To Convert Every Sour Relationship Into Rape Trivialises Seriousness Of Offence : Supreme Court

The Supreme Court on Monday (November 24) quashed a rape case against an advocate who was accused of committing repeated rape on a woman on a false pretext of marriage. Noting that the sexual intercourse was consensual, not influenced by any false promise of marriage, the Court found the woman's allegations to be untrue and a classic instance of a consensual relationship having subsequently turned acrimonious.

“The offence of rape, being of the gravest kind, must be invoked only in cases where there exists genuine sexual violence, coercion, or absence of free consent. To convert every sour relationship into an offence of rape not only trivialises the seriousness of the offence but also inflicts upon the accused indelible stigma and grave injustice. Such instances transcend the realm of mere personal discord. The misuse of the criminal justice machinery in this regard is a matter of profound concern and calls for condemnation.”, observed a bench of Justices BV Nagarathna and R Mahadevan while setting aside the Bombay High Court (Aurangabad Bench) order which refused to quash the case against the Petitioner.

The Court observed that in a society where marriage carries deep social and cultural importance, it is common for a woman to consent to a sexual relationship based on the belief that it will lead to a lawful and socially accepted marriage. In such situations, her consent is conditional and rooted in the promise of marriage. The Court held that if it is proved that the promise was false, made in bad faith, and with no real intention to marry but only to exploit the woman, such consent may be considered vitiated, attracting the protection of Section 376 IPC. At the same time, the Court cautioned that this principle can be applied only when supported by credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on mere allegations or assumptions.

This Court is conscious of the societal context in which, in a country such as ours, the institution of marriage holds deep social and cultural significance. It is, therefore, not uncommon for a woman to repose complete faith in her partner and to consent to physical intimacy on the assurance that such a relationship would culminate in a lawful and socially recognised marriage. In such circumstances, the promise of marriage becomes the very foundation of her consent, rendering it conditional rather than absolute. It is, thus, conceivable that such consent may stand vitiated where it is established that the promise of marriage was illusory, made in bad faith, and with no genuine intention of fulfilment, solely to exploit the woman. The law must remain sensitive to such genuine cases where trust has been breached and dignity violated, lest the protective scope of Section 376 of the IPC be reduced to a mere formality for those truly aggrieved. At the same time, the invocation of this principle must rest upon credible evidence and concrete facts, and not on unsubstantiated allegations or moral conjecture.

The case pertained to a relationship that lasted from March 2022 to May 2024. The accused and the woman had sexual intercourse on several occasions, and the woman opposed the Appellant's marriage proposal owing to her troublesome past matrimonial dispute. But later on, filed a rape case against the Appellant under Sections 376, 376(2)(n) and 507 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”), alleging that the Appellant committed repeated rape on her on the pretext of a false promise of marriage. 

The Court found that the allegations did not meet the high threshold for the offence of "repeated rape" under Section 376(2)(n) of the IPC. It noted that the relationship was long-term and emotionally involved, and physical intimacy during such a relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as rape. The Court added that despite being opposed to the idea of marriage, why “respondent No.2 continued to meet the appellant and indulged in physical relations with him even though she was already married.”

The Court said that the Respondent no-2 decision for physical intimacy was not solely induced by the promise of marriage. The Court cited the decision of Mahesh Damu Khare vs. State of Maharashtra, where it was held that “unless it can be shown that the physical relationship was purely because of the promise of marriage, thereby having a direct nexus with the physical relationship without being influenced by any other consideration, it cannot be said that there was vitiation of consent under misconception of fact.”

Applying the law, the Court observed:

“We find that the present case is not a case where the appellant lured respondent No.2 solely for physical pleasures and then vanished. The relationship continued for a period of three long years, which is a considerable period of time. They remained close and emotionally involved. In such cases, physical intimacy that occurred during the course of a functioning relationship cannot be retrospectively branded as instances of offence of rape merely because the relationship failed to culminate in marriage.”

Discrediting the woman's case, the Court observed:

“The FIR is conspicuously silent as to any specific allegation that the appellant had either forcibly taken or compelled respondent No.2 to accompany him to the hotel, nor does it Page 17 of 24 disclose any circumstance suggesting deceit or inducement on the part of the appellant to procure her presence there. Therefore, the only logical inference that emerges is that respondent No.2, of her own volition, visited and met the appellant on each occasion. It is also borne out from the record that whenever the appellant brought up the subject of marriage, respondent No.2 herself opposed the proposal. In such circumstances, the contention of respondent No.2 that the physical relationship between the parties was premised upon any assurance of marriage by the appellant is devoid of merit and stands unsustainable.”

The Court reiterated the observation made in Rajnish Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh that “when a woman who willingly engages in a long-term sexual relationship with a man, fully aware of its nature and without any cogent evidence to show that such relationship was induced by misconception of fact or false promise of marriage made in bad faith from the inception, the man cannot be held guilty of rape under Section 376 of the IPC.”

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed, while applauding Amicus Curiae Ms. Radhika Gowtam, AoR, for her valuable assistance provided in the matter with a direction to the Registry to pay her an honorarium of Rs. 15,000/-.

Cause Title: SAMADHAN VERSUS STATE OF MAHARASTHRA & ANOTHER

Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1137

Click here to download judgment

Appearance:

For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Sneha Sanjay Botwe, AOR Mr. Siddharth S. Chapalgaonkar, Adv. Mr. Bharat Doifode, Adv. Mr. Ashraf Patel, Adv. Mr. Akash Tripathi, Adv.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Mr. Bharat Bagla, Adv. Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv. Mr. Aditya Krishna, Adv. Mr. Adarsh Dubey, Adv. Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Adv.