[S.85 Finance Act 1994] Limitation Period Prescribed In Special Statutes Prevails Over Limitation Act: Allahabad High Court
The Allahabad High Court has held that the limitations prescribed under special statutes, such as Finance Act, 1994 will prevail over the limitations mentioned in the Limitation Act, 1963.The Court held that statutes such as the Finance Act, 1994 or the Central Excise Act, 1944 were enabled to address specific areas of law and that they often contained detailed provisions regarding...
The Allahabad High Court has held that the limitations prescribed under special statutes, such as Finance Act, 1994 will prevail over the limitations mentioned in the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Court held that statutes such as the Finance Act, 1994 or the Central Excise Act, 1944 were enabled to address specific areas of law and that they often contained detailed provisions regarding procedural aspects such as limitation.
“The rationale underlying this principle is rooted in the notion that the legislature, in enacting a special statute, intends to provide a comprehensive and exhaustive regime governing all aspects of the relevant legal domain,” held Justice Shekhar B. Saraf.
Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 provides a period of 3 months for filing appeals before Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals).
Petitioner was communicated an order on 17.01.2023 against which he preferred an appeal, filed on 09.06.2023. The Appellate Authority dismissed petitioner's appeal under Section 85 of the Finance Act, 1994 on the ground that it was time barred having been filed with a delay of more than 85 days. Aggrieved by the same, petitioner preferred a writ petition before the High Court.
During the course of the proceedings, petitioner admitted that he had received the original order on 17.01.2023. However, it was contended that the delay in filling the appeal was due to the ignorant behaviour of his previous counsel and a medical emergency suffered by the petitioner.
Counsel for petitioner relied on Jai Hind Bottling Company(P) Ltd. v. Commissioner (Appeals) Central Excise, Allahabad where Allahabad High Court held that the writ court had the power to condone the delay in filling an appeal. Further reliance was placed on Pioneer Corporation v. Union of India wherein the Supreme Court had similarly held that in exceptional circumstances and in the rarest of cases, the writ court had the power to condone the delay in filling an appeal.
The Court relied on Singh Enterprises vs. C.C.E. Jamshedpur, where the Supreme Court had held that “the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days.”
Justice Saraf held that Section 85 of the Finance Act was pari materia as Section 35 of the Central Excise Act and so was to be construed as one law.
The Court also relied on Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo India Private Limited and Anr. wherein Apex Court held that the appellate authority only had the power to entertain a delay of 30 days beyond the stipulated limit of 60 days. It was further held that in the absence of any clause condoning the delay by showing sufficient cause after the prescribed period, there would a complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It held that the power of Section 5 of the Limitation Act which stated that any appeal or application other than those under provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be admitted after the prescribed period on the satisfaction of the Court, would only be available if it were extended to a special statute.
“Courts have consistently held that when a special statute contains provisions governing limitation periods, it impliedly excludes the application of general statues such as the Limitation Act,” held Justice Saraf.
The Court held that while the court retained discretionary authority in certain matters, the primacy given to limitation under special statutes would work as a superseding principle that had to be taken into account while exercising judicial discretion. The Court observed that the primacy of limitation under Special Statutes over general statues was multifaceted and that it took into account legislature's intent to create a cohesive and self-sufficient legal framework.
“Moreover, the exclusion of general statutes like the Limitation Act from the purview of special statues serves to maintain the integrity and coherence of the legislative scheme, preventing potential conflicts and inconsistencies in statutory interpretation,” held the Court.
Accordingly, the writ petition was dismissed.
Case Title: M/S S Kumar Construction v. Commissioner Of Central Excise (Appeals), Central Goods And Services Tax (Appeals) And Another [WRIT TAX No. - 1368 of 2023]
Counsel for Petitioner: Rajneesh Shukla
Counsel for Respondent: Parv Agarwal