'Who Judges The Judge?': Allahabad High Court Calls For Recalibration Of CJ-Centric Administration, Greater Institutional Accountability

The Allahabad High Court has called for a 'recalibration' of the Chief Justice-centric model of High Court administration as it emphasized the need for a more deliberative, institutionally balanced and participative approach, coupled with stronger institutional accountability.

A bench of Justice Vinod Diwakar made this observation in a judgment arising from four cases in which it flagged issues like delays in the subordinate judiciary, non-compliance with directions on bail and also raised broader questions of judicial discipline.

While examining these issues, the Court discussed the functioning of the High Court itself and raised concerns about the exercise of administrative discretion, the limited role of puisne Judges in institutional administration, the concentration of administrative responsibilities among a few senior Judges, and the absence of structured internal accountability mechanisms.

The Court stressed that the Chief Justice-centric model envisaged by the Supreme Court combines strong leadership with a "collaborative, participative & consultative approach", embedded with a spirit of fraternity.

Chief Justice-Centric Administration Requires 'Recalibration'

The Court observed that there was little leeway for "conscious and participative dialogue" among Judges at the High Court level on matters relating to allocation of judicial business.

It noted that allocation of work was not linked to performance and that there were "no defined, codified and notified parameters" governing consideration for elevation and promotion to the next level.

The Court further observed:

"Above all, decisions taken on the administrative side attract no accountability, and are not subjected to audit by any independent agency, so that accountability may be fixed in cases of proven favouritism, partisanship, or the operation of other extraneous considerations".

It said the cumulative effect of these issues "erodes the conditions in which judicial character forms". The Court also remarked that "the repercussions of unfettered, unguided discretion have had a devastating effect on the administration of justice".

Against this backdrop, the Court concluded thus:

"The prevailing Chief Justice-centric model of High Court administration requires recalibration in favour of a more deliberative and institutionally balanced approach".

It added that the "marginal role of puisne judges in administrative matters" runs counter to broader administrative theories emphasizing participatory decision-making and institutional accountability.

High Court Administration Through 84 Committees

The Court also examined the committee structure through which the High Court's administrative business is presently conducted.

It noted that the administrative business of the High Court is presently transacted through 84 committees and that, over the preceding three-and-a-half years, a majority of these committees had been chaired by only 2-3 senior Judges, who were simultaneously discharging judicial work through demanding rosters.

The Court's concern was not simply the number of committees but the concentration of administrative responsibilities.

It observed that the existing arrangement raised questions about the effective participation of other Judges in the administration of the institution.

The Court stressed that a High Court is not merely a hierarchical administrative organization. Its Judges are equals in the discharge of judicial functions, while administrative decisions can directly affect the functioning of individual Judges. It therefore emphasised the importance of participative decision-making in High Court administration.

Committee Decisions and Institutional Accountability

The Court further noted that the minutes of committees constituted by the Chief Justice had never been communicated to the Full Court, giving the impression that their functioning was independent of the High Court itself.

It observed that, consequently, there was no institutional forum within the High Court to raise such issues except by addressing them through judicial orders.

The Court said such a situation could leave Judges to "endure and lead a frustrating professional life" in an environment neither conducive to judicial work nor reflective of the dignity of the institution.

The Court also linked the need for institutional checks to the self-regulated nature of the judiciary. It observed thus:

"The judiciary, being a self-regulated institution, must maintain effective checks and balances on its administrative side to ensure that administrative discretion is never misused and is exercised strictly in accordance with the procedure established by law and duly notified rules".

The Court's concern over Chief Justice-centric administration was closely linked to a broader question of accountability: what happens when a Judge exercises administrative power, and who scrutinizes such decisions?

'Who Judges The Judge?'

A significant part of the judgment examines the question of accountability when Judges exercise administrative, rather than judicial, powers.

The Court referred to administrative functions such as roster allocation, case listing and conduct of the business of the High Court through its committees, observing that such powers may remain insulated from external or internal review in the name of preserving judicial independence.

The Court stated that while judicial decisions are ordinarily subject to appeal and review,such administrative decisions may not be subjected to similarly structured scrutiny, despite their potential consequences for fairness, equality and institutional integrity.

Against this backdrop, the Court posed the question: "Who judges the judge" when a Judge exercises administrative power?

The Court observed that, in the absence of formal review structures, the burden of judging the judge shifts informally to the institution itself through "full-court deliberations, internal checks, and, increasingly, public scrutiny".

It cautioned, however, that such diffuse accountability is often insufficient, and called for "clearly articulated administrative standards, reason-giving obligations, and limited but meaningful review mechanisms based on rule-bound procedure".

The Court, however, clarified that its observations were not intended to test the "subjective satisfaction" of the Chief Justice or to cast any aspersions on the functioning of the office of the Chief Justice.

It stated that "the sole concern of this Court is the manner in which the High Court discharges its administrative functions in defiance of the provisions of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, and the need to streamline them by adopting a rule-bound procedure with greater transparency and objectivity".

Background

The broader discussion arose while the Court was dealing with four cases exposing problems in the functioning of the subordinate judiciary.

One significant issue concerned continued noncompliance with bail-related directions. The judgment records 1,65,930 bail orders in which two sureties were directed, despite directions issued by the High Court in Smt. Bacchi Devi v. State of U.P. The Court also found deficiencies in compliance reports submitted by District Judges.

The Court said such problems could not simply be treated as isolated conduct of individual judicial officers.

It observed that it is "not an attribute of the individual alone; it reflects the behavioral pattern of the institution.

The Court stressed that judicial character requires institutional support, including sustained programmes of training and learning, mechanisms for fixing accountability in respect of decisions taken on the administrative side, corrective measures for breaches of discipline, and a curriculum directed at cultivating fraternity and a spirit of brotherhood.

It further said that "every promotion or elevation should be followed by a compulsory program of training" so that judicial officers appreciate the consequences of decisions taken at each level and their effect upon society.

The Court's stance was that a self-regulated judiciary must maintain effective checks and balances on its administrative side, ensuring that administrative discretion remains subject to law and duly notified rules.