Supreme Court Criticises Rajya Sabha Secretary General For Commenting On Merits Of Impeachment Motion Against Justice Varma

The Supreme Court today(January 16) criticised the procedure adopted by the Secretary General of Rajya Sabha, which became the basis on which the Deputy Chairman of Rajya Sabha rejected the impeachment motion against Justice Yashwant Varma of the Allahabad High Court. Statedly, the Secretary General made a substantive assessment of the notice of motion, whereas the law only contemplates that administrative formalities must be met.

This observation was made by the Court while rejecting Justice Varma's plea seeking to declare the Lok Sabha's three-member Inquiry Committee as illegal on grounds of procedural irregularities. It may be recalled that Justice Varma was involved in a controversy after burnt cash was found at his official residence during a fire incident. Subsequent to the in-house procedure adopted by the then Chief Justice of India, Justice Varma had refused to resign, and an impeachment motion was moved in both Houses of the Parliament. 

Justice Varma filed a petition in the Supreme Court, challenging the Lok Sabha's Inquiry Committee constituted as per the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968, on the grounds that since the motion was 'given' in both Houses simultaneously, the Speaker of the Lok Sabha and the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha were to constitute the Inquiry Committee jointly. 

A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma rejected Justice Varma's petition. It said that Section 3(2) of the 1968 Act requires a Joint Committee when a motion is given in both Houses together and it is admitted on the same day. However, in the present case, while Lok Sabha's Speaker accepted the motion, there was no such acceptance from the Rajya Sabha's Chairman.

In this case, since the Rajya Sabha's Chairman Jagdeep Dhankar had resigned before the motion was admitted, it was ultimately decided and rejected by the Deputy Chairman of the Rajya Sabha. This was also challenged by Justice Varma, arguing that the Deputy Chairman is not a competent authority under the 1968 Act to reject or accept the motion. The Court, however, rejected this argument.

Since the decision of the Deputy Chairman was not under challenge, the Court chose to address the manner in which the Secretary General of the Rajya Sabha opined that the Rajya Sabha's motion was "not in order" without the observation in any manner affecting the decision.

The decision of the Deputy Chairman was not on record, and therefore, the Court sought a certified copy of it. As per the copy, the Dy Chairman had sought a closer scrutiny of the motion by the Secretary General, who flagged that the motion is not drawn on proper terms, it lacked material to support the facts, it relied on wrong provisions of law, and the sequence of the events was incorrectly specified. For instance, the Secretary General questioned how the spot inspection would have taken place a day before the fire incident.

Secretary General Can't Assume A Quasi-Adjudicatory function 

On this, the bench observed that the Secretary General transgressed its mandate because there is no requirement in law that supporting materials should be given with the motion, as was sought by him. Nor is there any requirement that notice of motion should include proper terminologies etc.

"The material placed by the Secretary General before the Deputy Chairman raises certain concerns. First, there appears to be an insistence on the use of 'proper terms' for the notice, a requirement which does not find express recognition in law. Secondly, a requirement seems to have been read into the law for furnishing authenticated documents in support of the material facts, which, particularly in view of documents already in the public domain, may not have been necessary at that stage.

In any event, the substance of the allegations was required to be considered, as there was no statutory obligation upon the notice-givers to produce supporting evidence at that juncture. Thirdly, exception appears to have been taken to an incorrect reference to a statutory provision, without due appreciation of the legal position governing the subject. Fourthly, the Secretary General appears to have examined the correctness of the facts pleaded, including with reference to certain dates, thereby traversing beyond the scope of his designated role."

The bench noted that the 1968 does not ask for a substantive assessment of the merits of the allegations by the Secretariat of a House. Therefore, the Secretary General's scrutiny was confined to administrative issues such as whether the motion is accompanied by enough signatures, etc. 

No mandatory manner in which notice of motion should be given

Further, the Court clarified that neither the 1968 Act nor the Rules prescribe a mandatory form for notice of notion. In the absence of defined parameters, what made the Secretary General conclude that the notice of motion was not in order remains a question.

"Where no prescribed format exists, a notice containing allegations of impropriety against a Judge could not reasonably be treated as ineffective solely on account of perceived deficiencies in drafting or form. The role of the Secretary General was confined to placing the notice before the competent authority, namely, the office of the Chairman, without expressing any conclusion as to its admissibility," the Court concluded.

Before concluding, the Court said: "We do hope that no other Judge faces proceedings for his removal from service on allegations of misbehaviour. Should, at all, there be an unfortunate recurrence of a Judge prima facie indulging in misbehaviour and the representatives of the people of the nation demand an investigation based on allegations of misbehaviour, it would be just and proper if Secretariat exercises restraint and leaves it to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha or the Chairman of the Rajya Sabha, as the case may be, to decide the question of admission of a motion insteadof concluding as to what should be the future course of action."  

Case Details: X Vs O/O SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF THE PEOPLE|W.P.(C) No. 1233/2025

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 54