Supreme CourtOrder XLI Rule 27 CPC | Appellate Courts Must First Examine Pleadings Before Allowing Additional Evidence : Supreme CourtCause Title: IQBAL AHMED (DEAD) BY LRS. & ANR. VERSUS ABDUL SHUKOORCitation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 831The Supreme Court held that appellate courts cannot permit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC unless such evidence is supported by...
Supreme Court
Cause Title: IQBAL AHMED (DEAD) BY LRS. & ANR. VERSUS ABDUL SHUKOOR
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 831
The Supreme Court held that appellate courts cannot permit additional evidence under Order XLI Rule 27 of the CPC unless such evidence is supported by proper pleadings. It emphasized that before allowing additional evidence at the appellate stage, courts must first examine whether the party had pleaded the factual foundation for such evidence at the trial stage, as evidence inconsistent with or unrelated to the pleadings is inadmissible and serves no legal purpose.
In the present case, arising from a 1995 agreement to sell, the Court found that the High Court erred in allowing the defendant to introduce new documentary evidence to raise a defence not pleaded earlier, and in reversing the trial court's decree on that basis. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and remanded the matter for fresh consideration in accordance with law.
Cause Title: TAHIR V. ISANI VS. MADAN WAMAN CHODANKAR, (SINCE DECEASED) NOW THROUGH HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES & ORS,
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 845
The Supreme Court clarified that the bar under Order XXI Rule 102 of the CPC, which restricts pendente lite transferees of a judgment-debtor from resisting execution of a decree, does not apply to a person who has purchased the suit property from a third party who was not a party to the original suit. The Court held that such transferees are entitled to invoke Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC and raise objections to execution, subject to satisfaction of the statutory conditions.
In the present case, the appellant had purchased the property from M/s Rizvi Estate and Hotels Pvt. Ltd., which had derived title from the original owner well before the suit, and not from the judgment-debtors. Therefore, even though the appellant's purchase occurred during the pendency of the suit, he could not be treated as a transferee pendente lite of the judgment-debtor, and the bar under Rule 102 was inapplicable. Setting aside the Bombay High Court's decision, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and directed the executing court to adjudicate the appellant's objections in accordance with law, explaining that Rule 102 is intended to prevent judgment-debtors and their transferees from frustrating decrees, not to deny protection to bona fide purchasers claiming through independent third parties.
Res Judicata Can't Be Ground To Reject Plaint Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC : Supreme Court
Case : Pandurangan v. T. Jayarama Chettiar and another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 698
The Supreme Court held that the plea of res judicata cannot be a ground for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as the issue of res judicata involves mixed questions of fact and law which must be decided only after a full-fledged trial.
Setting aside the Madras High Court's order that had upheld rejection of the plaint on this ground, the Bench of Justice P.S. Narasimha and Justice Joymalya Bagchi clarified that such an objection cannot be summarily adjudicated at the threshold stage.
The Court observed that similarity of causes of action and the applicability of res judicata can be determined only after examining pleadings and documents from the earlier suit during trial. The Court emphasized that res judicata cannot be decided merely on assertions made in an application seeking rejection of the plaint. While expressly refraining from expressing any opinion on whether the earlier ex parte decree would ultimately operate as res judicata, the Supreme Court held that such an enquiry was impermissible under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, especially in light of the specific averments made in the plaint, and accordingly allowed the appeal.
Cause Title: ODISHA STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATION VERSUS VIGYAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES AND OTHERS
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 772
The Supreme Court held that failure to serve the mandatory notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure before instituting a suit against a state-owned entity renders the resulting decree a nullity, which can be challenged even at the execution stage under Section 47 CPC. The Court clarified that while an executing court cannot go beyond the decree, it is duty-bound to examine objections questioning the decree's enforceability on grounds of jurisdictional defects. In the present case, the appellant was added as a party without being served the mandatory Section 80 notice, yet a money recovery decree was passed against it. Setting aside the findings of the executing court and the High Court, the Supreme Court ruled that non-compliance with Section 80 CPC strikes at the root of the trial court's jurisdiction, declared the decree unenforceable, and allowed the appeal.
Cause Title: LIFESTYLE EQUITIES C.V. & ANR. VERSUS AMAZON TECHNOLOGIES INC
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 974
The Supreme Court has settled the long-standing controversy under Order XLI Rule 5 CPC by holding that deposit of the decretal amount or furnishing security is not a mandatory precondition for granting a stay of execution of a money decree. Affirming the Delhi High Court's order, the Court clarified that the requirements under Order XLI Rule 1(3) and Rule 5(5) are directory and not mandatory, and while non-deposit may ordinarily justify refusal of stay, appellate courts retain discretion to grant stay in exceptional cases.
The Court emphasized that failure to deposit cannot result in dismissal of the appeal itself, and that the sole statutory requirement for stay is the existence of “sufficient cause.” For the first time, the Court also laid down clear criteria for granting an unconditional stay, such as when the decree is egregiously perverse, patently illegal, or facially untenable. Applying these principles to the facts, arising from an exorbitant and procedurally flawed damages decree against Amazon, the Supreme Court upheld the grant of an unconditional stay without deposit, underscoring that Order XLI Rule 5 applies uniformly to money and non-money decrees, though prudence generally favours deposit in money decrees.
Case Title: OM PRAKASH GUPTA ALIAS LALLOOWA (NOW DECEASED) & ORS. VERSUS SATISH CHANDRA (NOW DECEASED) & Connected Matter
Citation:2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194
The Supreme Court clarified the correct procedural sequence under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC for substitution of legal heirs and revival of suits or appeals after the death of a party. It held that if a substitution application is not filed within 90 days of death, the suit or appeal abates, and the proper course thereafter is to file an application to set aside the abatement within the next 60 days, as prescribed under Articles 120 and 121 of the Limitation Act.
The Court cautioned that lawyers often err by filing an application for condonation of delay along with the substitution application, instead of attaching it to the application seeking to set aside the abatement. It explained that condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act arises only after the total period of 150 days has lapsed. Once sufficient cause is shown and abatement is set aside, substitution follows as a matter of course and the case proceeds on merits.
Order VII Rule 11 CPC | Rejection Of Plaint To Be Decided Solely On Plaint Averments : Supreme Court
Cause Title: KARAM SINGH VERSUS AMARJIT SINGH & ORS
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1011
The Supreme Court reiterated that an application for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC must be decided solely on the basis of the averments contained in the plaint, without considering the defendant's defence or any external material. Setting aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court's decision, the Court held that the High Court committed an error by relying on the defendant's plea of a Will and old mutation entries to reject the plaint as time-barred, while ignoring the plaint averments which disclosed that mutation proceedings remained disputed and were finally settled only in 2017.
The Court clarified that issues such as the validity of a Will, adverse possession, or limitation involving disputed facts are mixed questions of law and fact and cannot be adjudicated at the threshold stage under Order VII Rule 11. Accordingly, the Supreme Court restored the trial court's order refusing to reject the plaint and allowed the appeal.
Cause Title: L.K. PRABHU @ L. KRISHNA PRABHU (DIED) THROUGH LRs VERSUS K.T. MATHEW @ THAMPAN THOMAS & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1154
The Supreme Court held that a property transferred through a registered sale deed prior to the institution of a suit cannot be subjected to attachment before judgment under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, as the essential condition for invoking the provision is that the property must belong to the defendant on the date of filing of the suit.
Setting aside the concurrent findings of the trial court and the Kerala High Court, the Court observed that attachment before judgment is an extraordinary and protective remedy and cannot extend to properties already alienated to a bona fide third party before the suit was filed. It clarified that allegations of a prior transfer being fraudulent cannot be examined under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 CPC, and the creditor's remedy in such cases lies exclusively under Section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. Accordingly, the appeal was allowed and the purchaser's claim petition was held to be maintainable.
Case Details: PERIYAMMAL (DEAD THR. LRS.) AND ORS Versus V. RAJAMANI AND ANR. ETC
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 293
The Supreme Court held that an application filed under Section 47 CPC, if it raises questions relating to right, title, or interest in the property after the passing of a decree, must be treated as an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC.
The Court clarified that although Section 47 deals with execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree, and Order XXI Rule 97 specifically concerns resistance or obstruction to possession (including by third parties), the substance of the application is decisive.
If objections raised under Section 47 involve adjudication of property rights, the executing court is required to treat it as one under Order XXI Rule 97 and decide it in accordance with Order XXI Rule 101. Applying this principle, the Court held that the respondents' claim of being bona fide cultivating tenants raised after the decree was passed was rightly examined as an application under Order XXI Rule 97, and since they failed to establish an independent right to possession, their objections were rejected.
Case Title: KANCHHU VS. PRAKASH CHAND & ORS
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 460
The Supreme Court held that a defendant against whom an ex-parte decree has been passed cannot present evidence in their defense and is limited to cross-examining the plaintiff's witnesses to challenge the plaintiff's case. The Court clarified that exceptions may exist if legal issues, such as limitation or jurisdiction, are raised in the written statement, allowing the court to decide them based on pleadings without evidence. However, if the defendant does not cross-examine the plaintiff's witnesses, the ex-parte decree cannot be set aside.
The Court overturned the Kerala High Court's decision that had allowed setting aside the ex-parte decree, emphasizing that the absence of cross-examination justified upholding the decree. This ruling underscores the curtailed rights of a defendant once an ex-parte order attains finality.
Case Title: SAROJ SALKAN VERSUS HUMA SINGH & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 538
The Supreme Court has clarified that courts possess the authority under Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) to dismiss a suit based on the plaintiff's own admissions, even without a formal application from the defendant.
The Court upheld the trial court's suo motu dismissal of a suit where the plaintiff's admissions weakened their claim, emphasizing that the provision grants wide discretion to courts to pass judgments at any stage of proceedings. The ruling reinforces the principle that judicial admissions can be grounds for disposal, ensuring expedited resolution where the claim lacks merit or a cause of action. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions and underscoring the utility of Order XII Rule 6 in streamlining civil litigation.
Case Title: OM PRAKASH GUPTA ALIAS LALLOOWA (NOW DECEASED) & ORS. VERSUS SATISH CHANDRA (NOW DECEASED) & Connected Matter
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 194
In a significant procedural clarification, the Supreme Court held that a separate application to set aside the abatement of an appeal is not mandatory if an application for substitution of legal heirs under Order XXII Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) has been filed. The bench emphasized a justice-oriented approach, ruling that a prayer for substitution inherently implies a prayer to set aside the abatement. The Court set aside the High Court's order, which had insisted on a separate application, and relied on the precedent in Mithailal Dalsangar Singh v. Annabai Devram Kini (2003) to affirm that allowing a substitution application effectively sets the abatement aside. This decision streamlines the process for legal heirs to be brought on record after the death of a party, ensuring that technicalities do not impede substantive justice.
Case Title: SMT LAVANYA C & ANR VERSUS VITTAL GURUDAS PAI SINCE DESEASED BY LRS. & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290
The Supreme Court reinforced the binding nature of interim court orders, holding that a party remains liable for wilful disobedience of an injunction under Order 39 Rule 2A of the CPC, even if the injunction order is subsequently set aside or the main suit is later dismissed.
The Court ruled that the act of disobedience committed while the order was in force is a separate offense that does not get erased by the later vacation of the order. Relying on the precedent in Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan (1998), the Court emphasized that upholding the sanctity of court directives during their operation is paramount for the administration of justice. In the instant case, the appellants had violated an undertaking not to alienate a property, given to the trial court. While the Supreme Court partly allowed the appeal by setting aside the sentence of imprisonment, it enhanced the compensatory amount payable by the appellants, thereby underlining that consequences for contempt of court persist independently of the final outcome of the litigation.
Case Title: SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIM VERSUS PRAKASAN & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622
The Supreme Court clarified the interplay between Order I Rule 10 (power to add/remove parties) and Order XXII Rule 4 (substitution of legal heirs) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Court ruled that a legal heir, once formally impleaded to a suit after a due inquiry under Order XXII Rule 4, cannot later seek deletion by invoking Order I Rule 10 if they had the opportunity to object during the substitution stage.
The Court held that the principle of res judicata applies to such impleadment proceedings, and allowing objections at a later stage would undermine judicial finality and fair play. In the instant case, the appellant had not objected to his substitution as a legal heir initially, and his subsequent application for deletion, based on an argument under Muslim personal law, was therefore barred. The judgment underscores that while courts have wide discretion under Order I Rule 10 to manage parties, this cannot be used to re-agitate an issue already conclusively determined, thereby ensuring procedural discipline and finality in civil litigation.
S. 80 CPC | Amendments To Plaint Linked To Main Cause Of Action Constitutes Continuous Of Action, No Notice Required To Government : Supreme Court
Case Title: THE STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. VERSUS PAM DEVELOPMENTS PRIVATE LIMITED & ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 52
The Supreme Court clarified the application of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which mandates a two-month prior notice to the government before filing a suit against it.The Court held that no fresh notice under Section 80 is required for amending a plaint to incorporate subsequent developments, provided the amendment relates to a continuous cause of action intrinsically linked to the original suit. The Court emphasized that a cause of action is "continuous" when the alleged wrongful act repeats over time. In the instant case, the respondent had challenged its initial debarment by a government department; subsequent debarment orders and claims for damages were held to be a continuation of the same core dispute. The ruling establishes that amendments merely updating facts within an ongoing suit, without altering its nature, do not constitute a new cause of action requiring a fresh Section 80 notice, thereby promoting procedural efficiency and preventing unnecessary multiplicity of litigation.
Case Title: YERIKALA SUNKALAMMA & ANR. VERSUS STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 344
In a significant judgment, the Supreme Court expressed concern over the declining significance of Section 80 CPC notices, which require a two-month prior notice to the government before filing a suit against it. The Court emphasized that such notices should not be treated as empty formalities by public authorities. The Court held that the government must acknowledge these notices in all seriousness and inform the litigant of its stance within the statutory period, as the notice serves as an opportunity for the state to assess and potentially settle a just claim. Failure to do so, the Court ruled, may lead to an adverse inference being drawn against the government, with any defense raised later being considered an afterthought.
In the instant case, the Andhra Pradesh Government's complete failure to respond to the appellants' notice before they were compelled to file a suit was a key factor in the Court's decision to set aside the High Court's order, uphold the appellants' title based on long possession, and award them compensation of Rs. 70 lakhs. The ruling underscores the duty of public authorities to engage with statutory notices proactively to avoid unnecessary litigation.
XII Rule 6 CPC | Judgment On Admission Can Be Passed Even Dehors Pleadings : Supreme Court
Case Title: Rajiv Ghosh Versus Satya Naryan Jaiswal
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 415
The Supreme Court clarified the expansive scope of Order XII Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), which allows for a "judgment on admission."
The Court held that such a judgment can be passed at any stage of a suit based on admissions made "either in the pleading or otherwise," and these admissions may be oral or in writing, express or implied, and even dehors (outside) the pleadings.
The Court emphasized that the 1976 amendment to the rule explicitly broadened its application beyond written pleadings to include admissions in any document or even in statements recorded by the court. Furthermore, the ruling affirmed that a separate application by a party is not mandatory; courts can exercise their suo motu powers to pass a judgment on admission to expedite proceedings where clear admissions negate the need for a full trial. To ensure uniform application, the Supreme Court directed its registry to circulate the order to all High Courts, which shall further disseminate it to district judiciaries. The judgment reinforces the procedural tool as an efficient mechanism for early disposal of suits where facts are unequivocally admitted.
