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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a civil suit cannot be transferred under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely because the opposite party is a practising advocate at the same court. There must be material showing a likelihood of prejudice or interference with the fair conduct of the proceedings.Justice Mandeep Pannu observed, “It is trite that a mere...

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The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a civil suit cannot be transferred under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure merely because the opposite party is a practising advocate at the same court. There must be material showing a likelihood of prejudice or interference with the fair conduct of the proceedings.

Justice Mandeep Pannu observed,

“It is trite that a mere apprehension, unsupported by cogent and tangible material, cannot form the basis for transferring judicial proceedings. Accepting such a plea solely on the ground that one of the litigating parties happens to be a practising Advocate would not only be contrary to the settled legal position but could also result in an unwarranted exclusion of members of the legal fraternity from litigating before the Courts where they ordinarily practise.”

The applicant sought transfer of a civil suit for recovery filed in 2022, pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panipat, to any other competent court in Haryana. The suit was filed by respondent No. 1 against the applicant and respondent No. 2.

The applicant's counsel argued that respondent is a senior practising advocate at the District Courts, Panipat. Because of his professional standing and influence, counsel said, the applicant could not get effective legal assistance there. Counsel added that the applicant had been proceeded against ex parte twice because his counsel did not appear. He also said no reply had been filed on the applicant's behalf to an application under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.

Opposing the plea, respondent 's counsel argued that the opposite party being a practising advocate is not, on its own, a valid ground for transfer. Counsel said both ex parte orders had been set aside with respondent No. 1's no-objection. Counsel also argued that if the applicant had no confidence in the Panipat Bar, he was free to engage counsel from the nearby District Courts at Karnal.

Mere Professional Status Not Enough

The Court said the power under Section 24 CPC must be exercised judiciously. It must take into account factors such as actual hardship to the parties and “the overarching requirement of ensuring a fair trial.”

It relied on the High Court's earlier decision in DAV College, Hoshiarpur Society (Regd.) v. D.M. Sharma [2005(1) RCR (Civil) 71], where the Court had said:

“In a given case there may be the possibility of establishing the relationship of a particular Advocate with the Presiding Officer and the same may constitute a ground for transfer but merely because the litigant is a practicing Advocate without anything more would not constitute a valid ground for transfer of the case. If such a principle is accepted, then all cases concerning members of the legal fraternity have to be contested at a place other than the one where the member of the Bar is practicing. Such a general ostracism of legal fraternity is impermissible.”

In the light of the above, the Court held, “Admittedly, respondent No. 1 is a practising Advocate at the District Courts, Panipat. However, the mere professional status of respondent No. 1, without any further material demonstrating the likelihood of prejudice to the applicant or interference with the fair conduct of judicial proceedings, cannot be a ground for transfer under Section 24 of the Code.”

The Court noted that the applicant had made no allegation of bias against the Presiding Officer, “Significantly, the applicant has neither alleged any specific bias on the part of the Presiding Officer nor pointed out any particular relationship or association between respondent No. 1 and the Presiding Officer which could reasonably give rise to an apprehension that the proceedings would not be conducted fairly.”

It added that no specific instance had been shown of respondent No. 1 misusing his professional position or influence to harm the applicant's interests.

On the two ex parte orders, the Court said, “Although the applicant has been proceeded against ex parte on two occasions, it is equally noteworthy that the orders in question were subsequently set aside by the Court concerned, with respondent No. 1 having expressed no objection to the same. Thus, the mere fact that such orders were passed, particularly when they were subsequently recalled, does not, in the absence of any other material, establish that the applicant has been subjected to any prejudice on account of the professional standing of respondent No. 1.”

Finding no justifiable ground to exercise its discretion, the Court dismissed the transfer application.

Mr.Ashish Gupta, Advocate and Mr. Divyam Singh, Advocate for the applicant

Ms. Shivani Jaglan, Advocate for respondent No.1. Mr. Yuvraj Garg, Advocate for respondent No.2

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