Important MCQs Based On Latest Supreme Court Judgments For Law Examinations
Q 1. The High Court passed an interim order in a second appeal without framing a substantial question of law. According to the High Court, because the interim order was passed at the pre-admission stage by exercising its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC'), thus it was not necessary to frame a substantial question of law. Decide.a. The High Court didn't...
Q 1. The High Court passed an interim order in a second appeal without framing a substantial question of law. According to the High Court, because the interim order was passed at the pre-admission stage by exercising its inherent powers under Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure ('CPC'), thus it was not necessary to frame a substantial question of law. Decide.
a. The High Court didn't commit an error as the requirement for framing a substantial question of law arises only after admission of a second appeal.
b. The High Court has wide discretionary power under Section 151 of CPC to pass an interim relief despite framing a substantial question of law.
c. The High Court erred by passing an interim order without framing a substantial question of law, violating Section 100, which bars second appeals without such a question
d. Both (a) and (b)
Answer: Option (c)
Case Title: U. SUDHEERA & OTHERS VERSUS C. YASHODA & OTHERS
Explanation: Observing that a second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot proceed without framing substantial questions of law, the Supreme Court set aside the Andhra Pradesh High Court's order which granted interim relief in the plaintiff's favor without framing a 'substantial question of law'.
Q 2. A wife refused to comply with a decree of restitution of conjugal rights directing her to reside with her husband, citing his oppressive and cruel behavior as the reason for her decision. Determine whether she is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125(4) CrPC despite her non-compliance with the decree.
a. No, as per Section 125(4) of CrPC her failure to comply with the decree of restitution of conjugal rights disentitles her from claiming maintenance under Section 125(1).
b. Yes, despite the decree directing her to live with her husband, she is entitled to maintenance as she had valid reasons for refusal because of her husband's cruel behavior.
c. Wife's refusal to comply with the decree of restitution of conjugal rights on sufficient grounds would not absolve the husband of providing her maintenance.
d. Both (b) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena Versus Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another
Explanation: In a notable ruling, the Supreme Court held that a wife, even if she refuses to live with her husband despite a decree of restitution of conjugal rights against her, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C. The judgment observed that a wife's refusal to comply with the decree of conjugal rights passed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on just cause would not disentitle her to claim maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.
Q 3. Two accused individuals met at the scene of the incident and inflicted injuries on the victim. One, armed with a knife, caused more severe injuries than the other, who carried a chopper and inflicted less serious harm. The High Court reduced the conviction of the latter from Section 326 IPC to Section 324 IPC, citing no prior common intention. Determine the appropriateness of this decision.
a. The High Court erred in modifying the conviction because the degree of harm inflicted on the victim cannot be the basis for reducing the sentence when both accused acted with a common intention.
b. The degree of injury inflicted on the victim can serve as a basis for sentence reduction, irrespective of whether both accused acted with a common intention.
c. The High Court did not commit an error, as there was no prior meeting of minds to establish that both accused acted with a common intention.
d. Both (b) and (c)
Answer: Option (a)
Case Title: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA VERSUS BATTEGOWDA & ORS.
Explanation: The Supreme Court noted that the severity of injuries caused by individuals acting with common intention cannot justify reducing a harsher punishment to a lighter one.
Q 4. Mr. X resigned from the directorship of the company before the company issued a cheque towards a legally enforceable debt that existed during his tenure as director. Determine Mr. X's liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1882.
a. Mr. X cannot be held accountable for the company's actions after his resignation.
b. Since Mr. X resigned before the cheque was issued, he cannot be held liable.
c. Both (a) and (b)
d. Mr. X can be held liable because the cheque was issued to settle a legally enforceable debt that arose during his tenure as a director..
Answer: Option (b)
Case Title: ADHIRAJ SINGH VERSUS YOGRAJ SINGH AND OTHERS
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that the cheque issued after the retirement of the director of the company would not trigger his liability under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1882 (“NI Act”). It rejected the argument that since the company's debt existed during the directorship of the Appellant, hence his liability needed to be examined in the trial.
