76. Supreme Court Dismisses Justice Yashwant Varma's Plea Challenging CJI's Recommendation For His RemovalCase Details: XXX V THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS|W.P.(C) No. 699/2025Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782)The Supreme Court August 7) dismissed the writ petition filed by Allahabad High Court Judge Justice Yashwant Varma challenging the in-house inquiry report, which indicted him in the...
Case Details: XXX V THE UNION OF INDIA AND ORS|W.P.(C) No. 699/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 782)
The Supreme Court August 7) dismissed the writ petition filed by Allahabad High Court Judge Justice Yashwant Varma challenging the in-house inquiry report, which indicted him in the case-at-home scandal, as well as the then Chief Justice of India Sanjiv Khanna's recommendation made to the President and the Prime Minister for Justice Varma's removal.
A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice AG Masih pronounced the judgment.
Pronouncing the judgment, the bench held at the outset that the writ petition cannot be entertained at all, in view of the conduct of Justice Varma in participating in the in-house inquiry and later questioning the competence of the in-house panel to conduct the inquiry.
Also from the judgment - CJI Has Authority To Recommend Removal Of Judge While Forwarding In-House Inquiry Report To President & PM : Supreme Court
77. Bar Councils Can't Collect Any Amount As "Optional Fee" During Enrolment : Supreme Court
Case Details: K. L. J. A. KIRAN BABU v. KARNATAKA STATE BAR COUNCIL REPRESENTED BY RAMESH S NAIK (FDA)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 786
The Supreme Court clarified that the Bar Council of India or the State Bar Councils can't collect any fees over and above the statutory fees as "optional fee" for enrolment.
"We make it clear that there is nothing like optional. No State Bar Council(s) or Bar Council of India shall collect any fees of any amount as optional. They shall strictly collect fees in accordance with the directions issued by this Court in the main judgment."
The Court affirmed its Gaurav Kumar v. Union of India (2024) judgment that the Bar Councils cannot charge enrolment fees beyond what is prescribed under Section 24 of the Advocates Act, 1961. Therefore, it stated that as stipulated in Section 24, the enrolment fee cannot exceed Rs. 750 for advocates belonging to the general category and Rs. 125 for advocates belonging to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes categories.
Case Details: ARSHNOOR KAUR V UNION OF INDIA|W.P.(C) No. 772/2023
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 788
The Supreme Court today(August 11) struck down a policy of the Indian Army to reserve the posts in the Judge Advocate General (JAG) branch for men and restricted the number of women who can be appointed to JAG posts.
"Keeping the above noted analytical framework in consideration, this Court is of the opinion that the practice challenged in the present petition results in indirect indiscrimination. The practice of fixing a ceiling limit to recruitment of female candidates has the effect of perpetuating the status quo, which has been historically discriminatory to women candidates. The result of such practice is confinement of women candidates, irrespective of their performance/merit, in their gendered category, thereby being destructive of not just the Constitutional scheme under Articles 15 and 16 as noted hereinabove, but also of the concept of 'gender-neutrality' and 'merit'."
The Court held that the true meaning of gender-neutrality is that all meritorious candidates, irrespective of gender, should be selected. Therefore, it has directed the Union of India and the Indian Army to conduct recruitment in JAG in a manner that there is no bifurcation of seats for any gender, that is, if all female candidates are deserving, all of them should be selected.
79. Publish On Website List Of Voters Omitted In Bihar SIR With Reasons; Specify Aadhaar Card Can Be Submitted: Supreme Court Directs ECI
Case Title: ASSOCIATION FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORMS AND ORS. v. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA, W.P.(C) No. 640/2025 (And Connected Cases)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 804
The Supreme Court (August 14) directed the Election Commission of India to publish on the websites of the District Electoral Officers the district-wise list of approximately 65 lakh voters who have been omitted from the draft electoral roll published after the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) drive in Bihar. The Court also stated that the reasons for deletion, such as death, migration, double-registration etc, should be specified.
This information should also be displayed on the website of the Chief Electoral Officer of Bihar. The documents should be searchable based on EPIC numbers.
Apart from that, the Court also directed the Election Commission to specify in public notices that the excluded persons, at the time of submitting their claims for inclusion in the final list, can also furnish their Aadhaar cards. Wide publicity should be given through newspapers, electronic and social media that the list will be published on website.
Cause Title: KALPATARU POWER TRANSMISSION LTD. (NOW KNOWN AS KALPATARU PROJECTS INTERNATIONAL LTD.) v. VINOD AND ORS. ETC. (And Connected Cases)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 816
The Supreme Court (Aug. 19) recommended to the Union Government to consider introducing a statutory appeal against the compensation awarded by the District Judge under the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 for land used to lay down power transmission lines.