Order VIII Rule 6-A CPC | Defendant Can't File Counter-Claim Against Co-Defendant: Supreme Court
Cause Title: RAJUL MANOJ SHAH ALIAS RAJESHWARI RASIKLAL SHETH VERSUS KIRANBHAI SHAKRABHAI PATEL & ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 912
The Supreme Court clarified a significant procedural point under Order VIII Rule 6-A of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Court held that a counter-claim can be filed only against the plaintiff and cannot be directed solely against a co-defendant. The ruling set aside a Gujarat High Court order that had permitted one defendant to file a counter-claim for the specific performance of an agreement against a co-defendant. Relying on its precedent in Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar (2006), the Court reiterated that a counter-claim is a procedural tool meant for a defendant to raise a claim against the plaintiff, and it cannot be used to adjudicate disputes exclusively between defendants.
Cause Title: G.R. Selvaraj (Dead), through LRs. versus K.J. Prakash Kumar and others
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1141
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of challenging auction sales under Order XXI Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC). The Court held that a judgment-debtor is barred from raising objections to an auction sale at a belated stage, especially after the sale is completed, if those objections could have been raised before the proclamation of sale was drawn up. The Court emphasized the mandatory bar under Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC, which prevents a party from assailing a sale on grounds that were available but not raised at the appropriate earlier stage.
In the instant case, the judgment-debtor, despite having notice and opportunity, failed to object to the sale proclamation regarding the sufficiency of a part-sale to satisfy the decree. The Supreme Court set aside the Madras High Court's order that had allowed such a belated challenge, ruling that acquiescence to the proceedings precludes a subsequent attack on the sale's legality. This ruling reinforces procedural discipline in execution proceedings and ensures the finality of auction sales conducted by courts.
Cause Title: C.P. FRANCIS VERSUS C.P. JOSEPH AND OTHERS
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 870
The Supreme Court observed that it is mandatory for the High Courts to record reasons while framing an additional question of law which was not originally raised in a second appeal in a civil case.
Proviso to Section 100(5) CPC grants power to the High Courts to frame an additional question of law, but this power cannot be routinely exercised, but only in exceptional circumstances, for which a reason needs to be recorded by the High Court, the court said.
Cause Title: P. KUMARAKURUBARAN VERSUS P. NARAYANAN & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 509
The Supreme Court held that a plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold when the issue of limitation is a mixed question of law and fact that requires evidence to determine.
The Court set aside the Madras High Court's order, which had summarily dismissed a suit for cancellation of an instrument, finding it time-barred based on a prima facie assumption about the plaintiff's date of knowledge. It emphasized that, for the purpose of Order VII Rule 11, the averments in the plaint must be taken as true; since the plaint specifically pleaded discovery of fraud in 2011 and the suit was filed within three years in 2014, the High Court erred in preemptively concluding that the cause of action arose earlier in 1988. The ruling reiterates that when disputed facts, such as the date of knowledge triggering limitation, are central to the case, parties must be allowed to lead evidence, and the suit should proceed to trial rather than being dismissed summarily.
Case Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73
The Supreme Court held that the bar under Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply when a subsequent suit is founded on a cause of action distinct from that of the first suit. The Court observed that the rule's true purpose is to prevent a plaintiff from instituting a second suit on the same cause of action for claims or reliefs that were available at the time of filing the first suit.
In the instant case, the plaintiff had initially filed a suit for a permanent injunction; a later suit for specific performance and cancellation of a subsequent sale deed was deemed to be based on a different cause of action, especially because a government order prohibiting registration of sale deeds had initially made the relief of specific performance impossible to claim. The Supreme Court affirmed the Madras High Court's decision, ruling that when a subsequent event creates a fresh cause of action or makes a previously unavailable relief feasible, a second suit is not barred.
Cause Title: SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIM VERSUS PRAKASAN & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 622
The Supreme Court has held that a legal heir formally impleaded in a lawsuit under Order 22 Rule 4 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) after a court inquiry cannot later be removed by filing an application under Order 1 Rule 10. The Court clarified that while the power to add or remove parties under Order 1 Rule 10 is broad and can be exercised at any stage, it does not allow a party to re-agitate an issue that has already attained finality. If a party had a sufficient opportunity to object to the impleadment at the initial stage under Order 22 Rule 4 but failed to do so, the principle of res judicata applies, barring a subsequent challenge.
Cause Title: SURESH CHANDRA (DECEASED) THR. LRS. & ORS. VERSUS PARASRAM & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 728
In a significant ruling, the Supreme Court has held that if a joint and indivisible decree is passed by a court involving multiple parties, the entire appeal will abate if the legal representatives of any deceased party are not substituted in time. The Court emphasized that proceeding with the appeal only against the surviving parties in such cases risks creating inconsistent or contradictory decrees, which is impermissible. This principle prevents the enforcement of one decree from negating another. The decision came in a case where, following the death of one appellant, his legal heirs were not substituted, leading the High Court to declare the entire appeal abated. The Supreme Court affirmed this, summarizing key legal principles on abatement and reinforcing that in cases of inseparable decrees, failure to substitute a deceased party's heirs results in the abatement of the whole appeal.
Cause Title: TIME CITY INFRASTRUCTURE AND HOUSING LIMITED LUCKNOW VERSUS THE STATE OF U.P. & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 791
The Supreme Court has held that an ex-parte interim injunction granted under Order 39 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) must be vacated if the plaintiff fails to comply with its mandatory conditions. The Court emphasized that while an injunction can be granted without notice to the opposite party in exceptional circumstances, this privilege comes with two mandatory obligations: the court must record its reasons for granting the ex-parte relief, and the applicant must serve copies of the injunction application, supporting affidavit, plaint, and relied-upon documents to the defendant. If these conditions are not met, the court is bound to vacate the ex-parte order, regardless of the merits of the case. The ruling affirms that compliance with these procedural safeguards is essential to balance the urgency of granting relief with the principle of audi alteram partem (hear the other side)
Cause Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73
The Supreme Court clarified the scope of Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), stating that while it mandates including the entire claim arising from one cause of action in a single suit, it does not require combining all different causes of action stemming from the same transaction into one suit. The Court emphasized that multiple distinct causes of action can arise from a single transaction, and each may form the basis for separate suits. To invoke the bar under Order II Rule 2, a defendant must prove that the second suit is based on the same cause of action as the first, that the plaintiff was entitled to multiple reliefs from that cause, and that they deliberately omitted a relief without court leave.
In the case at hand, the Court held that a subsequent suit for specific performance was not barred because a government order preventing registration of sale deeds had made seeking that relief in the initial injunction suit impossible, thus creating a distinct cause of action.
Cause Title: SMT LAVANYA C & ANR VERSUS VITTAL GURUDAS PAI SINCE DESEASED BY LRS. & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 290
The Supreme Court has held that a party remains liable for willfully violating an injunction order under Order 39 Rule 2A of the CPC, even if the injunction is subsequently set aside or the main suit is later dismissed. The Court clarified that the disobedience of a court order while it was in force is a separate offense, and its consequences are not erased by the eventual outcome of the case. In the matter at hand, the appellants had given an undertaking not to alienate property but sold it anyway during the injunction's operation. Citing the precedent in Samee Khan v. Bindu Khan, the Court upheld the High Court's finding of willful disobedience, affirming that penalties can be imposed for the breach. While it partly allowed the appeal by setting aside a three-month imprisonment term, it enhanced the compensation payable by the violators, reinforcing the principle that court orders must be respected during their currency.
Case Title: VINOD INFRA DEVELOPERS LTD. VERSUS MAHAVEER LUNIA & ORS
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 630
The Supreme Court has ruled that a plaint cannot be rejected in its entirety under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because one of the reliefs sought is legally untenable, provided that other reliefs are maintainable and arise from independent causes of action. The Court clarified that while considering such an application, the court must confine itself to the averments in the plaint and cannot selectively sever prayers or reject the plaint partially. If a plaint discloses a triable issue based on a distinct cause of action, the suit must proceed to trial. In the case at hand, the High Court had erroneously dismissed a suit seeking multiple reliefs after finding the first relief invalid, without adjudicating a separate, triable claim. The Supreme Court set aside this order, emphasizing that rejection of a plaint is warranted only when the entire claim, on its face, discloses no cause of action or is barred by law.
Dismissal Of Suit For Default Doesn't Bar Fresh Suit On Same Cause Of Action : Supreme Court
Cause Title: AMRUDDIN ANSARI (DEAD)THROUGH LRS & ORS. VERSUS AFAJAL ALI & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 488
The Supreme Court has clarified that the dismissal of a suit for default under Order IX Rule 2 or 3 of the CPC does not bar the filing of a fresh suit on the same cause of action. The Court held that such a dismissal is neither an adjudication nor a decree, as it does not decide the merits of the case. Consequently, the principle of res judicata does not apply. In the matter at hand, after a previous suit was dismissed for non-appearance, the plaintiff filed a fresh suit under Order IX Rule 4, which permits a plaintiff to either apply for restoration or file a new suit (subject to limitation). The Court upheld the validity of the fresh suit, reasoning that a default dismissal is not a judgment on the merits and therefore does not preclude a plaintiff from seeking justice again on the same claim.
Cause Title: CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ANR. VERSUS SMT. PRABHA JAIN & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 96
The Supreme Court has held that a plaint containing multiple reliefs cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC merely because some of those reliefs are legally barred. The Court clarified that a plaint cannot be rejected partially; if at least one relief is maintainable and within the court's jurisdiction, the entire plaint must proceed to trial. In the specific case, while a relief for restoration of possession under the SARFAESI Act was barred from civil court jurisdiction, other reliefs concerning ownership and title of the property were valid. The Court emphasized that during a Rule 11 application, the court should not make adverse observations on barred reliefs but should leave those issues undecided, focusing only on whether the plaint as a whole discloses a cause of action. Therefore, the presence of one valid relief is sufficient to prevent the summary rejection of the plaint.
Cause Title: PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK VERSUS ATIN ARORA & ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 27
The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the principle under Section 21 of the CPC that objections to the place of suing (territorial jurisdiction) must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity in the court of first instance and cannot be entertained at a belated stage. The Court emphasized that failure to promptly object precludes a party from raising the issue later, barring cases of manifest injustice. In the matter, a corporate debtor had participated in insolvency proceedings before the NCLT, Kolkata without raising any jurisdictional objection despite having changed its registered office. When it later sought to recall the admission order on jurisdictional grounds, the Supreme Court held the objection was impermissibly delayed. The Court set aside the High Court's intervention under Article 227, noting that the High Court had overlooked the limited scope of supervisory jurisdiction and the consequences of setting aside an IBC admission order. The ruling underscores the necessity of diligence in raising jurisdictional challenges at the outset of litigation.
Case Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 73
The Supreme Court has clarified that Order II Rule 2 of the CPC, which generally bars a second suit on the same cause of action if claims were omitted from the first, does not apply when a relief was legally or factually impossible to seek in the initial suit but becomes available due to a subsequent event. The Court held that such a subsequent event creates a fresh cause of action, allowing a new suit for the previously unavailable relief. In the case at hand, a government ban on registering sale deeds had prevented the plaintiff from seeking specific performance and recovery of possession in the first suit. Once the ban was lifted, it triggered a new cause of action, and the second suit for those reliefs was not barred. The ruling emphasizes that the bar under Order II Rule 2 should not be applied mechanically where obtaining a relief was initially impossible, ensuring that plaintiffs are not denied justice due to mere technicalities.
Cause Title: SRI SHRIKANTH NS & ORS. VERSUS K. MUNIVENKATAPPA & ANR.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 502
The Supreme Court has held that an appellate court cannot invoke Order XI Rule 14 of the CPC to direct the production of documents in an appeal against the rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11. The Court clarified that the power to order document production is confined to the pendency of a suit and cannot be exercised after the suit has been dismissed at the threshold. When a plaint is rejected, the suit terminates, and the appellate court's role is limited to examining the correctness of that rejection order based solely on the averments in the plaint. It cannot delve into the merits of the case or allow the introduction of new evidence. In the matter, the First Appellate Court and High Court had erroneously directed the production of a mutation register after the suit was rejected. The Supreme Court set aside these orders, emphasizing that such a direction was beyond the scope of Order XI Rule 14 and constituted an error in the exercise of jurisdiction.
Cause Title: OPERATION ASHA VERSUS SHELLY BATRA & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 775
The Supreme Court has ruled that a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 does not automatically lose its character as a public trust merely due to its registration. The Court held that a representative suit under Section 92 of the CPC can be maintained against such a society if it functions as a constructive trust. The mere fact of registration does not alter the nature of properties already dedicated to public charitable purposes. The judgment provides a test to determine if a society qualifies as a constructive trust, examining factors such as the method of property acquisition, whether grants are conditioned for public benefit, complete dedication of property, public user rights, and the application of profits for charitable objectives. If these circumstances exist, the society can be treated as a public trust, and a suit alleging mismanagement or breach of trust remains maintainable under Section 92, ensuring accountability for entities using public funds for charitable purposes.
Cause Title: SHUBHKARAN SINGH VERSUS ABHAYRAJ SINGH & ORS.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 536
The Supreme Court has clarified that the power under Order XVIII Rule 17 of the CPC to recall a witness vests solely with the court and is meant for the court to seek clarifications or remove ambiguities in the evidence. It does not confer a right upon the parties to recall witnesses for further examination, cross-examination, or re-examination to fill gaps in their case. The Court held that if a party wishes to recall a witness for such purposes, it must seek the court's leave under its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC. The ruling emphasizes that the provision is a judicial tool for clarification, not a means for parties to supplement their evidence after the fact.
Allahabad High Court
Tenant Should Be At The Pleasure Of Landlord, Must Release Property When Landlord Requires It For Bonafide Personal Use: Allahabad HC
Case Title: Zulfikar Ahmad And 7 Others vs. Jahangir Alam 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 15 [MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 6479 of 2021]
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 15
The Allahabad High Court has held that a tenant is usually at the pleasure of the landlord and will have to release the property if the landlord so desires. It was held that the Court must see if the need of the landlord is bonafide before ruling against the tenant.
“A tenant should be at the pleasure of landlord in a sense that as and when the landlord needs the property for his personal use, he will have to release. The court has to just see, whether the need is bonafide one or not,” held Justice Ajit Kumar.
Case Title: Hari Shankar vs. Rakesh Kumar 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 50 [MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 15637 of 2024]
Case Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 50
The Allahabad High Court has held that a son has every right to be in business independent of his father and the father's request for release of the rented shop so his son can start an independent business is a bona fide need, justifying the tenant's eviction.
Justice Ajit Kumar held that “if the son has been doing business with his father, he has every right to get settled independently in a business and father is absolutely justified in setting up a need for the release of the shop in question to settle his son.”
Case Title: State of U.P. and 2 others v. Md. Sameer Rao and 3 others [SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 459 of 2023]
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 67
The Allahabad High Court has held that name in board examination certificates can only be changed after obtaining a decree from a Civil Court regarding change in name. It held that mere reference to change in Aadhar card and PAN card is not sufficient for the Board to change the name of a person.
