" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA comprehends due service of the notice on the owner as contemplated by Section 35(5) of the IFA - The requirement of service is mandatory because it alone triggers the owner's right to object, which the State is obliged to consider - Appeal allowed. [Relied on Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra 2014 3 SCC 430; Para 13-15] Rohan Vijay Nahar v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1082 : 2025 INSC 1296

Registration Act, 1908 - Presumptive Titling System - Future Reforms – Held, Indian property law sustains a dichotomy between registration and ownership - The Registration Act, 1908, mandates the registration of documents, not titles, forming the cornerstone of India's presumptive titling system. Registration creates a public record with presumptive evidentiary value, but it is never a conclusive proof of ownership - This presumption is rebuttable - Supreme Court noted the promise in emerging technologies such as Blockchain for transforming land registration into a more secure, transparent, and tamper-proof system - The Law Commission is requested to examine the issue of integrating the property registration regime with conclusive titling and restructuring existing laws, considering technological advancement. [Paras 32-34, 37, 38; K. Gopi v. Sub-Registrar and Others 2025 INSC 462] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Registration Rules, 2008 (Bihar) - Section 69, Rule 19 (xvii) and (xviii) - Constitutional Law - Right to Property - Subordinate Legislation - Ultra Vires - Dichotomy between Registration and Title – Held, the impugned sub-rules are ultra vires the rule-making power under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 - Section 69, or any other provision of the Act, does not enable the Inspector General to make rules requiring the declaration or enclosure of proof of mutation in favor of the vendor as a condition precedent for registration - The existing grounds for refusal under Rule 19 (i) to (xv) relate to the identity of the property or the executant, or legal requirements (like fee/POA), and have no relation to proof of title - The impugned sub-rules are "qualitatively distinct" as they introduce 'mentioning' with 'proof' of a transaction under another statute (Bihar Land Mutation Act, 2011) as a precondition - The impugned sub-rules are arbitrary and illegal because they unduly restrict the constitutional right to acquire, possess, and dispose of immovable property - The interlinking of registration with mutation is illegal given the nascent stage of the mutation, survey, and settlement processes in Bihar (as acknowledged in the Bihar Special Survey and Settlement Act, 2011), where land records/Jamabandi are nowhere near completion. [Paras 11,12, 16, 17, 25, 29, 38] Samiullah v. State of Bihar, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1071 : 2025 INSC 1292

Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) - Section 23 (2) - National Council for Teacher Education (NCTE) - Notification dated August 23, 2010 - Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) – Held, teachers who obtained the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET) qualification within the extended time prescribed under the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009 (RTE Act) cannot be terminated merely because they did not possess the qualification at the time of their initial appointment - The High Court's non-interference with the termination was erroneous - The respondents were directed to forthwith reinstate the appellants to the post of Assistant Teacher with continuity of service and all consequential benefits, including seniority. The appellants were not entitled to back-wages - Appeal allowed. [Paras 9-14] Uma Kant v. State of U.P., 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1078 : 2025 INSC 1273

Service Law - Biometric Attendance System - Introduction without Prior Consultation – Issue - Challenge to the introduction of a Biometric Attendance System in the Office of Principal Accountant General (A&E), Odisha, via Circulars dated 01.07.2013, 22.10.2023, and 06.11.2013 - Supreme Court noted that the employees were not opposed to the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System, which was accepted by their counsel - Since the employees had no reservation, no controversy survived for adjudication, and the department could proceed with implementation - Held that the exercise undertaken by the High Court was "totally unnecessary" - The court ruled that when the introduction of the Biometric Attendance System is for the benefit of all stakeholders, the mere fact that the employees were not consulted before implementation does not render the introduction of the system to be illegal - Appeal allowed. [Paras 7 - 10] Union of India v. Dilip Kumar Rout, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1063