The dispute concerned damages arising from the erection of transmission towers and overhead lines, where compensation is governed by the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885. Under the Act, such disputes are adjudicated by District Judges, whose orders are deemed 'final,' with no statutory right of appeal. The Court noted this legislative gap, as the absence of an appellate remedy compels parties to invoke writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227, where the High Court cannot reappreciate evidence. To address this vacuum, the Court directed the Union Government to consider introducing a statutory appeal mechanism against compensation awards by District Judges, rather than relegating parties solely to writ proceedings.
“In the aforesaid background, we are of the opinion that these issues need to be examined by the Law Commission of India and the Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India, so as to determine whether a statutory remedy of appeal should be provided against judgments/orders passed under Sections 16(3) and 16(4) of the 1885 Act, the Petroleum Act or any other similar statute.”, the court said.
81. Govts Must Not Extract Regular Work From Ad-hoc Workers; Must Create Sanctioned Posts For Recurring Jobs : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Dharam Singh & Ors. v. State Of U.P. & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 818
The Supreme Court (Aug. 19) set aside the Allahabad High Court's decision that had denied regularization of long-serving ad-hoc employees who performed perennial nature of work at the U.P. Higher Education Services Commission, solely on the ground that they were initially appointed as daily wagers and no sanctioned posts were available.
The appellants'- five Class-IV employees and a Driver- had been continuously working with the Commission since 1989–1992. Despite decades of service, their demand for regularization was rejected by the State, citing “financial constraints” and a ban on the creation of new posts. The High Court's decision affirming the State's decision led to the filing of the instant appeal before the Supreme Court.
Setting aside the impugned judgment, and placing reliance on cases of Jaggo v. Union of Indiaand Shripal & Another v. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, the bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta reiterated that the plea of employee being outsourced cannot be deployed as a shield to justify exploitation through long-term “ad hocism".
82. NHAI Or Its Agents Can't Levy Toll If Road Is Pothole-Ridden: Supreme Court Affirms Kerala HC View
Case Details: National Highway Authority Of India And Anr. v. O.J Janeesh And Ors| Slp(C) No. 22579/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 819
The Supreme Court affirmed the view of the Kerala High Court that the National Highways Authority of India cannot force commuters to pay toll if the highway is kept in a terrible condition.
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice K Vinod Chandran dismissed the NHAI's appeal against the Kerala High Court's judgment which suspended the toll collection at Paliyekkara in Thrissur district along NH-544 due to the bad condition of the road.
The bench expressly recorded its agreement with the High Court's view that a citizen paying toll acquires a corresponding right to demand good roads, and if that right is not protected, then the NHAI or its agents cannot demand toll.
Case Details: In Re: 'City Hounded By Strays, Kids Pay Price' | Smw(C) No. 5/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 825
The Supreme Court (August 22) stayed the direction passed by a two-judge bench on August 11 that stray dogs, which are picked up from the Delhi National Capital Region, must not be released.
The Court opined that the "direction given in the order dated 11th August, 2025, prohibiting the release of the treated and vaccinated dogs seems to be too harsh." It noted that Rule 11(9) of the ABC Rules provided that once the stray dogs have been sterilised, inoculated, and dewormed, they have to be released back in the same locality from which they were picked up
A three-judge bench comprising Justice Vikram Nath, Justice Sandeep Mehta and Justice NV Anjaria clarified that the stray dogs, which are picked up, must be released back to the same area from where they were picked up, after sterilisation, deworming and immunisation, except those dogs which are infected with rabies, suspected to be infected with rabies or are exhibiting aggressive behaviour.
Related - Supreme Court Prohibits Feeding Of Stray Dogs In Streets & Public Places Except Dedicated Areas
84. If High Court Bench Doesn't Deliver Judgment In 3 Months After Reserving, Registrar Must Place Matter Before Chief Justice : Supreme Court
Case Details: Ravindra Pratap Shahi v. State Of U.P.|Slp(Crl) No. 4509-4510/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 834
The Supreme Court expressed shock at the manner in which judgments are not being delivered for long period by the High Courts, depriving the litigant to seek appropriate remedy. It reiterated that the guidelines passed by the Court in Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2002), wherein the Court directed that the parties are free to move an application before the Chief Justice of the High Court for withdrawal of case and to be assigned to a different bench if the judgment is not pronounced within six months after being reserved, must be adhered to properly.