The bench of Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra held that
“Acquiring a new name by choice is covered by Chapter-VI of the Act in the sense that a person seeking to acquire a new name, may obtain a decree of declaration from the civil court to the effect that, henceforth, he would be known as a person by his newly acquired name. In such event, the date of decree would be relevant and would operate from the said date, prior whereto, the plaintiff seeking declaration would be known by his previous name.”
Case title - Ishan Chaudhary And Another vs. Union Of India And 4 Others 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 136
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 136
The Allahabad High Court observed that a non-agricultural land use declaration under Section 80(1) or 80(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Revenue Code, 2006, does not imply that the land has been partitioned among co-bhumidhars.
Interpreting Section 80 (4) of the Code, a bench of Justice Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava and Justice Shekhar B. Saraf clarified that if one of the co-bhumidhars wants to apply for non-agricultural use of jointly owned land, then either all co-bhumidhars must apply together, or if only one of the co-bhumidhars is applying for the same concerning his own share, the land in question must already be partitioned as per the provisions of Section 116 of the 2006 Code and the relevant Rules.
Case Title: Smt. Santosh Awasthi v. Smt. Urmila Jain [MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 11807 of 2024]
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 156
The Allahabad High Court has held that a revisional court cannot assume jurisdiction of an execution court and decide an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, when the same is pending before the executing court.
Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal observed that the Revisional Court exceeded its jurisdiction in rejecting an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, after concluding that the issue of res judicata should be adjudicated first. The Court said that the revisional court should have remanded the matter to the executing/trial court to decide it as a preliminary issue, rather than dismissing the application under O21 R97.
Case Title: Brahmdutt Yadav v. State Of Uttar Pradesh & Another
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 166
The Allahabad High Court has reiterated that proceedings under Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 not maintainable against illegal encroachment on Gram Sabha land.
While quashing proceedings under the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, Justice Saurabh Srivastava relied on the earlier decision of his coordinate bench in Munshi Lal and Another vs. State of U.P. and another where it was held that “as far as criminal proceeding for illegal encroachment, damage or trespass over the land belonging to Gram Sabha is concerned, the same can be undertaken but it would be subject to the adjudication of rights of the parties over the land in dispute as the said determination can be done only by the revenue court.”
Case Title: Jayraj Singh v. State Of U.P. And 3 Others [WRIT - C No. - 41221 of 2024]
Case Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 173
The Allahabad High Court has held that under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, the Sub-Divisional Officer has not been empowered to grant a declaration of bhumidhar rights on administraive side.
While dealing with a case where petitioner sought a writ of mandamus for grant of declaration of absolute bhumidhar rights and decision on representation filed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Justice Kshitij Shailendra held,
“A careful reading of the aforesaid provisions would reveal that all the three provisions; Sections 131A, 131B of Act, 1950 and 76 of Code, 2006 speak of conferment of status upon the concerned tenure holder as Bhumidhar with transferable rights, however, the provisions do not provide for a forum for making conferment or such declaration. Certainly, the Sub-Divisional Officer or any other officer has not been held to be empowered, on administrative side, to grant such a declaration in favour of concerned tenure holder under the aforesaid provisions.”
Case title - Committee Of Management, Jami Masjid Sambhal Ahmed Marg Kot Sambhal vs. Hari Shankar Jain And 12 Others 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 180
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 180
The Allahabad High Court today rejected Mosque Committee's plea against the trial court's order passed on November 19 directing an Advocate Commissioner to survey the mosque in a suit which claimed that the mosque was built after destroying a temple.
With this, a bench of Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal has upheld the trial court's survey order. It also added that the Hindu Plaintiffs is prima facie not barred
Case Title: Shiv Narayan Gupta vs. Garib Chandra 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 215 [MATTERS UNDER ARTICLE 227 No. - 4107 of 2024]
Case citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 215
The Allahabad High Court has held that trial courts are empowered to amend preliminary decree to do justice between the parties.
Referring to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Baliram Atmaram Kelapure vs. Indirabai and S.Satnam Singh & Ors. vs. Surender Kaur & Anr. relied upon the parties, Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal held
“The provision of Section 97 C.P.C. or interpretation of the said provision by Hon'ble Apex Court does not restrict the power of the trial Court to amend the preliminary decree in case it necessitates to do justice between the parties.”
Case Title: Ashok Kumar Maurya v. The State Of U.P. And 25 Others [WRIT - C No. - 41837 of 2024]
Case citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 258
A single judge of the Allahabad High Court has referred to a larger bench the question whether a preliminary decree in a partition suit is an interlocutory order or an order finally deciding the substantial rights of the shareholder. It also referred the question whether such an order is appealable under Section 207 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006.
Case Title: Smt.Amina v. Up Zila Adhikari Patti Pratapgarh And Others 5 [WRIT - C No. - 1003005 of 2002]
Case Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 281
The Allahabad High Court has held that once a person's name has been recorded in revenue records under consolidations proceedings under the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, proceedings under Section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 for declaration as asami would not be maintainable.
Section 49 of the Uttar Pradesh Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 specifically bars civil courts jurisdiction in case of land or any matter for which proceedings have to be undertaken under the Act including when notification has been issued for a declaration and adjudication of right of tenure-holder in respect of land lying in an area or adjudication of rights arising out of consolidation proceedings where proceedings must be undertaken under the Act.
Case Title: M/s Jay Chemical Works v. M/s Sai Chemicals [COMMERCIAL APPEAL DEFECTIVE No. - 1 of 2025]
Case Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 316
The Allahabad High Court has held that it is not justified to dismiss one appeal on grounds of limitation when an identical order has been challenged on identical grounds in a different appeal within limitation
The bench of Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra held
“it does not appear to be justified that, in one matter, validity of the order returning the plaint is examined on merits and, in another matter, challenge laid to exactly an identical order on identical grounds is discarded only on account of delay having occurred in filing the appeal.”
Case Title: Shahadat Ali And Another Versus Board Of Revenue, U.P., Lko. Thru. Member And 8 Others
Case Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 341
The Allahabad High Court has held that in a partition dispute under the U.P. Revenue Code. 2006, primacy must be given to family settlement which has been acted upon by the co-tenure holders.
Justice Alok Mathur held, “Primacy has to be given to family settlement, which has been acted upon, and the co-tenure holders are in possession of their respective shares. In case there is no dispute between the parties with regard to the family settlement, the Kurras has to be prepared to take into consideration the family settlement, which is duly recognised in sub Rule (g) of Rule 109 (5) of the Rules, 2016.”
Case Title: Lala Singh And 3 Others Versus Chairman, Board Of Revenue, Lko. And Others
Case Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 342
The Allahabad High Court has held that the directive of the Supreme Court in Anil Rai Vs. State of Bihar, prescribing a maximum 6-month period for the delivery of judgment by a bench, is applicable to the Revenue Courts.
Justice Alok Mathur held, “We see no reason as to why the said pronouncement of the Supreme Court should not be extended even to the revenue courts to decide the title disputes as a substitute to the civil courts.”
Case Title: Ved Prakash Saini And 45 Others v. State Of U.P. And 2 Others [WRIT - C No. - 35876 of 2022]
Case citation : : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 395
Observing that Section 28-A of the Land Acquisition Act 1984 is beneficial provision, the Allahabad High Court has held that limitation for filing application under Section 28-A starts from date of award of redetermination of the compensation on which land owner relies and not the original award which may have been set aside by a higher court.
Case Title: Hanif Khan and others v. Additional Commissioner Lucknow and others. [WRIT-C No.1002036 of 2003]
Case citation : : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 396
The Allahabad High Court has held that any change in the entry in revenue records, including removal or substitution under Section 34 of the Land Revenue Act is a judicial matter for which opportunity of hearing must be provided to concerned parties.
Justice Irshad Ali held,
“Grant of opportunity of hearing in administrative matters is comparatively a recent doctrine. As far as judicial matters are concerned since the time when Courts were established it has been the most essential ingredient of procedural law that no order shall be passed without hearing parties concerned. Removal and substitution of entry in revenue records under Section 34 of Land Revenue Act or any other provision is a judicial matter making it all the more necessary to provide opportunity of hearing to the party concerned.”
Case Title: Hatam Singh and others Versus State of U.P. Thru Secy. Housing and Urban Planning and Anr. [WRIT - C No. - 4986 of 2005]
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 411
The Allahabad High Court has held reiterated that mere threat of encroachment and stating that the land is to be used for planned development for public purpose will not justify the invocation of urgency clause under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and dispensation of the statutory requirement of calling for, hearing and deciding objections of the landowners.
While dealing with 2004 acquisition proceedings initiated by Ghaziabad Development Authority, relying on various judgments of the Apex Court the bench of Justice Manoj Kumar Gupta and Justice Anish Kumar Gupta held
“acquisition of land for planned development is a public purpose, it has been held time and again that the same itself is not sufficient to warrant exercise of power under Section 17 of the Act.”
Case Title: Mahesh Kumar And 3 Others Versus Omaira Buildcon Proprietor Lalit Gogia [FIRST APPEAL FROM ORDER No. - 2422 of 2025]
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 425
The Allahabad High Court has held that an injunction can be granted against the owner of a property in specific circumstances under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of CPC, even if the principle of lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act ('TP Act') is applicable.
Referring to the decision of the Apex Court in Ramakant Ambalal Choksi vs. Harish Ambalal Choksi & Others, Justice Sandeep Jain held
“The relief of interim injunction can be granted in favour of the plaintiffs against the defendant for preventing the defendant from alienating or transferring the disputed property, even if the principle of lispendens enumerated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is applicable, as held by the Apex Court in the case of Ramakant Ambalal Choksi(supra)”
Case title - Santosh Jain and 2 others vs. Kewal Kishore and another
Case citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 428
Interpreting Order XXI Rules 10 & 11(2) of CPC, the Allahabad High Court held that a Power of Attorney holder can validly sign and verify an execution application if he is proved to the satisfaction of the Court to be acquainted with the facts of the case.
A bench of Justice Rohit Ranjan Agarwal held so while dismissing a petition challenging the maintainability of an execution application filed by the decree-holder's father, who was acting as his Power of Attorney holder.
Case Title: M/s Jay Chemical Works v. M/s Sai Chemicals [COMMERCIAL APPEAL No. - 27 of 2025]
Case citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 433
The Allahabad High Court has held that a commercial court instituted prior to the Supreme Court's judgment in Patil Automation Private Limited and others Vs. Rakheja Engineers Private Limited cannot be returned for non-compliance of Section 12-A of the Commercial Court Act, 2015.
It held that the mandate in the judgment regarding compulsory per-institution mediation and settlement as per Section 12-A of the Commercial Court Act, 2015 before filing a suit was applicable prospectively from the date of the judgment and not to the suits filed prior to the judgment of the Apex Court.
Case Title: Tarkeshwar Pandey v. Deena Nath Yadav And 6 Ors. [SECOND APPEAL No. - 723 of 2025]
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 447
The Allahabad High Court has held that no appeal shall lie before a High Court on the strength of Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 from orders passed in an appeal under Section 104 CPC.
Section 100 CPC provides that an appeal can lie to the High Court from every decree passed in appeal by any subordinate court, so long as the case involves a substantial question of law.
Case Title: Deependra Chauhan v. Phool Kumari Chauhan and 4 Ors. [CIVIL REVISION No. - 12 of 2024]
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 470
The Allahabad High Court has reiterated that as per Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, an agreement to sell would not create an interest in the property to be sold.
Justice Manish Kumar Nigam relied on judgments of the Apex Court in State of U.P. v. District Judge & Ors., Rambhai Mandeo Gajre v. Narayan Bapuji Dotra through LRS, to draw the distinction between an agreement to sell and a deed of sale.
Case Title: Sadhu Saran Chaubey v. Addl. Commissioner Devi Patan Mandal And 4 Ors [WRIT - C No. - 1003822 of 2002]
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 484
The Allahabad High Court has held that a revision is not maintainable against an interlocutory order passed in an interim injunction application. It held that the same could be challenged in writ jurisdiction.
In 1985, the deceased executed a will in favour of Respondent No. 5. Thereafter, a second and third will were executed in favour of Respondent No. 4 and the petitioner, respectively. Following the death of the testator, Respondent No. 5 got his name mutated in the revenue by concealing the will executed in favour of the petitioner.
Case Title: Kaushal Kishore and another Versus State of U.P. Thru. Addl. Chief Secy. Revenue , Lucknow and 4 others [WRIT - C No. - 8222 of 2024]
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 496
The Allahabad High Court has recently held that alleged oral consent of the land holder is not enough to construct a road over his land. For such construction, the land must be acquired through proper procedure prescribed in law.
Holding that consent for land use for public passage will not amount to adverse possession of the State, the bench of Justice Shekhar B. Saraf and Justice Prashant Kumar held
“We are surprised by the plea taken by the State that since the land was used as a passage for the last 30-40 years, it would tantamount to adverse possession. The State being a welfare State cannot be permitted to take a plea of adverse possession. The State cannot be permitted to perfect its title over the land by invoking the doctrine of adverse possession to grab the property of its own citizen. [reliance is placed to paragraph 12.11 of Vidya Devi (supra)].”
Case title - Devendra Srivastava And Ors. vs. M/S Eifel Recreation Club (P) Ltd.
Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 568
The Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) observed that a suit for specific performance of a contract cannot be rejected at the threshold as time-barred under Order VII Rule 11 Civil Procedure Code (CPC) if the plaintiff has pleaded explicitly that the subsequent execution of a supplementary agreement extended the original timeline for performance.
A Bench of Justice Jaspreet Singh held that, in such circumstances, the question of whether the suit is barred by limitation is a mixed question of law and fact, which can be ascertained only after the parties have led evidence at the trial stage.
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Case Title: Tuf Metallurgical Private Limited Vs. Bst Hk Limited and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 3
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justices Ninala Jayasurya and Nayapathy Vijay observed that in deciding a petition under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the Court cannot ignore the basic principles of the CPC. At the same time, the power of the Court to grant relief is not curtailed by the rigours of every procedural provision in the CPC. In exercise of its powers to grant interim relief under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act, the Court is not strictly bound by the provisions of the CPC.
The issue before the court was 'whether the order of attachment of the learned single Judge calls for interference?
If a strong prima facie case is made out and the balance of convenience is in favour of interim relief being granted, the Court exercising power under Section 9 of the Arbitration Act should not withhold relief on the mere technicality of absence of averments, incorporating the grounds for attachment before judgment under Order 38 Rule 5 of the CPC.”
Case Title: Gorripati Veera Venkata Rao vs Ethalapaka Vanaja and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 5
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has said that at the stage of registration of civil suits, the trial court registry must not insist on compliance of objections to a plaint that are not mandated under the Civil Procedure Code or the Civil Rules of Practice
Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari said, “It shall ensure, not to insist compliance with such objections, which are not contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure or Civil Rules of Practice, at the stage of registration of plaint or which the registry in the discharge of its ministerial function has to consider. Even if the objections have the backing of the rules and there is non-compliance, the plaint should not be returned, frequently, to comply with the objections, in spite of re-submission with the reply. Registry, with the objections and note/reply, should place the matter before the Court for consideration and appropriate orders.”
The court also said that maintainability of a suit is always a question which is to be decided by the Court. It said that after registration and placing of the plaint before the Court for consideration, such question of maintainability can be considered and answered.
