Is S.17A PC Act Sanction Needed When FIR Initially Mentioned Only IPC Offences? Supreme Court To Consider
The Supreme Court is set to examine whether prior approval in terms of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is mandatory in a case registered invoking only IPC offenses against unknown persons, who are later found to include public servants.The development comes as a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta today issued notice on Karnataka government's challenge to an order...
The Supreme Court is set to examine whether prior approval in terms of Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act is mandatory in a case registered invoking only IPC offenses against unknown persons, who are later found to include public servants.
The development comes as a bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta today issued notice on Karnataka government's challenge to an order that quashed a criminal case against former-MLC DS Veeraiah over alleged misappropriation of Rs 47.1 crores from the D Devaraj Urs Truck Terminal Limited (DDUTLL) during his term as its Chairman in 2021.
Briefly put, the case was initially lodged against unknown persons invoking only IPC offenses. Later, finding involvement of public servants, the prosecution invoked offenses under the PC Act. It was claimed that due sanction was obtained subsequently, but the High Court quashed the case against Veeraiah noting that offenses under the two statutes [Section 409 IPC and Section 13(1)(a) of PC Act] were same in essence and the prosecution attempted to avoid rigors of Section 17A of the PC Act. It was held that registration of an FIR under IPC for acts relatable to a public servant's duty required prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act.
Assailing this order, counsel for the State today argued that the High Court erred in reading in Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, when the charged offenses related only to IPC. On a specific court query as to whether it was a PC Act case or not, the counsel informed that as of today, the case against Veeraiah is not one under PC Act.
Background
The FIR in the case was registered under Sections 120B, 409, 420, 465, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code. While filing chargesheet, the police included offences under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
The complaint alleged that works close to Rs.47.10 crores that were undertaken during the term of Veeraiah and accused No.1 (Managing Director, DDUTLL) were found to be suspicious, as the works were awarded to the contractors without taking recourse to the provisions of the Karnataka Transparency in Public Procurements Act, 1999.
Before the High Court, Veeraiah contended that he being a public servant at the relevant point in time, working as Chairman of a Government enterprise, prior approval under Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, ought to have been taken for any investigation to commence. Though the offence under the IPC was registered, it was factually, in entirety, offences under the PC Act.
Sanction is granted under Section 19 of the PC Act to prosecute while filing the charge sheet. Thus, deliberately Sections 409, 420, 465 and 468 were alleged initially out of which Section 409 is similar to Section 13(1)(a) of the PC Act, to get away the rigor of Section 17A of the PC Act as the FIR was first registered against unknown persons, he said.
The State opposed the plea submitting that when there was no offence under the PC Act at the outset and during the investigation, the offence under PC Act emerged, it was not incumbent upon the Investigating Agency to obtain approval at the time of filing of the charge sheet. What is necessary is sanction under Section 19 of the Act and the same is granted.
Vide the impugned order, the High Court quashed the case against Veeraiah, observing that no camouflage proceedings could be permitted to get over the rigor of Section 17A. “The prosecution has devised a method of projecting only offences under Section 409 and 420 of the IPC which are clearly identical to Section 13 of the PC Act, to get away with the rigour of prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act.”
Allowing the petition, the High Court further noted, “The prior approval under Section 17A is admittedly not granted. Therefore, the prosecution is wanting to build its edifice on shifting sands. Sanction obtained post facto under Section 19 of the PC Act cannot cure the threshold illegality of not having prior approval under Section 17A of the PC Act. Therefore, the foundation being infirm the structure cannot be sustained. Section 17A of the PC Act, cuts at the root of the matter.”
Against this order, the State government moved the Supreme Court. It pleads that the High Court erred in equating Section 409 IPC with Section 13(1) of the PC Act for the purpose of prior approval and failed to note that the FIR was initially registered against unknown persons and PC Act offense was invoked only after due sanction was obtained.
"the Hon'ble High Court failed to note that the offences under IPC and the PC Act . are distinct and mere similarity in ingredients between Sections 409 IPC and I3(l)(a) of the PC Act cannot ipso facto attract the requirement of prior approval under Section 17A when the FIR is limited to IPC offences" the petition states. It is asserted that the High Court's equivalence of the IPC and PC Act offenses, making prior approval mandatory even for offenses solely under the IPC, is contrary to legislative intent and judicial precedents.
Case Title: THE STATE OF KARNATAKA BY WILSON GARDEN P.S. Versus D.S. VEERAIAH AND ANR., Diary No. 64940-2025