In UAPA Bail Hearing, Defence Not To Be Considered; Only See If Prosecution Has Shown Prima Facie Case : Supreme Court

Update: 2026-01-06 04:38 GMT
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The Supreme Court, in denying bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots conspiracy case, held that a bail hearing under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) is not a forum for evaluating defences or weighing evidence. The Court's role, it ruled, is limited to determining whether the prosecution's material, taken at face value, prima facie discloses the...

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The Supreme Court, in denying bail to Umar Khalid and Sharjeel Imam in the Delhi riots conspiracy case, held that a bail hearing under the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) is not a forum for evaluating defences or weighing evidence. The Court's role, it ruled, is limited to determining whether the prosecution's material, taken at face value, prima facie discloses the essential ingredients of the alleged offence.

A bench of Justices Aravind Kumar and NV Anjaria laid down certain propositions governing the application of Section 43D (5) of UAPA while considering bail pleas:

"First, the provision embodies a deliberate legislative departure from ordinary bail jurisprudence, premised upon the distinctive nature of offences under Chapters IV and VI of the Act.

Second, the expression “prima facie true” mandates a threshold judicial inquiry which is neither perfunctory nor adjudicatory, requiring the Court to examine whether the prosecution material, taken at face value, discloses the essential statutory ingredients of the alleged offence.

Third, the inquiry is necessarily accused specific, directed to the role and attribution qua the individual, and does not admit of collective or undifferentiated treatment merely because allegations arise from a common transaction or conspiracy.

Fourth, the bail stage under Section 43D (5) is not a forum for evaluating defences, weighing evidence, or conducting a minitrial; judicial restraint at this stage is not an abdication of duty but a fulfilment of the statutory mandate. These propositions, read together, define the contours of judicial power and responsibility under the provision."

Further, according to the Court, the correct application of Section 43D(5), therefore, requires the Court to undertake a structured inquiry confined to the following:

"i. whether the prosecution material, accepted as it stands, discloses a prima facie case satisfying the statutory ingredients of the offence alleged;

ii. whether the role attributed to the accused reflects a real and meaningful nexus to the unlawful activity or terrorist activity proscribed under the Act, as distinguished from mere association or peripheral presence; and

iii. whether the statutory threshold is crossed qua the individual accused, without embarking upon an assessment reserved after full-fledged trial."

“Where these requirements are met, the statutory restraint on the grant of bail must operate with full force; where they are not, the embargo stands lifted. This approach preserves the legislative purpose of the Act, and ensures that the exceptional nature of the bail regime under Section 43D(5) is neither diluted by overreach nor distorted by mechanical application.”, the court added.

Cause Title: GULFISHA FATIMA VERSUS STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) (and connected matters)

Citation : 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 1

Click here to download judgment

Other reports about the judgment can be read here.

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