The Supreme Court has recently held that a Magistrate who rejects a police report stating that no cognizable offence is made out must record reasons for doing so before directing registration of an FIR under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC, now Section 175(3) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023/BNSS).
A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta ruled so while quashing an FIR registered by the Economic Offences Wing (EOW), Delhi, against L&T Finance Limited and Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited (EARC), for offences under Sections 406, 409, 420, and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC, now Sections 316(2), 316(5), 318(4), and 61 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023/BNS).
“If the Magistrate himself has called for the report, he must apply judicial mind to it and the consequential order must speak why he does not accept it. The duty to give reasons is at its highest where a judicial authority reaches a conclusion contrary to the material collected by the agency charged by law with the investigation of offences, and where the final order will trigger criminal investigation against the persons concerned. Such reasons need not elaborate. But they must exist, and they must relate to the material,” the bench explained.
A group of landowners had complained to the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) of the Delhi Police against a developer and its lenders, alleging cheating, criminal breach of trust and criminal conspiracy. After a preliminary enquiry, the EOW closed the complaint, concluding that no cognizable offence was made out. The landowners then approached the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC subsequent to which an Action Taken Report (ATR) was filed before the Magistrate reiterating that no cognizable offence was made out. The Magistrate, however, directed registration of an FIR. A plea was filed before the High Court seeking quashing of the case, but the High Court refused to do so.
Aggrieved by the High Court's refusal, the appellants approached before the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court firstly determined whether the Magistrate's order reflected the application of judicial mind, particularly when the police had reported that no cognizable offence was made out. On this, the bench said that the ATR is not a report under Section 173 CrPC (now Section 193 of the BNSS) and does not bind the Magistrate. However, it is not a formality either as it apprises the Magistrate of what the police have done with the complainant's information, and of whether they found that the information disclosed a cognizable offence after any preliminary enquiry.
Reference was made to Lalita Kumari v Government of UP, to observe that commercial offences and cases of abnormal delay are categories in which a preliminary enquiry is permissible, and held that the present case falls within both categories.
“If the Magistrate himself has called for the report, he must apply judicial mind to it and the consequential order must speak why he does not accept it. The duty to give reasons is at its highest where a judicial authority reaches a conclusion contrary to the material collected by the agency charged by law with the investigation of offences, and where the final order will trigger criminal investigation against the persons concerned. Such reasons need not be elaborate. But they must exist, and they must relate to the material,” the bench observed.
The bench disagreed with the High Court's view that reasons for not concurring with the ATR are merely desirable and observed as under:
“An order that rejects the conclusion of the police on a mere ipse dixit cannot be tested. It is, in substance, an order without application of mind.”
The bench noted that Section 156(3) CrPC stated that the Magistrate 'may' order investigation which signifies a discretion, not a duty, and the discretion must be the product of application of judicial mind. The Magistrate can direct investigation, take cognizance and proceed, or decline if no offence is made out.
Relying on Maksud Saiyed v State of Gujarat and Priyanka Srivastava v State of UP, the bench cautioned against the routine invocation of Section 156(3) and observed that where an aggrieved party invokes it against a financial institution covered by the SARFAESI Act, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to. It also took note of Anurag Bhatnagar v State (NCT of Delhi), which itself affirms that a reasoned order is inherent in the exercise of this power.
Noting paragraph 6 of the Magistrate's order that referred only to 'builders and developers' and said nothing about the role of L&T or EARC, the bench held that the High Court could not substitute reasons the Magistrate had not recorded, and its summary of the allegations merely reproduced the complainants' case.
“At the stage of directing registration of an FIR against multiple accused persons, it would be unreasonable to expect the Magistrate to undertake a hair splitting exercise of carving out the individual roles of the accused. Thus, though finding the order of the Magistrate as not satisfying all parameters required under Section 156(3) CrPC, we are not drawing our conclusions on the legality of the subsequent proceedings as the same would by implication affect the proceedings against the other accused who are not before us.” the bench added a caution.
The bench also took note of the delay, observing that the transactions dated back to 2016-2019, while the complaint was lodged only in 2022, after the EOW had closed it and after enforcement proceedings under the SARFAESI Act had begun. While delay by itself cannot furnish a ground for quashing, unexplained delay assumes relevance where the allegations are otherwise predominantly civil in character, the bench observed.
Clarifying the stance on parallel proceedings, the Court said that the existence of civil remedies cannot by itself justify quashing, as held in SN Vijayalakshmi v State of Karnataka, but where there is no tangible element of criminality, criminal proceedings cannot be permitted to continue.
Applying the aforesaid, the bench held that the dispute was of commercial nature between landowners and their developer in which the lenders were sought to be implicated with the objective of exerting pressure to settle the monetary demands of the complainants.
The Court held that continuing the FIR against the appellants amounted to abusing the process of the court.
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Appearances:
For Appellant: Mr. Siddharth Dave, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Amit Kumar Mishra, Adv.; Ms. Mitakshara Goyal, Adv.; Mr. Chandramauli Dwivedi, Adv.; Ms. Shambhavi Kashyap, Adv.; Mr. Himanshu Tyagi, Adv.; Ms. Stuti Singh Sisodia, Adv.; Mr. Siddhartha Sinha, AOR; Mr. Abhimanyu Bhandari, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Jaiveer Shergill, Adv.; Mr. Ananya Kumar, Adv.; Mr. Ishan Gaur, Adv.; Mr. Utkarsh Khandelwal, Adv.; Mr. Vaibhav Khanna, Adv.; Mr. Divyam Agarwal, AOR
For Respondents: Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G.; Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR; Mr. Rajan Kumar Choursia, Adv.; Mr. Anmol Chandan, Adv.; Ms. Aashana Gill, Adv.; Ms. Shambhavi Sharma, Adv.; Mr. Amit Rawal, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Tanvir Nayar, AOR; Ms. Archana Singh, Adv.; Mr. Samar Khan, Adv.; Mr. Abhishek Bakshi, Adv.; Mr. Yagyesh Kumar, Adv.; Ms. Rishika, Adv.