Case Title: Pitta Samadana Swarooparani v. Pitta Kumari
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 28
A single judge bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court comprising Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari has ruled that in a partition suit, a plaintiff may not always be aware of all the ancestral properties to be partitioned. If he later discovers additional properties which need to be partitioned or included in the partition suit during the pendency of the case, he should be allowed to amend the suit to include them.
The Court directed that amendments to add such properties cannot be refused on a mere technical plea.
Case Title: M/s. Real Fab India Pvt.Ltd. Versus M/s. Rashtriya Ispath Nigam Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 44
The Andhra Pradesh High Court bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari has held that a second execution petition for enforcing an award is not maintainable if the first was rejected on the ground that the award had not been set aside, solely because a signed copy was not filed with the application to set it aside under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (Arbitration Act).
It also held that if valid grounds existed for setting aside the award, its execution cannot be allowed merely due to the submission of a signed copy thereafter.
Case Title: Vaitla Rama Murthy and Others v. Marisetty Satyanarayana
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 51
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that the purpose of issuing urgent notice under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC, even if the court does not grant a temporary injunction, is to address situations requiring immediate action and in such cases the attitude of the Courts in posting the matter to a longer date defeats the purpose of the provision.
Justice K. Manmadha Rao observed that such situations arise in cases of imminent danger, threats to safety, potential financial loss or risk of violation of legal rights and issuing urgent notice in such situations ensures that the legal system can respond and intervene strictly in situations which can cause irreparable harm. Such interference is crucial for “safeguarding rights of the individual who are facing immediate threats or potential harm and further enable legal system to respond to ensure the justice is served in a timely manner…”
The Court also held:
“The urgency of passing of orders under Order 39 Rule 1 CPC should be kept in mind. Even where the Court is not inclined to grant temporary injunction or decides to issue urgent notice in that case also the Court should issue urgent notice and post the matter to a shortest date. The Court should examine what is the reasonable time required to serve the notice upon the respondents. Where the plaintiff undertakes to serve the notice within two or three days, the matter need not be adjourned to a longer date. It can be posted within four days or a week.”
Case Title: NAKUL CHANDRA BISWAL v. BADARU SRINIVASA RAO and another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 150
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has clarified that under Rule 15A of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), a defaulting tenant who disputes arrears of rent is required to not only pay arrears up to the date of filing of the suit, but also the arrears accruing until the fixation of rent by the Court and thereafter.
In the present case involving a tenant defaulting in payment of rent, the Trial Court passed an award fixing the provisional rent at Rs 20,000, with a direction to the petitioner to pay Rs.21,10,000 as arrears of rent from 2016 to 2025, and to continue to deposit the future rent at Rs 20,000 per month.
Against this backdrop, Justice Raghunandan Rao explained that Order 15A of CPC provides for two situations— one, where the defendant, while filing his written statement, is required to deposit the undisputed arrears of rent up to the date on which the written statement is filed and the further amount as and when they become due, and; second, where the Court is required to go into the fixation of rent where the defendant pleads that no arrears of rent or default exist. The Court stated,
“Upon such determination, the defendant would be liable to deposit the rent fixed by the Court within the time stipulated by the Court and to continue to deposit the rent which becomes payable thereafter.”
Noting that the present case falls under the second eventuality, the Court added,
“In the present case, the Trial Court fixed a lump sum amount of the arrears of rent due from 2015 to 2025. Though the order may not clearly signify the contours set out in Rule 2 Order 15A, the order cannot be faulted on the ground of violation of Order 15A. This is because, Rule 2 of Order 15A casts an obligation on the petitioner/deponent to not only clear the arrears of rent due till the date of fixation of rent but to clear all such arrears of rent, which have fallen due after the date of fixation of rent.”
Case Title: Bhavanam China Venkata Reddy v. Dantla Subba Reddy and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 152
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has clarified that, by virtue of Section 357 of CrPC, civil suits filed for damages are maintainable even when criminal proceedings have already been initiated in respect of the same incident involving the same parties.
For reference, Section 357(3) of CrPC, permits compensation to be granted to any person suffering loss or injury due to the action of the accused when no fine is imposed, and Section 357(5) provides that any subsequent civil suit must consider the compensation already awarded under the Section to avoid double benefit.
Noting that these provisions collectively empower the Court to determine compensation which victims are entitled to against the accused in civil proceedings, a division bench comprising Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam stated,
“…we deem it appropriate to hold that, both the civil and criminal proceedings arising out of same matter is aptly maintainable. The real purport of Section 357(5) CrPC is that in the event of awarding damages by the civil Court, it must take into account of compensation granted by the criminal Court by virtue of above provision. Similarly, if the civil proceedings are disposed of prior to the conclusion of the criminal proceedings relating to the same matter, then it is the duty of the criminal court to take into account the decree passed by the civil court while exercising its powers vested under Section 357 Cr.P.C."
Mere Pendency Of Appeal Does Not Operate As Stay On Execution Of Trial Court's Decree: AP High Court
Case Title: Pilla Venkateswara Rao Alias Allabakshu v. Kancherla Malyadri
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 154
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that mere pendency of appeal in a Civil Court does not operate as stay on execution of a decree passed by the Trial Court.
For context— the Court was dealing with a case where the petitioner lost a suit for eviction and filed an appeal, which was later dismissed for non-prosecution, leaving the Trial Court's decree intact. The decree holder (respondent) then filed an Execution petition, where the Execution Court issued notice to the petitioner to appear and raise objections, which the petitioner challenged in a revision petition claiming that the decree was not final.
Against this backdrop, Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari held,
“This Court is of the considered view that the Civil Revision Petition under Section 115 of CPC against the impugned notice asking the petitioner to appear in the execution case and to file the objections, if any, fixing a date and time is not maintainable. It is not a case decided by any Court subordinate to the High Court. There is also no jurisdictional error in issuing notice. The petitioner instead of approaching this Court should have approached the Execution Court pursuant to the notice and must have been duly advised by his counsel.”
“The dismissal of appeal even in default confirms the Trial Court's decree. Mere pendency of the appeal does not operate as stay on execution of the Trial Court's decree, though here no appeal is pending. The Execution Court has the power and jurisdiction to execute the decree.” the Court added.
Case Title: Gummadi Usha Rani & another v. Guduru Venkateswara Rao and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 158
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has set aside a trial court order which rejected a suit seeking declaration of title, recovery of possession on the grounds that it was barred by limitation and disclosed no new cause of action. In doing so the high court said that the trial court had rejected the case without "meaningfully" reading the plaint as a whole.
The reason attributed by the Trial Court for rejection of the plaint was that the documents relating to a particular schedule property were registered and their registration operated as notice to the whole world. The trial court had further reasoned that the plaint was barred by limitation and the plaintiffs had not filed any suit within the period prescribed to challenge the registered documents. The trial court had also concluded that no fresh cause of action arose, especially after the dismissal of an earlier suit filed by the plaintiffs, and that through the suit, the plaintiffs had created an illusion of a cause of action with clever pleadings while ignoring their failure to initiate the suit within a reasonable period of limitation.
Noting that the plaint was within the period of limitation, a division bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam held,
“We are of the view that at this stage knowledge could not be imputed to plaintiffs only because of the registration of the sale deeds. At this stage only the plaint averments are to be considered and are to be taken as true and correct on their face value. A perusal of the plaint, inter alia, shows that in para-IV, the cause of action, the plaintiffs have given in detail as to when the cause of action arose for the first time and thereafter continuously on different dates. In para–VIII Limitation, the plaintiffs stated that the 1st plaintiff was cross-examined on 15.12.2021 inO.S.No.372 of 2015, wherein she was posed certain questions, which lead the plaintiffs to investigate into the issue. In the 1st week of January, 2022, when the plaintiffs came to know that the defendants created, concocted void-ab initio documents without knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs. In the month of February, 2023, the defendants 6 and 7 occupied the plaint schedule properties. Hence, the claim of the plaintiffs was within the limitation.”
Noting that the plaint was not read as a whole by the Trial Court, the High Court concluded,
“… the entire plaint has not been read as a whole. There is no meaningful reading of the plaint. It is so evident from reading of the impugned judgment which completely missed the paras relating to cause of action and the limitation in particular.”
Case Title: Konkanala Suryaprakasha Rao (died) and others v. Kampa Bhaskara Rao and another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 159
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has reiterated that a General Power of Attorney-cum-Sale Agreement (GPA/SA) does not confer any title or ownership in an immovable property and cannot be used to defeat a decree for specific performance where a prior sale agreement had culminated in a Court decree and delivery of possession.
While dealing with a case where the appellants claimed ownership over a suit schedule property based on a GPA/SA of 2007, which was made after the Respondent 1/plaintiff's earlier valid sale agreement of 2006, a Division Bench of Justice Ravi Nath Tilhari and Justice Maheswara Rao Kuncheam held,
“… we hold that the Special General Power of Attorney dated 17.01.2007 in favour of the 1st appellant does not confer or create any right, title and interest in favour of the 1st appellant, nor based thereon the lease in favour of the 2nd appellant by the 1st appellant confers any right to the 2nd appellant, so as to object to the execution of the decree in favour of the 1st respondent/decree holder for delivery of possession of the E.P.schedule property or to resist/obstruct delivery of possession.”
Case Title: BOYA KISTAMMA v. BOYA SURI
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 160
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has observed that Trial Courts, while granting an order of status-quo, must refrain from adopting a “short-cut method” where the status of parties is not determined, as such orders create “doubt and ambiguity”, and instead, the order must state, in unequivocal terms, what the status-quo is.
While dealing with a case where the Trial Court modified an ad-interim injunction into an order of status quo without recording who was in possession of the suit property, Justice Subba Reddy Satti observed,
“… trial courts developed a tendency to take a short-cut method of granting status quo without determining the status of the parties. While ordering Status-Quo, the court must state in unequivocal terms what the Status-Quo is. The Court must state whether the Plaintiff or the defendant is in possession. Granting the order of status quo without recording the possession, in the considered opinion of this court, would leave the matter in doubt and ambiguity, and it would result in dangerous consequences. It is desirable and appropriate that when the court intends to pass an order of status quo concerning the possession, the court must record a finding as to who is in possession of the property. If the court is convinced, based upon the material, regarding prima facie possession of the plaintiff, the status quo regarding possession of the suit property shall continue till further order or disposal of the suit. But a finding to that effect must be recorded.”
“If the order of status quo relates to the nature and character of the suit property and the property has to be preserved till disposal of the suit, then also before passing an order of status quo in respect of the nature and character of the property, the conditions thereof obtaining on that date must be indicated (i.e. Demolition and Dispossession). But passing an order of status quo without indicating the status is a shortcut procedure, and such a type of order will further frustrate and complicate the issues. Such a vague order of status quo without indicating status by the civil courts cannot be encouraged at any cost because such an order unnecessarily creates multiplicity of disputes, and such a vague order of status quo does not render any effective service to the litigants. Such orders, instead of advancing the cause of justice, are creating problematic situations, where the litigants are filing one petition after another without knowing where to seek justice” the single judge added.
Case Title: V. Maheswari and others v. S. Bhaskarachari
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (AP) 165
The Andhra Pradesh High Court has upheld a Trial Court order, which dismissed a petition filed under Order 18 Rule 3 of CPC seeking permission for the plaintiffs to reserve their right to adduce rebuttal evidence after the defendants concluded their evidence in a partition suit involving a registered partition deed of 2002, which also stood challenged by the plaintiffs in the original suit.
Justice B.S. Bhanumathi held,
“A perusal of the issues shows that the initial burden of establishing all these issues lies on the plaintiffs alone. It is not a case of a normal partition suit wherein, if the plaintiffs claim that the plaint schedule property is joint family property and the defendants take a plea that the property was already partitioned, the burden may lie on the party pleading earlier partition. Whereas, in the present case, the plaintiffs already admitted that there is a registered partition deed, dated 28.02.2022, and seek declaration of the same as null and void. Therefore, they cannot throw the burden of proving any of the issues on the defendants. Order XVIII Rule 3 applies where the burden lies on one party with regard to some issues and the other party with regard to other issues, which is not the case on hand.”
Bombay High Court
Case Title: Pandit Vithal Landage vs Vishnu Govind Pawar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 186
The Bombay High Court stated that court commissioner can be appointed at pre-mature stage under Order XXVI Rule 9 CPC in encroachment and boundary dispute.
Case Title: Anil Dhanraj Jethani vs Firoz Nadiadwala
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 211
The Bombay High Court stated that formal service of writ of summons not required in transferred suit if appearance made at interlocutory stage. The Bench of Justice Abhay Ahuja stated that “since the rigours of the Commercial Courts Act and the amended CPC in relation to the service of summons do not apply to transferred Suits and considering that the captioned Suit was a regular Suit filed before the enactment of the Commercial Courts Act to which the Commercial Courts Act become applicable and that the Defendant No.1 had already entered an appearance at the interlocutory stage / filed Vakalatnama, there is no need for the Plaintiffs to thereafter serve a writ of summons as the object of serving writ of summons has been satisfied.”
Case Title: M/s. Unique Integrated Transport & Management Consultancies Pvt. Ltd. vs Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 283
The Bombay High Court has ruled that the bar of res judicata under Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) cannot be invoked for the first time in a final judgment without framing an issue or giving parties an opportunity to respond. It has set aside a single judge's judgment that dismissed a suit invoking res judicata at the decree stage without prior notice.
Case Title: Akshay Quenim vs Royce Savio Pereira
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 394
The Bombay High Court has held that when a defendant files an application for return of the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC, the Trial Court must first examine that application before considering any amendment sought by the plaintiff. The Court emphasised that jurisdiction cannot be conferred on a Court by way of amendment if it inherently lacks jurisdiction at the time of filing of the plaint.
Leave Under Clause 12 Of Letters Patent Not Required For Filing Suits U/S 19 CPC: Bombay High Court
Case Title: Sameer Gulamnabi Kazi vs Ruhinaz Shakil Shaikh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Bom) 467
The Bombay High Court has held that leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent is not required for instituting a suit in the High Court's original civil jurisdiction when the case falls under Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), i.e., for compensation for wrongs done to a person or movable property. The Court clarified that Clause 12 applies only to suits covered under Sections 16, 17, and 20 CPC, whose applicability to the High Court is expressly excluded by Section 120 CPC.
Calcutta High Court
Case: MSC MEDITERRANEAN SHIPPING COMPANY S. A. AND ANR. VS NTC INDUSTRIES LIMITED
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Cal) 265
The Calcutta High Court has held that service of a writ of summons on a company by speed post at its registered office constitutes valid service under Order XXIX Rule 2(b) of the Code of Civil Procedure, thereby triggering the mandatory 120-day period for filing a written statement under the Commercial Courts framework.
Justice Aniruddha Roy dismissed NTC Industries Limited's application seeking extension of time to file its written statement in a demurrage claim suit filed by MSC Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. and another. Holding that the statutory deadline had long expired, the Court declared that the defendant had forfeited its right to file the written statement and directed that the suit shall proceed as undefended.
