Wife Can Claim Maintenance From Husband Even If She Doesn't Live With Him As Per Decree On Conjugal Rights Restitution : Supreme Court

Yash Mittal

11 Jan 2025 9:13 AM IST

  • Wife Can Claim Maintenance From Husband Even If She Doesnt Live With Him As Per Decree On Conjugal Rights Restitution : Supreme Court

    There is no hard and fast rule that husband can deny maintenance to wife merely because she doesn't live with him, the Court said.

    In a notable ruling, the Supreme Court yesterday held that a wife, even if she refuses to live with her husband despite a decree of restitution of conjugal rights against her, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.The issue before the bench comprising CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar was that “Will a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of...

    In a notable ruling, the Supreme Court yesterday held that a wife, even if she refuses to live with her husband despite a decree of restitution of conjugal rights against her, is entitled to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.

    The issue before the bench comprising CJI Sanjiv Khanna and Justice Sanjay Kumar was that “Will a husband, who secures a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, stand absolved of paying maintenance to his wife by virtue of Section 125(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if his wife refuses to abide by the said decree and return to the matrimonial home?”

    The judgment authored by Justice Sanjay Kumar observed that a wife's refusal to comply with the decree of conjugal rights passed under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, on just cause would not disentitle her to claim maintenance from her husband under Section 125 of the Cr.P.C.

    Noting that the respondent-husband had completely ignored his wife-Appellant after she suffered the miscarriage of their child and ill-treated her in her matrimonial home, the Court held that the Appellant-Wife has sufficient cause to not return to the matrimonial home. Thus, it observed that the husband would not be absolved from his responsibility to maintain her wife despite a decree of restitution of conjugal rights not complied with the wife.

    “Dinesh (husband), therefore, sought to protect himself from a claim by Reena (wife) for maintenance by projecting the disobeyed restitution decree as a defence and as long as she did not attain the status of a divorced wife, that protection would endure to his benefit. This stalemate of sorts created by Dinesh clearly reflects his lack of bonafides and demonstrates his attempt to disown all responsibility towards his wife, Reena. These factors, taken cumulatively, clearly manifest that Reena had more than sufficient reason to stay away from the society of her husband, Dinesh, and her refusal to live with him, notwithstanding the passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights, therefore, cannot be held against her. In consequence, the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C. was not attracted and the High Court erred grievously in applying the same and holding that Reena was not entitled to the maintenance granted to her by the Family Court.”, the Court observed.

    The Court allowed the Wife's Appeal against the Jharkhand High Court's decision, overturning the Family Court's order directing the Respondent-Husband to provide Rs. 10,000/- per month maintenance to the Appellant-Wife.

    The Court observed that passing the decree of restitution of conjugal rights would not exonerate the husband from his responsibility to maintain his wife. According to the Court, the restitution decree serves as relevant material but does not conclusively determine maintenance eligibility. The Court must independently assess the wife's reasons for living apart while deciding her maintenance plea.

    The Court rejected the Husband's argument that the refusal of the wife to return to her matrimonial home and cohabit with him amounted to refusal under Section 125(4) of Cr.P.C., and therefore she would not be entitled to maintenance under the provision.

    Instead, the Court said that Section 125 is a social justice provision designed to prevent destitution and vagrancy. It applies irrespective of ongoing marital disputes, and even divorced wives are eligible under specific circumstances.

    Reference was drawn to decision of Kirtikant D. Vadodaria vs. State of Gujarat and another (1996) and Amrita Singh vs. Ratan Singh and another (2018) where it was observed that “the mere passing of a decree for restitution of conjugal rights at the husband's behest and non-compliance therewith by the wife would not, by itself, be sufficient to attract the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.”

    “It would depend on the facts of the individual case and it would have to be decided, on the strength of the material and evidence available, whether the wife still had valid and sufficient reason to refuse to live with her husband, despite such a decree. There can be no hard and fast rule in this regard and it must invariably depend on the distinctive facts and circumstances obtaining in each particular case. In any event, a decree for restitution of conjugal rights secured by a husband coupled with non-compliance therewith by the wife would not be determinative straightaway either of her right to maintenance or the applicability of the disqualification under Section 125(4) Cr.P.C.”, the court added.

    Accordingly, the Court allowed the Wife's appeal and reinstated the Family Court's order for payment of maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

    Appearance:

    For Petitioner(s) Ms. Mohini Priya, AOR Ms. Sayesha Gambhir, Adv.

    For Respondent(s) Mr. Anup Kumar, AOR Ms. Pragya Choudhary, Adv. Mrs. Neha Jaiswal, Adv. Mr. Shivam Kumar, Adv. Ms. Shruti Singh, Adv. Mr. Vaibhav Prasad Deo, Adv. Mr. Vishnu Sharma, Standing Counsel, Adv. Ms. Madhusmita Bora, AOR Mr. Shiv Ram Sharma, Adv. Mr. Pawan Kishore Singh, Adv. Mr. Dipankar Singh, Adv. Mrs. Anupama Sharma, Adv.

    Case Title: Rina Kumari @ Rina Devi @ Reena Versus Dinesh Kumar Mahto @ Dinesh Kumar Mahato and another

    Citation : 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 47

    Click here to read/download the judgment 


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