The Supreme Court recently directed a private school to pay Rs 10 Lakh each to two clerks as compensation for the wrongful termination of their services, noting that their case had failed in the High Court because of poor drafting of the writ petitions.

A bench of Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice Sheel Nagu ruled so while hearing appeals against a Bombay High Court judgment which dismissed the clerks' writ petitions. The bench observed as under:

“The present case illustrates how a meritorious cause was allowed to fail by reason of inept drafting of a writ petition, the substance having been eclipsed by form.”

The appellants were proceeded against departmentally for alleged misappropriation of public money and other charges, along with the in-charge headmaster. After an inquiry under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, in which they did not participate, the charges were held as established which led to termination of their services, however the inquiry reports were not furnished to them.

Thereafter, the appellants filed an appeal before the School Tribunal, Mumbai, which stayed the termination orders and directed the school to resume service on 50% salary. The school challenged the order before the High Court, which allowed the school to apply to the Tribunal to lead evidence to substantiate the charges of misconduct. However, the school never made such an application, and the Tribunal did not insist on evidence. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals, noting that the appellants had deliberately avoided the inquiry. It also found sufficient documentary evidence on record to deny them relief.

Subsequent to this, the appellants approached the High Court under Article 226, relying mainly on the fact that the in-charge headmaster's termination had been converted to compulsory retirement by the Tribunal, based on which they sought similar treatment. The High Court dismissed the petitions, holding that the headmaster and the appellants did not stand on the same footing.

Aggrieved by the High Court's order, the appellants approached the Supreme Court.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants argued the merits of the Tribunal's orders. However, the Court found this to be outside the pleadings in the writ petitions, and noted that the appellants had neither alleged that the school violated the High Court's consent order nor challenged the Tribunal's failure to consider the absence of evidence.

“A party is under obligation to plead its case by making the requisite averments/assertions in support of the relief that it claims, whereas a court is under no obligation to entertain a plea if the same is not supported by the necessary averments/assertions in the petition.”

It held that no exception could be taken to the High Court's judgment for not dealing with these aspects, and observed as under:

“We could have, thus, upheld the impugned judgment and dismissed the appeal by a short order.”

The bench, however, held that the circumstance arising from the High Court's order was a matter of serious concern, noting that why the school did not comply with the order was not forthcoming, since the school did not seek to justify such omission.

“What, therefore, emerges is that there was no evidence worth the name before the tribunal resting whereon the charges against the appellants could be held 'established',” the bench concluded.

The bench also noted that the final inquiry reports were not furnished to the appellants before their termination, which constituted a serious flaw in the process of taking disciplinary action against them, despite which, the Tribunal held there was no infirmity in the proceedings.

The Court acknowledged that a High Court cannot grant relief under Article 226 to a litigant who approaches it without pleading an appropriate case. However, relying on Ram Saran Varshney v State of UP, it held that this was a fit case for some relief, based on the principle that an action or order wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted.

It also took note of the fact that one appellant had died and was represented by his legal representatives. On this, the bench noted as under:

“Ex debito justitiae, the appellants would have been entitled to larger relief if only their writ petitions had been appropriately drafted and the right points had been argued. Since that stage has passed, we exercise our power under Article 142 of the Constitution and direct the school to pay to each of the appellants Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakh) only as lump sum compensation for wrongful termination of their services within three months from the date of receipt of this order from the heirs/legal representatives of late Prithviraj S. Singh and from Shivadatta R. Singh or his authorised representative.”

Applying the aforesaid, the appeal was disposed of.

Appearances:

For Appellants: Mr. B H Marlapalle, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Ajit Pravin Wagh, AOR; Mr. Avinish Kumar Saurabh, Adv.; Ms. Nivedita Kushwaha, Adv.; Mr. Ritik Ranjan, Adv.

For Respondents: Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, AOR; Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv.; Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv.; Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv.; Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Adv.; Mr. Sudhanshu S Choudhari, Sr. Adv.; Mr. Vatsalya Vigya, AOR; Ms. Aanchal Rathore, Adv.; Ms. Gautami Yadav, Adv.; Ms. Pranjal Chapalgaonkar, Adv.; Mr. Yash Singhania, Adv.; Mr. Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, Adv.

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