Q 5. The property owner entered into an agreement to sell with a company, agreeing to transfer the property in exchange for a proportionate share in the company. After the owner's death, his legal heirs executed a sale deed transferring the property to a third party. The company, which had possession of the property as part performance of the contract, now claims ownership. Determine the validity of the company's claim.
a. A mere agreement to sell and possession of the property would not transfer ownership to the company.
b. Ownership is transferred only upon execution of a sale deed and its registration under the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
c. Since no sale deed was executed in the company's favor by the owner or his legal heirs, the company cannot claim ownership of the property.
d. All of the above.
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: INDIAN OVERSEAS BANK Vs. M.A.S SUBRAMANIAN & ORS.
Explanation: The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that mere possession of a property under an agreement to sell does not confer ownership unless a sale deed is duly registered under the Indian Registration Act, 1908.
Q 6. Mr. Y, the owner of a truck used as his sole source of livelihood, seeks interim release of the truck under Sections 451 and 457 of the CrPC. The truck was seized after 24.8 grams of heroin were found concealed during a routine check. The State opposes the plea, citing potential misuse and the NDPS Act's objectives. Find out the most appropriate option.
A. The NDPS Act specifically prohibits interim release of vehicles seized for transporting contraband; therefore, the truck cannot be released until the trial concludes.
B. Vehicles seized under the NDPS Act cannot be released under CrPC provisions because they are integral to drug trafficking and evidence retention.
C. The NDPS Act does not bar the interim release of seized vehicles, and the trial court can release the vehicle under Sections 451 and 457 of the CrPC, subject to conditions like videography, inventory, and restrictions on sale/transfer.
D. The seized vehicle can be confiscated immediately without hearing the owner if the court finds it was used to transport contraband, regardless of the owner's knowledge or involvement.
Answer: Option (c)
Case Title: BISHWAJIT DEY VERSUS THE STATE OF ASSAM
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”) doesn't prohibit the interim release of vehicles that are seized for allegedly transporting contraband. The Court added that the seized vehicle can be released under Sections 451 and 457 of the CrPC.
"Undoubtedly, the Vehicle is a critical piece of material evidence that may be required for inspection to substantiate the prosecution's case, yet the said requirement can be met by stipulating conditions while releasing the Vehicle in interim on superdari like videography and still photographs to be authenticated by the Investigating Officer, owner of the Vehicle and accused by signing the said inventory as well as restriction on sale/transfer of the Vehicle", the court said.
Q 7. A plaintiff couldn't seek specific performance of an agreement to sell due to a government ban on the registration of sale deeds in the property's location. However, he sought a permanent injunction to prevent the defendant from alienating the property. After the ban was lifted, the plaintiff filed a subsequent suit for specific performance and recovery of possession. Determine the fate of the subsequent suit under Order II Rule 2 of the CPC.
a. The subsequent suit would be barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC because the plaintiff should have included all claims arising from the same transaction and cause of action in one suit.
b. Order II Rule 2 prohibits splitting claims from the same cause of action, but the plaintiff's subsequent suit was based on a different cause of action due to the government ban on registration.
c. If a plaintiff cannot obtain relief in the first suit but it becomes available due to a subsequent event, Order II Rule 2 does not bar a subsequent suit, as the event creates a fresh cause of action.
d. Both (b) and (c)
Answer: Option (d)
Case Title: CUDDALORE POWERGEN CORPORATION LTD VERSUS M/S CHEMPLAST CUDDALORE VINYLS LIMITED AND ANR.
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that "when it is not possible for the plaintiff to obtain a particular relief in the first instance but such relief becomes available to him on the happening of a subsequent event, post the institution of the first suit, then the bar under Order II Rule 2 would not stand in the way of the plaintiff who has instituted a subsequent suit for claiming those reliefs. It can be said that the occurrence of that subsequent event gives rise to a fresh cause of action to the concerned plaintiff for claiming certain reliefs which he was otherwise prevented from claiming."
