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The Supreme Court recently recalled an instance from the colonial era, when it was considered normal for a judge's sons to appear as lawyers before him, to explain how the law on judicial bias has evolved over the years.The Court referred to the practice Justice Badruddin Tyabji of the Bombay High Court, the first Indian barrister in Bombay, who became a Judge of the Bombay High Court in 1895...

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The Supreme Court recently recalled an instance from the colonial era, when it was considered normal for a judge's sons to appear as lawyers before him, to explain how the law on judicial bias has evolved over the years.

The Court referred to the practice Justice Badruddin Tyabji of the Bombay High Court, the first Indian barrister in Bombay, who became a Judge of the Bombay High Court in 1895 and acted as the Chief Justice in 1902, being the first Indian to be conferred that honour.

Justice Tyabji's two sons practised before him, the Court observed that although kinship was once not treated as a disqualification for a judge, the law has since evolved to recognise that a close familial relationship can give rise to a reasonable likelihood of bias.

The Court was explaining the principles governing the rule against bias while setting aside a Bombay High Court judgment that had upheld the termination of an Assistant Teacher. It held that the disciplinary inquiry against her was legally unsustainable because the Convenor of the Inquiry Committee was the real brother of the School Secretary, who was the complainant, prosecutor and principal witness in the proceedings.

A bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Manmohan observed that the law does not require proof of actual bias to invalidate a proceeding. It is sufficient to establish a reasonable likelihood or real possibility of bias in the mind of a fair-minded person.

Recounting the anecdote about Justice Tyabji, the bench referred to an article by Dr Balram K Gupta and the autobiography of late senior advocate Fali S Nariman, the Court narrated : 

“Justice Tyabji decided cases fairly and honourably. Two of his sons were members of the Bar. In every case that came before Justice Tyabji, solicitors in Bombay would brief the two sons on behalf of their respective clients, so that one appeared for the plaintiff and the other for the defendant. They lived together. They dined together. The gossip was that they discussed their cases at the dining table. This was brought to the notice of Chief Justice Sir Lawrence Jenkins, who sent message to Justice Tyabji, asking whether it was appropriate for the two sons to appear in their father's Court. Tyabji thundered, 'Go and tell the Chief Justice to mind his own business'. The matter rested there and that Justice Tyabji continued to decide cases, favouring neither side.”

It then turned to AK Kraipak v Union of India, wherein the acting Chief Conservator of Forests of Jammu and Kashmir sat on the Selection Board for officers of the Indian Forest Service while also being a candidate, and noted as under:

“It is not necessary to establish bias, but it is sufficient to invalidate the selection process if it is shown that there was a reasonable likelihood of bias. The likelihood of bias may arise on account of proprietary interest or on account of personal reasons, such as, hostility to one party or personal friendship or family relationship with the other. Where reasonable likelihood of bias is alleged on the ground of relationship, the question is always how close the relationship or, in other words, whether nearness of relationship is so great as to give rise to reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the authority making the selection.”

Relating the anecdote to its ruling in the present case, the bench observed that although the Tyabji's account shows that kinship was at one time not treated as a disqualification for a judge, it is now well established that kinship does disqualify wherever it is close enough to give rise to a 'reasonable likelihood of bias'.

The Court also set out the test it applied that bias need not be proved in fact, what must be shown is a 'reasonable likelihood of bias' or 'real possibility of bias', in the mind of a reasonable person as distinguished from a merely fanciful apprehension.

With regards to the facts of the case, the bench noted that the Convenor of the Inquiry Committee was the real brother of the School's Secretary. The Secretary was the complainant, a principal witness and the prosecutor, and the sole witness on eleven of the twenty charges against the teacher. On this, the bench noted that the Secretary “tendered evidence before his own brother acting as convenor, who accepted the said evidence and held the Appellant guilty.”

It held that an immediate blood relative of a person who initiates disciplinary action or who is directly interested in its outcome, is disqualified from acting as an adjudicator, and that the maxim nemo judex in causa sua constitutes a constitutional imperative under Article 14 of the Constitution.

In the light of aforesaid, the Supreme Court held that the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable likelihood of bias from the perspective of a fair-minded person and that the inquiry was unsustainable in law. Allowing the appeal, it set aside the High Court's judgment and restored the School Tribunal's judgment.

“Consequently, this Court is of the view that on an objective appreciation of the case, circumstances give rise to a reasonable likelihood of bias from the perspective of a fair-minded person and thus, the inquiry proceedings initiated against the Appellant are unsustainable in law.”

It also directed the Education Officer (R3), to consider the feasibility of absorbing the appellant in any other 100% grant-in-aid school within its jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 26(2)(iii) of the MEPS Rules.

“The present Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 4965 of 2024 dated 29th April 2025 is set aside. Further, the judgment of the School Tribunal, Nagpur dated 21st March 2024 is restored. This Court also directs Respondent No.3- Education Officer to consider the feasibility of absorbing the Appellant in any other hundred per cent (100%) grant-in-aid School within its jurisdiction in accordance with Rule 26(2)(iii) of MEPS Rules.”

Appearances:

For Petitioner: Mr. Satyajit A. Desai, Adv.; Mr. Sachin Patil, Adv.; Mr. Prateek Kumar Singh, Adv.; Mr. Sachin Singh, Adv.; Mr. Shashank Upadhyay, Adv.; Ms. Anagha S. Desai, AOR

For Respondents: Mr. Sudhanshu Choudhuri, Sr. Adv.; Ms. Rucha Pande, Adv.; Mr. Yash Singhania, Adv.; Mr. A. Selvin Raja, AOR; Mr. Nitin Lonkar, Adv.; Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.; Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR; Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv.

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