Specific Performance — Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Subsequent Purchaser — Deemed Notice — Section 19(b) – Held, a subsequent purchaser cannot claim the protection of a 'bona fide purchaser for value without notice' under Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act if they had prior knowledge of the earlier Agreement to Sell (ATS) and were aware that the original vendees were still litigating to protect their rights under the Agreement to sell, even after the vendor claimed to have terminated the agreement - A subsequent purchaser who chooses to remain content with the unilateral assertions of the vendor regarding the termination of the ATS, and consciously abstains from making further inquiry into the subsisting interest of the original vendee, cannot escape the consequences of deemed notice - To invoke section 19(b) protection, a purchaser must establish - i. purchase for value; ii. Payment made in good faith; iii. Absence of notice of the earlier contract. [Relied on Manjit Singh v. Darshana Devi 2024 SCC OnLine 3431; Ram Niwas v. Bano 2000 6 SCC 685; Para 73-80] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

Specific Performance — Termination of Agreement to Sell (ATS) — Failure to Seek Declaration of Invalidity — Maintainability – Held, where the vendor's notice of termination is based on their own inability and inconvenience rather than any breach by the vendee, and the vendee immediately replies challenging the termination and asserting the continuance of the contract, the subsequent suit for specific performance is not rendered non-maintainable solely because the plaintiff/vendee failed to include a specific prayer for a declaration that the termination notice is bad in law. The failure to specifically frame an issue on the maintainability of the suit for want of such declaration does not preclude an Appellate Court from examining whether the jurisdictional fact necessary for granting the relief of specific performance exists - A party cannot unilaterally terminate a non-determinable agreement to sell, except where the contract itself is expressly determinable in nature under Section 14 of the Act - Such invalid termination does not oblige the aggrieved party to first seek a separate declaration challenging the termination before pursuing a claim for specific performance -Appeal dismissed. [Relied on R. Kandasamy (Since Dead) v. T.R.K. Sarawathy, (2024 SCC OnLine SC 3377); Para 54-70] K.S. Manjunath v. Moorasavirappa @ Muttanna Chennappa Batil, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1084 : 2025 INSC 1298

Stray Dog - Directions issued to all States and UTs - i. Identification - Identify all Government and private educational institutions, hospitals, public sports complexes/stadia, bus stands/depots, and railway stations within two weeks; ii. Securing Premises: Administrative heads, under the supervision of the District Magistrate, must secure premises using adequate fencing, boundary walls, and gates to prevent the ingress of stray dogs within eight weeks; iii. Nodal Officer: Management of each institution shall designate a Nodal Officer responsible for cleanliness and preventing the entry/habitation of stray dogs; iv. Inspections: Local municipal authorities/panchayats shall carry out regular inspections (at least once in three months) to ensure no stray dog habitats exist; v. Removal and Non-Release: Jurisdictional municipal bodies shall forthwith remove every stray dog found within these institutional premises and shift the animal(s) to a designated shelter after sterilisation and vaccination; The stray dogs so picked up shall not be released back to the same location from which they were picked up; vi. Medical Stock: All Government and private hospitals must maintain a mandatory stock of anti-rabies vaccines and immunoglobulin; vii. Waste Management and Security: Railway authorities and State transport corporations/municipal authorities over bus stands/depots must ensure premises are effectively secured, implement proper waste-management systems to eliminate food sources, and conduct regular inspections; viii. SOPs: Animal Welfare Board of India (AWBI) shall issue detailed Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) within four weeks for the management of stray dogs in institutional premises, to be uniformly adopted. [Para 25] In Re 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price', 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1072

Stray Dog Menace in Institutional Areas (Educational Institutions, Hospitals, Sports Complexes, Bus Stands/Depots, Railway Stations) — Directions for Securing Premises and Management of Stray Dogs - The Supreme Court, acknowledging the alarming rise in dog-bite incidents in institutional areas and the systemic failure to secure these premises, observed that the persistence of dog bites constitutes not merely a public-health challenge but a matter of human safety, compromising the constitutional mandate of safeguarding the right to life under Article 21 - noted that despite the Animal Birth Control Rules, 2023, the implementation has been ineffective, and the high frequency of incidents in places like schools and hospitals reflects deficiencies in institutional responsibility and municipal oversight. [Para 14 - 24] In Re 'City Hounded by Strays, Kids Pay Price', 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1072