Case Title: Steel Authority of India Limited Vs H. R. Construction Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Cal) 119
The Calcutta High Court bench of Justice Shampa Dutt (Paul) has held that an amendment to the original claim may be permitted during arbitral proceedings, even at the stage of final arguments, particularly when costs have been imposed on the party seeking the amendment and accepted by the opposite party—provided the amendment does not materially alter the nature of the original claim or cause prejudice.
It further held that while Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) provisions may be applied in arbitration, they are not to be strictly enforced to bar such amendments under Order VI Rule 17, given the more flexible framework of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Second Appeal Not Maintainable Under Trade Marks Act: Calcutta High Court Dismisses Dunlop's Appeal
Case Title: Glorious Investment Limited v. Dunlop International Limited & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Cal) 248
The Calcutta High Court recently reaffirmed that a second appeal against a Single Judge's order is not permissible under the Trade Marks Act, 1999. The court clarified that once an appeal from an order passed by the Registrar of Trademarks is decided by a Single Judge, no further appeal can be filed before a Division Bench in view of the bar under Section 100A of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).
Case: EDEN CONSULTANCY SERVICES PVT LTD VS KERALA STATE ELECTRONICS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD AND ORS
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Cal) 259
The Calcutta High Court has held that a co-defendant cannot file a written statement in response to a counter-claim raised by another defendant, ruling that the CPC does not permit such inter se litigation within a single suit.
Justice Aniruddha Roy, dismissed an application by the first defendant, KERALA STATE ELECTRONICS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD (KELTRON), seeking leave to file a rejoinder and “additional written statement” to a counter-claim lodged by the third defendant.
Chhattisgarh High Court
Illegal Termination During Probation, Chhattisgarh HC Declines To Review Judgement
Case Title: State Of Chhattisgarh v. Ku. Kirti Kumari Kanwar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Chh) 2
A single judge bench of the Chhattisgarh High Court comprising of Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey held that a review cannot be used to reargue the case or introduce new arguments without an apparent error or new evidence. Therefore, the employee, who was illegally terminated, was allowed to continue her service.
It was observed that the court may review its judgment or order, but application for review shall not be entertained except on the grounds mentioned under Order 47 Rule 1 of the CPC:
- If the person is aggrieved by a decree or order where an appeal is either not allowed or not preferred.
- If new and important evidence was discovered which was previously not available despite due diligence.
- If there is an error apparent on the face of the record.
Delhi High Court
Case title: Rajeev Shukla vs. Gopal Krishna Shukla
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 13
The Delhi High Court has observed that mentioning a wrong section of law in an application would not considered fatal to case if the substance of application was clear and no prejudice would be caused to the opposite party.
Justice Ravinder Dudeja remarked, “Procedural errors, including mentioning incorrect provision of law should not override the substantive justice. The Court has enough powers under Section 151 CPC to ensure that justice is served.”
Case Title: DIN DAYAL AGRAWAL HUF versus CAPRISO FINANCE LTD
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 715
The Delhi High Court bench of Justice Ravinder Dudeja has held that if a proper application is filed under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Court must refer the parties to arbitration and may reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC) as barred by law. However, if no such application is filed and no prayer is made for reference to arbitration, the mere existence of an arbitration clause is not sufficient to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
Case title.: Sh. Raj Kumar And Anr. v. Mrs Poonam
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 930
The Delhi High Court has stayed a Magistrate Court order directing auction of husband's alleged share in a family property, in the execution petition filed by his wife seeking payment of maintenance.
This was after the husband cited violation of Section 60(1)(ccc) CPC, which prescribes that every person has a right to reside and there cannot be an execution against the only dwelling house which a person possesses.
Plaintiff Has No Vested Right To File Replication Under CPC: Delhi High Court
Case title: Dinesh Kumar Verma v. Ramesh Ghai
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1116
The Delhi High Court has made it clear that filing of replication by a Plaintiff is only judicially sanctioned and is not a statutory right of the party.
Case title: Mrs Shumita Sandhu v. Mrs Tani Sandhu Bhargava
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Del) 1392
The Delhi High Court has made it clear that mere failure of a party, alleging that a document is fraud, to provide particulars of such fraud doesn't lead to a conclusion that the party has admitted the genuineness of such document.
Gujarat High Court
Case title : IMRAN KUMELAHMED KHAN LEGAL HEIR OF LATE KUMELAHMED ABDULHAMID KHAN V/S STATE BANK OF INDIA & ANR.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 41
The Gujarat High Court recently rejected a man's plea against dismissal of his application for rejection of suit filed by a bank to recover a loan taken by the man's deceased father, claiming he was not liable to pay his father's bank loan as debt is not heritable property under Muslim Law.
The court however said that the contentions made by the son would require a "detailed inquiry during the course of trial" of the recovery suit.
The son had challenged a November 27, 2024 order passed by 4th additional senior civil judge Surat dismissing his application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of a suit for recovery of debt against the borrower. The Petitioner was impleaded as defendant no. 2 in the said suit, in the capacity of legal heir of the borrower being his son. He was also joined in the capacity of proprietor of M/s SK Textiles.
Case title: IRSHADUNNISHA & ANR. v/s MAKBULHUSEN ABBASALI SAIYED HEIRS OF DECEASED ABBASALI HAJI MURADALI SAIYED & ORS.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 53
The Gujarat High Court has upheld a trial court's eviction order which had held that the tenants had breached the terms of tenancy concerning a property which was originally given on rent to be exclusively used for a cycle repair business but was eventually being used to conduct business of seat covers and accessories.
The high court was hearing a revision plea against judgment of the Appellate court which had quashed and set aside the order passed by the trial court in a civil suit. The trial court had allowed a plea for eviction of defendants; this was challenged by defendants before the appellate court which allowed the defendants' appeal. Against this the plaintiff moved the high court.
Case title: DIPAKKUMAR KIRTILAL SHAH Versus NAVINKUMAR BANSIDHAR MAHESHWARI
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 80
The Gujarat High Court has upheld a trial court order which sent a man stated to be suffering from a disability to 30-day civil imprisonment for selling a shop despite a status quo order against such sale.
The high court rejected the contention of the petitioner's counsel that civil imprisonment imposed on the petitioner was wrong and that the court should have weighed other options available to it–attachment of the property of the person guilty of such disobedience.
Justice JL Odedra in his order observed that when the petitioner's advocate was questioned as to the property which was made available or which was pointed out to the Court for being attached, the advocate could not satisfy this Court as to the property which could have been attached
Case title: SUNNI MUSLIM IDGAH MASJID TRUST v/s HARDIK SITARAM PATEL & ANR. and Batch
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Guj) 230
The Gujarat High Court on Wednesday (December 17) dismissed a batch of petitions moved by various waqf institutions challenging orders passed by Gujarat State Waqf Tribunal rejecting applications under the Waqf Act over disputes pertaining to waqf properties, citing insufficient court fee.
In doing so the court held that there was "no blanket exemption" or waiver granted to waqf institutions from paying court fees for filing applications under Section 83(3) of Waqf Act in the State.
The court observed that Section 83(5) of the Waqf Act, provides that the Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court and shall exercise the same powers. Section 83(6), stipulates that the Tribunal may regulate its own procedure, provided such procedure is consistent with CPC. Further Section 83(7) ordains that a decision rendered by the Tribunal shall have the force and effect of a decree of a Civil Court.
"A conjoint reading of Sections 83(5) to 83(8) leaves no manner of doubt that the provisions of the CPC, are fully applicable to judicial proceedings under Chapter VIII of the Waqf Act..thus, It is clear that in deciding any dispute relating to the procedure specially provided by the act i.e. Waqf Act or the waqf rules the tribunal shall be guided by provision contained in the CPC as far as possible. In that circumstances the provision of the CPC applies to the proceedings," it said.
The court noted that the Waqf Tribunal rejected the plaint by invoking Order VII Rule 11 CPC on account of insufficiency of court fees. It noted that there is no independent or specific provision under the Waqf Act, the Rules, or the Gujarat State Waqf Rules governing rejection of a plaint on the ground of insufficient court fees.
Thus, the court held, the recourse to the provisions of the CPC by the Tribunal "was not only permissible but inevitable".
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Case Title: Devi Dass v/s M/s Ginni Global Pvt. Ltd. & another
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has set aside a Trial Court order which set aside an ex-parte decree, while holding that an ex parte decree can't be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity in service of summons if it is established that the other party had notice of the hearing date and sufficient time to contest the claim.
Justice Satyen Vaidya said: “The second proviso appended to Rule 13 of Order 9 of the Code carves out an exception that no Court shall set-aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim.”
Case Title: Dalip Singh & another V/s Khatri Ram & another
The Himachal Pradesh High Court held that under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a Local Commissioner can't be appointed at the appellate stage merely to help a party gather fresh evidence which it failed to produce or challenge during the trial.
Justice Vivek Singh Thakur: “By appointing a Local Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC, the Court is not to be used as a facilitator for collection of evidence in favour or against any party”.
Case Name: Sh. Mukhtyar Singh V/s Gyan Singh & Others.
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that the plea that documents were inadvertently left in the counsel's brief is not a valid ground to invoke the provisions of Order VII Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Rejecting the Contention of the Petitioner Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “These pleas are no reasons to invoke the provisions of Order 7, Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions have been provided in the Statute to advance the cause of justice and not to throttle the wheel of justice as apparently is the intent of the petitioner.”
Case Name: Puran Prakash Goel & another v/s Chaman Lal Vaidya
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that the omission of certain khasranumbers in an eviction petition does not amount to non-disclosure of cause of action and cannot be a ground for dismissal under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Rejecting the tenant's contention, Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “Mere non-mention of certain khasra numbers per se cannot be so fatal so as to throw the petitioners in terms of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code on the count that the petition did not disclose any cause of action.”
Case Name: Smt. Ganga Jogta v/s Shri Nand Lal (deceased) through his legal heirs
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that in execution proceedings, if a judgment debtor was proceeded against ex parte and subsequently died, his legal representatives must still be brought on record.
Rejecting the contention of the plaintiff, Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “Simply because, the only judgment-debtor was proceeded against ex- parte, this does not gives any right to the petitioner not to bring on record his legal representatives after his death”.
Case Name: Mangat Ram (deceased) through his Lrs. Namely Tarsem Lal and others V/s State of H.P. & Ors.
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that a plaintiff has the right to continue a suit until a formal judicial order of withdrawal is passed. It further remarked that merely filing an application or making a statement about compromise and withdrawal does not, by itself, amount to dismissal of the case.
Rejecting the Trial Court's reasoning, Justice Ajay Mohan Goel observed that:“The Court cannot force the plaintiff to withdraw a case, simply because at an earlier stage the plaintiff might have filed such an application or even may have recorded his or her statement… The Court cannot shy away and shun its duty to decide the case on merit.”
Right To Appeal Cannot Be Made Conditional Upon Deposit Of Decretal Sum: HP High Court
Case Name: Sh. Rajinder Singh Thakur & another v/s Sh. Dhaminder Kunmar Chadha
The Himachal Pradesh High Court held that an appellate court cannot impose the condition of depositing the decreetal amount as a precondition for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “The learned 1st Appellate Court had no authority to issue a direction that the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is allowed subject to deposition of 50% of the decreetal amount,”
Case Name: Smt. Amar Kaur and other v/s Sh. Rishib Kumar
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that translated versions of already exhibited documents are not additional evidence and the courts must prioritize justice over procedural technicalities.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “...by no stretch of imagination it was an application to lead additional evidence. Interest of justice would have been served had the learned Appellate Court allowed the application... Failure on the part of the learned Appellate Court to do so renders the impugned order bad in law.”
Case Name: Santosh Kumar v/s Pushpa Devi & others
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that the scope of Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure,1908, which lays down consequences for disobeying an injunction or breaching the terms, is not confined to the parties in the suit. The provision applies to any person who has violated the order of the court.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: "In case of disobedience or breach of an injunction, the Court may order attachment of the property or detention in civil prison of the person guilty of such breach. This provision does not restrict itself to the parties in the lis—the expression used is 'person'.”
Case Name: Mahindra and Mahindra Finance Services Limited & another v/s Smt. Basanti Devi
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that an executing court can't rely on evidence led in a separate proceeding under a different provision of the Civil Procedure Code between the parties.
Case Name: Hardeep Singh v/s Manohar Lal and others
The Himachal Pradesh High Court held that Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code has nothing to do with the connection with consolidation or clubbing of suits. It provides for the stay of subsequent suits filed between the same parties on the same cause of action.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “Section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code has got nothing to do with the issue of clubbing or consolidating the cases, because, the same relates to the principle of res-subjudice, wherein, a subsequent suit filed between the same parties on the same cause has to be stayed in the light of the pendency of the earlier suit.”
Case Name: Sachin Shridhar & others v/s Himachal Pradesh Housing & Urban Development Authority
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has quashed a communication issued by the Himachal Pradesh Housing and Urban Development Authority , which had withheld payment of to the landowners on the ground that a shortfall in the land area could not be treated as a defect in title under the sale deed.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel said: “This Court is of the considered view that defect in title of land cannot be confused with the alleged shortfall in the total land sold by the petitioners to the respondent.”
Case Name: Shri Mansha Ram v/s Shri Amar Nath (since deceased) through Lrs. Sh. Ashok Kumar and others
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that courts can permit secondary evidence only upon strict proof that the original document is lost, destroyed, or withheld by the opposing party. Mere allegations or unsubstantiated claims of loss are insufficient grounds for such permission.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel observed that: “An inquiry report revealed that no original document was submitted by the plaintiff for registration and what he had submitted was only a photocopy of the said Will and the complaint was also dismissed.”
Case Name: Shri Vinod Kalia v/s Bhagwati Public Aushdhalaya through Shri Rattan Chand Kalia
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that a party cannot rely on the old age of a person to justify his failure to produce the witness or prove the alleged original rent agreement in a civil suit.
The Court reiterated that when a witness is aged, the law provides a clear mechanism for recording such testimony through a Court-appointed Commissioner.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: "The contention that Roshal Lal is an aged person, cannot come to the rescue of the petitioner because if that was the case, the petitioner could have had moved an appropriate application to have the statement of Roshan Lal recorded by the appointment of a Commissioner.
Case Name: Nanak Chand v/s Madan Lal
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has held that while deciding an application under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC, the Appellate Court cannot question the veracity of the Local Commissioner's report, as examining its veracity lies within the domain of the parties and must be tested through evidence.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel remarked that: “Raising objections to the report… lay in the domain of the respondent… it was not for the learned Court to have had commented upon the veracity of the report… Had the application been allowed… it would not have amounted to the admission of the averments…”
Case Name: Himinder Lal & others v/s Madan Lal and others
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has observed that Section 92(1)(h) of the Code of Civil Procedure is “very widely worded”, empowering courts to grant such further or other relief as the nature of the case may require.
The Court further remarked that Section 92(1)(h) is broad and allows “further or other relief” necessary for trust administration, including examining alienation of trust property.
A Division Bench of Chief Justice G.S. Sandhawalia and Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj remarked that: “Section 92 sub-Clause (1) (h) of CPC is very widely worded… the power of the Courts would depend upon as to what relief has to be granted at the time of the final decision and whether it is to be exercised qua the alienation… has to be decided after evidence is led and at this stage even otherwise cannot be done.”
Allegations Of Fraud Can't Be Decided Under SARFAESI Act: Himachal Pradesh High Court
Case Name: UCO Bank and another v/s Smt. Manjana Verma Sahni and another
The Himachal Pradesh High Court has dismissed a writ petition filed by UCO Bank, which challenged a trial court order rejecting an application under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code.