"It is extremely shocking and surprising that the judgment was not delivered for almost a year from the date when the appeal was heard. This Court is repeatedly confronted with similar matters wherein proceedings are kept pending in the High Court for more than three months, in some cases for more than six months or years wherein judgments are not delivered after hearing the matter. In most of the High Courts, there is no mechanism where the litigant can approach the concerned Bench or the Chief Justice bringing to its notice the delay in delivery of judgment. In such situation, the litigant loses his faith in the judicial process defeating the ends of justice."
Remarking that the principles laid down in Anil Rai must be followed, a bench comprising Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra said: "We reiterate the directions and direct the Registrar General of each High Court to furnish to the Chief Justice of the High Court a list of cases where the judgment reserved is not pronounced within the remaining period of that month and keep on repeating the same for three months. If the judgment is not delivered within three months, the Registrar General shall place the matters before the Chief Justice for orders and the Chief Justice shall bring it to the notice of the concerned Bench for pronouncing the order within two weeks thereafter, failing which the matter be assigned to another Bench."
85. Supreme Court Mandates TET Qualification For Teachers In Non-Minority Schools; Allows Time For In-Service Teachers To Clear Test
Case Details: Anjuman Ishaat E Taleem Trust v. State of Maharashtra and Ors | C.A. No. 1385/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 861
The Supreme Court held that qualifying the Teachers' Eligibility Test (TET) is mandatory for those aspiring for appointment as teachers and also in-service teachers aspiring for promotions..
As regards those teachers appointed prior to the enactment of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education, 2009 ("RTE Act") and have more than five years of service left, the Court granted a time of two years to pass the Teachers' Eligibility Test ("TET").
At the same time, the Court held that the TET requirement under the RTE Act wouldn't apply to minority educational institutions, till the larger bench decides the issue regarding the applicabilityof the RTE Act to minority schools.
Supreme Court Doubts Correctness Of Judgment Exempting Minority Schools From RTE Act; Refers To CJI
In the same judgment, the Court expressed doubt over the correctness of the 2014 Pramati Educational & Cultural Trust judgment delivered by a 5-judge Constitution Bench insofar as it held that the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education, 2009 ("RTE Act") exempts minority schools, whether aid or unaided, under the purview of the RTE Act.
"In view of the foregoing discussions, we respectfully express our doubt as to whether Pramati insofar as it exempts application of the RTE Act to minority schools, whether aided or unaided, falling under clause 1 has been correctly decided," observed a bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Manmohan.
The bench referred the matter to the Chief Justice of India to decide whether a larger bench reference is warranted.
86. Dispose Bail Applications Within Two Months; Can't Keep Them Pending For Years : Supreme Court To High Courts & Trial Courts
Case Title – Anna Waman Bhalerao v. State of Maharashtra
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 901
The Supreme Court has directed High Courts and trial courts across the country to take up bail and anticipatory bail applications for disposal within a short time frame, preferably within two months. The Court also directed High Courts to come up with mechanism to avoid accumulation of pending bail and anticipatory bail applications
A bench of Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan observed that such applications, which directly concern the right to personal liberty, cannot be left pending for years while the applicants continue to remain under a cloud of uncertainty.
"Applications concerning personal liberty cannot be kept pending for years," the Court remarked, adding that prolonged delay not only frustrates the object of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) but also amounts to a denial of justice, contrary to the constitutional ethos reflected in Articles 14 and 21.
87. Every New Housing Project Must Be Registered With Local Revenue Authority On Buyer Paying 20% Cost : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Mansi Brar Fernandes v. Shubha Sharma and Anr. (And Connected Cases)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 903
In order to safeguard the interests of homebuyers, the Supreme Court has ordered that every residential real estate transaction for new housing projects shall be registered with local revenue authorities upon payment of at least 20% of the property cost by buyer/allottee.
The Court further directed that contracts that significantly deviate from the Model RERA Agreement to Sell, or that incorporate returns / buyback clauses where the allottee is over the age of 50, must be supported by an affidavit sworn before the competent Revenue Authority, certifying that the allottee understands the attendant risks.
A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice R Mahadevan passed this direction while upholding an NCLAT judgment which had rejected the insolvency petitions filed by speculative buyers against a housing project.
NCLT, NCLAT Vacancies Must Be Filled On War Footing; RERA Must Be Adequately Staffed : Supreme Court
In the same judgment, the Court directed the Union Government to fill up the vacancies at the National Company Law Tribunals(NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal(NCLAT) on a "war-footing".
"Dedicated IBC benches with additional strength should be constituted. Services of retired judges may be utilized on ad hoc basis until regular appointments are made," the Court observed.
