Long Service, Subsequent Recognition Can't Validate Invalid Appointment; No Right To Salary From Public Funds: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that a teacher of an aided institution cannot claim salary from the State exchequer merely on the strength of long continuance in service or subsequent administrative recognition, where the competent University had declined approval to the appointment and had directed a fresh selection which was never held.The Court held that before a mandamus for payment...
The Allahabad High Court has held that a teacher of an aided institution cannot claim salary from the State exchequer merely on the strength of long continuance in service or subsequent administrative recognition, where the competent University had declined approval to the appointment and had directed a fresh selection which was never held.
The Court held that before a mandamus for payment of public money can be issued, the person claiming salary must first establish the existence and legality of the appointment from which the right is said to flow.
Justice Irshad Ali held,
“The doctrine of long continuance cannot be invoked to compel the State to make payment from public funds where the foundational legality of the appointment remains unestablished. The Court cannot ignore statutory requirements merely because the petitioner has continued in service for a considerable period.”
Petitioner No.1 was appointed Pracharya of Shri Ganesh Sanskrit Pathshala, Peedhin Kauria, District Gonda on 8th July 1992, and petitioner Nos.2 and 3 as Assistant Teachers in the same institution. Not being paid their salary, they filed the writ petition in 2005 seeking a mandamus for arrears and for regular monthly payment from 1st January 2005.
By an interim order dated 8th February 2005, the High Court directed payment of salary with effect from January 2005. During the pendency of the petition, petitioner No.2 died and petitioner No.3 retired on 31st March 2025.
It was argued for the petitioners that the selection proceedings had been forwarded to Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, which recognised petitioner No.1 as Principal through various communications. It was submitted that the District Inspector of Schools had recognised him as Principal vide order dated 31st July 2015, and inquiries held in 2019 and 2020 found no illegality in the appointments. It was submitted that he had served about 32 years.
Counsel for petitioner submitted that the date of appointment pleaded as 8th July 1989 was a clerical error, since corrected by amendment to 8th July 1992, the date on which petitioner No.1 joined pursuant to appointment letter dated 30th June 1992.
Counsel for respondent No.5 opposed the claim on the ground that the original appointment order had never been produced; that petitioner No.1 had passed Purva Madhyama, equivalent to High School, only in 1986 and did not hold the qualification required for the post of Principal/Lecturer on the date originally pleaded. It was argued that his father was then the Manager of the institution and the University by order dated 5th October 1993 had declined approval and directed a fresh appointment process which was never undertaken.
Lastly, it was argued that the amendment of the date of appointment was moved about 16 years after the petition was filed. Reliance was placed on R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala & Others, where the Supreme Court held that an appointment obtained on fabricated or fraudulent documents is no appointment in law and that long continuance confers no right or equity.
The Court held that although the petition was projected as a claim for salary, it could not be decided without first examining whether petitioner No.1 held a valid appointment carrying an enforceable right to be paid from the State exchequer.
“The Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot issue a mandamus for payment of public money merely because the petitioner claims to have worked for a particular period. The right to receive salary from an aided institution out of public funds is subject to the appointment having the sanction of law and having been made in accordance with the prescribed procedure.”
The Court observed that the University's order dated 5th October 1993 declining approval went to the root of the controversy, and once a fresh selection had been directed, it was for the petitioners to establish that it was held. It held that the later communications relied upon showed recognition for the purposes of correspondence and institutional functioning, but were not conclusive proof that the initial appointment had been validly made.
“An appointment which is required to receive approval of a competent statutory authority cannot ordinarily be transformed into a valid appointment merely by prolonged continuance, particularly where the competent authority had earlier declined approval and had specifically directed that a fresh selection be undertaken.”
On the change in the pleaded date of appointment, the Court held that the alteration went to the root of the claim, since the petitioner's age, his qualification and the question of approval all turned on when the appointment was made.
“The amendment may have been permitted procedurally; however, allowing an amendment does not amount to an adjudication upon the truthfulness or legal correctness of the amended assertion.”
The Court also declined to read the earlier judgments in petitioner No.1's favour as settling the validity of his appointment. It held that those proceedings decided whether the rival claimant, Krishna Deo Tripathi, was entitled to displace him from the post of Principal, which was distinct from the question whether his own appointment met the statutory requirements.
“The failure of a rival claimant to establish his own entitlement does not dispense with the independent requirement of the petitioner establishing the legality of his own appointment.”
Holding that the inquiry reports could not cure an appointment where the foundational conditions were not fulfilled, and that salary paid under the interim order remained subject to the final outcome, the Court found no ground to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in the petitioners' favour.
Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed. The Court directed that the interim order dated 08.02.2005 shall merge in the final order and shall not be treated as creating any independent or vested right in favour of the petitioners.
Case Title: Ved Pati Tripathi and 2 Ors v. State of U.P. Thru Secretary Secondary Education and 4 Ors