Justice Ajay Mohan Goel noted that: “This Court is of the considered view that the first relief which has been prayed for by the petitioners by no stretch of imagination can be granted under Section 17 of the 2002 Act and for the grant of that relief obviously the Fora is the Civil Court.”
Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh High Court
Case Title: Mushtaq Ahmad Bhat Vs Sheeraza Akhtar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 7
Reaffirming the principle that no appeal lies against a compromise decree the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court court emphasised that a party seeking to avoid such a decree must challenge it before the court that issued it, proving the invalidity of the underlying agreement.
Case Title: Peer Rattan Nath Mahant Sh. Shiv ji Maharaj Peer kho Vs Wazir Onkar Singh
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 69
The High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh reaffirmed the broad jurisdiction of executing courts under Order 21 Rule 97 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The Court presided by Justice Javed Iqbal Wani held that the term "any person" in Rule 97(1) is deliberately broad to include all individuals who resist or obstruct possession, empowering executing courts to adjudicate such disputes within the execution proceedings itself.
Case Title: Punjab National Bank vs V K Gandotra
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 80
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that a suit for damages due to wrongful dismissal is not maintainable unless the termination is first challenged and declared wrongful. The court observed that the plaintiff has neither pleaded nor made any attempt to demonstrate that the impugned order of dismissal was in violation of any terms of his employment.
Case Title: Punjab National Bank vs V K Gandotra
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 81
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that if there is an omission on the part of the trial court to frame an issue on the maintainability of the suit under law, that does not limit the powers of the appellate court to decide the issue of maintainability. The court added that the only requirement is that there should be no new facts that need to be pleaded and no new evidence to be led by the parties. The court held that if the evidence on file is sufficient, the appellate court can decide and determine the case finally.
Case Title: Saraj Din Vs Liaqat Ali
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 91
The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court reaffirmed that a Commissioner for local investigation under Order 26 Rule 9 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) can only be appointed when the evidence before the trial court is inconclusive and requires clarification.
Case Title: Saraj Din vs Liyaqat Ali
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 113
The Jammu and Kashmir High Court held that a Commission under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC could be issued only when the trial court is unable to decide the controversy based on the evidence placed by the parties. The court noted that a Commissioner under Order 39 Rule 7 CPC is appointed for inspection purposes, while a Commissioner under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC is meant for investigation to elucidate disputed facts.
Case Title: Mst Sara Vs Financial Commissioner Revenue JK Srinagar
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 176
Reinforcing a critical procedural safeguard, the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh at Srinagar held that Order XXII Rule 10A CPC introduces a legal fiction deeming the contract between an advocate and a deceased party as subsisting but only for the limited and essential purpose of requiring the advocate to inform the Court about the death of the party they represent.
Case Title: Abdul Khaliq Sofi Vs Mohammad Shafi Mir
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 299
Observing that due process of law is satisfied the moment a competent court adjudicates rights of the parties, the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh held that “once a person in possession brings a suit for injunction against a person who interferes in his possession and his rights are determined in the said suit, it is not necessary for the defendants to bring a fresh suit for eviction”.
Case Title: Mehraj Ahmad Ganai And Anr. Vs Mst. Sara Begum & Ors
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 316
The Jammu & Kashmir High Court held that an appellate order dismissing an appeal as withdrawn does not amount to a compromise decree merely because a written compromise was placed on record, unless the court records its satisfaction and passes a decree in terms of the compromise as required under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Case Title: Abdul Gani Ganai Vs Habibullah Ganai
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 334
The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court held that the question of limitation can be subsumed within the broader issues arising from the pleadings, and failure to frame a specific issue on limitation is not fatal, so long as no prejudice is caused to the parties.
Jharkhand High Court
Case Title: Maya Ram v. Asha Ram & Ors.
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 3
The Jharkhand High Court in a recent ruling has emphasized that appointing a second Pleader Commissioner without assigning reasons for ignoring the report of the first Commissioner violates the provisions of Order 26, Rule 10(3) of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) and is to be condemned.
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, presiding over the case, criticized the lower court's decision, stating, “The practice of appointing a second Commissioner without formally recording objections to the first Commissioner's report without considering whether the first Commissioner's report should be superseded, or not is a practice which cannot be too strongly condemned. Reasons for superseding the first Commissioner's report must be recorded in writing by the Court.”
Case Title: X vs. Y
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 53
The Jharkhand High Court enhanced the permanent alimony awarded by the family court a woman to Rs. 90,000 p.m.–including Rs. 40,000 for maintenance of her minor son who suffers from autism, rejecting the husband's argument that she was self sufficient observing that she can't do a permanent job in view of her son's condition.
In doing so the court also took note of the husband's job observing that he earns Rs. 2,31,294 per month while also remarking that autism, which is incurable, requires treatment carrying "huge expenditure on a regular basis".
Case Title: Prabodh Kumar Tiwary v. Rakesh Kumar Tiwary & Ors.
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 61
The Jharkhand High Court has held that an amendment to pleadings at the appellate stage cannot be allowed when the party seeking it fails to offer strong reasons for the delay and does not carry out the earlier permitted amendment during trial.
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, presiding over the case, observed that Order VI Rule 17 of the CPC confers a discretionary jurisdiction on the Court exercisable at any stage of the proceedings to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be just.
Case Title: Rites Ltd v. M/s Supreme BKB DECO JV
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 7
The Jharkhand High Court Bench of Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary has held that the power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution can be invoked for interfering with an interim order only in exceptionally rare cases.
Additionally, the court held that Arbitral Tribunals are not bound by the strict rigours of CPC and an amendment is permissible at any stage of the proceedings for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties.
Case Title: Manoj Kumar Khatri @ Manoj Khatr and Anr vs Kumar Rohit Singh and anr
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 11
The Jharkhand High Court has reiterated that a commissioner as a pleader appointed by the court under Order XXVI Rule 10-A of the CPC cannot collect evidence on behalf of parties to a suit.
Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi held that the appointment of a commissioner is meant to elucidate matters in dispute and not to aid a party in establishing its claims.
Case Title: State of Jharkhand v. R.K. Construction Private Limited
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 97
The Jharkhand High Court recently observed that the State is not an ordinary litigant seeking to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook. The Court directed that henceforth all litigation on the appellate or revisional side at the behest of the State must be initiated only after complying with the Jharkhand State Litigation Policy.
A Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan and Justice Rajesh Shankar was hearing a civil review petition filed by the State against an earlier order of the High Court directing the executing court to dispose of the execution proceedings expeditiously. The High Court noted that the impugned order had not even remotely touched upon the merits of the case and had merely issued directions to the executing court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously, in line with settled legal principles.
Case Title: Rajani Kanta Patra v. Union Of India & Ors.
LL Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Jha) 9
The Jharkhand High Court has held that an officer's good antecedents cannot be one of the grounds to interfere with the quantum of punishment imposed by a disciplinary authority, especially when the charges relate to misconduct.
A division bench comprising Chief Justice M. S. Ramachandra Rao and Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary confirmed the disciplinary punishment awarded to a former Assistant Commandant of Central Industrial Security Force, Bokaro Steel Limited, who was found guilty of making caste-based remarks against an Inspector in his office.
Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Bowring Institute AND Sarwik S and Others
Case No: MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.7641/2024
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 10
The Karnataka High Court has reiterated that before granting an ad-interim temporary injunction without notice to the opposite party, the trial court must assign reasons on whether the object of granting the injunction would be defeated by delay.
Justice H P Sandesh, said, “The word used in Order 39 Rule 3 (Civil Procedure Code) is the court shall exercise the discretion and when the statue itself requires reasons to be recorded, the Court cannot ignore that requirement by saying that if reasons are recorded, it may amount to expressing an opinion in favour of the plaintiff before hearing the defendant.”
Case Title: Kudleepa AND Mahantesh & Others
Case No: WRIT PETITION NO.100030 OF 2025
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 12
The Karnataka High Court has held that a respondent in an election petition cannot seek for transposition as a petitioner claiming that there is a collusion between the Election petitioner and the successful candidate or any other ground.
A single judge, Justice Suraj Govindaraj held thus while dismissing a petition filed by Kudleepa Chittaragi who had questioned the order of the trial court rejecting his application made under Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure.
It said “The petitioner in the present case being a respondent and not having independently challenged the election of respondent No.2 could not have filed an application for transposition under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC.”
Case Title: Balakrishna K P & ANR AND K P Puttaraju & Others
Case No: WRIT PETITION NO.51712/2019
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 242
The Karnataka High Court has said that the exercise of power by the trial Court to consider the application for police protection is an inherent power of the Court under Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The trial Court may pass such an order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court.
A single judge, Justice Vijaykumar A. Patil held thus and issued guidelines to be followed by trial courts while considering the application made seeking police protection by the plaintiff in a suit. It said, “I am of the view that the consideration of the application filed for police protection before the trial Court shall be based on various factors like:
Case Title: M Sharadamma & Others AND Kiran Kumar & Others
Case No: WRIT PETITION NO.50575/2019
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 243
The Karnataka High Court has upheld an order of the trial court which allowed an application filed by a plaintiff in a suit filed for specific performance of contract, seeking to summon the defendant in the case as a witness.
The Trial Court had concluded that any party to the suit can be summoned as a witness and allowed the application as per Rule 21 of Order XVI (summoning and attendance of witnesses) CPC. The defendants in the suit M Sharadamma and others had approached the high court challenging trial court's 12-09-2019 order.
Case Title: Sivagami N AND M/s Vinayaka Travels & Others
Case No: WRIT PETITION No.17796 OF 2025
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 269
The Karnataka High Court has said that the right to cross-examination, whether or not encoded in statute, emerges as a sine qua non of adjudication. It is not merely permissible, it is an indispensable right.
Justice M Nagaprasanna held thus while upholding an order passed by the Commercial Court dismissing an application filed by the petitioner Sivagami N, seeking the trial court to draw an adverse inference and deny cross-examination to the plaintiffs.
Civil Suit Seeking Corrections In Birth/Death Certificate Not Maintainable: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Suhas L AND The Chief Registrar Births And Deaths & Others
Case No: REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.2454 OF 2024
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 271
The Karnataka High Court has held that a civil suit for seeking rectification of entries in a Death Certificate is not maintainable.
Justice Sachin Shankar Magadum said, “This Court is of the considered view that the present suit, filed before the Civil Court seeking rectification of entries in the Death Certificate, is not maintainable. There exists a clear bar under Section 9 of the CPC, as the nature of the relief falls exclusively within the domain of the Registrar under Section 15 of the 1969 Act (Registration of Births And Deaths Act)."
Case Title: Seetha Nayak & Others AND Laxmi Kom Nagesh Naik
Case No: WRIT PETITION NO.102555 OF 2025
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 294
The Karnataka High Court has said that only the defendant who has filed a written statement, in a suit seeking partition and separate possession, can seek amendment of the written statement filed by him, other defendants who have adopted the written statement are not permitted to amend it.
Justice Suraj Govindaraj held thus while dismissing a petition filed by Seeta Nayak and others. He said “In my considered opinion, it would not be permissible for defendant No.4, who has not filed a written statement, to seek amendment of a written statement not filed by defendant No.4.”
Case Title: Veerabhadrapa & Others AND Channappa Gowda D & Others
Case No: REGULAR SECOND APPEAL NO. 807 OF 2014
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 341
While considering a dispute involving a partition suit, the Karnataka High Court has suggested the legislature to revisit and suitably amend the Civil Procedure Code to facilitate quick resolution of final decree proceedings.
Justice Ananth Ramanath Hegde said:
“When it comes to delay in court proceedings, partition suits occupy the top of the list, among various categories of litigation. The reasons are plenty. Probably one of the prime reasons is the procedure of passing the preliminary decree and final decree and providing two appeals up to the High Court (If the valuation of the plaintiff's share is less than Rs.10 lakhs), both on preliminary decree and final decree.”
Case Title: DEENANATH AND CHANDRAHAS & Others
Case No: WRIT PETITION NO. 796 OF 2022
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 380
The Karnataka High Court has said that in a suit where there are multiple issues framed, the right to lead the evidence is always on the plaintiff, even if the burden of proving some of the issues is on the defendant.
Further, in a case where the plaintiff intends to reserve his right to lead evidence in rebuttal after the defendant leads his evidence, the plaintiff can always make such a request to the court; however it is for the defendant to decide whether he wants to begin with his evidence.
Justice S Vishwajith Shetty said thus while allowing a petition filed by one Deenanath and set aside the order of the trial court. "From a plain reading of Rule 1 and 3 of Order XVIII it is clear that in a case which falls under Rule 1 normally it is for the plaintiff to lead his evidence first. It also enables defendant to exercise his right subject to the contingency mentioned in the Rule. In a case where plaintiff intends to reserve his right to lead evidence in rebuttal after the defendant leads his evidence, he can always make such a request to the Court, but then it is for the defendant to decide whether he wants to begin with the evidence. When there are several issues in a case, in respect to the issue where the burden is on the defendant to prove, the plaintiff can exercise the option as provided under Rule 1. However, in respect to the other issues the right to lead the evidence is always on the plaintiff".
RERA Orders Not Decrees, Cannot Be Executed Through Civil Courts: Karnataka High Court
Case Title: Mantri Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. Snil Pathiyam Veetil & Ors
Case Number: W.P. Nos. 17821/2025 C/w W.P 18348/2025 & W.P 19184/2025
Citation No: 2025 LiveLaw (Kar) 420
The Karnataka High Court has recently ruled that an order passed by a Real Estate Regulatory Authority (RERA) does not amount to a civil court decree and cannot be executed through civil execution proceedings, holding that RERA orders must be enforced only through the statutory recovery mechanism provided under the Act.
A single bench of Justice M Nagaprasanna said the statutory scheme shows that RERA is a 'self-contained code' whose decisions do not conform to any of the requirements of a decree as defined in Section 2(2) CPC, and therefore its orders cannot be executed as civil decrees.
Kerala High Court
Case Name: Muhammed V. Raveendran Nair And Others.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 34
The Kerala High Court (on January 14), while refusing to order a joint trial of suits, observed that the Civil Procedure Code does not specifically provide for consolidation of suits. Instead, its necessity is governed by equity, justice, convenience and necessity. Further, the Court may consider the principle of prejudice while ordering a joint trial.
“The Civil Procedure Code does not specifically provide for consolidation of suits or other proceedings. Equity, justice, convenience and necessity govern the question of whether the joint trial of suits or other proceedings is required or not. The principle of prejudice may also be taken into account when the court orders a joint trial.”
Case Title: G. Giri v G. Geetha
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 101
The Kerala High Court has observed that if a person does not fully disclose the details of his property while applying to sue as an indigent person, it is an indication that he wants to play fraud on the court by suppressing his ability to pay court fee.
Justice A. Badharudeen observed that in such cases, the courts can reject the application under Order 33, Rule 5(b) of CPC saying that the applicant is not an indigent person.