The Court noted that though such directions were issued earlier also, no effective step has been taken on the ground.
88. Waqf Amendment Act 2025 : Supreme Court Stays Certain Provisions
Case Details: In Re The Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025 | W.P.(C) No. 276/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 909
The Supreme Court stayed certain provisions of the Waqf (Amendment) Act 2025, while observing that several other provisions did not require any interference at the interim stage.
The key points from the interim order passed by the bench of Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice AG Masih are as follows :
1. Stayed the condition that a person should be a practitioner of Islam for at least 5 years till rules are framed by State Governments to provide a mechanism to determine this question. Without such a mechanism, the provision can lead to arbitrariness, the Court said.
2. Stayed the provisions allowing the Government to derecognise a Waqf land during the pendency of decision by the Government officer on the dispute of encroachment. SC said allowing the Collector to decide the dispute is against the separation of powers.
Till the question of title is decided by the Tribunal or the Court, the disputed Waqf land will not be affected. At the same time, the Court said that no third-party rights should be created on such lands till the dispute is decided.
3. Directed that in the Central Waqf Council, the non-Muslim members cannot exceed 4. In State Waqf Boards, the non-Muslim members cannot exceed 3.
4. Did not stay the provision allowing a non-Muslim to be the CEO of the State Waqf Board. However, the Court said that as far as possible, a Muslim person should be appointed.
5. Did not interfere with the condition of registration.
The Court did not interfere with the other major contentious provisions, such as the abolition of 'waqf-by-user', bar on creating waqfs over Scheduled Areas and protected monuments, condition that only Muslims can create Waqfs, application of the Limitation Act to the Waqf Act etc.
89. Vantara's Acquisition Of Animals As Per Regulations : Supreme Court Accepts SIT Report
Case Details: C.R. Jaya Sukin v. Union of India | W.P.(C) No. 783/2025 Diary No. 44109 / 2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 913
The Supreme Court (September 15) observed that the acquisition of animals in Vantara (Greens Zoological Rescue and Rehabilitation Centre) run by the Reliance Foundation at Jamnagar, Gujarat, is prima facie within the regulatory mechanism. There was no foul play found by the Special Investigation Team(SIT) constituted by the Court to inquire into various allegations, including whether there has been compliance with all laws in the acquisition of animals from India and abroad, particularly elephants.
"The Court has no hesitation in accepting the conclusion so drawn in the report. Thus, as no contravention of law has been reported by the SIT, the complaints particularly those listed in Schedule A in the summary of the report stand closed."
A bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice PB Varale said that they did not deliberately read the report submitted by the SIT headed by former Supreme Court Judge Justice J Chelameswar, as they wanted to go through it during the hearing. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta and Senior Advocate Harish Salve(for Vantara), and counsel for the petitioner were all present when the Court went through the report in a cursory manner.
90. Supreme Court Directs States/UTs To Register Sikh Marriages, Make Rules Under Anand Marriage Act Within 4 Months
Cause Title: Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors | WP(C) 911/2022
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 920
In an important development, the Supreme Court directed 17 States and 7 Union Territories (UTs) to frame rules under the Anand Marriage Act, 1909 for the registration of Sikh marriages (Anand Karaj) within four months. The Court stressed that decades of non-implementation created unequal treatment of Sikh citizens across India and violated the principle of equality.
"The fidelity of a constitutional promise is measured not only by the rights it proclaims, but by the institutions that make those rights usable. In a secular republic, the State must not turn a citizen's faith into either a privilege or a handicap. When the law recognises Anand Karaj as a valid form of marriage yet leaves no machinery to register it, the promise is only half kept. What remains is to ensure that the route from rites to record is open, uniform and fair," the Court observed.
Until state-specific rules are notified, the Court directed all States and UTs to immediately register Anand Karaj marriages under their existing general marriage laws (like the Special Marriage Act). The marriage certificate must explicitly mention the 'Anand Karaj' rite if the couple requests. This ensures no citizen is denied proof of marriage.
91. Supreme Court Orders MP Govt To Pay Rs 25 Lakhs Compensation To Convict Who Spent Extra 4.7 Years In Jail After Serving Sentence
Case Details: SOHAN SINGH @ BABLU v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 938
The Supreme Court today(September 8) directed the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay compensation of Rs. 25 lakhs to a convict who had to remain in jail for more than 4.7 years after having undergone the entire sentence of seven years in a rape case.