Q 8. A violent altercation resulted in a death. The police filed an FIR charging five individuals but dropped two with a closure report. During the trial, a witness implicated the dropped individuals, leading the court to summon them as additional accused under Section 319 CrPC. The individuals argued they couldn't be summoned due to the closure report. Which of the following is the most accurate statement regarding the trial court's power to summon additional accused under Section 319 of the CrPC, based on the facts provided?
a. The trial court can summon any person as an additional accused only if they were initially named in the FIR and included in the chargesheet.
b. The trial court can summon an individual as an additional accused, even if they were exonerated by the police, provided that new evidence surfaced during the trial.
c. The trial court is bound to follow the police's closure report and cannot summon any additional accused after it has been filed.
d. The trial court can only summon an individual as an additional accused if the prosecution has submitted a protest petition requesting it
Answer: Option (b)
Case Title: OMI @ OMKAR RATHORE & ANR. VERSUS THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR.
Explanation: The Supreme Court observed that Section 319 of the CrPC gives the trial court the discretion to summon any person as an additional accused if, during the trial, evidence is adduced that implicates them, even if they were exonerated by the police or were not included in the charge sheet. The trial court is not bound by the police investigation or closure report and can exercise its discretion to summon additional accused based on trial evidence, the Court said.
Q 9. In 1994, Mr. A was adopted by a widow, Ms. B, after the death of her husband, Mr. C. Prior to the adoption, Ms. B had acquired property through a sale deed in 1985, which was her absolute property. In 2007, Ms. B executed another sale deed for the same property in favor of two other parties, Mr. D and Mr. E, without consulting or obtaining consent from Mr. A, the adopted son. Mr. A claims that his right to the property should relate to the date of his adoptive father's (Mr. C) death in 1982, and therefore, the sale deed executed after his adoption should be invalid as it was done without his consent. In light of the facts mentioned and the applicable legal provisions, which of the following is the correct legal outcome?
a) The sale deed executed by Ms. B in 2007 is invalid because Mr. A's rights to the property are deemed to have vested as of the date of his adoptive father's death, and the sale was made without his consent.
b) The sale deed executed by Ms. B in 2007 is valid as it was done in accordance with the rights Ms. B acquired before the adoption, and those rights remain absolute under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
c) Mr. A is entitled to a share in the property because the adoption relation back to the death of Mr. C automatically invalidates all transactions made by Ms. B after the adoption.
d) The property can be inherited by Mr. A only from the date of adoption, and all transactions by Ms. B before adoption are invalid under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956.
Answer: Option (b)
Case Title: Sri Mahesh Versus Sangram & Ors.
Explanation: According to the Supreme Court ruling, the property acquired by a female Hindu prior to the adoption remains her absolute property, and the adopted child's rights do not divest the adoptive mother of her rights over such property. The sale deed executed by Ms. B in 2007 is valid, as the rights she had acquired before the adoption remain intact.
Q 10. In a property dispute, the plaintiff filed a suit seeking only an injunction, asserting undisputed title over the property. The defendant did not dispute the title, and the plaintiff did not seek declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The trial court granted the injunction, but the High Court reversed the decision, ruling that the suit was not maintainable without declaratory relief. Can a suit seeking only an injunction be dismissed solely because it does not seek a declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 when the defendant does not dispute the plaintiff's title?
a) A suit seeking only an injunction must be dismissed if it does not seek declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, regardless of whether the defendant disputes the plaintiff's title.
b) A suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable and cannot be dismissed solely because it does not seek a declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, when the defendant does not dispute the plaintiff's title to the property.
c) A suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable only if the defendant explicitly agrees to the plaintiff's title in writing.
d) A suit seeking an injunction simpliciter is not maintainable in any circumstances if declaratory relief is not sought under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
Answer: Option (b)
Case Title: KRUSHNA CHANDRA BEHERA & ORS. VERSUS NARAYAN NAYAK & ORS.
Explanation: The Supreme Court held that if the defendants do not dispute the plaintiff's title, the suit seeking only an injunction (injunction simpliciter) is not to be dismissed simply because it does not seek declaratory relief under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The High Court erred in dismissing the suit based solely on the absence of declaratory relief.
(The author is a Legal Correspondent At Live Law. For feedback/suggestions, he can be reached at yash@livelaw.in)