“When a party in possession of movable/s and immovable property/ies fails to disclose the details of movable/s or immovable property/ies, which is mandated under Order 33 Rule 2, the same would throw light on the fact that he had suppressed material facts about movable/s and immovable property/ies, with a view to mislead the court and play fraud on the Court by suppressing his assets, which would disclose his capacity to pay the Court fee. To put it differently, suppression of the assets held by the person, who wants to sue as an indigent person is a clear indication to hold that the said person hided his assets, knowing fully well that disclosure of his assets would show prima facie, his capacity to pay the Court fee.”
Case Title: Dasan v Yathra and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 110
The Kerala High Court held that courts should order oral examination (viva voice examination) only in exceptional cases for the purpose of getting further information if a person has not answered or answered insufficiently a question in the interrogatory.
Under Order XI Rule 11 of CPC, if a person interrogated omits to answer or answers insufficiently, the Court on an application by the interrogating party can direct the opposite party to answer or answer further either by affidavit or by viva voice.
Justice P. Krishna Kumar held that the party cannot apply for a particular course of action. The party can only make an application under Order XI Rule 11 and the manner in which the other party shall answer shall be decided by the Court.
Case Title: Fathima v Vappinu
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 117
The Kerala High Court ruled that amending an original petition filed before the Family Court incorporating reliefs under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is permissible and that it will not change the nature and character of the original petition.
The Court further stated that reliefs to be claimed under Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act can also be granted by the Family Court under Section 7 of the Family Courts Act to provide protection and justice to the victim.
The Division Bench of Justice Devan Ramachandran and Justice M.B. Snehalatha allowed the petition for amendment filed under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to incorporate reliefs under Sections 18 to 22 of the DV Act.
Case Title: K. C. Sivasankara Panicker v. K. C. Vasanthakumari @ K. C. Vasanthi and others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 275
The Kerala High Court has recently observed that a subsequent or second application seeking to deliver interrogatories to a party is not barred when there is a subsequent cause of action or changed circumstances.
Justice K Babu dismissed the Original Petition challenging the order of the Trial Court that permitted the respondent (plaintiff) to deliver interrogatories to the petitioner (defendant), and refused to interfere with the trial court's order.
Case Title: Iruvaikonam Bhagavathi Temple & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 327
The Kerala High Court has dismissed an application seeking leave to sue under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) concerning the administration of the Iruvaikonam Bhagavathi Temple in Thirupuram Village, Neyyattinkara. In his judgment, Justice M.A. Abdul Hakhim underscored that leave under Section 92 CPC is not to be granted automatically and highlighted the importance of satisfying statutory requirements before initiating such a suit.
The court emphasised that The main purpose of S.92 (1) is to give protection to public trusts of a charitable or religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them. Justice Abdul Hakhim clarified that before granting leave under Section 92 CPC, a court must be satisfied on several counts.
Case Title: Owners and Parties Interested in the Vessel M.V. Korea Chemi & Anr. v. Siluvaipichai Francies & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 330
In a ruling clarifying the territorial reach of admiralty jurisdiction under the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, the Kerala High Court has dismissed an admiralty suit against the owners of the vessel M.V. Korea Chemi, holding that the vessel was not within the court's jurisdiction at the relevant time.
Justice Syam Kumar V.M., while allowing an application filed by the owners (defendants 1 and 2) under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, ruled that the Kerala High Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Admiralty Act, 2017, since the vessel was anchored at Nhava Sheva Port in Mumbai and not within Kerala's territorial waters.
Case Title: M/s Cappithan Agencies v. Commissioner of Customs
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 378
In a ruling clarifying the territorial reach of admiralty jurisdiction under the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017, the Kerala High Court has dismissed an admiralty suit against the owners of the vessel M.V. Korea Chemi, holding that the vessel was not within the court's jurisdiction at the relevant time.
Justice Syam Kumar V.M., while allowing an application filed by the owners (defendants 1 and 2) under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, ruled that the Kerala High Court lacked jurisdiction under Section 3 of the Admiralty Act, 2017, since the vessel was anchored at Nhava Sheva Port in Mumbai and not within Kerala's territorial waters.
Case Title: Thalapalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sebastian P. George
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 666
In a recent judgment, the Kerala High Court has observed that the Co-Operative Arbitration Court conducting a trial in an election petition has the power to invoke provision under Order XI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure to order any party to produce documents in his possession as it deems necessary.
Referring to Section 70(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, Justice K. Babu clarified that the Arbitration Court is bound to follow the procedure for trials provided under the CPC and must adjudicate dispute based on the pleadings before it. For doing that, it must allow parties in the dispute to lead relevant evidence.
Case Title: Shahabeen Hameed v. Muhammed Ajnas A.B.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 703
The Kerala High Court recently refused to entertain an Original Petition filed before it challenging a Family Court's order dismissing a restoration application. According to the Court, when an alternative statutory remedy of appeal is provided under Order 43 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that has to be pursued.
The Division Bench comprising Justice Devan Ramachandran and Justice Snehalatha M.B. noted that the Family Court had dismissed an application preferred under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC for restoring a suit that was dismissed for non-appearance.
Case Title: Rifa Fathima v. Salim and Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 724
The Kerala High Court has recently held that a court can attach a father's retirement benefits for maintaining his child. It further clarified that the exemption under Section 60(1)(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that stipends and gratuities of pensioners are not liable to attachment and sale in execution of a decree, would not apply in such cases.
Distinguishing the Supreme Court decision in Radhey Shyam Gupta v. Punjab National Bank (2009), the Division Bench comprising Justice Devan Ramachandran and Justice M.B. Snehalatha observed that a minor daughter claiming maintenance cannot be equated with a creditor.
Case Title: Thalapalam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Sebastian P. George
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 666
In a recent judgment, the Kerala High Court has observed that the Co-Operative Arbitration Court conducting a trial in an election petition has the power to invoke provision under Order XI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure to order any party to produce documents in his possession as it deems necessary.
Referring to Section 70(3) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969, Justice K. Babu clarified that the Arbitration Court is bound to follow the procedure for trials provided under the CPC and must adjudicate dispute based on the pleadings before it. For doing that, it must allow parties in the dispute to lead relevant evidence.
Madhya Pradesh High Court
While upholding the Trial Court's decision, the Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that the question of whether a suit for malicious prosecution is maintainable or not cannot be decided at a preliminary stage by way of an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC as it requires a thorough examination of evidence.
Case Title: Dineshchandra Shrivastava And Others Versus Smt. Anuradha Saxena And Others, Civil Revision No. 731 Of 2018
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (MP) 62
The Gwalior Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the valuation of suits must be based on the relief sought and the substance of the plaint and not merely on the words used in the plaint.
In doing so, the Court said that where a plaintiff attempts to under-value a suit, the Court has to intervene to ascertain whether the relief sought has real money value.
Case Title: Ramcharan Goyal v Kamlrani Verma and Ors., Misc. Petition No. 6624 of 2023
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (MP) 96
The Madhya Pradesh High Court has strongly criticized the Trial Court for passing a non-speaking order while dismissing multiple applications by a party including those for substitution of parties (under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC) on the ground of absence of the party and its counsel.
Case Title: Parameshwari Developers Pvt Ltd v Suresh and Others (MP-5129-2025)
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (MP) 193
Madras High Court
Civil Court Has Jurisdiction To Pass Injunctive Relief In Industrial Disputes: Madras HC
Case Title: M. Nagappan v. The Management
Citation: 2024 LiveLaw (Mad) 5
Madras High Court: A single judge bench consisting Justice V. Lakshminarayanan allowed a civil revision petition against a District Munsif's order that refused to pass an injunction against TAW Footwear Division. The Munsif had rejected the plaint holding that the matter was an industrial dispute and fell exclusively within the Labour Court's jurisdiction. However, the court ruled that civil courts have jurisdiction over matters not covered under the Industrial Disputes Act. Following Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamalakar Shantharam Wadke, it held that since the labour courts were not empowered to grant interim injunctions under the Industrial Disputes Act, civil courts are the appropriate forum.
Case Title: Los Gatos Production Services India LLP v Wunderbar Films Private Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 27
The Madras High Court has dismissed applications filed by Netflix's Indian entity - Los Gatos, seeking to reject the plaint filed by Dhanush's Wunderbar, in connection with alleged copyright infringement by Nayanthara, Vignesh Sivan, and others.
Justice Abdul Quddhose also informed the parties that he would be hearing the interim injunction application filed by Wunderbar on February 5th, 2025.
Dhanush, who produced the movie “Naanum Rowdy Daan” has approached the court claiming that some behind-the-scene footages from the movie was used unauthorisedly in the making of Nayanthara's documentary “Nayanthara: Beyond the Fairytale”. Since Netflix India's office is in Mumbai, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Madras High Court, he had moved an application seeking leave to sue the company in the High Court which was allowed.
Case Title: Matrimony.com Ltd v. People Interactive (I) Pvt Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 33
The Madras High Court has held that a recent advertisement of the matrimonial company Shaadi.com giving money back guarantee if unable to find a bride/groom in 30 days is prima facie misleading and deceptive.
Justice RMT Teeka Raman observed that real terms of the offer, which is "contrary" to the promise made in the ad, are "tucked in fine print". As per the terms and conditions, the money back guarantee is triggered when a premium member sends at least 10 interests but doesn't get a single accept within first 30 days.
This prompted the bench to allow an interim injunction application filed by Shaadi.com's competitor Matrimony.com.
Case Title: PhonePe Private Limited v. BundlePe Innovations Pvt. Ltd
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 34
The Madras High Court recently dismissed a suit filed by PhonePe to declare its mark as a well known trademark and to grant permanent injunction against “BundlePe” and “LatePe”.
Justice P Velmurugan observed that the term “Pe” was not a unique or distinct one as claimed by PhonePe and was commonly used word in the payment services industry. The court noted that the word, which was a transliteration of the Hindi word “Pay”, was widely used by other prominent companies such as Google Pay, Paytm, and ApplePay. The court noted that given the widespread use of the word “Pe” in the payment sector, PhonePe could not be exclusively associated with the word.
Case Title: Anugraha Castings v. Anugraha Valve Castings Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 41
The Madras High Court recently emphasized that courts should refrain from passing ex-parte orders in a routine manner and must only pass such orders when there is a real emergency which was shown through the plaint and averments.
The bench of Chief Justice KR Shriram and Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy noted that ex-parte orders can have disastrous consequences and could possibly bring a party's business to a halt. The court added that by the time the party is heard and the ex-party order is vacated, the party and its customers may have faced a huge loss.
Pointing to the Supreme Court's direction in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeira, in which the court enunciated the principles relating to granting or refusal of injunction, the High Court highlighted that the courts in the State should always bear the directions in mind and ensure that ex-parte orders are passed only in case of grave emergency.
Case Title: TR Ramesh v The Commissioner, HR & CE Department
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 76
The Madras High Court has recently dismissed an appeal challenging the leasing out of temple land for building an Arts and Science College.
The division bench of Justice R Subramanian and Justice C Kumarappan noted that even though the requirements of Rule 2 (1) of the Alienation of Immovable Trust Property Rules 1960 have not been entirely complied with, the advantages of the purpose for which leasing was done would outweigh the procedural infractions.
The court also noted that while Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act 1959 and the rules provided the procedure to be followed during the alienation of immovable trust property, the act and the rule were silent on the consequences of non-compliance with the procedural requirements. Thus, the bench observed that in the absence of consequence of non-compliance, the word 'shall' used in the provisions could be said to be directory and not mandatory.
Case Title: M. Gunasekaran v. The District Registrar and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 100
The Madras High Court has clarified that pleadings in a civil suit is not a document or instrument to be registered under the Registration Act or the Stamp Act. The court added that authorities cannot entertain the pleadings or make entries regarding the same in the encumbrance certificate.
Justice Anand Venkatesh made the observations noting that previously, the courts have ruled in favour of registering pleadings to ensure that an innocent purchaser is not put into distress. The court observed that though the earlier directions were well intended, it had a flip side to it and if allowed to continue, it would result in more confusion.
Case Title: S. Mayalagu v. The Director of Collegiate Education and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 109
The Madras High Court has stressed that courts should be slow to ignore delay once the limitation period for a particular suit expires and the action becomes time-barred.
Justice Shamim Ahmed observed that the statute relating to limitation determines the life span of a legal remedy and as time passes, newer causes would come up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy. Remarking that time is precious, the court thus noted that if the life span of legal remedy was not followed, it may lead to unending uncertainty and anarchy.
Case Title: Ganesan Prabhu v. M/s. Dhanabakkiam Enterprises and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 144
The Madras High Court has raised attachment of property belonging to late actor Sivaji Ganesan that was attached by the court in March 2023 in a plea seeking execution of an arbitral award against his grandson Dushyanth Ramkumar and their production company Eshan Productions.
Justice Abdul Quddhose ordered lifting the attachment on a plea filed by Ganesan Prabhu, the actor's elder son, who argued that the property was wrongly attached and that he was the absolute owner of the property. Finding merit in his argument, the court allowed his application and raised the earlier attachment. The court permitted Prabhu to communicate the order to the concerned authorities who could then act accordingly.
Case Title: Mohan Ravi v. Aarthi Ravi and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 179
The Madras High Court has restrained the media from sharing or discussing the details of the matrimonial dispute between cine actor Mohan Ravi and his wife Aarthi Ravi.
Passing a “John Doe order”, Justice GR Swaminathan noted that though the matrimonial dispute between the parties had no public element in it, since he was a celebrity, every information was magnified and distorted in a sleazy manner. Thus, considering the necessity to protect the privacy of the children of the couple, the court thought it fit to retrain the media.
The court wondered if it could pass an injunction order against the media or unknown defendants who were not present before the court. The court noted that there was no impediment against passing a John Doe order, which was an exparte order issued against unidentified persons preventing them from indulging in activities breaching the copyright of applicants. The court added that John Doe ordered could be issued not to uphold copyright but also to protect right and reputation.
Case Title: Lyca Productions Private Limited v Vishal Krishna Reddy
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 192
The Madras High Court has directed Actor Vishal to pay Rs. 30 Crore due to entertainment company Lyca Productions.
Decreeing a suit filed by Lyca, Justice PT Asha also remarked that Vishal's conduct had been evasive from the beginning of the suit. Thus, the court noted that it was a case where cost could be imposed on Vishal.
Case Title: GB Pachaiyappan and Another v. Tamilaga Vettri Kazhagam and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 277
The Madras High Court on Monday dismissed an application seeking interim injunction to restrain actor Vijay's Tamilaga Vetrri Kazhagam party from using the party flag, over alleged infringement of a Trust's trademark.
Justice Senthilkumar Ramamoorthy rejected the plaintiff's claim that the usage of the flag by Vijay's party amounted to copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and passing off. The court, however, added that these were tentative observations and the matter would be dealt with in September.
The interim orders were passed in a petition filed by G.B. Pachaiyappan, trustee of the Thondai Mandala Saandror Dharma Paribalana Sabai.
Case Title: Dr Ilaiyaraja v. Mythri Movie Makers
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 298
The Madras High Court has temporarily restrained the makers of Ajith starrer Good Bad Ugly movie from using three songs of musician Ilaiyaraja.
Justice N Senthilkumar granted the temporary injunction in a plea moved by the musician seeking to restrain Mythri Movie Makers, producers of the movie, from exhibiting, screening, selling, distributing, publishing, broadcasting the movie, along with the three songs of Ilaiyaraja.