A bench comprising Justice JB Pardiwala and Justice KV Viswanathan passed an order after coming down heavily on the State of Madhya Pradesh for its lapse, which led to the over-incarceration of the convict. Initially, when the notice was issued to the State of Madhya Pradesh, the Court noted that the convict had suffered 8 extra years of incarceration. But the Court was informed by Senior Advocate Nachiketa Joshi (for State of Madhya Pradesh) that the convict was out on bail for some time.
The Court granted compensation considering the 4.7 years of extra incarceration suffered by the convict as informed by Advocate Mahfooz A. Nazki (for the convict). It also questioned the State's counsel for filing "misleading" affidavits in this matter. It disposed of the matter with a direction to the Madhya Pradesh Legal Services Authority to carry out an exercise to find similarly placed persons.
92. 'Day-to-Day Trial Practice Must Be Revived In Sensitive Cases' : Supreme Court Gives Guidelines To Courts On Speedy Trial
Case: Central Bureau of Investigation v. Mir Usman @ Ara @ Mir Usman Ali
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 949
The Supreme Court expressed serious concern over the discontinuation of the practice of holding trials on a day-to-day basis in important or sensitive cases, observing that a tradition that existed three decades ago has now been “given a complete go-by”.
“We sincerely believe that it is high time that the courts revert to that practice,” the bench observed, stressing that speedy and continuous trial hearings are essential for justice delivery, particularly in cases involving grave social or political ramifications.
The Court directed that all High Courts should constitute Committees to deliberate on how the practice of day-to-day trial can be revived and implemented effectively in their respective district judiciaries.
93. Supreme Court Modifies Guidelines On Compounding Of Cheque Dishonour Cases
Case: Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952
The Supreme Court has recently modified the guidelines on compounding dishonour of cheque Cases issued in Damodar S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H.
The Supreme Court bench comprising Justice Manmohan and Justice NV Anjaria in Sanjabij Tari Vs Kishore S Borkar and another 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952, observed that since a very large number of cheque bouncing cases are still pending and interest rates have fallen in the last few years, the Court is of the view that it is time to 'revisit and tweak the guidelines' issued by Supreme Court in Damodar S. Prabhu vs Sayed Babalal H.
S.138 NI Act - Cheque Bounce Case Maintainable Even For Cash Loan Above ₹20,000 : Supreme Court Sets Aside Kerala High Court Ruling
Case: Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952
The Supreme Court (September 25) set aside the Court which held that a debt created by a cash transaction above Rupees Twenty Thousand in violation of the Income Tax (IT) Act, 1961 cannot be considered as a "legally enforceable debt" under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
A bench comprising Justice Manmohan and Justice NV Anjaria, while deciding an appeal against a Bombay High Court Judgment, observed that the Kerala High Court's recent judgment in P.C. Hari v. Shine Varghese and Anr, delivered on June 25, 2025 was wrong.
It may be noted that the bench was not deciding an appeal against the Kerala High Court's judgment. The Special Leave Petition filed against the Kerala High Court's judgment, on which the Supreme Court last week issued notice, is pending.
No Need For Pre-Cognizance Summons To Accused In S.138 NI Act Case : Supreme Court Issues Directions For Speedy Trial Of Cheque Bounce Cases
Case: Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 952
The Supreme Court held that an accused need not be heard at the pre-cognizance stage of complaints filed for dishonour of cheque as per Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
The Court agreed with the Karnataka High Court's judgment in Ashok Vs. Fayaz Aahmad, that there is no requirement to issue summons to the accused at the pre-cognizance stage under Section 223 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita for NI Act complaints.
"Recently, the High Court of Karnataka in Ashok Vs. Fayaz Aahmad, 2025 SCC OnLine Kar 490 has taken the view that since NI Act is a special enactment, there is no need for the Magistrate to issue summons to the accused before taking cognizance (under Section 223 of BNSS) of complaints filed under Section 138 of NI Act. This Court is in agreement with the view taken by the High Court of Karnataka. Consequently, this Court directs that there shall be no requirement to issue summons to the accused in terms of Section 223 of BNSS i.e., at the pre-cognizance stage," the Court observed.
94. Judicial Officers With 7 Years Combined Experience Eligible For Direct Recruitment As District Judges
Case Title: Rejanish KV v. K Deepa and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 989
A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court held that a judicial officer, who has a combined experience of seven years as a judicial officer and an advocate, is eligible to apply for direct appointment as a District Judge.
To ensure a level playing field, the Court held that the minimum age of the in-service candidates applying for District Judges' direct recruitment must be 35 years.
The Court observed that the state governments will have to frame rules providing eligibility for in-service candidates. The rules should provide that in-service candidates should be eligible if they have a combined experience of 7 years as a judicial officer and advocate.
The Court held:
(i) Judicial Officers who have already completed seven years in Bar before they were recruited in the subordinate judicial service would be entitled for being appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge in the selection process for the post of District Judges in the direct recruitment process;
(ii) The eligibility for appointment as a District Judge/Additional District Judge is to be seen at the time of application;
(iii) Though there is no eligibility prescribed under Article 233(2) for a person already in judicial service of the Union or of the State for being appointed as District Judge, in order to provide a level playing field, we direct that a candidate applying as an in-service candidate should have seven years' combined experience as a Judicial Officer and an advocate;
(iv) A person who has been or who is in judicial service and has a combined experience of seven years or more as an advocate or a Judicial Officer would be eligible for being considered and appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge under Article 233 of the Constitution;
(v) In order to ensure level playing field, we further direct that the minimum age for being considered and appointed as a District Judge/Additional District Judge for both advocates and Judicial Officers would be 35 years of age as on the date of application.
(vi) It is held that the view taken in the judgments of this Court right from Satya Narain Singh till Dheeraj Mor (supra), which take a view contrary to what has been held hereinabove do not lay down the correct proposition of law.
The Court directed the High Courts and State Governments to amend the rules in terms of the judgment within a period of three months.
Bench: Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice MM Sundresh, Justice Aravind Kumar, Satish Chandra Sharma and K Vinod Chandran
95. Age Bar In Surrogacy Act Won't Apply To Couples Who Froze Embryos Before Law Came Into Force: Supreme Court
Case Title – Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India and Connected Cases
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990
The Supreme Court held that couples who had begun the surrogacy process before the enactment of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 law can proceed with surrogacy despite being over the statutory age limit under section 4(iii)(c)(I). The law mandates that the woman must be between 23 and 50 years of age and the man between 26 and 55 years.
A bench of Justice BV Nagarathna and Justice KV Viswanathan said that the right to surrogacy of such couples crystallised when they had their empbryos frozen under the law prevailing at the time (before commencement of the Surrogacy Act when there was no age limit) as a part of reproductive autonomy and parenthood, and the age restriction under the Act cannot apply retrospectively to such couples.
"In the result, we hold that section 4(iii)(c)(I) does not have retrospective operation, and therefore will not apply to the petitioners and applicants who are intending couples", the Court held.
Surrogacy Act Does Not Affect Rights Vested In Couples Who Froze Embryos Before Law Took Effect : Justice Viswanathan's Concurring Judgment
Case Title – Arun Muthuvel v. Union of India and Connected Cases
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 990
In the same judgment, the Court held that couples who had frozen embryos for surrogacy before the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 came into effect on January 25, 2022, had acquired vested rights to surrogacy which the Act could not retrospectively take away.
Justice KV Viswanathan, in his concurring opinion, said that by completing the fertilisation process before the statutory cut-off date, the couples had already crossed a legally recognised threshold, and the later introduction of age limits under Section 4(iii)(c)(I) of the Act could not invalidate their position.
“by the fertilization of the embryo prior to 25.01.2022, certain rights inhered in the intending couple and the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (for short 'the Act') does not divest them of those rights”, he said.
96. Magistrates Can Direct Witnesses To Give Voice Samples, Not Just Accused; Article 20(3) Not Violated : Supreme Court
Cause Title: Rahul Agarwal v. State of West Bengal & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1002
The Supreme Court held that a Magistrate can direct the collection of voice samples not only from accused persons but also from witnesses. It ruled that such samples, whether voice, fingerprints, handwriting, or DNA, constitute material evidence rather than testimonial evidence, and therefore do not infringe the constitutional protection against self-incrimination under Article 20(3).
A Bench of Chief Justice B.R. Gavai and Justice K. Vinod Chandran relied on the 2019 precedent Ritesh Sinha v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr., which held that even in the absence of an explicit provision in the Cr.P.C., a Judicial Magistrate has the authority to direct a “person” to provide a voice sample for investigation. The Court clarified that the term “person” is not confined to the accused alone but also extends to witnesses.
“it was held in Ritesh Sinha that despite absence of explicit provisions in Cr.P.C., a Judicial Magistrate must be conceded the power to order a person, to give a sample of his voice for the purpose of investigation for a crime. We specifically note that this Court had not spoken only of the accused and specifically employed the words 'a person', consciously because the Rule against self-incrimination applies equally to any person whether he be an accused or a witness.”, the court said.