Ilaiyaraja had argued that the songs "Otha Rubayum Tharen" from the movie "Nattupura Pattu", the song "Ilamai Idho Ido" from the movie "Sakalakala Vallavan", and the song "En Jodi Manja Kuruvi" from the movie "Vikram" had been used in the Ajith movie without obtaining express consent or permission from him and without paying royalties to which he is statutorily entitled.
Case Title: S Venkatesan v. Sundaram Fasteners Limited
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 327
The Madras High Court recently observed that for determining the indigency of a person under Order 33 of Civil Procedure Code, the court has to conduct an independent inquiry by itself or by appointing an officer of the court.
The bench of Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice Mohammed Shaffiq said that the certificate obtained from the Government Authorities showing that a person is indigent can only be relied on for establishing the indigent circumstances and cannot be conclusive proof for to conclude whether the person is indigent.
Case Title: Joe Micheal Praveen v. Apsara Reddy and Another
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 366
The Madras High Court recently emphasised that the interest of the litigant should not be affected due to the errors or mistakes committed by the lawyers.
The bench of Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice Mohammed Shaffiq added that the courts should normally take a lenient view while setting aside ex parte decrees. The court added that ex parte decrees must be awarded only in exceptional cases where the conduct of the party is totally indifferent.
The court was hearing an appeal filed by a YouTuber, Joe Micheal Praveen, against the order of a judge refusing to set aside an order directing him to pay Rs. 50 Lakh as compensation to Apsara Reddy, AIADMK sportsperson, for making derogatory statements against the latter.
Case Title: Ramasamy v State of Tamil Nadu and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 368
The Madras High Court was recently surprised to note that the summons in a criminal case was served 12 years after the case was taken on file.
Justice B. Pugalendhi noted that the delay was attributable to both the police and the court registry. The court said that while the police failed to cause service of summons in time, the Judicial Magistrate also failed to verify whether the summons was issued, and did not call for an explanation for non-service.
The court also took note of the proceedings of the Director General of Police who had instructed all police personnel to utilise the e-summon mobile application. The court directed the Chief Secretary, the Secretary to the Government (Home Dept), the DGP, the Registrar General and the Registrar General (IT) to work in tandem and ensure strict compliance of e-summons.
Case Title: M/s GAIL (India) Limited v M/s Coromandal Electric Company Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 389
In an important ruling for the natural gas sector, the Madras High Court Bench of Justices G Jayachandran and Mummineni Sudheer Kumar denied appeals by GAIL (India) Limited against five natural gas supplier companies in arbitrations aggregating to Rs. 246 crores, observing that natural gas transactions are commercial and GAIL could not invoke the public trust doctrine to escape limitation.
The Court held that pricing policy and clarificatory letters did not provide any consumer subclassification and rejected the allegation of misrepresentation. The plea of unjust enrichment was held inapplicable as the Buyers generated energy and sold at fixed prices. It observed that public trust doctrine would not apply to this transparent commercial transaction and that concluded contracts could not be reopened by importing new terms. Entertaining GAIL's stance would create perpetual uncertainty against public policy.
Case Title: G Sampath Kumar v. Mahendra Singh Dhoni and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 391
The Madras High Court has dismissed an appeal filed by retired IPS officer G Sampath Kumar against a single judge order refusing to reject a defamation suit filed by cricketer MS Dhoni against the IPS officer and others.
Dhoni had filed the defamation suit for content made by the respondents in connection with the 2013 IPL betting scandal.
The bench of Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice M Jothiraman, on Friday, dismissed an appeal filed by the former IPS officer.
Case Title: G Sampathkumar IPS v. Mahendra Singh Dhoni and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 399
The Madras High Court on Monday dismissed an appeal filed by retired IPS Officer G Sampath Kumar, challenging an order of the court appointing an advocate commissioner for recording the evidence of cricketer MS Dhoni in connection with a defamation suit filed by him against the former.
The bench of Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice Mohammed Shaffiq remarked that Dhoni is a national-level cricketer and his presence in the court during trial might create security issues and may cause inconvenience to the court proceedings. The court also wondered how appointing an advocate commissioner for ensuring expeditious trial, would prejudice Kumar.
Madras High Court Protects Personality Rights Of Musician Ilaiyaraaja
Case Title: Dr Ilaiyaraaja v. John Doe Ashok Kumar, and Others
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 432
The Madras High Court, on friday, passed an interim order protecting the personality rights of renowned musician Ilaiyaraaja against unauthorised usage of his name, images, and other works by third parties.
Justice N Senthilkumar found a prima facie case in favour of the musician and granted interim relief in a suit moved by Ilaiyaraaja seeking to protect his personality rights. The court has also directed the respondents to file their counter.
Senior Advocate S. Prabakaran, appearing for Ilaiyaraaja, submitted that the suit was being filed against misappropriating and fabricating his identity in any form on the public platform. He submitted that various media and YouTube channels were using Ilaiyaraaja's images and name for commercial purposes to gain traction and generate revenue for exploitation.
Madras High Court Stays Single Judge Order Asking Actor Vishal To Pay ₹30 Crore To Lyca Productions
Case Title: Vishal Krishna Reddy v. Lyca Productions
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 437
The Madras High Court, on Monday, stayed a single judge order directing actor Vishal to pay Rs. 30 crore due to the entertainment company Lyca Productions.
The bench of Justice SM Subramaniam and Justice Mohammed Shaffiq granted the interim relief in an appeal moved by the actor challenging the June 2025 order of the single judge.
The judges however asked the actor to deposit 10 crore towards the credit of the case and directed the registry to deposit the money into an interest-bearing account.
Madras High Court Temporarily Restrains Makers Of "Dude" Movie From Using Songs Of Ilaiyaraaja
Case Title: Dr. Ilaiyaraaja v. Mythri Movie Makers
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 449
The Madras High Court, on Friday (28th November), temporarily restrained the makers of the "Dude" movie from using the songs of renowned musician Ilaiyaraaja.
Justice N Senthilkumar granted an interim injunction in a plea moved by the musician seeking to restrain Mythri Movie Makers, producers of the "Dude" movie, from using his songs unauthorisedly. The court had reserved orders on November 26, after hearing the parties.
Ilaiyaraaja had approached the court seeking a permanent injunction restraining the producers of the Dude movie from using his copyrighted works unauthorizedly and a mandatory injunction asking them to remove such infringing content from the movie. Ilaiyaraaja has also sought disclosure of profits and gains received by the production house from the unauthorised exploitation of his copyrighted works.
Orissa High Court
Case Title: Kabita Nath v. National Insurance Company Ltd., Cuttack & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 20
The Orissa High Court held that the 'next friend', as provided under Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), need not necessarily be a 'duly appointed guardian' as defined under Section 4(b) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 (the 1956 Act). Elucidating the position of law as to eligibility for appointment as 'next friend', the Single Bench of Justice Sanjay Kumar Mishra held –
“'Next friend' acts for the benefit of the “minor” or other person who is unable to look after his or her own interest or manage his or her own law suit, without being a regularly appointed guardian as per the Guardianship Act.”
Case Title: Niharkanti Mishra v. Nihar Ranjan Patnaik & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 62
The High Court reiterated that a plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) for mere 'non-existence' of cause of action, rather it can be rejected for 'non-disclosure' of the same. Reaffirming the settled principle of law, the Single Bench of Justice Ananda Chandra Behera observed –
“So, non-disclosure of cause of action in a plaint would fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of the plaint, but, whereas, non-existence of cause of action would not fall within the ambit of Order 7 Rule 11 of the C.P.C. for rejection of plaint.”
Case Title: Ramakrushna Nayak v. Manoj Kumar Behera & Anr.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 75
The Orissa High Court clarified that the report submitted by a Pleader Commissioner, appointed under Order 39 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), cannot be treated as evidence while deciding a suit, and utility of such report is confined to the limited purpose of inspection, preservation or detention of a suit property. While upholding an order of appointment of Pleader Commissioner for inspection of suit property, the Single Bench of Justice Radha Krishna Pattanaik held –
“It is at the cost of repetition observed that the report of the Pleader Commissioner is, though, necessary to take a decision, while dealing with the I.A. filed by the petitioner under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and for opposing construction over the suit land by the opposite parties but is to be utilized for the limited purpose as proposed and not beyond.”
Case Title: Udayanath Sahoo (Dead) represented by LRs. & Anr. v. State of Odisha & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 118
“Delayed justice is egregious form of human rights violation,” the Orissa High Court remarked while imposing an exemplary cost of rupees two lakh on the State for its apathy in not executing a clear order passed by the highest Court of the land more than three decades back. Drawing curtains to almost five-decade-old “relentlessly fought legal battle”, the Single Bench of Justice Dixit Krishna Shripad observed –
“In the case at hand, nearly five decades having lapsed in the court corridors, not even a fig leaf has fallen into the pocket of Decree Holders. Delayed justice is egregious form of human rights violation. At least, as a concession to shortness of human life, litigation longevity needs to be shortened, by devising new techniques. It is high time that the stakeholders converge their ideas to achieve it.”
Highlighting lassitude coupled with authoritarian ego on the part of State functionaries, the Judge said –
“The State and its functionaries conduct themselves as model litigants. When a citizen wins a legal battle, State should rejoice it. That spirit is not seen nowadays. At times, State functionaries take ego trip. That drives the citizens to think, if State is their first enemy. This does not auger well to the good governance.”
Order 21 CPC | Principle Of Res Judicata Not Applicable To Execution Proceedings: Orissa High Court
Case Title: Santosh Patra v. State of Odisha & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 128
The Orissa High Court held that the principle of res judicata, as provided under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), is not applicable to execution proceedings under Order XXI of the CPC as it is a 'self-contained' and 'independent Order'. Justice Ananda Chandra Behera held that non-applicability of res judicata is a fundamental rule of civil law. In his words –
“It is very fundamental in civil law that, principles of res judicata are not applicable to the execution proceedings...Because, Order-21 of the C.P.C., 1908 containing 106 Rules in total for execution of decrees and orders is a self-contained and independent Order. For which, the principles of res judicata available in Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code are not applicable to the execution proceedings.”
Case Title: Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Adarsh Nobel Corporation Ltd.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 132
The Orissa High Court held that objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC') cannot be allowed to be raised in the enforcement proceeding of an arbitral award, as enunciated under the provision of Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ('A & C Act'). While bringing clarity as to applicability of Section 47 of CPC to arbitral proceedings, a Bench of Dr. Justice Sanjeeb Kumar Panigrahi held –
“Allowing objections under Section 47 of the CPC, 1908 to be raised against arbitral awards would undermine the finality and binding nature of arbitration awards. It would subject arbitral awards to same procedural complexities and delays associated with court proceedings, defeating the purpose of choosing arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.”
Case Title: Charulata Beura & Anr. v. Ranjana Pradhan & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 142
The Orissa High Court held that after referring a dispute to mediation, the referring Court cannot deny to accept the mediation report nor it can defy its duty to pass a decree basing upon the solution/compromise arrived at in the mediation. Setting aside the order of a Civil Court denying a decree based on mediation report, the Bench of Justice Sashikanta Mishra observed –
“As already stated, in the instant case the trial Court, on the prayer of the parties referred their dispute to mediation. This implies that the Court was of the view that the dispute could be settled through mediation as otherwise such a reference would not have been made. Having itself made the reference, this Court fails to understand as to how it was held that though the dispute was settled, no decree recording such settlement could be passed.”
Case Title: Sabita Sahu v. Nishakar Singh & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 147
The Orissa High Court reiterated that plaintiff being the 'dominus litis' cannot be compelled to implead someone, against whom he seeks no relief, as a defendant in his suit. The Bench of Justice Sashikanta Mishra, however, clarified that if the plaintiff chooses not to add someone as defendant, he does so at his own risk. In the words of the Court –
“Court below has not cited any reason justifying impletion of the third party-interveners. It has only been stated that the same would avoid multiplicity of suits but exactly how, has not been spelt out at all. As already started (sic), the plaintiff being dominus litis cannot be forced to implead someone against whom he does not specifically seek any relief. It goes without saying that if he has chosen not to, he does so at his own risk.”
Civil Court Can Order Police Assistance To Enforce Injunction Orders U/S 151 CPC: Orissa High Court
Case Title: Sayed Ekram Saha v. Haroon Khan & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 168
The Orissa High Court held that even though the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) does not contain a specific provision enabling police assistance for enforcing and implementing an order of injunction, still a Civil Court can invoke the inherent power vested in it under Section 151 to order police assistance, if other express provisions are found inadequate to give effect to an injunction order. While setting aside the order of a Civil Court denying police assistance, the Single Bench of Justice Sashikanta Mishra ruled –
“True, the CPC does not specifically provide for police assistance for implementation of the order of the Court but the power under Section 151 of CPC is wide enough to be exercised for protection of the rights of the parties if the available provisions are found to be inadequate.”
Case Title: Kalyani Swain & Ors. v. Bijay Kumar Swain & Ors.
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 169
The Orissa High Court held that an executing Court can order eviction of judgment-debtor from illegally occupying the suit-land even while executing a decree of permanent injunction against him, confirming the possession in favour of the decree-holder, under Order XXI Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Clarifying the procedure governing the field, the Bench of Justice Sashikanta Mishra held –
“…this Court finds that the Executing Court took note of the objections raised and rightly held that the decree of confirmation of possession can only be satisfied by evicting the judgment debtor from the suit land. It is a case of removing the obstruction caused by the judgment debtor to enforce the decree of confirmation of possession.”
Punjab and Haryana High Court
Title: Kuldeep Kumar Sharma v. Randeep Rana
Citation: 2025 LiveLaw (PH) 03
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has made it clear that Local Commissioner is not a witness of any party and the discretion lies with the Executing Court to permit or refuse to examine the Commissioner.
Justice Deepak Gupta said "the Local Commissioner appointed by the Court is not a witness for any of the party. In fact, he performs his duty as an extended arm of the court and thus to all intent and purposes, he is an officer of the Court."
Rajasthan High Court
Telangana High Court
M/s Singareni Collieries Company Ltd Vs M./s H.B.T GMBH
2025 LiveLaw (Tel) 38
The Telangana High Court has reiterated and clarified that suits initiated before Civil Courts to curb arbitration proceedings ignore section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996, and deserve to be rejected under Order 7, Rule 11(d) as being barred by statute.
The order was passed in a commercial court appeal by a Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R.Madhusudhan Rao.
Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority vs. Cyberabad Expressway Limited.
2025 LiveLaw (Tel) 71
The Telangana High Court has clarified that section 47 of the CPC, which permits objections to be raised in an execution petition before the Trial Court; cannot be used as an alternative to challenge an arbitration award, which is being executed before a Trial Court.
The Division Bench of Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya and Justice B.R. Madhusudhan Rao, while passing the order made it clear that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a Code in itself and lays down a mechanism to challenge an award under section 37, by way of an appeal.
Devendra Kumar v/s Santosh Kumar Agarwal and Others
2025 LiveLaw (Tel) 105
While adjudicating a rent control dispute where the landlord had sought eviction of the tenant for defaulting in payment of rent, the Telangana High Court said that in such a situation it is the landlord who must always lead evidence first.
In doing so the high court dismissed three petitions filed by petitioner-landlord, seeking to shift the burden of leading evidence onto his tenants (the respondents) in an ongoing matter concerning eviction of the tenant.