97. No Summons To Advocates Except Under S.132 BSA Exceptions; Prior Approval Of Superior Officer Mandatory: Supreme Court Issues Directions
Case Details: In Re: Summoning Advocates Who Give Legal Opinion Or Represent Parties During Investigation of Cases and Related Issues | SMW(Cal) 2/2025
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1051
The Supreme Court (October 31) issued a set of directions to ensure that investigating agencies do not arbitrarily issue summons to advocates in criminal cases over the legal advice given by them to the accused.
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice K Vinod Chandran and Justice NV Anjaria pronounced the decision in the suo motu case taken by the Court over the issue of investigating agencies arbitrarily summoning advocates representing accused.
While the Court refrained from issuing any guidelines and ruled out the need for Magisterial supervision before the issuance of summons, it issued certain directions.
Supreme Court Issues Directions On Production Of Advocates' Digital Devices For Investigation; Says Clients' Documents Not Covered By S.132 BSA
In the same judgment, the Court issued detailed directions regulating the production of advocates' documents and digital devices that may contain client information.
The Court clarified that documents belonging to a client but held by an advocate are not covered by privilege under Section 132 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), whether in civil or criminal proceedings. However, such production must follow strict procedural safeguards.
In criminal cases, if an advocate is directed to produce a client document, it must be done before the court under Section 94 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), read with Section 165 of the BSA, ensuring judicial supervision. In civil proceedings, production will be governed by Section 165 BSA and Order 16 Rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). Upon production, the Court must hear both the advocate and the client before ruling on objections regarding production or admissibility.
Also from the judgment - In-House Counsel Not 'Advocate'; Their Communication With Employer Not Protected Under S.132 BSA : Supreme Court
98. If Written Grounds Of Arrest Not Furnished At Least Two Hrs Before Production Of Accused Before Magistrate, Arrest & Remand Illegal: Supreme Court
Cause Title: Mihir Rajesh Shah v. State of Maharashtra and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1066
In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court (November 6) extended the requirement of providing the grounds of arrest in writing to apply to all offences under the IPC/BNS, and not just to cases arising under special statutes like the PMLA or UAPA.
A bench of Chief Justice BR Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih held that the failure to provide the grounds of arrest in writing to an arrestee, in the language he/she understands, would render the arrest and subsequent remand illegal.
“The requirement of informing the arrested person the grounds of arrest, in the light of and under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, is not a mere formality but a mandatory binding constitutional safeguard which has been included in part III of the Constitution under the head of Fundamental Rights. Thus, if a person is not informed of the grounds of his arrest as soon as maybe, it would amount to the violation of his fundamental rights thereby curtailing his right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, rendering the arrest illegal.”, the court said.
Written Grounds Of Arrest Must Be Furnished In Language Arrestee Understands; Otherwise Arrest & Remand Illegal: Supreme Court
In the same judgment, the Court observed that failure to supply the written grounds of arrest to an arrestee in the language in which he/she understands renders the arrest and subsequent remand illegal.
“mere communication of the grounds in a language not understood by the person arrested does not fulfil the constitutional mandate under Article 22 of the Constitution of India. The failure to supply such grounds in a language understood by the arrestee renders the constitutional safeguards illusory and infringes the personal liberty of the person as guaranteed under Article 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. The objective of the constitutional mandate is to place the person in a position to comprehend the basis of the allegations levelled against him and it can only be realised when the grounds are furnished in a language understood by the person, thereby enabling him to exercise his rights effectively.”, the court observed.
A bench of Chief Justice BR Gavai and Justice Augustine George Masih made this observation while delivering an important ruling, extending the mandate of furnishing written grounds of arrest to an arrestee for all offences committed under IPC/BNS, as was earlier limited to UAPA/PMLA offences.
99. No Quota For Judicial Officers In District Judge Posts
Case Title: All India Judges Association v. Union of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1119
A five-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled out any special quota/weightage for promotee judges in the posts of District Judges, observing that there is no nationwide pattern of disproportionate representation of direct recruits in the Higher Judicial Service.
The Court observed that a perceived feeling of "heartburn" among judicial officers cannot justify the creation of any artificial classification within the cadre Higher Judicial Service(HJS). On the entry into a common cadre from different sources (Regular Promotion, Limited Departmental Competitive Exam and Direct Recruitment) and assignment of seniority as per the annual roster, the incumbents lose their 'birthmark' of the source from which they are recruited.
The Court noted that in-service judicial officers have enough opportunities for advancement as District Judges, especially after the judgment in Rejanish, which allowed them to contest for direct recruitment as District Judges. Also, fast track promotions as Civil Judge (Senior Division) are facilitated with the reduction of service period condition.
Exercising powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Court issued the following guidelines for filling up of the DJ posts –
- The seniority of officers within the HJS shall be determined through an annual 4-point roster, filled by all officers appointed in the particular year in the repeating sequence of 2 Regular Promotees, 1 LDCE, and 1 DR.
- Only if the recruitment process is completed within the year after which it was initiated and no other appointments, from any of the three sources, have already taken place in respect of the recruitment initiated for that subsequent year, shall the officers belatedly so appointed be entitled to seniority as per the roster of the year in which recruitment was initiated.
- If the recruitment process is not initiated for vacancies arising in a given year in the same year, the candidate filling such vacancy, in subsequent recruitment, shall be granted seniority within the annual roster of the year in which the recruitment process is finally concluded and appointment is made.
- After the recruitment of DRs and LDCEs is complete for a particular year, the positions falling in their quota that remain unfilled due to lack of suitable candidates shall be filled through RPs, subject to such RPs being placed only on subsequent RP positions in the annual roster; and the vacancies in the subsequent year shall be computed so as to apply the proportion of 50:25:25 to the entire cadre.
- The statutory rules governing the HJS in the respective States, in consultation with the High Courts, shall prescribe the exact modalities of the Annual Roster and how the directions of this judgement shall be implemented.
The Court clarified that these guidelines are not intended to resolve any inter-se dispute. The guidelines are general and mandatory to be incorporated into the regulations governing inter-se seniority of higher judicial services.
Bench: Chief Justice of India BR Gavai, Justice Surya Kant, Justice Vikram Nath, Justice K Vinod Chandran and Justice Joymalya Bagchi
100. Presidential Reference | Supreme Court Cannot Prescribe Timelines For President/Governor On Granting Assent To Bills, No 'Deemed Assent'
Case Title: In Re: Assent, Withholding Or Reservation Of Bills By The Governor And The President Of India
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1124
Answering the reference made by the President of India, Droupadi Murmu under Article 143 of the Constitution, a five-judge bench opined that the Supreme Court cannot impose any timelines for decisions of the President and the Governor on granting assent to Bills under Articles 200 and 201 of the Constitution.
The Court further held that the concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" to the Bills if the timelines are breached was antithetical to the spirit of the Constitution and against the doctrine of separation of powers. The concept of Courts declaring "deemed assent" is virtually a takeover of the functions reserved for the Governor, the Court said.
At the same time, the Court observed, if there is a prolonged or unexplained delay by the Governor which frustrates the legislative process, then the Court can exercise a limited power of judicial review to direct the Governor to decide in a time-bound manner, without observing anything on the merits of the Bill.
101. When Witnesses Examined Virtually, Their Prior Statements Must Be Electronically Transmitted To Them : Supreme Court To Trial Courts
Case Details: Raj Kumar @ Bheema v. State of NCT of Delhi
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1113
Delivering a significant judgment (November 17), the Supreme Court issued a binding directive to rectify a critical procedural gap in virtual trials. The bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta mandated that in all proceedings where a witness is examined via video conferencing, the trial court must facilitate the electronic transmission of the witness's prior statements to them.
This measure, the Court said addresses the "procedural irregularity" that disadvantaged the defence, which was often unable to effectively cross-examine a witness because the document containing their prior inconsistent statement could not be physically presented in the virtual setting.
Thus, recognizing the accused's right to fair cross-examination of a witness, the Court directed that “in every case where, it is proposed to record the statement of a witness over video conferencing and any previous written statement of such witness or a matter in writing is available and the party concerned is desirous of confronting the witness with such previous statement/matter in writing, the trial Court shall ensure that a copy of the statement/document is transmitted to the witness through electronic transmission mode and the procedure provided under Section 147 and Section 148 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (corresponding Section 144 and Section 145 of the Evidence Act) is followed in the letter and spirit, so as to safeguard the fairness and integrity of the trial.”
102. Supreme Court Strikes Down Tribunal Reforms Act 2021, Says It Violated Judicial Independence
Case Details: Madras Bar Association v. Union of India | Wp(C) 1018 of 2021
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1120
The Supreme Court (November 19) struck down the Tribunal Reforms Act, 2021, relating to the appointments, tenure, and service conditions of the members of various Tribunals.
A bench comprising Chief Justice of India BR Gavai and Justice K Vinod Chandran expressed displeasure at the Union Government for not giving effect to the directions given by the Court in its earlier judgments regarding Tribunal appointments. The bench disapproved of the Tribunal Reforms Act for re-enacting the same provisions which were earlier struck down in previous judgments.
The Court held that the Act cannot be sustained as it violates the principles relating to "separation of powers and judicial independence." The Act amounts to "legislative overruling" of binding judgments without curing any defects.